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Abstract 
The intertextual theories of V. N. Voloshinov, Mikhail Bakhtin and the early Julia 
Kristeva provide the most convincing account of the processes of textual production, 
conceived as constitutively social, cultural and historical. However, the ways in 
which intertextual accounts of reading (or 'use') have extended such theories have 
foreclosed their potential. In much contemporary literary and cultural theory, it is 
assumed that reading, conceived intertextually, is no simple decoding process, but 
there is little interest in what interpretation, as a process, is, and its relations to 
reading. It is these questions which this thesis seeks to answer. The introduction sets 
the scene both for the problem and its methodological treatment: drawing certain 
post-structuralist and pragmatic theories of meaning into confrontation, and 
producing a critical synthesis. Part one (chapters one to three) elaborate these two 
traditions of meaning and stages the encounter. Chapter one offers detailed 
expositions of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva, contrasting these with other 
intertextual theories of production and reception. Chapter two examines inferential 
accounts of communication within pragmatics, focusing on Paul Grice and on Dan 
Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's Relevance theory. Chapter three stages an encounter 
between these radically different traditions. A common ground is identified: both are 
rhetorical approaches to meaning, focusing on the relations between texts, contexts 
and their producers and interpreters. Each tradition is then subjected to the theoretical 
scrutiny of the other. Inferential theories expose the lack of specificity in intertextual 
accounts which completely ignore inferencing as a process. Intertextual theories 
reveal that text and context have semantically substantive intertextual dimensions, 
most particularly genre and register (conceived intertextually) which are ignored by 
inferential theories. Text and context are therefore far more semantically fixed than 
such theories suppose. Both traditions ignore the role of production practices other 
than 'speech' or 'writing', i.e. they ignore how publishing practices - editing, design, 
production and marketing - constitute genre and shape reading. In Part Two 
(chapters four to six), the critique is developed into an account of interpretation. 
Interpretation, conceived intertextually, is significantly, though not exclusively, 
inferential, but inferential processes do not 'work' in the ways proposed by existing 
inferential theories. Patterns of inference are ordered by the relations between 
discourses (in Foucault's sense) and genres in the text, the reader's knowledge and the 
conditions of reading. Chapter four elaborates the concepts required for such an 
account of interpretation, centring on the role of publishing processes and the text's 
material form in shaping interpretation. The limits of existing accounts of the edition 
and publishing, specifically Gerard Genette's Paratexts and work in the 'new' textual 
studies, call for a more expansive account of how publishing shapes genre and 
interpretation. Chapters five and six develop two case-studies which extend these 
concepts and arguments. These examine two contemporary publishing categories: 
'classics' (Penguin, Everyman etc.) and literary theory textbooks (Introductions and 
Readers). Through the detailed analyses of particular editions, I develop and 
substantiate a stronger and richer account of interpretation as process and practice and 
its relation to reading. This is expanded in the final chapter. 
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Introduction 
1. Reading, interpretation and intertextuality 
Early in Emma, the heroine surmises (quite correctly it turns out) that her new friend, 
Harriet Smith, has a taking for a young farmer. Eager to draw her out, Emma 
questions Harriet about her acquaintance. Harriet is unaware of the intentions that lie 
behind her friend's enquiries. What appear to be requests for information - 'what sort 
of looking man is Mr Martin?' and so forth - are also speech acts of a very different 
kind. But the question which takes priority - it is the first question Emma poses, and 
the most important - is not about his age or his looks: 
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'Mr Martin, I suppose, is not a man of information beyond the line of his own 
business. He does not read?' 
'Oh yes! - that is, no - I do not know - but I believe he has read a good deal but 
not what you would think anything of. He reads the Agricultural Reports and 
some other books that lay in one of the window seats - but he reads all them to 
himself. But sometimes of an evening before we went to cards, he would read 
something aloud out of the Elegant Extracts - very entertaining. And I know he 
has read The Vicar a/Wakefield. He never read The Romance a/the Forest, 
nor The Children a/the Abbey. He had never heard of such books before I 
mentioned them, but he is determined to get them now as soon as he can.'l 
Harriet's reply is a masterpiece of confusion and clarity. He does read and he doesn't 
read, she doesn't 'know' but she has clear evidence that he can and does (she has seen 
him, stronger, she has heard him). Yet, in the process of this baffling and baffled 
reply it also become abundantly clear that Robert Martin is a model reader: first, he 
reads both aloud and silently and second, his reading is, in the strongest possible 
sense 'improving'.2 Just as the Agricultural Reports help provide him with the means 
to improve the land that he works for Mr Knightley (he is also a model tenant), so too 
The Vicar a/Wakefield contributes to his moral improvement (and to that of his 
audience). The fact that he has not read the popular novels that Harriet enjoys is also a 
po~!!ive. And although his infatuation with her encourages him to profess a desire to 
read them, it soon becomes clear that this is not a priority~another mark in his favour. 3 
Harriet's reply above all marks a confusion about what is meant by 'reading'. 
Imbricated in the social and ethical dynamics of the everyday, and an index of these, 
reading is clearly more than a 'mere' technical competence, although this too may be a 
social and ethical marker. Harriet intimates that what Emma means by reading is not 
(only) a technical skill (though what Emma means is itself unclear). He may have read 
'a good deal' but not anything Emma 'would think anything of'. What is read is 
sharply fore grounded in the confusing clarity of the answer. Emma, hereand 
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elsewhere, 'misreads' the evidence that Robert Martin provides, as she 
misreads much else. And Emma has been classified as a novel about 'reading' (and 
misreading).4 In 'Feminism, New Historicism and the Reader', Wai-Chee Dimock 
invokes Stephen Marcus's writings about the city to suggest that reading 'might be said 
to be a phenomenon peculiar to modernity',5 The reading she has is mind is 'non-
generic', reading 'in the br9adest sense of the word', 'having to do with the 
interpretation of signs, the adjudication of meanings, and the construction of reality,.6 
It is this type of reading that is suggested by the classification of Emma as a novel about 
reading. This notion of reading, reading as a distinctive practice of modernity, seems 
to sit uneasily with the other, apparently more simple definition: reading as a 
competence and component of literacy, 
In 1999, two British soap operas introduced story-lines which focused on the 
effects of adult illiteracy,7 In each case, illiteracy was a shameful secret that the 
character had hidden from friends and close family members, perfectly in accord with 
the Gothic current that runs so strongly through such dramas. In each case the 
character's confession or 'coming out' paved the way to the solution of adult literacy 
classes.s Although both stories emphasised the damaging psychological effects of 
secret illiteracy and the prejudices shared by literate and illiterate, they also locked into 
a narrative of progress that makes literacy a marker of 'development' and modernity. 
This is the 'same' literacy that functions as an OECD indicator, along with average 
infant mortality and death rates. Here, of course, the progress was individual. In 
Brookside, a possible promotion, emerging out of a re-structuring, was the catalyst to 
a crisis which threatened exposure and sacking; in HoUyoaks, the character - a recent 
schoolleaver with no educational qualifications - had little or no likelihood of 
employment or progress. 
The 'simple' sense of reading as literacy is not simple at all. These two senses of 
reading - functional competence and practice of distinction - are only superficially 
ignorant of one another. As many recent histories of literacy illustrate, being able to 
read or write is never conceived exclusively as a pedagogically transferable technical 
competence, but always imbricated in discourses and arguments about progress, the 
practices of politics, the meanings of culture and above all authority.9 The social, 
political and cultural complexity of literacy can perhaps be most simply illustrated by the 
Chomsky an derived definition of a 'general' lini:uistic capability: being able to generate 
an infinite number of well-formed sentences. This formulation is of little or no help if 
you want to define either reading or writing. To be able to read does not mean that you 
can read anything; to be able to write likewise. Capable of both reading and writing, 
we read a far greater variety of texts than we ever write. 
If reading is never only a functional competence, nor is it ever ' singUlar. I will 
argue in this thesis that reading always encompasses three interrelated processes. The 
I ~~~ I 
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first of these is interpretation, the ways in which readers assign meanings 
to texts, those procedures which seek to answer the question what does this text or 
text-fragment mean? Second, reading always also involves explanation: most simply, 
the ways in which we account for why a text means what it means. Third, reading 
includes a dimension of evaluation, a judgement or assessment of the text's value. It is 
the processes of interpretation which are the central focus of this thesis. Much more 
will be said about the interpretative process and its relations with the explanation and 
evaluation, and likewise. about the many forms that interpretation, explanation and 
evaluation can take in particular situations of reading. But this focus on the 
interpretative process, as one of the processes of reading, stems from a dissatisfaction 
with some of the more extended and generic claims that have been made about reading 
'in the broadest sense of the word'. The interpretations and interpretative processes I 
am concerned with are almost all linguistic which sets one obvious limit. But beyond 
this, it is, I will argue, counter-productive to define reading as expansively as Dimock 
to encompass 'the construction of reality'. In the attempt to secure reading as a 
definitively social and cultural process, the specificity of reading and the processes it 
encompasses can easily get lost. 
Above, I proposed the beginnings of 'readings' of a fragment from a novel and a 
shared storyline in two popular tv dramas. I treated Harriet's utterance as a signifier of 
character, and one interpretation of her utterance is that she is confused or, more 
brutally, stupid. After all, either Robert Martin can read or he can't. Another 
interpretation, congruent with the first but not necessarily dependent upon it, is that 
Harriet's utterance reveals her to be pulled in opposing directions by conflicting desires. 
'Oh yes !': her admiration of Mr Martin drives her to correct the implicit criticism in 
Emma's question. But Harriet is also impressed by her new friend, and certain of her 
superiority; whatever and however Martin reads it will not impress Emma: 'not what 
you would think anything of.' Both these interpretations rely on an identification of 
characters as categories in fictional texts and on certain know ledges of how characters 
function and are represented. The first 'knows' that in novels, the manner in which 
characters speak frequently signifies or provides evidence of some other 
characteristic(s). This knowledge could be said to explain the interpretation, but we 
can also see that the explanation in some sense precedes it: the interpretation can only 
be produced with this knowledge. The interpretation may be attached to a particular 
evaluation of it as a novelistic utterance. There is, after all, a long tradition which 
admires 'show' over 'tell' and views it is as a marker of compositional ability. Enter 
the author. But, like explanation, evaluation also precedes interpretation, and the 
relations between the three are clearly complex. The second interpretation also relies on 
a concept of character but of a somewhat different kind. We need to know that the 
direct speech of characters in novels not only functions to represent their traits but that 
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such speech also represents character relations, that there are always 
dynamics at play when characters interact verbally (or in other ways); and also perhaps 
that language and narrative articulate conflict and desire. Enter psychoanalysis. This 
interpretation could also be linked to a judgement, an evaluation, of the same show 
and tell type as above. What interests me is first the kinds of knowledge that are 
deployed in such operations. Both interpretations of Harriet's utterance rely on a 
concept of character which belongs to discourses about fiction and drama. These are 
not individual 'factual' items which form a part of some highly general knowledge, but 
a particular set of concepts, arguments and assumptions: a discourse which forms part 
of the already-written. This example in particular foregrounds the textual character of 
knowledge. Second, why are certain concepts mobilised in particular acts of 
interpretation and reading, and not others? The discussion of Emma neglects to 
mention genre. This may be perfectly reasonable: a few lines may not provide 
interesting or conclusive generic markers. But the immediate classification of the soap 
opera story-lines as Gothic suggests that both readings are informed by a set of 
assumptions about the literary and the mass which mobilise very different concepts and 
reading practices. I described Harriet's utterance as a 'masterpiece' of confusion and 
clarity: character confusion clearly, but what kind of clarity? The fact that this is 
direct speech makes any easy appeal to a 'narrator' somewhat difficult. Harriet's reply, 
above all, seems to inscribe the presence of ill! author, who articulates through 
'Harriet's' language of confusion another language: a discourse which, despite the 
chaos of its logic, is formally harmonious and from which emerges the model reader. 
Such a reading relies on a set of concepts about compositional practice, and finally on a 
concept of author as originator and producer of meaning. Soap opera, by contrast, 
appears to be anonymous and it is genre which organises meaning: the literacy 
storyline makes sense within and is ordered by the Gothic structure. What also 
emerges are the complex and, perhaps, non-obvious relations between the three 
modalities of reading. Interpretation, explanation, and evaluation seems to be a logical 
sequence: only when we know what it means do we start to think about why; only 
when this too is answered do we address questions of value. But the example above 
immediately suggests that such a sequence of operations is by no means necessary. 
Explanatory and evaluative processes may well precede interpretation, providing the 
concepts that interpretation draws on. To theorise the interpretative process therefore 
requires both the delineation of highly specific procedures - about the mobilisation and 
deployment (or not) of particular know ledges for example - and their situation within 
the dynamics of reading as a whole. 
The readings above indicate some of the ways in which reading and more 
specifically, interpretation, are intertextual; in particular, how textual know ledges are 
central to interpretative processes. And this thesis aims to theorise interpretation within 
a model of language and its practice as intertextual. If reading and 
increasingly re-reading is a privileged signifier in many contemporary intellectual 
discourses about culture, then intertextuality is scarcely less so. Indeed 
'intertextuality', a term and concept which originated in a highly specific domain of 
theoretical discourse has, like 'deconstruction', metabolised and metamorphosed 
beyond intellectual and academic writing into broadsheet culture. This may be 
supremely appropriate: that the concept of writing as re-writing or re-reading should 
itself be subject to the very process it theorises: But this process of multiple re-
appropriation is also, as I will show below, problematic. 
Specifically then, this thesis seeks to theorise interpretation as an intertextual 
process. I would immediately and readily acknowledge that this aim is not original. 
Questions about the relations between interpretation, or, more usually the broader 
generality of reading, and intertextuality abound, as do answers. It is frequently 
assumed that ·I~. rr ri~ht~is an intertextual process. This 'novelty -deficit' can be 
posed in far stronger terms: do such questions still have the status of questions? Not 
surprisingly (this being the very beginning), my answer to the first question is yes; 
and my purpose in this introduction is to explain why this is (still) so. Further, I will 
argue that the common assumption that interpretation (or reading) is intertextual 
frequently forecloses the possibility of theorising the ways in which it is or might be, 
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in particular a specifying of the process itself. Below I will substantiate these claims, 
discussing four accounts of intertextual reception which are, in different ways, 
representative of the range and scope of work which draws on the concept of 
intertextuality to theorise interpretation or reading. I will then go on to address the 
strengths of such accounts but also a set of problems which these accounts (and those 
which they 'represent'), individually and jointly share, a set of problems which in turn 
suggest a very different line of theoretical enquiry. In line with this, the definition of 
intertextuality offered at this point is deliberately loose: a conception of cultural 
production as the variation and/or transformation of extant signifying practices. This 
definition is broad enough to encompass the various accounts which follow. I use 
'intertextuality' simply because it has become the preferred term for such theories 
across a range of fields and disciplines. I will also use the terms 'reading' or 
'reception' and not interpretation in much of the discussion below as these accounts 
conceive the process in broader terms than the sense specified above. 
2. Intertextuality as departure: Roland Barthes 
Barthes's formulations of the relations between intertextuality and reading are perhaps 
the best known. In a cluster of texts originally published between 1968 and 1973, 
Barthes elaborates a concept of the text as intertextuality and binds this redefinition to a 
rethinking of a number of other concepts - author, scriptor, reading, 
writing, reader - in terms which challenge both the 'myths' of Literature and the aims 
and practices of high structuralism. lo Barthes defines the intertextual text on a number 
of occasions in these writings, but perhaps the most succinct formulation occurs in 
'The Death of the Author': ". 'a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of 
writings, none of them original, blend, and clash. ,I I This is immediately suggestive 
about the processes of reading, which must be able to handle both the plural that the 
text is, and the conflicts that arise between the various writings that constitute it. But 
Barthes conceives a more intimate relation between text, conceived as a process of 
production and reading: 
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What I tried to begin in S/Z was a kind of identification of the notions of writing 
and reading. I wanted to squash the two together ". Once again, the problem 
is not to move from writing to reading, or from literature to reading, or from 
the author to the reader: the problem, as we said earlier, is one of the 
transformation of the object, of the changing of the level of perception - writing 
and reading must be conceived, worked, defined, r e-defined together ... It is 
necessary therefore to block the two notions, we need to put together, to make 
one single block of the notions of writing and reading. 12 
The desire to 'squash' reading and writing together, 'to make one single block' of the 
two makes it very difficult to specify a Barthesian account of reading. Barthes is not, I 
would argue, proposing a collapsing of the two which would perhaps make the task of 
such an elucidation easier: if reading was writing and vice versa, then any account of 
writing would simultaneously, also, be, or could function as, an account of reading. 
But the 'squashing' retains the notion~ of reading and writing even though the 
boundaries between the two become difficult to decipher. That said, these texts have 
Men frequently been read as a dissolution of the distinction, and S/Z in particular, has 
often been annexed and celebrated as an account of intertextual reading; 'the most 
sustained yet pulverised meditation on reading I know in all of West em critical 
literature' writes Richard Howard, in the note on S/Z which prefaces the English 
translation. 13 And as I will show below, formulating reading as writing or re-writing, 
and dissolving one into the other has become one of the key features of most 
intertextual theories of reception. 
Barthes's clearest statement about reading takes the form of an extended metaphor 
which characterises the reader as a stroller on the side of a valley: 
... [W]hat he perceives is multiple, irreducible, coming from a disconnected, 
heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives: lights, colours, 
vegetation, heat, air, slender explosions of noises, scant cries of birds, 
children's voices, from over on the other side, passages, gestures, clothes of 
inhabitants near or far away. All these incidents are half-identifiable: they come 
from codes which are known but their combination is unique. 14 
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This metaphor suggests the 'innumerable centres' from which meaning issues, centres 
which cannot be sourced (this would be to 'fall in with the myth of filiation'). 15 The 
text as intertextuality is an 'irreducible plural' but this plurality is not liberal: 'it is not a 
question of conceding some meanings, of magnanimously acknowledging that each 
one has its share of truth. ,16 The meanings of a text are multiple and conflictual (the 
text is a space where writings 'clash'), and meaning is never either revealed or 
resolved. The reader's experience of meaning is both familiar and unfamiliar, there is 
repetition but also the particular variation of this text. The reader is also characterised as 
the centre through and around which meanings echo but the metaphor also suggests that 
reading requires a certain distance: many of these sounds issue from 'the other side'.17 
The stroller-reader is not a participant in a conventional communicative exchange: 
reading is a distracted activity but distraction is not diversion but an active and watchful 
process. 18 
The title concepts 'Work' and 'Text' are also suggestive of reading practices. 
Within this essay the sense of 'Text' shifts.19 It is first a term for an extant form of 
writing, of which modernism is the prime exemplar; but Text or Writing (Ecriture) is 
also an ontological category: it is the reality which underlies all textual production, it is 
what the Work and all the institutions which support it (and in particular the practices of 
filiation), resist ('Work' has a similarly dual sense in this essay). This double sense is 
perhaps suggestive of what an 'ideal' Barthesian reading practice might be: a 
'disentangling' of the text's multiple threads rather than a 'deciphering' of the meaning 
reputed to lie beneath, a mode of reading which is both the consequence of 
intertextuality and a resistance to reading as decipherment and resolution.2o 
3. Structuralist intertextuality: Michael Riffaterre 
... [W]hen it activates or mobilises the intertext, the text leaves little leeway to 
readers and controls closely their response.21 
Riffaterre's insistence here on the 'mandatory' character of interpretation is general, 
and strongly marked in the title of the text cited above: 'Compulsory Reader Response: 
the Intertextual Drive', 22 Whilst Barthes's accounts of intertextuality may well be the 
most familiar, fixing it definitively as a post-structuralist concept, Riffaterre's model 
of intertextual reading is worth recalling as its other: the un-representative. Like 
Gerard Genette, whose work will be discussed in chapter four, Riffaterre has 
formulated a structuralist model of intertextual reception. Central to his account of the 
interpretative imperatives of the text are the distinctions he draws between text and 
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intertext, and intertext and intertextuality. The intertext is 'one or more 
texts which the reader must know in order to understand a work of literature in terms of 
its overall significance.' Intertextuality is defined as 'the web of functions that 
constitutes and regulates the relationships between text and intertext. ,23 The intertext is 
the key to the work's 'overall significance' but it is not directly present in the text. 
Rather the intertext is symptomatically present - 'the intertext is to the text what the 
unconscious is to the conscious' - marked as a moment of disruption in the process of 
mimetic decoding that Riffaterre conceives as the default mode of reading.24 These 
disruptions also mark the presence of another code, the poetic, and call for a 
corresponding mode of reading: poetic decoding. In 'Compulsory Reader Response', 
as elsewhere, Riffaterre characterises these anomalies as markers or indices of 
interpretative problems which simultaneously propose clues to a solution. 25 What is 
crucial is the difference between text and intertext: the difference drives the reader to 
construct a relation between the two, to find the key that will unlock the poetic code 
which created the initial disturbance. This key, variously named in Riffaterre's 
writings as 'matrix', 'hypotext' and 'hypogram', and which Riffaterre conceives as the 
intertextual variant of Peirce's 'interpretant', is the means or rule by which the various 
anomalies of the text, now revealed to be systematic, can be resolved.26 The difference 
between intertext and text enables the reader to identify the hypogram or rule which 
transforms the intertext - defined as cultural convention - into the literary. This account 
of the role of the intertext is clearly structured by a Formalist definition: the search for 
the intertext is prompted by the 'perceptual' challenge that the poetic poses. Likewise, 
the Formalist valuing of the transformation of established norms 
[I]ntertextuality enables the text to represent, at one and the same time, the 
following pairs of opposites (within each of which the first item corresponds to 
the intertext): convention and departures from it, tradition and novelty, 
sociolect and idiolect, the already-said and its negation or transformation.27 
Riffaterre's account of the relations between intertext and text therefore both situate the 
literary within the generality of culture and also distinguish it as the transformation of 
that generality. 
4. Intertextuality as context: Tony Bennett and Janet Woollacott 
Whilst Riffaterre is concerned with the specificity of the literary, and Barthes with the 
myths of literary reading, Bennett and Woollacott's interest lies in theorising popular 
reading. In Bond and Beyond: The Political Career of a Popular Hero, they develop an 
account of 'inter-textual' reading through a detailed study of the novels, films and other 
discourses surrounding the production and reception of 'the texts of (James) Bond'.28 
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'Inter-textuality' is a determinate set of textual relations or situations which 
organise specific readings of a text. An educational curriculum, a mode of cultural 
classification (authorial, generic, historic), a film season, for example, can all 
operate as inter-textualities within specific conditions of reading.29 This immediately 
suggests the central role of context in intertextual reading or interpretation. In their 
study, the focus is the different inter-textual locations that have constituted and 
reconstituted the mUltiple meanings and values of the Bond texts from the late fifties up 
to the mid-eighties .. Whilst in Britain, the early novels were read by a working-class 
male readership through the inter-textual lens of the imperial spy thriller, in America, it 
was hard-boiled detective fiction which provided the framework of expectations for an 
equivalent reading constituency?O Bennett and Woollacott use the term 'reading 
formation' to describe inter-textual processes which 'co-produce' both text and 
reader.31 It is, predominantly, educational and media institutions and practices which 
produce the inter-textual relations which in turn shape or 'produce' texts and readers. 
The inter-textual perspective of the imperial spy thriller, for example, 'cues' the Bond 
novels in particular ways but also activates specific expectations and fields of reference. 
Bennett and Woollacott's 'inter-textual' is developed as a critical intervention in 
existing accounts of text-reader relations. The 'inter-textual' challenges the intertextual. 
According to them, 'intertextuality' identifies a 'system of references' as resident in the 
text, a theoretical error, which is shared, it seems, by nearly all models of text-reader 
relations.32 Accounts of the implied, preferred or model reader who is positioned and 
indeed constructed by the text and diverse work on audiences - David Morley's The 
Nationwide Audience, Laura Mulvey's account of the gendered psychodynamics of 
spectatorship, Stuart Hall's encoding-decoding model and Umberto Eco's account of 
naive and sophisticated readers - all make the same mistake. All 'retain intact the virtual 
identity of the text in the respect that when all is said and done such variations are 
conceived as merely different responses to the "same" text,;3 By contrast, the concept 
of inter-textuality explodes the concept of a text that pre-exists any reading of it, or a 
reader, actual or 'textual' who pre-exists its reading: text and reader 'co-produce' each 
other. Bennett and Woollacott do not deny the existence of certain determinate objective 
properties in texts, such as narrative patterns, but argue that these are subordinate to 
the inter-textualities of reading.34 Bennett and Woollacott's development of inter-
textuality is an attempt to formulate a concept of popular reading which is in turn part of 
a more general critique of certain Marxist approaches (although 'Marxist' is in this 
context formulated in very general terms, the reference to 'the culture industry' 
suggests Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer) which, they argue, treat mass culture 
as a mere container for ideologies which the majority of readers (or consumers) simply 
ingest.35 Bennett and Woollacott insist on the ways in which ideologies of gender, 
sexuality and nation are transformed through the processes of cultural production and 
~ 
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reception of Bond texts. 'Inter-textuality' is therefore both a challenge to 
the fixed or, as they term it, 'metaphysical' text and to a specific variety of this within 
definitions and treatments of the popular. 
5. Intertextuality as assumption: Roger Chartier 
The concept of intertextuality and its relations with reading is less explicit in Chartier's 
writing than in the accounts outlined above. Intertextuality is, in the main, an 
assumption which underwrites particular concepts of culture and cultural production. 
This however is exactly what makes Chartier's work representative, as will be 
discussed below. Intertextuality is also pivotal to his own recent work about reading, 
and to his broadly defined project: to reconfigure intellectual history with are-defined 
cultural history at its centre. 36 Chartier defines reading as 'production' and 
'appropriation', definitions which are sanctioned by an intertextual definition of 
reading and developed via Barthes from Michel de Certeau whom he cites: 
'The reader takes neither the position of the author nor an author's position. He 
invents in texts something different from what they "invented': He detaches 
them from their (lost or accessory) origin. He combines their fragments and 
creates something un-known in the space organised by their capacity for 
allowing an indefinite plurality of meanings.'37 . 
For Chartier, it is the 'capacity' of the text as intertextuality, the text of fragments, to 
have multiple meanings that yields this definition and possibility of reading as 
production. This production is not an attempted reconstruction of the authorial 
meaning, it is invention, different and new ('unknown'). Nor is the reader another 
author, the practices of author and reader are (though this is ambiguous as in Barthes) 
different, if not altogether distinct, 'another production'. Chartier's concept of 
'appropriation' extends this to accent reading as the process by which the text is drawn 
into the social and cultural world of the reader via the practices through which it is read 
and, more generally, the Uses to which such readings are put. This focus on the 
reader and her/his practices is conceived in historical terms which foreground variegated 
use.38 
In the programmatic 'Labourers and Voyagers: From the Text to the Reader', 
Chartier suggests some of the broad categories which a history of reading practices 
might encompass: reading aloud or silently (here he concurs with De Certeau's 
conjecture that silent reading frees the reader from interiorising the text, from 
embodying it); publicly or privately; intensive reading ('reading applied only to a few 
texts and sustained by hearing and memory') and extensive reading (consuming many 
texts, moving from one to another and another, 'granting little consecration to the 
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object read,).39 Like Bennett and Woollacott, Chartier's fonnulation of 
text and reading as intertextual is conceived as a challenge to the text conceived as 
transcending fixity and the subordination of the reader and reading which follows from 
it.40 In opposition to the 'text', Chartier proposes the book, the manuscript, the 
pamphlet: the material fonns in which readers encounter 'texts'. These exert a force 
on interpretation through the practices which produce and are inscribed within them-
design, typography, spacing and so on -but are also changeable and, abov~ all, 
historically situated.41 In insisting on the variegated uses to which readings can be put, 
on reading as appropriation and production, Chartier is emphasising the active role that 
reading plays in meaning-construction within cultures. This counters what Chartier 
perceives to be a reflectionist tendency in French cultural history (once more this is 
comparable with Bennett and Woollacott). Chartier is also critical of the ways in which 
popular and literary fonns are definitionally opposed and treated: whilst the latter are 
accorded complex and individuating analysis, the popular is subject to 'an external, 
collective and quantitative approach,.42 But his argument goes beyond methodology: 
an intertextual conception of 'text' and reading contest the binary separation of the 
literary and the popular within culture as a whole, each is imbricated within the other.43 
Nor is appropriation the exclusive privilege of the 'people', as opposed to elites: 
Perrault's appropriation of folk tales is a case he cites in point.44 For Chartier then, 
intertextuality is the theory of textual production and reception which make both 
variegated readings possible and enables reading, and consumption more generally, to 
be conceived and explored as active processes which are always historically situated. 
6. Intertextual reception: some generalities 
The 'representatativeness' of three of these accounts - Barthes, Bennett and Woollacott 
and Chartier - is evident in literary, media and cultural studies (though it is noticeable 
that with the exception of Genette, there are no real parallels to Riffaterre's approach). 
In each of these fields intertextuality has become central to accounts of culture and 
reception conceived as processes of appropriation and re-appropriation. Within literary 
studies, new historicism is the exemplar of a critical practice modelled from culture 
. defined in this way. Emphasising above all the historical situatedness of the text, 
conceived as material instance and assemblage of often conficting discursive practices, 
sometimes described as a practice of reading,45 new historicism draws eclectically on 
various strands of contemporary cultural theory: Derridean and Lacanian accounts of 
language, the Bakhtinian concepts of the dialogic and the heteroglossia and, perhaps 
above all, on Foucault's work on discourse, power and resistance.46 The emphasis 
on conflict most clearly echoes Barthes, but the fonnulations of historical context are 
strongly congruent with Chartier and Bennett and Woollacott. New historicist readings 
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of Shakespeare are emblematic of its practice: confronting the reified 
poetic text of earlier studies with the 'materiality' of Shakespeare as drama, 
performance and increasingly publication.47 Instead of the definitive, corrected 
version of a play, new historicism explores its variants as effects of contextual 
practices. Instead of a canonically conceived author whose meanings are fixed and 
timeless, Shakespeare is embedded in the languages and discourses of his historical 
'moment' and his semantic stability challenged.48 Concepts of intertextuality are central 
to the ways that new historicist readings attempt to break down and transform the 
conventional distinctions between text and context. Insisting that context is neither the 
banalising 'background' of the great work nor a homogeneised Zeitgeist, and that the 
text neither reflects nor expresses context, new historicist readings tend to focus on the 
relations between discourses and languages within and between texts, all of which are 
conceived as material practices: of signification and legitimation.49 New historicism 
can best be understood, perhaps, as an institutionalised practice of reading governed 
by a conception of the intertextuality of text and culture .. 
In media and cultural studies, intertextuality is central to the dominant definition of 
culture as the modification and transformation of extant cultural materials. Hall's 
encoding-decoding model (explicitly grounded in Barthesian 'polysemy' and V. N. 
Voloshinov's multiaccentual sign), Dick Hebdige's work on the subcultural 
recombinations of artefacts and practices (informed by concepts of 'bricolage' and 
appropriation), the work of John Fiske and David Buckingham which draw on various 
accounts of intertextuality (including Barthes, De Certeau, Voloshinov and Mikail . 
Bakhtin) are just a few instances. 50 Indeed, in the work of Fiske and Buckingham, 
intertextuality is a condition of existence of the mass texts which are popularised by 
their consumers: 'the central paradox of mass communication is that in order to ensure 
its popularity it must allow for a wide diversity of readings. ,51 The intertextuality of the 
mass text is then the rationale for its appropriation by diverse social and cultural 
constituencies, the guarantee of its popularity.52 The concept of reception as 
appropriation reaches its apotheosis in work on fan cultures, for example, Henry 
Jenkins's Textual Poachers, which draws, as the title suggests, explicitly on De 
Certeau.53 But Jenkins is critical of his characterisation of reading as leaving no traces 
(in contrast to writing), arguing that fan cultures transmute reading and interpretation 
into writing, for example, fan fiction. Here reading and writing are finally collapsed: 
reading is, or can become writing, 'another production'. The impact of De Certeau 
and Bourdieu on Chartier's work is representative of the ways in which cultural studies 
has configured this concept of active reading in terms of appropriation and use, which 
are the privileged categories in 'New Audience Studies'. Indeed, De Certeau and 
Bourdieu are central figures in much contemporary work on audiences and, more 
generally consumption. 54 
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These accounts and the tendencies they represent suggest a number of 
concepts and questions which an account of intertextual interpretation must take account 
of and which will be explored in detail in this thesis. First and most obviously, these 
accounts propose that interpretation must involve more than simple decoding. If the 
text is a mUltiplicity of signifying practices, frequently manifested in the text only as 
fragments, there can be no underlying grammar of the text (Barthes, Chartier). If 
meanings are predominantly constituted in contexts rather than texts, there can be no 
single code which is present as such in the text and any determinate properties 
(narrative, for example) are subordinated to the contexts which constitute them as 
meaningful (Bennett and Woollacott, Chartier). Even in the case of Riffaterre, there 
are (at least) two codes - mimetic and poetic. Intertextuality clearly makes the 
conceptualisation of interpretation as a 'simple' and singular decoding process 
unsustainable. It must involve some other process or processes. Following on.from 
this, the meaning of a text is multiple or, at the least, appears to be ambiguous 
(Riffaterre). The other three accounts all ascribe a non-apparent (i.e. not resolvable) 
conflict or dissonance to the text and the interpretative and reading possibilities that it 
engenders. With the possible exception of Riffaterre, interpretation cannot be 
conceived as a recovery or recuperation of meaning, authorial or not: just as writing 
reconfigures extant signifying practices, so interpretation, likewise and by analogy 
varies or transforms that which is read. Bennett and Woollacott's 'inter-textual' 
foregrounds the centrality of context in intertextual interpretation and Chartier's interest 
in reading as historical is congruent with this. His formulation of the book as a context 
opens up a further, important zone of textual knowledge which can shape interpretation 
and reading. Bennett and Woollacott'sand Chartier's interest in reading practices and 
Barthes's account of how the myths of the literary limit reading, raise the question of 
process and practice. Is there a single process which describes the generality of all 
reading? And if there is, what are its relations with- particular reading and interpretative 
practices? Finally, each of these accounts demonstrates that the interpretation of a 
particular text or text fragment is always bound to much larger social and cultural 
processes. 
These accounts are then suggestive; but they also contain within them a number of 
serious problems which cannot be resolved by piecemeal modification. These problems 
may be helpful in themselves, identifying pitfalls to avoid and so on, but they suggest 
most strongly that existing theories of intertextual reading are not the place to begin a 
theorisation of the process intertextual interpretation .. Rather a consideration of the 
problems suggests alternative lines of enquiry. 
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7. Specifying processes 
The fu~t§etofproblems conce~the ways in which reading, as both process and 
practice, is characterised. What is most difficult to assess in these accounts is the 
modal or non-modal status of reading (in both epistemic and deontic terms): are these 
accounts of how we do read, how we can or might read or how we should read? Is 
Riffaterre's reader's quest for the key to the poetic code really a description of reading? 
Or is it, as it appears to me, an idealised representation, the aim of which is to secure 
a 'poetic' that is distinct from the mimetic? Chartier and Bennett and Woollacott might 
call for a historical characterisation of Riffaterre's reader and his practices. But the . 
ambiguity is not resolved by a specification of who reads, even though the two issues 
are closely related. Further, within the contingent zones of might and can, are there 
not radically differing degrees or forces of possibility? In 'Labourers and Voyagers: 
From the Text to the Reader', Chartier contends that the 'founding paradox of any 
history of reading' is 'to postulate the freedom of a practice of which, broadly, it can 
only grasp the determinations. ,55 A paradox indeed. But this binarising of 
determination and freedom, which is now a stock move in cultural theory, banalises 
contingency as the zone of a freedom opposed to an absolute necessity. This severely 
undermines the theoretical value of the concept. Contingency is surely best perceived 
as a graduated concept which encompasses everything from the barely possible to the 
highly probable. Above, I drew attention to the meanings of Text (and Work) in 
Barthes's writings. Is there not also a double sense of ' reading'? Is what Barthes 
formulates as reading, an ontological description of reading, reading as it always in 
some fundamental sense 'is', even when it is constrained by the myths of filiation; or, 
is this a model of reading as it should be or could be, liberated from myth? Or is it 
both? In Chartier, as in De Certeau, there is no such ambiguity: reading is 'another 
production'; there is no 'ought' and no 'can'. But can this clarity be taken at face 
value? Is this decisive 'is' really a description, or is it, as it so often seems to be in 
cultural studies, a desire?56 
Second, are their shared processes (decoding, recoding, the procedures by which 
cultural knowledges are 'activated' or cued) common to all reading practices? In 
Barthes, and most strongly in Chartier and Bennett and Woollacott, there is an 
emphatic underscoring of reading practices - plural,differentiated, historically 
situated, culturally specific - which is central to the attack on· reading conceived as 
undifferentiated reception. This 'corrective' strategy means, perhaps inevitably, that 
the relations between process and practice are not a critical priority. In Chartier there is 
no account of the processes of reading at all, except as a type of production. Practices 
such as reading aloud may significantly shape readers' relations with what they read, 
particularly in terms of the relative authority of the reading matter, but the procedures 
involved can at most be assumed as a kind of 'recoding' whose character remains 
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unsubstantiated. In Bond and Beyond, there is an informing but implicit 
concept of process. Bennett and Woollacott assign a central role to genre in their 
account of reading, defined not as a code or grammar inherent in the text, but as 'sets 
of expectations through which the possibilities of reading are organised,.57 But how 
precisely does a particular practice construct meanings through a set of generic 
expectations which are inter-textually organised? And is this practice a specific variety 
of decoding or some other process? In their exploration of the early Bond novels, they 
emphasise both the similarities and differences between Bond and the imperial spy 
thriller. But do readers register these patterns of repetition and variation and what part 
might these play in interpretation? Riffaterre's account recognises the role of both, but 
the decoding of convention does not seem to warrant any explanation. These accounts 
are much clearer about what interpretation is not, than about what it is. It is clearly not 
the simple decoding of a single underlying code, but the positive attributes of the 
process remain extremely unclear. 
Whilst within literary theory and criticism there is still a strong interest in 
interpretation and reading, within the fields of media and cultural theory (including 
film) there has been a sharp shift away from questions of interpretation to a 
concentration on context and 'use'.58 In 'What Future for Interpretive Work in Film 
and Media Studies?' Alan Durant charts the theoretical shift from studies of the 
mechanisms and processes of interpretation to the contemporary, where 'social issues 
of identity construction to which particular critical interpretations of texts can make a 
contribution' have become the norm. 59 Further, '[a]udience Studies has, in effect, 
turned away from reception understood as interpretation towards reception understood 
as demographic description and lifestyle. ,60 Durant is not inherently hostile to the 
issues raised by use and users, but concerned by the backgrounding of interpretation as 
a set of processes and practices. Questions about context have to be reconnected with 
'meaning' and interpretation if such studies are to avoid 'two divergent but 
complementary excesses' 
[F]irst presenting as textual interpretations empirical descriptions of cultural 
behaviour which have little to do with the texts they are deemed to be inspired 
by; and second, reading texts so creatively, for maximum relevance to the 
reader's own concerns that readings become what Umberto Eco, calling for 
limits on interpretation, has dismissively called 'psychedelic trips upon a 
text. ,61 
8. The productions of reading 
The second set of problems concern the ways which reading and interpretation are 
characterised as 'productions', and the reader as active and frequently resistant. Each 
of these four accounts characterise reading as an active process and accords the active 
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positive value. Conceiving reading as intertextual sanctions this: 
interpretation cannot be the simple decoding of signal into message. Further, the 
'inherent' mobility of meaning proposed by inter-textuality and the potential for 
variegated reading proposed by De Certeau's always-already fragmented text 
significantly shape the reader as active, and metaphorically agile and mobile, 
inhabiting the cracks and spaces of the texts in order to create the 'readable space,.62 
Riffaterre may insist on the interpretative constraints of the intertext, but his reader is 
not immobilised by the anomalies that mark the presence of the poetic. Rather he63 is 
moti.vated by the difficulties of discrepancy to search for the interpretative key that will 
decode the text's 'significance' and enable him to travel beyond the inertia of the 
mimetic. Barthes distinguishes the subordinating consumption instilled by the auratic 
work and the active distractions that characterise the reading of the text. 64 His 
association of reading with structuration, as opposed to the decoding of a pre-existent 
structure, renders it a process which makes meaning, not one which discovers it. For 
Bennett and Woollacott and for Chartier, the production defined as popular reading is 
a critique of discourses which configure literary reading as active, and popular or mass 
reading as passive, positions which are echoed again and again in media and cultural 
studies. 
Two of these accounts (Barthes and Chartier) are also explicitly representative of 
another tendency: intertextuality as a sanction for resistant reading. In Barthes, to read 
against the myths of filiation, to read the text as text, as intertextual·and, above all, as 
multiple, is to resist the ideological force of the institutions and practices of Literature 
itself. The reading that 'disentangles' but does not decipher, that refuses meaning or at 
least its closure, is in this sense resistant. The concept of resistance is central in much 
writing about readin~. From Kate Millett in Sexual Politics to Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgewick, and in radically different ways, the notion of reading against - intention, 
preferred meaning, classification (fiction as theory for example) - is the dominant of all 
explicitly committed political reading. Whilst there is no necessary connection between 
such resistance and intertextuality, they are now commonly conjoined.65 Chartier's 
conception of reading also suggests reading as resistance, but here the resistance is not 
the practice of a specific political position but a potential that seems to be inherent in all 
reading. Power is everywhere, but it is also overextended, cracking and fragmenting. 
But the reader works in the cracks and resists its scope and strictures. The effects of 
such resistance remain unspecified however as does a more precise formulation of 
'resistance '. 
The formulations of reading and interpretation as a production emerge in part out of 
a hostile or ambivalent relation to something which is generically described as Marxism, 
though it is usually specific varieties that are invoked. In Bennett and Woollacott, 
intertextuality and intertextual reception stand explicitly as counters to reflectionist or 
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expressivist reduction. Once the text is conceived as a variation or 
transformation of signifying practices, text:-context relations cannot be conceived in any 
simple way as reflective or expressive. Chartier's hostility is more general and more 
oblique.66 Barthes's position is more complex. On the one hand 'Text' is a challenge 
to any critical mode which seeks to discover what the text reflects or expresses. On the 
other, Barthes also suggests that Marxism might 'be able to materialise itself more if it 
pluralises itself'; the 'material' concept of culture that intertextuality proposes can, it 
seems, be configured within a Marxist cultural criticism.67 In each case however, 
intertextuality is conceived as a challenge to any strictly determining relation which 
might govern reading, and as the underwriter of the active reader and productive 
reading. In this context, Riffaterre's 'compulsory' reader response is easily forgotten. 
There is however an overwhelming vagueness in the concept of reading as active, 
productive, a production. Again there is greater clarity about what reading is not, than 
about what it is: reading is not consumption or reception understood in their narrow 
and denigrated senses, suggestive of passivity. In literary criticism and theory, the 
invocation of intertextuality as the 'guarantee' of active reading is just the latest move in 
a long history. It is present, although in shadowy and ideal form, in early nineteenth 
century Romantic discourse where an opposition emerges between the reflective and 
critical Romantic reader, whose judgement is central, and the repetitive reading that is 
part of the mechanised routines of daily life.68 Such mechanised practices threaten the . 
adjudication which is the valorised dominant of literary reading, a relation strongly 
intimated in I. A. Richards's Practical Criticism, first published in 1929.69 
Richards's proposed model of reading is precisely active, in significant part because 
literary judgement and the forms of reading it requires are, to say the least, difficult. ' , 
The reading and judgement of poetry are the antithesis of a natural process which must 
be learnt and extensively practised.70 For Richards, 'difficulty' is only partly a 
function of the poem's complexity - the relations between the four types of meaning.71 
The anxieties which motivate Practical Criticism are at least as much about the 
assumptions that readers bring to poetry. Richards challenges contemporaneous 
literary-critical assumptions, but beyond this lies an implicit attack on the broader 
contours of contemporary culture which emerges most strongly in his discussion of 'the 
stock response'. Both the poem and the reader's interpretation can be categorised as 'a 
stock response', 'ready-made and available with less trouble than if it had to be 
specially made out of raw or partially prepared materials. t72 The stock response is, of 
course, the effect of the 'made-to-measure' culture of which it is a part: the 
quintessence of passive reading. Richards's active reader is just one instance of what 
seems to have become the near inevitable locking of active and resistant: his reader 
resists the recipe temptations of made-to-measure culture (civilisation). The active 
audience, like the productive consumer, that is now a topos in media and cultural 
studies emerges from the same discourse about culture, but it is the bad 
other of literary reading - the consumption of mass communication forms - that is the 
site of focus and redefinition. Whether it is the 'readers' of women's or men's 
magazines, soap opera, romance, or Hollywood cinema, the aim is to challenge the 
consumer of mass forms as the duped, doped 'victim' of the text as hypodermic.73 
Fiske's account of the popular as the appropriation of mass texts and Jenkins's fan 
cultures are emblematic of the consumer as producer. 
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The concept of the active reader has itself been subject to a certain scrutiny within 
media and cultural. studies, and the binary' active' I'passive' has been criticised as 
ambiguous andlor vague.74 The 'active' choice of passivity by film audiences and the 
ways in which non-reaction (which could be the definition of a certain kind of 
passivity) to certain textual cues constitutes an active response in that it resists those 
cues are also topics of discussion.75 In the main, these criticisms are still imbricated 
within the binary. To choose passivity is still characterised as an active response 
because the viewer or prospective viewer is the agent who chooses it. These critiques 
are, for the most part, motivated by the attempt to extend the scope or 'rule' of the 
active into new domains of audience experience and practice. And the question of what 
active means, except in the sense of meaning more that it apparently appears to, often 
gets lost. More generally, the relation's between notions of active reading and resistant 
reading need to be disentangled rather than, as is increasingly the case, equated or 
made synonymous. Riffaterre and Iser are only two instances of an active reading 
which is precisely not resistant to the meanings and values of the text.76 These notions 
of active and passive, of reading that is productive and resistant clearly raise important 
questions about the role of text, reader and, perhaps above all, context in the 
construction of meaning.' Barthes, Bennett and Woollacott and Chartier all conceive 
reception as a process of recontextualisation. But the new historicist conception of the 
material text and the definition of reading as (another)-production in media and cultural 
studies evade rather than answer the questions raised by such formulations. Both these 
simultaneously invoke and resist Marxism: the material text and productive reading are 
both alibis for other materialities, and above all that other production which is now 
largely ignored or disregarded within such work. The formulation of reception as 
production often leads to a collapsing of the two: writing is reading; reading is writing. 
And intertextuality is one of the key concepts which have been invoked to effect the 
dissolution of the two. Production is valorised within reading: the emphasis on the 
active is precisely the marker of this. But it is devalued (and increasingly ignored) 
'within' production. 77 Chartier is an interesting instance of this strange doubling of the 
meaning and value of production. He at once insists on the difference between 
production and reception and resists it. In recognising the materiality of the text (as 
book, pamphlet, manuscript) and its role in shaping reading practices, he is clearly' . 
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distinguishing between production as publishin~ and reception as reading. 
But his classification of the book as one modality of varying historical situatedness of 
reading undermines the distinction. In one sense of course this classification is 
incontestable, as the most cursory glance at any two editions of the same text will 
confirm. But at the same time this classification subordinates production (publishing) 
to consumption (reading) by making the book or the edition 'merely' a modality of 
variegated reading. It is unlikely that the scope of such discussions will be usefully 
extended unless there is a renewed attempt to formulate context or better, context~, not 
only the micro-particular temporal and spatial co-ordinates of particular acts of 
reception, but the broader, longer and stronger contexts which are also constitutive of 
interpretation and reading, contexts which include production. 
9. Alternative directions 
Intertextual theories of reception offer many indicators of what an account of 
intertextual interpretation might look like and the issues it must engage with. As 
outlined above, interpretation must involve more than decoding and cannot be a 
straightforward process of meaning recuperation. Textual meaning is (or appears to be) 
multiple (or ambiguous, or conflictual) and never wholly resident in the text. Context, 
encompassing not only the textual knowledges of the reader but the knowledges made 
possible by the whole situation of reading, are fundamental to the interpretative 
process. But, I have also shown that existing intertextual theories of reception also 
share a number of problems. The 'negative' characterisations of reading as 'not 
decoding' and 'another production' mark a profound lack of specificity about the 
processes of intertextual reading. These accounts also demonstrate that there is no 
consensus about the meaning of intertextuality itself, which is formulated in different 
and often incompatible ways. Riffaterre's definition centres on the way that 
intertextuality orders ('regulates') the relations between text and intertext but the text-
intertext relation also strongly delimits the intertextual knowledges which the reading 
process activates. Barthes emphasises the non-originality of the text as intertextuality: 
a mosaic or tissue of 'Quotations' or -'citations', a mosaic which can never be fully 
inventoried or quantified (,drawn from the innumerable centres of culture,).78 This 
definition is clearly at odds with Riffaterre, whose hypogram is precisely a key to the 
privileged code of the poetic and the text's significance. Chartier foregrounds the 
fra~mentaO' character of the intertextual text: it is this which makes the multiplicity of 
readings and 'recodings' possible. Bennett and Woollacott define intertextuality as 'a 
system of references', the singular 'system' intimating a structuralist 'grammar', 
assuming an underlying order that is at strongly at odds with both Barthes and Chartier. 
This definition is, of course, strongly motivated by their 'competing' concept, inter-
textuality. Subsequently they suggest that the former is an effect of the 
latter: intertextuality is not inherent in the text but the manifest and variable effect of 
specific and socially organised reading formations.79 
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At the beginning of this introduction I mentioned the various 'appropriations' of 
intertextuality as unsurprising and, perhaps, appropriate. I also defined 
'intertextuality' very loosely, and deliberately so, to cast the net widely and suggest 
some of the ways in which intertextuality and reading have become imbricated. 
Definitions vary widely and it is clear that the differences identified above cannot be 
dismissed as mere variations of a central and relatively stable core. Intertextuality and 
interpretation must be formulated in far more rigorous and precise terms. This can only 
be achieved if the focus of inquiry is significantly shifted, first to intertextual theories 
of textual production, second to linguistic pragmatics. 
I have tried to suggest at least some of the discursive dialogisms which shape these 
definitions but I have said little as yet about the definitions which these accounts both 
repeat and transform, re-read and re-write. To speak of the ori~ins of intertextuality as 
a theoretical concept is perhaps, paradoxical; provoking an unease which can force the 
beginnings of this narrative back toPlato.80 And in suggesting a return my purpose is 
not to secure an 'originary' or founding definition which renders all subsequent 
variationsepigonic. What motivates this return is the desire to rethink intertextuality as 
a theory of text and above all textual production which is how it developed in the 
writings of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva. The aim is first to develop an 
account which clearly specifies and differentiates intertextual production from 
intertextual reception, so avoiding the weaknesses of an unspecified concept of 
production and the collapsing of production and reception (reading as writing). And 
second, to differentiate and explore the relations between the interpretative process and 
interpretative practices and between interpretation and reading. Therefore, in chapter 
one, I will examine, in some detail, various accounts of intertextuality as textual 
production, focusing on the work of Vol os hi nov, Bakhtin and the early Kristeva. 
This then is the first element of the shift of focus. But what of interpretation? The 
vagueness, ambiguities and problems in the definitions discussed above suggest the 
need to look elsewhere, to pragmatics, or, more precisely, to what is often called 
'Anglo-American pragmatics'. In chapter two, I will examine this tradition, focusing 
on a set of accounts which theorise interpretation as an inferential process: the utterance 
treated as 'evidence'. Only a few provisional remarks are called for here. 
Conceptualised from within linguistics, pragmatics has been defined as one component 
or 'level' within the study of language as a whole: the study of language in use as 
opposed to the study of linguistic structures (segmental and suprasegmental phonology, 
morphology, syntax, lexical semantics) in terms independent of context. For some, 
pragmatics is the residue, the level or dimension which intervenes to explain what no 
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other domain of linguist study can. For others, pragmatics is the 
privileged field of study, subordinating, and in the process transforming, other modes 
of linguistics. It is this tradition of strong pragmatics that I am interested in: where 
definitions of meaning are always bound to definitions of context, where what an 
utterance means is specific to and delimited by context. Here, context is broadly 
defined as the knowledges which addressees deploy in interpretation. The pragmatic 
interest in the constitutive role of context in meaning and interpretation, coupled with 
the recognition that contexts and therefore utterance meaning are, in theory at least, 
infinite, encourage highly specific formulations of the processes and mechanisms of 
interpretation - a fundamental deficit in intertextual theories of reception. Pragmatics is 
not an unknown in either literary, media or cultural theory and certain aspects of 
pragmatic thinking have been strongly metabolised within these areas. The name of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, sometimes credited as the founder of pragmatics (as well as 
philosophical pragmatism) is familiar in both, though it is his tri-partite classification of . 
signs that has the strongest currency.8! Closer to home, Riffaterre draws on Peirce's 
concept of the interpretant, as does in a very different way, Jean Jacques Lecercle 
whose writings on interpretation and literary forms draw extensively on pragmatic 
concepts as well as a broad range of contemporary cultural theory.82 'Speech Act 
Theory' is perhaps the most familiar pragmatic reference in contemporary literary and 
cultural theory. Marie Louise Pratt and latterly, Judith Butler, have appropriated 
aspects of the work of J. L. Austin and J. Searle and Jacques Derrida's critique of 
. Austin, in 'Signature Event Context' is another familiar instance of engagement and 
disengagement. 83 The term 'pragmatics' itself also has a currency in cultural theory: 
the writings of Voloshinov and Bakhtin writings have been described as 'social 
pragmatics'.84 
My focus in chapter two is inferential theories, specifically those of Paul Grice and 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. These treat the utterance as a certain kind of evidence 
from which interpretations (or conclusions) are derived, in conjunction with various 
know ledges of the addressee. Inferential accounts of meaning are probably the least 
discussed in post-structurally inflected cultural theory, including intertextual 
accounts.85 Yet inferential theories explicitly address some of the key questions raised 
by intertextual ones. What is or are the process( es) which hearers use in interpretation? 
How and why are some know ledges (rather than others) mobilised and deployed? 
How is one set of interpretations selected over another/others? And inferential theories 
also offer some very plausible answers and powerful accounts of the interpretative 
process. Beyond this, there are important congruences between intertextual theories 
and inferential ones. Both theories argue that a simple and singular en-de-coding 
cannot explain meaning production or interpretation. This is their 'common' starting 
point and inferencing is theorised as an alternative process. Both define 'utterances' as 
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inherently polysemous and, following on from this, insist that any 
utterance has a range of possible interpretations. Neither approach presupposes that the 
hearer will recover the speaker's intended meaning from the utterance. Both can, 
though in very different ways, be conceived as rhetorical approaches to language and 
meaning, focusing on the relations between texts, contexts and those who produce and 
interpret them. 
That said however, intertextual and inferential accounts formulate these positions 
and reconceptualise text and the processes of production and reception in radically 
different ways. It is not possible to simply 'apply' pragmatic concepts to what are, 
broadly speaking, post-structuralist accounts of textuality and meaning, or to conjoin 
or collapse inferential and intertextual accounts. Chapter three stages an encounter 
between the two accounts or traditions of thinking meaning, where each is subjected to 
the theoretical scrutiny of the other. As already suggested above, inferential theories 
expose the lack of rigour and specificity in intertextual accounts. Above all, 
intertextual theories ignore inference as a process. Intertextual theories also expose the 
limits and flaws of inferential ones. Above all, inferential accounts cannot conceive the 
text as intertextuality, and contexts as discursive .. Further, inferential theories ignore 
interpretative practices and the relation of these to evaluation and explanation within 
reading as a whole. Finally, both traditions share a problem. Inferential theories focus 
on the interpretation of speech modelling writing and its reception from the 
interpretation of speech. Intertextual accounts centre on the reading of writing. Both 
ignore the constitutive contexts of print, the book and the processes of publishing, 
contexts which shape not only the interpretation of print texts but that of speech itself. 
Through the critique I develop an account of intertextual interpretation which is 
elaborated in chapter four. Intertextual interpretation is substantively (though not 
exclusively) an inferential process. However, the ways in which inferential processes 
work are very different to the accounts proposed by existing inferential models of 
communication. It is, as I will show, intertextual relations which govern the patterns 
of inference in interpretation, relations which are shaped not only by text and reading 
but by the situation of reading and in particular the edition, the material form in which 
the text is read. Intertextual interpretation and reading are shaped in important ways by 
production practices, not just writing but publishin~ praGtices - editing, design, 
production and marketing - which intersect in the edition. This in turn calls for an 
expanded definition of genre, conceived intertextually as an intersection of production -
here publishing - practices. A focus on these relations in turn draws attention to the 
multiple tonalities of interpretative contingency - no longer a singularity, binarised 
against a mythical necessity - but a gradient ranging from the highly probable to the 
barely possible. 
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Chapters five and six develop two case-studies which extend the 
arguments about the relations between intertextuality and inference, and substantiate the 
expanded idea of genre and how it shapes the reading process. The case-studies 
examine two contemporary publishing categories: 'classics' (Penguin, Everyman, 
Modern Library, Signet) and literary theory textbooks (Introductions and Readers), 
chapters five and six respectively. Here I develop a mode of intertextual analysis 
which recasts a number of classical rhetorical strategies as intertextual practices. 
Through detailed analyses of particular editions, I develop a stronger and more 
plausible theorisation of the interpretative process and its relations to reading. I also 
develop a mode of intertextual analysis which can identify.8B@ interpretative and 
reading possibilities in terms of a graduated contingency and which demonstrates that 
genre - in the expanded sense - significantly shapes interpretative possibilities and the 
explanatory and evaluative practices which are always in play in any instance of 
reading. These conclusions will be elaborated in the concluding chapter. It is the 
dynamic between constitutive semantic unfixity (predicted by both "theories) and, 
equally importantly, the processes of fixing which lies at the heart of interpretation and 
reading. Both unflxity and fixity are effects of the intertextuality of both text and the 
processes of interpretation. Interpretative possibilities are many and rich but for the 
most part interpretations are few and sparse. 
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PART ONE 
Chapter One: Intertextual Theories 
To parody a well known saying, I shall say that a little formalism turns one away from 
history, but that a lot brings one back to it (Roland Barthes).! 
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The origins of a theory which casts the production of meaning as the transformation of 
the always-already read easily become a vexed and anxious question, as two recent 
accounts of intertextuality amply demonstrate. Both seek a measure of comfort in the 
argument from authority. The first begins with Plato, then, via Aristotle and a cluster 
of rhetoricians, and after a longish stay with Montaigne, finally finds itself back in the 
more familiar terrain of Bakhtin and after. 2 The second, a recently published textbook, 
draws on at:J. authority and genealogy now equally conventional: Saussure.3 Not 
because of the anagrams, which could perhaps be suggested by Kristeva's reading; 
and not because of the critique of the Saussurean word. No; it is the 'differential sign' 
itself which is proposed as origin.4 In proposing a return to intertextual theories of 
production, it is no simple matter to decide where 'home' is. The very surfeit of 
contemporary theories of meaning production which have been dubbed 'intertextual' 
. . 
can also present difficulties. Bakhtin, Kristeva, Barthes. Certainly. Voloshinov? 
Not always.5 Derrida, Ricoeur, Genette, Bloom, Gilbert and Gubar, Showalter?6 
That depends. But what is elaborated here is neither a return to origins (though it could 
be so argued), nor a (doomed) attempt to be exhaustive. Rather, it is the specifying of 
what I will argue is a distinctive lineage of theories of textual production which offer the 
richest theoretical opportunities for developing an account of intertextual interpretation: 
Voloshinov's writings on the multi accentual sign and verbal interaction, Bakhtin's on 
the heteroglossia, genre and dialogism, and Kristeva's on intertextuality and the 
relations between the system of language and the speaking subject. In the most general 
terms, what unites these writings is first an insistence on the constitutive sociality of 
writing and the subject, where social relations are conceived as conflictual; second, an 
abiding interest in the political functions of discourse, its role in the production of 
consensus and authority, and/or its challenge to these; and third, an explicit attempt to 
theorise speech and writing as processes, and as a production, and in particular here 
the development of a strong concept of textual context. In the three main sections 
below, I will offer a detailed critical exposition of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva's 
theories of textual production. In the concluding section, I will draw out the 
distinctiveness of this lineage (in part through a series of comparisons and contrasts), 
identify some relevant problems and return to some of the questions posed in the 
introduction about intertextual theories of reception. Most importantly, what is the 
relationship between these accounts of intertextual production and the problems in 
intertextual theories of reception? 
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It should be noted that the relations between texts and signatures here are 
particularly complex. The 'authorship question', one of the many cruces of debate 
about the Bakhtin circle, is the most obvious issue, and pertains directly to Marxism 
and the Philosophy of Language;-7 But Kristeva's relations with Bakhtin are also 
complex: on occasion her 'readings' are impersonations of a Bakhtin who is in fact a 
Kristeva - 'the early Kristeva'.8 The authorship question falls outside the concerns of 
this thesis. My focus here is on texts and their discursive relations. My convention 
here is to treat the signatory of a text as a convenience of representation - hence 
Voloshinov and not Voloshinov / Bakhtin or 'Bakhtin'. This usage makes no claim for 
the authorship of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.9 
1. Voloshinov: verbal interaction and the multiaccentual sign 
Voloshinov's Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, originally published in 1929, 
first appeared in English in 1973. Reviewing interest in the book was stimulated by its 
'association' with Bakhtin whose seventy-fifth birthday was officially celebrated in the 
same year. A book, first published in the late twenties, which provided an extensive 
and cogent critique of Saussurean linguistics, and represented what was then a 
"'forgotten tradition'" of Marxist linguistics, was more than a historical curiosity to a 
number of theorists - most notably Fredric Jameson and Raymond Williams; and it was 
also a key text for the early work of the Language and Ideology group at the 
Birmingham centre for Cultural Studies. 1 0 Williams casts Voloshinov as a theorist 
who made a decisive break with earlier attempts to formulate a Marxist linguistics. II 
'His originality lay in the fact that he did not seek to apply other Marxist ideas to 
language. On the contrary he reconsidered the whole problem of language within a 
general Marxist orientation'. 12 Williams's interest also lies in what he sees as 
Voloshinov's strong challenge to Saussure's 'formalism' and what that implies about 
consciousness, a focus shared in a different way with the Birmingham group, though 
reformulated as subjectivity.13 Emerging from the Birmingham reading is an attempt to 
suggest the relative autonomy of the subject in Voloshinov's writing - an issue to which 
I will return below - and the rather complacent and topos-heavy hindsight that 
Voloshinov could go no further because he did not have at his disposal Lacan's 
'linguistic reading' of Freud. 14 
Voloshinov's key contribution lies in his concepts of the multiaccentual sign and 
verbal interaction. 15 These are developed within the programme of the book as a 
whole whose aim is to redefine the object of linguistic study within the framework of a 
Marxism which is not 'mechanical'.16 The dialectical process out of which this 
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redefinition emerges is through a critique and synthesis of two opposing types of 
linguistic theory: 'individualist-subjectivism', Voloshinov's term for Romantic models 
of language, and 'abstract-objectivism', which conceives meaning exclusively as the 
production of an autonomous linguistic system are structured as thesis and antithesis 
within the book. 17 'Verbal interaction', which emerges as the synthesis, is the 'basic 
reality' of language and the proper object of linguistic study: 
Any utterance, no matter how weighty and complete in itself, is only a 
moment in the continuous process of verbal communication (p.95).18 
What makes his definition distinctive is the expanded setting in which he views the 
study of language and linguistics, as a critical component of the study of ideologie.s" 
understood here as broad zones of knowledge and practice - 'scientific knowledge, 
literature, religion, ethics and so forth- (p.9) - which are conceived in resolutely 
monist terms. 
Any ideological product is not only itself a part of a reality (natural or social) 
just as in any physical body, any instrument of production, or any product for 
consumption, it also, in contradistinction to these other phenomena, reflects 
and refracts another reality outside itself (p.9). 
The proposition that linguistics is a component of the study of ideologies can be 
understood in at least two senses. Linguistics in its various forms should be studied as 
ideology - hence the critique of existing linguistics in the book. And, the study of 
ideologies must centre on questions of meaning. 
Everything ideological possesses meaning, it represents, depicts or stands for 
something lying outside itself. In other words it is a sign. Without signs there 
is no ideology' (p.9). 
The domain of ideology coincides with the domain of signs. They equate with 
one another' (p.IO). 
Language itself does not coincide with ideology, as anything can be transformed into a 
sign and be made meaning-bearing. But ideologies are more than bodies of knowledge, 
they involve socially determined relations to know ledges and values. Voloshinov's 
definition of the word makes this explicit. This social reality of language can be 
understood at the level of the word itself, once the word is viewed in the context of its 
use. 
.. .. [T]he word sensitively reflects the slightest variations in social existence. 
Existence is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this refraction of 
existence in the ideological sign refracted? By an intersecting of differently 
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oriented social interests within one and the same sign community, i.e., by the 
class struggle. 
Class does not co-incide with the sign community, i.e., with the 
community which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological 
communication. Thus various different classes will make use of one and the 
same language. As a result differently oriented accents intersect in every 
ideological sign ... 
. This social multiaccentuality of the ideological sign is a very crucial 
aspect (p.23). 
Meaning is contested because there is always a fundamental disjuncture between a 
shared language (implicitly here a national language ) and the conflicting social interests 
of its users. And, given the constitutive inequality that Voloshinov's explicitly Marxist 
version of social relations proposes, the dominant social formation will always seek to 
generalise its own meanings and values: to render its language uniaccentual. 19 
From the concept of the multi accentual sign, Voloshinov develops a critique of the 
two dominant trends in linguistics, arguing in each case that the explanation of 
meaning, and more specifically its source, is erroneous. Romanticism defines 
language as expression and locates the source of meaning in the individual psyche. 
Language is the outer manifestation of 'that inner something which is expressible' 
(p.84). Voloshinov's critique of Romantic dualism is conventional if forceful; 20 it is 
his second argument which is distinctive and pertinent to the development of 'verbal 
interaction', building as it does on language'as a 'refractor' of social reality. 
'Utterance as we know is constructed between two socially organised persons' (p.85), 
and 'not any two members of the species Homo Sapiens' (p.12). The 'formative 
center' of meaning is not within the psyche but without (p.85). 'In point of fact, 
word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and/or whom it 
is meant' (p.86). Romantic theories do not recognise that the individual is 'a socially 
organised person', that meaning is constituted in the relation between self and other 
and is never a matter of individual 'expression'. The production of meaning is 
therefore always interpretative and evaluative - affirming and/or contesting - of social 
relations. 
At the same time, however, Voloshinov is attracted by the creativity attributed to 
the speaker in Romantic accounts, and this becomes a component of his critique of 
abstract-objectivism, whose fundamental error is the sourcing of meaning within the 
system - the 'langue' that governs 'parole' for example.21 Retaining his emphasis on 
the relations between users of language, he rejects a system that can generate only 
'normatively identical forms'. 
What is important for the speaker about a linguistic form is not that it is a stable 
and always self-identical signal, but that it is always a changeable and adaptable 
sign. (pp.67 -68) 
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Voloshinov makes a critical distinction between signal and sign in order to draw a 
distinction between two types of process, the recognition of a signal and the 
understanding or interpretation of a sign. The separation is a deliberate abstraction as 
these processes cannot be differentiated in any instance of language use. For 
Voloshinov, the signal is the word out of context and shorn of its ability to mean. His 
opposition is intended to show that it is an error to source meaning in the language 
system alone, and that use in specific conditions is the dominant in the production of 
meaning. For the speaker, 
the center of gravity lies not in the identity of form but in that new and concrete 
meaning it acquires in the particular context (p.68). 
It is context which centres or 'fixes' meaning and not the system which posits the false 
abstraction of a merely 'formal' identity. 
Thus verbal interaction is the basic reality of language. 
Dialogue, in the narrow sense of the word, is, of course, only one of 
the forms - a very important form, to be sure - of verbal interaction. But 
dialogue can also be understood in a broader sense, meaning not only direct 
face-to-face vocalised verbal communication between persons, but also verbal 
communication of any type whatsoever. A book, i.e.,. a verbal performance in 
print, is also an element of verbal communication ... it is calculated for active 
perception ... and for organised printed reaction ... Moreover, a verbal 
performance of this kind also inevitably ori~nts itself with respect to previous 
performances in the same sphere ... Thus the printed verbal performance 
engages as it were, in ideological colloquy of large scale: it responds to 
something, objects to something, affirms something, anticipates possible 
responses and objections, and so on. (p.95) 
It is worth citing this definition at length because its rhetorical strategies exemplify its 
argument. Voloshinov's argument does indeed 'respond', 'object', 'affirm' and 
'anticipate'. After asserting that verbal interaction is the basic reality of language, (the 
importance of the claim stressed by the one sentence paragraph22), the text anticipates 
a commonplace gloss of 'verbal interaction': dialogue. But this conventional 
understanding ('face-to-face', 'vocalised', 'communication between persons') 
identifies only one of its forms. Every production of meaning is a dialogue. The 
demonstration of this requires a shift from the commonplace of face-to-face speech to 
what is anticipated as a limit case for verbal interaction: the book. The book appears to 
be finite- and discrete, but it becomes the example that affirms every instance of 
meaning as verbal interaction. Voloshinov begins with the most commonsensical way 
in which this can be the case: first, a book can be talked about, it can form part of a 
conventional dialogue. Second, a book is intended to be read and thought about. 
Third, there are institutionalised modes of reception for print texts. So far it would 
seem, so commonsensical, but these very obvious senses in which the book is a 
dialogue also counter anticipated objections. 
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A book is not only oriented 'forwards', as it were, towards its anticipated 
reception, it also dialogues with 'previous performances in the same sphere': with 
'something' that already exists and is responded to, affirmed or objected to. The 
repetition of 'something' stresses the materiality of the text's context and suggests an 
active set of relations between any instance of textual production and other instances: 
any text takes up a relation to 'previous performances' which it may affirm and/or 
contest and it is therefore always interpretative and evaluative of these. These relations, 
between text and text, and texts and context are outlined a paragraph later where three 
topics are prescribed for the study of language: 
(1) the forms and types of verbal interaction in connection with their concrete 
conditions; (2) forms of particular utterances, of particular speech 
performances, as elements of a closely linked interaction - i.e., the genres of 
speech performance in human behaviour and ideological creativity as determined 
by verbal interaction; (3) a re-examination, on this new basis, of language 
forms in their usual linguistic presentation. (pp. 95-96) 
What is immediately noticeable here is the interest in 'form' and 'type' or 'genre' which 
assumes the possibility of classifying particular utterances in terms of their similarities 
to and differences from others. Therefore whilst, as was seen above, Voloshinov is 
concerned with the new and particular meaning that words or utterances acquire in 
particular contextual configurations, this relation is in significant part shaped by genre. 
Second, forms or genres must be studied in context. This context is both immediate, 
local - the setting, the relations between speaker and hearer and so on - but also 
something 'broader'. The sense that context is not only the immediate situation of 
utterance is supported by the acknowledgement of a methodological difficulty. 'An 
important problemarises in this regard: the study of the connection between concrete 
verbal interaction and the extraverbal situation - both the immediate situation and, 
through it, the broader situation' (p.95). This broader situation, though it is not 
explicitly defined would seem to be the same as that indicated by the multi accentual 
sign: a situation of conflictual social interests and desires. It is more appropriate, then, 
to speak of the context~ which constitute genres or types of verbal interaction. But 
genres also shape one another, 'as elements of a closely linked interaction': genres 
should not be studied as discrete entities because this is to reject the reality and role of 
verbal interaction. The third element of the new linguistics is the methodological 
consequence of the first two imperatives; it also re-states them: 'a re-examination, on 
this new basis, of language forms in their usual linguistic presentation.' 
As a whole entity, the utterance is implemented only in the stream of verbal 
intercourse. The whole is after all defined by its boundaries, and these 
boundaries run along the line of contact between a given utterance and the 
extraverbal and verbal (i.e. made up of other utterances) milieu (p.96). 
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Utterances are the 'real' units of language and the real objects of study but the contexts 
which shape them - verbal and extraverbal - are a part of the whole and a part of the 
study. The third and final section of the book is an attempt to re-draw an existing object 
of linguistic study - reported speech - from the standpoint of verbal interaction. 
For Voloshinov, reported speech is not only a formalised instance of verbal 
interaction, it has a correspondence with 'the governing tendencies of speech 
reception', with interpretation (pp.117 -8). He does not claim that the processes of 
speech reporting directly express those of interpretation, but that there is a congruence 
between them. This is because the patterns of reported speech are shaped by the 
possibilities of reception processes, although once established they too playa role in 
shaping reception (pp.117 -118). This in turn suggests something about how he 
conceives the relations between language and the speaking subject, an issue which 
Ellis raises in his discussion of Voloshinov. !!'An outer sign incapable of entering the 
context of inner signs i.e. incapable of being understood and experienced, ceases to be 
the sign and reverts to the status of a physical object'''.23 For Ellis, Voloshinov's 
distinction between outer and inner sign (the former those units which make up 
utterance in a context, the latter, those units which constitute the subject's thought 
processes) is evidence of the subject's relative autonomy. The subject is 'in some 
sense constitutive of the social reality that constructs it' (p.192).24 This is clearly 'in 
some sense' true but Ellis seems to misread the distinction that Voloshinov makes 
between inner and outer sign. Both need to be distinguished from the signal. There 
can be no inner sign that it is not also an outer sign, otherwise the socialisation of 
meaning that Voloshinov proposes is only partial and there is a zone of activity which 
remains untouched by social relations. 
Voloshinov criticises existing analyses of reported speech as 'static' and 'inert', . 
because the reported speech is 'virtually divorc[ed]' from the reporting context. 
[T]he true object of inquiry ought to be precisely the dynamic interrelationship 
of these two factors, the speech being reported (the other person's speech) and 
the speech doing the reporting (the author's speech). After all, the two actually 
do exist, function, and take shape only in their interrelation, and not on their 
own, the one apart from the other (p.119). 
Meaning is produced by the relationship between the reported speech and the reporting 
context, a new textual context. The self-other dynamic of the two-sided act that is 
word and utterance is once more re-iterated. Voloshinov identifies two broad 
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tendencies in the reporting of speech: 'linear' and 'pictorial'. The linear style of 
reporting speech is distinguished primarily by being 'content-analyzing': the key 
interpretative concern of the reporting is with the referential function of the speech being 
reported (p.120).25 This concern with referential meaning tends to reduce or even 
eliminate what Voloshinov describes as the 'internal individuality' of the speech being 
reported and often, the styles of reporting and reported speech are homogenised 
(p.120). This in tum calls for conventions - of design and typography as well as lexis -
which differentiate reported from reporting speech. By contrast, the pictorial style is 
characterised .by incursions of the reporting speech into the reported or vice versa, a 
'weakening (of) the peripheries' between reported and reporting utterance (p.12l). The 
work of interpreting or transposing the reporting speech is likewise different. 
This time the reception includes not only the referential meaning of the 
utterance, the statement it makes, but also all the linguistic peculiarities of its 
verbal implementation (p.12l) . 
Voloshinov's central focus in this section of the book is the constitutive role of textual. 
context and the ways in which textual production is, in significant part, an 
interpretative process of transformation. The intersections between reported speech 
and reporting contexts are also presented as historical varieties which are part of an 
epochally imagined narrative. Therefore, various forms of linear reporting are 
dominant from the Middle Ages till the end of the 18th century (although the pictorial 
style does have a 'moment' during the Renaissance, especially in France). The 
pictorial style rises to dominance in the early 19th century and seems to converge with 
the rise of the bourgeoisie ih Western Europe. Its contemporary incarnation is 
'relativistic individualism' and seems to correspond to modernism. The prior authority 
of the reporting context is itself relativised by the reported one (p.123). The discussion 
of reported speech is the only point in the book where a preference for a particular mode 
of representation asserts itself. The pictorial is clearly a positive value in at least some 
of its varieties, apparently because it represents the underlying reality of verbal 
interaction which the linear reporting style would seem to deny. This is also the only 
moment in the book where a literary and fictional corpus becomes a discernible part of 
the object of the new linguistics which Voloshinov is proposing. 
Voloshinov's formulations of the multi accentual word and verbal interaction ami 
offer the outline of an intertextual theory of textual production which asserts that the 
relations between texts are always shaping of meaning, in terms which are dynamic 
and transforming. At the same time these relations are, in important senses, 
constrained. The 'utterance' is always ordered by what precedes it: by its relations 
with previous text~genres, and by the reception that it anticipates. This formulation is 
decisively shaped by the terms of which it is the synthesis and the 'general Marxist 
orientation' which drives the critique. As Williams succinctly formulates it: 
This enabled him to see 'activity' (the strength of the idealist emphasis after 
Humboldt) as social and to see 'system' (the strength of the new objectivist 
linguistics) in relation to this social activity and not, as had hitherto been the 
case, formally separated from it.26 
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Most simply, Voloshinov seeks to think through how constitutive social difference and 
conflict shapes language production and how social differences produce linguistic ones. 
2. Bakhtin: the many modes of being dialogic 
Bakhtin's contribution to the lineage of intertextual theories considered here can be 
summarised very succinctly.27 First, he thinks through the conditions that make '[a]ny 
utterance ... a link in a very complexly organised chain of utterances ... ', and the 
consequences.28 Here, Bakhtin works within the contradiction of language as 
individual and social, as mine and the other's, which becomes the condition of 
language and meaning as dialogic (or, more broadly speaking, intertextual). This can 
be viewed as both an elaboration and transformation of the programme announced in 
Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Bakhtin's other contribution is the rich and 
suggestive discussion of the many modes of being dialogic. 
But whilst Bakhtin's contribution is easily summarised, any attempt at a more 
detailed and critical exposition can easily run aground in ambiguities, inconsistencies 
and incoherence. Needless to say, Bakhtin's inconsistency has itself become a critical 
topOS.29 But this is doubtless preferable to those who seek the key that will unlock and 
decipher his writings once and for all, who treat Bakhtin as an anticipator of every 
subsequent theory of language and culture, or those who 'terrorise' with their 'real' 
Bakhtins.30 In Bakhtin criticism everything is a site of struggle - his discursive 
genealogy and 'disciplinary' location, his politics, and of course, the very meanings 
of his concepts?' In 'Bakhtin and Cultural Theory', Ken Hirschkop suggests that the 
mUltiple appropriations of Bakhtin, the very enthusiasm which with 'everyone can 
endorse the central elements of the Bakhtinian programme indicates that the hard work 
has not really begun.'32 Hirschkop was writing in 1989 and his 'everyone' is intended 
to suggest the political variety of such endorsements. This has a particular salience for 
any assessment of Bakhtin's contribution to intertextual theories. Williams begins his 
chapter on language in Marxism and Literature by asserting that '[a] definition of 
language is always, implicitly or explicitly, a definition of human beings in the 
world'.33 Any definition of language is political in that it necessarily imagines social 
relationships in particular ways. But although Bakhtin's definition of language clearly 
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espouses its intrinsic political character, his speaking subject is always-already social, 
and his vision of social relations is constitutively conflictual, his social and political 
'theory', if such it can be called, is notoriously difficult to draw out and pin down. 
V oloshinov's explicit desire to formulate a specifically Marxist linguistics makes the 
contrast. For whilst Bakhtin's writings can be appropriated by a Marxist cultural 
theory, his strong tendency to translate all questions about social relations into 
questions about meaning, and the unspecified character of the forces of centralisation 
which he invokes pose problems for reading Bakhtin as a Marxist. He neither 
proposes the mode of production as that which constitutes and orders social relations, 
nor explicates the relations between social relations in general and the processes of 
meaning which are a part of that generality. This has implications for his formulations 
of context and the dialogic. 
If Bakhtin's understanding of language as mine and yours, individual and social 
marks a certain continuity with Voloshinov then his concept of the heteroglossia marks 
a significant reformulation, both of Voloshinov's concept of the multiaccentual sign 
and of some of his own earliest work. The term 'heteroglossia' is introduced i~ 
Discourse in the Novel to describe the historical reality of any 'language'. 
At any given moment of its evolution, language is stratified not only into 
linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word (according to formal linguistic 
markers, especially phonetic), but also - and for us this is the essential point -
into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social groups, 
"professional" and "generic" languages, languages of generations and so forth' 
(pp.271-272).34 
Something of this 'so forth' is suggested earlier when he discusses the novel's 
incorporation of a 'diversity of social speech types ... : social dialects, characteristic 
group behaviour, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations 
and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various 
circles and of passing fashions that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, 
even of the hour' (pp.262-263). This characterisation is typical of both the richness 
and the vagueness of many of Bakhin's definitions. Some of the languages which 
comprise the heteroglossia are easily identifiable and translatable: class languages for 
example, the languages or registers of working life. Others ary not: 'characteristic 
group behaviour' and 'tendentious languages'. Despite this, the examples focus two 
important and interrelated aspects of his definition. First, language is a site of 
overlapping and competing social values: languages are socio-ideological and are 
therefore imbricated in the processes of power and authority. Second, languages can 
be distinguished in terms of their historical duration. The slogan of the hour may not 
outlast the 'hour', other languages may have more staying power. The formulation of 
value here - as social - present in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language and in The 
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Formal Method in Literary Scholarship, differs from Bakhtin's earliest attempts at 
definition?5 Hirschkop is once again instructive. In his discussion of one of Bakhtin's 
early essays, 'The Architect/onics of the Deed', he shows that a very different concept 
of value, 'human intention and purpose of any kind', organises the relationship 
between the individual and language understood as grammatical and logical system. 
Intonation is the means by which the speaker's linguistic relations to objects of 
experience can be individuated and endowed with a unique purposiveness.36 Here 
value is individual, not social. The contrast between the two texts is important if we 
are to understand the distinctiveness of Bakhtin's later formulation and its importance 
for intertextuality. In the first, the individual's utterance is a compromised term:. it is 
the realisation of an always pre-existing set of possibilities, but it is also endowed with 
the individuality and uniqueness that intonation makes possible. But the social and the 
individual elements of the utterance do not make contact with one another. The 
individual utterance semantically exceeds the linguistic system but cannot, it would 
seem, impact on it - given the unique relation that intonation establishes with the 
referent. The shift to value understood as social, is fundamental to all of Bakhtin's 
concepts considered here, not only the heteroglossia, but utterance, genre and the 
overarching concepts of dialogic and monologic. 
As mentioned above, heteroglossia also differs from Voloshinov's vision of a 
single language variously accented by different and c.ompeting socio-political values. 
While the idea of language does not strictly conflict with the arguments of Marxism, it 
is possible to see Bakhtin's insistence on language~ as the attempt to refine the 
conditions of possibility of the multi-accentual sign, introducing a certain stability and 
systematisation into meaning. The multi accentual sign is now an intersection of 
languages. The heteroglossia is defined not only as the multiplicity of languages but 
their relations, and above all, an overarching conflict: between the reality of the 
heteroglossia and the various attempts to assert or enforce a single or unitary language 
which has a singular relation to reality. 
A unitary language is not something given [dan] but is always in essence 
posited [zadam] - and at every moment of its linguistic life, it is opposed to the 
realities of the heteroglossia. But at the same time it makes its real presence felt 
as a force for overcoming this heteroglossia, imposing specific limits to it, 
guaranteeing a certain maximum of mutual understanding and crystallising into a 
real though relative unity - the unity of the reigning conversational (everyday) 
and literary language, 'correct language' ('Discourse in the Novel', p.270). 
For Bakhtin, a unitary language is always a myth in the Barthesian sense, and has to 
be read as such, as both 'true' and 'unreal'?7 '[T]he very concept of a language ... 
[is] already the result of particular social conflicts'.38 The heteroglossia, as a critical 
concept, can disclose the unreality of a unitary language. Equally important, however, 
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are the ways in which the unitary language is 'true': 'its real presence' in the 
production of meaning. The opposition confirms the socially contested character of 
meaning: the unitary language, as both claim and the practices which seek to 
substantiate it, 'gives expression to forces working towards concrete verbal and 
ideological unification and centralization, which develop in vital connection with the 
processes of sociopolitical and cultural centralization' (p.271). A vague formulation, 
but it is clear that the unitary language participates in the processes of power, seeking 
to extend and strengthen the values of the dominant social formation?9 This dynamic is 
central to his definitions of utterance and genre. 
Every utterance participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces 
and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical 
heteroglossia (the centrifugal stratifying forces). . 
Such is the fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a social group, a 
genre, a school and so forth. It is possible to given a concrete and detailed 
analysis of any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-ridden, 
tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language (p.272). 
Just as the heteroglossia 'cannot be reduced to a linguistic system',40 so the utterance 
as its minimal unit, cannot be conceptualised in exclusively linguistic terms. 
Any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was directed 
already, as it were, overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged 
with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist :- or, on the contrary by the 
"light" of alien words that have already been spoken about it (p.276). 
Context is constitutive of the utterance, but is understood here as always-already 
textualised. Previous utterances about the object shape the speaker or writer's 
utterance, as does the addressee, also textualised as an expected response. The 
speaker has a 
dialogic relationship toward an alien word within the object and ... [aJ 
relationship toward an alien word in the anticipated answer of the listener ... 
(p.283). 
This definition of the utterance as dialogic, as a dynamic between this particular use 
and others - extant and possible - is also the minimal unit in Bakhtin's 'meta'- or 
'translinguistics', most expUcitly elaborated in Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.41 
Translinguistics counters theories which ignore the complex context-bound character of 
meaning in use. Defining the production of meaning as the relation between utterances, 
which is in turn organised by a relation between utterances, most obviously challenges 
Saussure.42 Bakhtin's awkward and tendentious definition of the utterance in the 'The 
Problem of Speech Genres', which can include anything from a one word rejoinder to a 
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novel, is further evidence of his hostility to the explanatory value of exclusively 
'linguistic' description and analysis.43 More successfully, his analysis of double 
voiced discourse and the hybrid .utterance in Problems in Dostoevsky's Poetics and 
'Discourse in the Novel' which are, in 'narrow' linguistic terms, sentences, reveals 
the limits of the sentence as a unit of meaning and analysis.44 It is also this definition of 
the utterance as dialogic which forms the basis for his definition of genre. 
Genre is central to Bakhtin's definition of language practice as individual and social 
and, like language, it introduces a stability into practice. Such stabilities and relative 
regularities are an important element within this lineage and central to the account of 
interpretation which is developed in the thesis. Indeed genre is a central concept in 
Bakhtin's work per se, although those who assert its centrality frequently also charge 
the majority of other critics with ignoring or backgrounding it.45 In 'The Problem of 
Speech Genres', Bakhtin elaborates his most explicit and abstract definition of genre as 
a 'typical' utterance and its centrality to language practice. 
We speak only in definite speech genres, that is, all our utterances have definite 
and relatively stable typical/orms 0/ construction o/the whole. Our repertoire 
of oral (and written) genres is rich. We use them confidently and skilfully in 
practice and it is quite possible for us not even to suspect their existence in 
theory (p.78). 
Bakhtin clearly ascribes a fundamental role to' genre conceived as a relative stability. He 
also insists on the 'rich' repertoire of genres that speakers have, which accords with 
the 'heterogeneity' that characterises the field of speech genres as a whole (p.60). A 
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few sentences later, Bakhtin he that genre plays a crucial role in language acquisition, 
where it is almost akin to grammar. 
We are given these speech genres in almost the same way that we are given our 
native language, which we master fluently long before we begin to study 
grammar ". Speech genres organize our speech in almost the same way as 
grammatical (syntactical) forms do (pp.78-79). 
When we speak, we 'by no means always' take words 'from the system of language in 
their neutral, dictionary form', 
[w]e usually take them from other utterances, and mainly from utterances that 
kindred to ours in genre ", Consequently, we choose words according to their 
generic specifications (p.87). 
Genre is also, for Bakhtin, a critical, indeed polemical, concept. He is insistent that 
there are no areas of language use which are not' genred' - even the most 'intimate' .46 
The use of speech genres and the frequent use of speaker, maintains the force of his 
argument that utterance and practice are the proper objects of ' linguistics', even though 
many of the 'speech' genres instanced here are precisely not speech, but writing or 
print. 47 And heterogeneity, which will always also reveal a shared verbal nature, is 
the precondition of any adequate definition of genre. 
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The heterogeneity of linguistic reality does not mean that it is not ordered. Bakhtin 
defines genre as a 'relatively stable type of utterance', where there is a 'relatively 
stable' relation between a speaker, a hearer and what is spoken about, a particular 
content which he usually refers to as 'theme' (p.60). 
Genres correspond to typical situations of speech communication, typical 
themes and consequently also to particular contacts between the meanings of 
words and actual concrete reality under certain typical conditions (p.87). 
A genre is a type of utterance which articulates a specific and reproducible kind of 
- relation to what it depicts and the .relations between addresser and addressee. Bakhtin 
discusses the latter under the heading of 'addressivity' (p.95). The addressee of a 
genre may be characterised and typified in a range of ways as 'lower, higher, familiar, 
foreign' in relation to the speaker (p.95). Relative proximity, social and cultural, is 
the key criterion here,once more making knowledge and authority central. 
Thus, addressivity, the quality of turning to someone, is a constitutive feature 
of the utterance; without it the utterance does not and cannot exist. The various 
typical forms this addressivity assumes and the various concepts of the 
addressee are constitutive, definitive features of various speech genres (p.99). 
What is suggested here is not only the constitutive role of addressivity in genre, but the 
role of genre in shaping social relations. The military command, for example, does 
not simply reflect the authority of the commanding officer over his 'men', in some 
significant part, it constitutes his authority and their obedience as the predominant 
ground of their social relationship. This indicates one of the ways in which Bakhtin 
formulates text-context relations: text or utterances playa role in shaping context.48 
But other formulations also emerge in this text, which, while suggestive, create 
inconsistencies and contradictions which cannot be fully resolved ... 
Texts or utterances, it can be seen, playa role in constituting speaker, hearer and 
referent - understood as contexts of utterance. But at the same time, Bakhtin 
introduces a notion of extra-linguistic context which itself plays a role in shaping 
utterance meaning . 
... [E]ach sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable 
types of these utterances. These we may call speech genres (p.60). 
A particular function (scientific, technical, commentarial, business, everyday) 
and the particular conditions of speech communication specific for each sphere 
give rise to particular genres ... (p.64). 
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The typicality of an utterance - its reproducibility - seems here to be an index of the 
. reproducible situation of which it forms a part, a situation whose social purposes are 
certainly textualised by the particular utterance-type but which can be differentiated from 
it. The short military command presumes a set of social situations - from training and 
drill, through rehearsal to actual battle - and relations - an established chain of 
command, obedience to this, 'team' work and so on - which are not exclusively 
constituted by genre. It is this use of context which makes sense of Bakhtin's 
continuous insistence on the 'object' that is talked about, the relations between words 
and 'concrete reality'. The object may be obscured by the mist of its previous and 
anticipated significations, but the impossibility, in practice, of conceiving 'reality' 
extra-linguistically, does not mean that this reality either dissolves or has no 
constitutive role in meaning. 
These two understandings of text-context relations do not, of course, necessarily 
contradict one another. It is perfectly possible to describe text and context as co-
constitutive, to argue that each has a shaping role on the other. But Bakhtin never 
makes this claim explicitly, nor does he suggest whether there is a hierarchy of 
determination, or explicate the relations between textual and non-textual context. An 
ambiguity about the last surfaces strongly in his account of how the word 'exists' for 
the speaker. 
Therefore one can say that any word exists for the speaker in three aspects: as a 
neutral word of a language, belonging to nobody; as an other's word, which 
belongs to another person and is filled with the echoes of the other's utterance, 
and finally as my word for ... I am dealing with it in particular 
situation ... (p.88). 
As a unit within the system of a language, no one can claim ownership of the word, 
but these are not the conditions in which we know and use language (there is a strong 
similarity herewith Voloshinov's distinction between signal and sign ).49 The w.ord 
belongs to the other in the sense that it is charged with the accents of its previous usages 
which interpret and evaluate the 'reality' that it depicts. But it is also 'mine', the mine 
of my 'particular situation' with its particular co-ordinates of speaker and hearer, time, 
place and purpose. The constitutive role of textual context is relatively clear - other 
representations, extant or possible as anticipations, constrain 'mine'. But in what 
precise sense is the word 'mine'? And how does this relate to a 'particular situation'? 
If 'we speak only in definite speech genres', this 'mine' is both the product and the 
production of a context, in the ambiguous terms discussed above. And this reading 
would map with the polemic against parole understood as 'a completely free 
combination of forms of language' which is so marked in this text (p.81). In a footnote 
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he comments: 'Saussure ignores the fact that in addition to forms of language there are 
also forms of combinations of those forms, that is he ignores speech genres,.50 
-But there is also a suggestion that my 'particular situation' is not quite, never quite, 
a typical situation, or rather that this situation lies within the zone of a typicality but is 
not reducible to it - a suggestion which weakens the strong sense of genre identified 
above. The distinction between genre and utterance is, of course, theoretically 
necessary if their relations are to be understood, but Bakhtin seems to mean more than 
this. In the immediately preceding paragraph a different distinction is drawn. 
The word's generic expression - and its generic expressive intonation - are 
impersonal, as speech genres themselves are impersonal (for they are typical 
forms of individual utterances, but not the utterances themselves. But words 
can enter our speech from others' individual utterances, thereby retaining to a 
greater or lesser degree the tones and echoes of individual utterances (p.88, my 
emphasis). 
To distinguish between the typical 'intonation' or accentuality of a genre and that of an 
individual utterance, there must be a distinguishable individuality in the particular 
utterance which can override its impersonal generic inflection. Words can either 'enter 
our speech' through genre or through 'others' individual utterances'. The 'but' 
suggests an alternative entry point. But how does this accord with 'we speak only in 
definite speech genres'? What seems to surface here is a resistance to the implications 
of his own argument, a willingness to engage with the role of others' individual 
utterances - 'this is why the unique speech experience of each individual is shaped and 
developed in continuous interactions with others' individual utterances' (p.89) - but not 
with the more ordered institutional sociality that his own definition of genre would seem 
to suggest (the return to 'intonation' can perhaps be seen as evidence of this).51 
Accompanying this is a retreat from the typicality of situation, of extra-linguistic 
context: the unrepeatable utterance finds its complement in 'the unrepeatable individual 
context of the utterance' (p.88).52 
Whilst 'The Problem of Speech Genres' emphasises the heterogeneity of genre in 
general, it is in Bakhtin's other writings (especially those collected in The Dialogic 
Imagination) which offer the richest elaborations of how different genres respond to 
the heteroglossia. Central here are the set of distinctions through which he develops the 
concept of the novelistic. In Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy, Hirschkop argues 
that Tzvetan Todorov's formulation of Bakhtin's novel as 'the expression of the innate 
tendencies of language' is 'half-right' in the sense that 'Bakhtin never shakes off the 
desire to portray the most impressive and difficult achievements of modern culture as 
the setting loose of the dialogic powers stored up in the structures of ordinary 
discourse,53 This is clearly important for thinking language and culture as intertextual 
processes. If a certain zone of practice is severed from the rest in terms of its 
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operations and procedures, then the explanatory force of intertextuality as a general 
theory of how meaning is produced must obviously suffer. It would mean that some 
practices are intertextual (the novelistic, the carnivalesque) and others are not; and that 
there is some absolute boundary between the two types of practice which clearly 
weakens the notion orland force of permutation as the condition of possibility of text. 
But Todorov is only half right, Hirschkop argues 'because Bakhtin has incorporated 
"novelness" into his theory to begin with.,54 Hirschkop sees this as part of his 
commitment to always theorise language and culture as historical. This in turns draws 
attention to the ways in which intertextuality as a general theory of meaning is always 
also a historical theory: intertextuality is an ontological concept but one in which a 
historical process is always-already inscribed. 
What is also crucial here is the set of distinctions and oppositions through which 
Bakhtin elaborates the novelistic, which, like the poetic, is not a genre but a mode of 
discourse.55 It is, in part, defined against the poetic. Whilst 'the poet strips the word 
of other's intentions', seeking to rid the text of diverse. alien accents and participating 
in the centralising forces of literary language, the novelistic designates forms of writing 
which recognise the heteroglossia and represent its complex relations. 
The prose writer does not purge words of intentions and tones that are alien to 
him, he does not destroy the seeds of social heteroglossia embedded in words,· 
he does not eliminate those language characterisations and speech mannerisms 
... glimmering behind the words and forms ('Discourse in the Novel', pp.297-
298). 
Just as the novelistic is a shaping force that the poetic seeks to undo, so the poetic is an 
active agent in the production of the novelistic. But at the same time, the novelistic is 
defined in relation to other genres which are openly dialogic - a contrast which imagines 
the field of discourse as a whole. Reference, summary and citation are ubiquitous 
features of all language use from anecdote to learning the skills of recitation or precis at 
school.56 It is the particularity of the novelistic's dialogic that differentiates it from 
other dialogic genres. Whilst many genres incorporate other texts and other genres, 
these are usually kept separate from one another and from authorial discourse through 
the use of stylistic, typographical and design conventions. Within the novelistic these 
barriers are broken down and the discourse of the other can be detected within a single 
sentence or even within the same word.57 Many forms of writing transmit elements of 
the heteroglossia, but this is for Bakhtin, a practice governed by an extra-linguistic 
purpose; the novelistic represents the heteroglossia, it is 'its defining concern' and 
primary purpose to represent the utterance or utterance type itself (p.338).58 
Transmission is determined by an extra-linguistic purpose, whilst the focus of 
representation is the utterance or utterance type itself. 59 This definition of the novelistic 
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also shapes Bakhtin's understanding of novelistic composition, where one of the 
challenges for the author is 'the problem of representing the image of a language' 
(p.336). What is emphasised in Bakhtin's account of novelistic production is not only 
the diversity of language types within the novelistic text but simultaneously the 
organising, 'orchestrating' role of the author - selecting, combining, inflecting.60 
There is a tension in Bakhtin's writing here between his tendency to represent language 
and utterance as agencies and his characterisation of the author.61 Is the heteroglossia 
and its dynamic the origin of 'a' meaning which the author in some sense expresses? 
Or does the author have a distinguishable role which cannot be equated with such an 
idea of expression? There do not seem to be definitive answers. As Hirschkop points 
out, Bakhtin's 'idealised novelist', particularly in the texts written in the 1930s is also 
a philosopher and sociologist,62 No strong sense emerges of a Romantic author who 
possesses a distinct mode of knowledge which is inherently different and 
distinguishable from other kinds. Yet, at the same time, Bakhtin's argument that the· 
genres of artistic literature are the most conducive to individual style suggests a 
differential valuing of literary writing and authorship, more akin to the individual 
purposiveness of his early work. It is also interesting that this argument is made in 
'The Problem of Speech Genres', where the implications of typical genres and typical 
contexts are being resisted.63 
More gener-ally, what makes Bakhtin's accounts of dialogic processes so valuable 
is the variety of modes of intertextual practice he discusses, from its workings as the 
resisted reality of language practice in the poetic, through the detailed elaborations of 
double-voiced discourse and the hybrid utterance in Problems in Doestoevsky's Poetics 
and 'Discourse in the Novel', through the various histories of the novelistic utterance 
which are scattered throughout his writings and are the central component of 'From the 
Prehistory of Novelistic Discourse', to his most explicit discussion of genre in 
narrative terms, in 'Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel'.64 A number 
of the specific definitions and classifications he makes will be taken up in subsequent 
chapters. What is relevant here, is first, as noted above, the diversity, the many 
modes of 'being' intertextual, which include the myriad of utterance types which 
transmit, rather than 'represent' other languages, which do not break down the 
boundaries between utterances in a single hybrid construction, but seek to retain them. 
And whilst these are not types of discourse that Bakhtin tends to address in his 
analyses, their presence as categories makes their elaboration possible. Bakhtin's 
emphasis does however reflect his preference for and valorisation of certain modes of 
dialogic being. Like post-structuralism's tendency to valorise modernist writing, he 
justifies his choices, not as mere matters of aesthetic preference, but in terms of their 
relation to his definition of translinguistic reality. These are texts which articulate most 
clearly and explicitly, language 'being' language. This could suggest a more cynical 
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interpretation of the 'novelness' always inscribed in his theory of language. Does his 
theory of language exist to 'fit' his theory and preference for the various practices 
which make up the novelistic. This again might have serious implications for 
intertextuality as a ~eneral theory. But as a criticism it is unfounded, because the 
dynamic relation between the monologic and the dialogic is so resolutely the condition 
and process of all meaning. Bakhtin's various histories of the novelistic also suggest a 
productive refining of his account of textual context. The novelistic explicitly draws on 
and represents the heteroglossia, but he also identifies a particular zone of the 
heteroglossia, as an important textual context for the novelistic: its own history.65 
This suggests the ways in which utterances and utterance types tend to shape 
themselves in and against particular intertextual configurations. At the highest level of 
abstraction, every utterance is indeed part of a single dialogic chain. But Bakhtin's 
accounts of the novelistic suggest a way out of this truistic notion, towards a focus on 
historical patterns of textual relations.66 
Bakhtin's distinctive contribution is to explicitlyJormulate how language can at 
once be mine and the other's. But the terms of his formulation radically transform the 
concepts of all three terms: a language which is always languages and languages in 
practice, a speaker who is always-and-already part of a complex web of social 
interdependencies and a social world which is predicated on division and hierarchy. A 
contrast with Saussure makes the originality of Bakhtin's formulation. clear. Saussure 
clearly recognises not only the presence of dialects and registers within a national 
language but also the presence of conflict between literary language and local dialects.67 
He also clearly p~rceives such phenomena as, in part, political, institutional and 
historical processes. But this is all part of the terrain of 'external linguistics' that is 
excluded from his definition of langue. Excluded but also superseded: in effect 
multiplicity and conflict play no part in the system that is langue. Bakhtin not only 
extends the boundaries of linguistics but renders the external, the 'excluded' as its 
centre, proposing a radically different linguistic reality. It is this definition of language 
as mUltiple and as practice, as individual and social, that is the precondition of 
intertextuality, which can itself be understood as the dynamic relation between the two. 
What Bakhtin does not offer, as discussed above, is a definitive answer to the 
question of context. His concept of textual context is both rich in itself and suggestive, 
but his formulations of non-linguistic context are, in the senses considered above, 
either banal or compromised by a resistance to the implications of the social world that 
such formulations imply or imagine. It is at this point that the question of the political 
character of discourse surfaces, as does the type of society that Bakhtin imagines. 
Two astringent insights into Bakhtin's vision of culture and society are relevant here. 
The first is from Tony Crowley, who asks why monologism is never a positive value. 
If historical and political contexts are so important to Bakhtin, 'then it is possible that 
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in certain contexts a preference for heteroglossia and dialogism would be politically 
regressive,.68 Crowley makes an illuminating contrast with Gramsci's insistence on 
the need for a unifying language. This could expose a final formalism in Bakhtin's 
theory and a radical weakening of his concept of context which is subordinated to the 
overwhelmingly positive value which accrues to the dialogic. Second, Graham Pechey 
argues that Bakhtin only seems able to envisage a dichotomy between official and 
unofficial culture. 'The roll call of Bakhtin's literary heroes - Dante, Rabelais, Goethe, 
Dostoevsky - follows the same pattern: all spring from social formations which are 
either pre-bourgeois or 'world-historically' retarded in being quasi-feudal absolutisms'. 
69 The official culture may be feudal or Stalinist but the notion does not capture the 
complexity of capitalist cultural relations. This goes some way to accounting for 
Bakhtin's lack of interest in conflict within official or unofficial culture. This too has 
serious implications for the contexts which are imagined and retreated from in his 
various writings. These are issues to which I will return. 
3. Kristeva: more than neologism 
'More than binarism, dialogism may well become the basis of our time's intellectual 
structure'. This, the penultimate sentence of 'Word, Dialogue and Novel', is one of . 
Kristeva's many avowals of Bakhtin's importance.7o Here the a~c~nt is on his general 
theoretical value, iii particular, the critique of structuralism that dialogism makes 
possible; but Kristeva also acknowledges his role in her own intellectual development. 
71 Her early writings, in particular 'Word, Dialogue and Novel', 'The Ruins of a 
Poetics' and Le Texte du Roman are, in important senses, readings of Bakhtin which 
draw explicitly on many of his categories: the 'ambivalent' word, the dialogic, the 
novelistic, the carnivalesque and so on.n It is easy, in this context, to view 
Kristeva's role within this lineage as predominantly that of a circulator and 'translator', 
whether her Bakhtin is viewed as a productive elaboration and extension, or 
alternatively as wilful and tendentious.73 But this would severely underestimate her 
contribution. Kristeva draws out the full implications of the text as process and 
production. Her focus on the speaking subject - a psychic subject who is constituted in 
and against language - aligns subjectivity with textuality, as processes which are co-
constitutive. Further, whilst Bakhtin is centrally interested in the shifting hierarchies 
manifested by the utterances of characters and narrators, Kristeva locates these 
relations more rigorously within a concept of genre envisaged as the whole patterning 
of the text.74 It is with Le Texte Du Roman, which explicitly formulates the text as 
intertextual process and narrative that I will begin. 
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The title itself marks a displacement: inscribing what is conventionally conceived as 
a genre - the novel - but at the same time constituting another object within it - text - and 
suggesting its specificity within the 'genre': Le Texte. du Roman. At the very 
beginning of 'The Bounded Text', Kristeva asserts that the object of contemporary 
semiotics should not be 'a discourse' but 'several semiotic practices' which 'operate 
through and across language' (my emphasis).75 The immediately opens up a different 
way of conceiving the text. A strong stylistic contrast is produced between 'discourse' 
and 'practices', the former, singular and given, the latter, multiple and dynamic. The 
'several' also marks a modification of Bakhtin's dialogic. Asked to clarify the 
difference between Bakhtin's dialogic and her own concept of intertextuality in a 1985 
interview, Kristeva drew a distinction between the dialogic as the 'intersection of two 
voices in direct or indirect discourse' and intertextuality as 'the intersection of a number 
of voices, of a number of textual interventions,.76 In Kristeva's definition, the 
intersections of meaning which produce the text are multiplied and released from the 
intimations of a dialogue between two speakers. Kristeva's neologism therefore marks 
a distinctive displacement of the dialogic, definitively formulating the speaking subject 
within the text and giving a new emphasis to the relations between practices: the text 
as process or productivity. 
In this perspective, the text is defined as a trans-linguistic apparatus that 
redistributes the order of language 'by relating communicative speech, which 
aims to inform directly, to different kinds of anterior or synchronic utterances. 
The text is therefore a productivity ... (,The Bounded Text' p.36). 
The novel, seen as a text, is a semiotic practice in which the synthesised 
patterns of several utterances can be read (p.37). 
'Utterance' clearly invokes Bakhtin and it subsequently becomes clear that an utterance 
can be an utterance-type or genre.77 The text of the novel is not singular but plural: a 
historical genre conceived as the intersection of a multiplicity of utterances and utterance 
types. At the same time, text is also a critical concept ('seen as a text'), a perspective 
which makes it possible to theorise the multiplicity and productivity of the novel. It is 
the transforming relations between 'several semiotic practices' which produce meaning 
and it is this process of transformation which Kristeva calls intertextuality. 
The text is therefore a productivity, and this means: first, that its relationship 
to the language in which it is situated is redistributive (destructive-constructive), 
and hence can be better approached through logical categories rather than 
linguistic categories; and second, that it is a permutation of texts, an 
intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several utterances taken from other 
texts, intersect and neutralise each other (p.36). 
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The distinctive accent in Kristeva's definition is on the productivity or process that is 
text: the text as permutation or, as it is insistently iterated in Le Texte Du Roman, 
'transformation'.78 'Transformation' which is borrowed from the lexicon of 
transformational grammar, mainly acts here as a polemical retort to structuralism which 
posits the text as a realisation of a pre-existing structure, and in particular structuralist 
narratology.79 Bakhtin, hovering between a genre-governed typicality and a situation-
oriented uniqueness, and whose dialogic analyses explore the relations between 
distinguishable utterances, ca,nnot fully draw out the implications of the text as 
transformation (a 'redistribution' of language which is 'destructive-constructive'). 
Antoine de La Sale's lehan de Saintre, a proto-novel written in 1456, forms the 
basis for Kristeva's analysis in Le Texte du Roman.\ Her interest is in the processes 
by which the novel as text resignifies meanings or utterances from the 'General Text 
(Culture)' and how these various utterances operate together within the text (,The 
Bounded Text', p.36).80 She identifies a range of contemporary and anterior texts and 
genres present in the text: moral precepts, Latin citations (themselves from a wide 
range of genres: historical, biographical, philosophical, political, religious) epic 
poetry, courtly love poetry, and 'blazons' or street cries.81 All have a particular 
function and circulation within the General Text or culture and identifiable speaker-
addressee relations. But their conjunction in a new textual space produces new 
meanings: these genres are resignified. What also emerges here as distinctive and 
contrastive with Bakhtin is the relations between utterances within the text as whole . 
... laudatory utterances, known as blazons were abundant in France during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They come from a communicative discourse, 
shouted in public squares and designed to give direct information to the crowd 
on wars (the number of soldiers, their direction, armaments, etc.), or on the 
marketplace (the quality and price of merchandise) ('The Bounded Text', 
p.53). 
In the novel, these cries are transformed to function as a means of description 'of either 
objects (clothes, gifts and weapons) or events (the departure of troops, banquets and 
combats), (p.52). The extra-novelistic function of blazons - as direct information - is 
refunctioned in the novelistic context to produce a series of circumlocutions or 
'deviations' from the story' (p.52). They interrupt its unfoldi~g ire also 'complete in 
I-
themselves', introducing a distinctive temporal rhythm, repetition (such descriptions 
recur 'periodically'), into the narrative (p.52). The blazon also articulates a new set of 
know ledges and values, those of the emerging marketplace, which compete with and 
challenge another set of know ledges and values present in the proto-novel: the sacred 
know ledges presented as citation of religious texts, usually in Latin. The proto-novel 
is not only a specific plurality of utterances rather than a single genre but a space of 
transformation, of resignification. 
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This still leaves the question of what governs or orders this process of 
transformation. The intertextuality of lehan de Saintre is not the outcome of a random 
. process of appropriation from the General Text, any more than the relations of 
signification between utterances within it are haphazard. Both are governed by a 
relation between two conflicting ideologies. Kristeva is not content to leave ideology as 
an abstract force which shapes meaning, her interest is in process: how does ideology 
work to produce meaning? Early in 'The Bounded Text', Kristeva identifies the 
interest of lehan de Saintre as its 'transitory structure', located within and between 
two theories of meaning, one sacred, the other secular: the ideologemes of the symbol 
and the sign (p.42). Kristeva develops the concept of the ideologeme from Bakhtin and 
Medvedev's The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship, where the ideologeme 
registers both the literary text's imbrication in ideologies - 'the literary reflects only the 
ideological horizon, which itself is only the refracted reflection of real existence' - and 
the specific work that the literary does with ideologies: literature is not the 'simple 
servant and. transmitter' of ideologies.82 In Kristeva, as for Bakhtin and Medvedev, 
the ideologeme is a unit of ideology which confirms the relations between the subject 
and her/his object of knowledge.83 This clarifies the sense of Kristeva's section 
heading 'The Utterance as Ideologeme' (,The Bounded Text', p.36). The utterance is 
always-already ideological as it is always spoken and spoken from a particular social 
and historical place: there is no linguistic meaning which precedes ideology.84 
In Le Texte du Roman, Kristeva examines two theories of meaning, that of the 
sign and the symbol as ideologemes, identifying their meanings within the General 
Text, and the work they do and that is done on them within the novel.85 She argues 
that it is the emergence of the sign - understood here in broadly Saussurean terms - that 
makes the novel form possible. Most simply, it represents the beginning of a 
secularisation of meaning. The meaning of the symbol is derived exclusively from the 
universal that it marks which always fixes and predetermines it: the symbol is believed 
to mean what it means prior to any instance of use. Its authority is educed from its 
. connection to the transcendent sphere that the universal occupies. By contrast, the 
ideologeme of the sign derives it meaning and authority from the singularity of the 
object it represents and from its conjunction and combination with other signs. The 
symbol's logic of combination is disjunctive - contraries of all kinds must be kept 
separate. The sign's logic is non-disjunctive - contraries can be kept separate or 
conjoined (,The Bounded Text', pp.38-41). The novel is the first genre to be 
organised by the ideologeme of the sign which, Kristeva argues, challenged and 
replaced the symbol between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. But although it 
resituates meaning in a monist framework, it also absorbs and transforms aspects of 
the symbol. Specifically, the logic of the sign recodes genres which developed under 
the ideologeme of the symbol to obey its own logic. Courtly love poetry is one 
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example. The figure of the Lady, exclusively emblematic of virtue'in a disjunctive 
arrangement is, in the proto-novel, rendered ambiguous: she is also duplicitous. This 
has important implications for the narrative. The eponymous hero reads the Lady as 
alternatively vicious and virtuous, but he cannot recognise what the narrator does: that 
the Lady is both. This becomes the source of Saintre's 'defeat'. 
Saintre's defeat - and the end of the narrative - are due to this error of 
substituting an utterance accepted as disjunctive and uni-vocal for the non-
disjunctive function of the utterance (p.44). 
The logic of the emergent sign (and its relation to the symbol) is, for Kristeva, 
articulated at every level of the novel and makes possible the type of story and 
narration, the characterology and figures that are typical of the novel. 
All figures found in the novel (as heir to the carnival) that can be read in two 
ways are organised on the model of this function [i.e. non-disjunction] ruses, 
treason, foreigners, androgynes, utterances that can be doubly interpreted or 
have double destinations ... The trajectory of the novel would be impossible 
without this non-disjunctive function (p.43, my [ ] parenthesis). 
Important here is the emphasis on particular types of action and character. Indeed for 
Kristeva, it is the logic of the sign that makes the development of a realist 
characterology possible. Epic, by contrast, ordered by the logic of the symbol 'can ... 
engender neither personalities nor psychologies' (p.49). But this non-disjunction is 
itself constrained by the manner in which the authorial position is constructed. The 
narrative is itself pre-programmed: its apparent arbitrary ending is an illusion. 
The text opens with an introduction that shapes (shows) the entire itinerary of 
the novel. La Sale knows what his text is ('three stories') and for what reason it 
exists (a message to Jean D'Anjou) .... All that remains to tell, that is, to fill 
in, to detail, what was already conceptualised, known, before any contact 
between pen and paper 'the story as word upon word it proceeds' (p.42). 
Just as the symbol's meaning is always-already given, so finally is the narrative that 
the novel tells. The ideologeme of the sign, by transferring the symbol's authority to 
the implied author limits the openness of the nov:elistic text. The sign, because it does 
not fully break with the symbol, enacts a closure on meaning by locating its source in 
the author. The sign's logic therefore does not only impact on narrative, it shapes a 
distinctive figure: the author of the novel. This also marks a break with Bakhtin's 
author as orchestrator, who is ambiguously both within and without the text. In 
Kristeva a distinctive authorial subject is constituted by and in the genre of the novel. 
The proto-novel therefore articulates a conflict within the General Text of the period 
between sacred and secular culture. The novel both appropriates congruent practices -
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the blazon for example - and recodes opposing practices of representation according to 
its secuhirising logic. This contrast and conflict between secular and sacred is an 
epochally formulated version of a familiar narrative which identifies a set of contexts 
which are seen to shape 'the rise of the novel': the development of a print culture, and 
more generally 'a culture of exchange' or nascent capitalism, secularisation and the 
cancellation and preservation of divine authority in 'man', most particularly in the 
figure of the author and so on.86 It is rendered unfamiliar by its transposition into the 
domain of discourse - these contexts are formulated as textual (the General Text of 
history and society). Like Voloshinov and Bakhtin, Kristeva formulates a powerful 
concept of textual context. Text, conceived as intertextuality, becomes a critical 
concept and perspective, a way of understanding the dynamic relations between any 
genre or text and the General Text. The General Text is the constituting context for the' 
novel, but the novel becomes a constituent in the General Text. 
There seems to be a problem, however, with the way that Kristeva aligns symbol 
and sign with sacred and secular - it seems too convenient, too ready a fit. Leaving 
aside the question of historical evidence (which lies beyond the scope of this 
discussion), symbol and sign sometimes appear to express the sacred and the secular, 
an expressivism which is masked (though it may also be undone) by the insistence on 
the work that the ideologemes of sign (and symbol) do on the novel. Can the sign 
plausibly be conceived for example as the exclusive precondition of 'modern', realist 
character? Can all genres be typologised as being ordered exclusively by one of two 
theories of meaning?87 
The tenuousness of this logic is further suggested by another text of Kristeva's, 
'The Adolescent Novel', presented at a conference in 1987, seventeen years after Le 
Texte du Roman.88 Kristeva discusses the same proto-novel, but now she insistently 
repeats its full title Petit lehan de Saintre (which is given only in the bibliography of Le 
Texte du Roman).89 Here the text is of interest as a demonstration of the 'adolescent 
economy of writing' that, she argues, orders much of novelistic production.90 No 
mention is made of her earlier text or the ordering, transforming logic of the sign. 
Indeed, what is shown to organise utterance relations here is a particular kind of 
psychic economy. The ambivalence of the lady's utterance and its effects are now 
conceived as Jehan's moving away from incestuous desire (hence the importance of 
'petit' - he is a pageboy) to identification: he learns to speak the double language of the 
lady (p.13).91 This, at the very least, suggests a weakness of connection between 
symbol and sign and the ordering and functioning of utterances, which are revealed as 
disposable in their very absence. 
'The Adolescent Novel' also illustrates Kristeva's abiding preoccupation with the 
speaking subject as psychic subject. In 'The Ruins of a Poetics', she suggests that 
whilst Bakhtin makes 'no mention of Freud ... [he] was to study the "word" as a 
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territory in which instances of discourse confront each other, "I's" which speak. 
"Dialogic" is the term which indicates the discourse belongs doubly to an "I" and to the 
other'.92 Whilst Bakhtin's discussion of genre implies that the subject is, in part at 
least, constituted in language, this is not explicitly developed. Kristeva's insertion of 
a psychoanalytically conceived subject into the signifying process is a distinctive 
extension, creating a further tension in the relation between language as mine and the 
other's. At the same time, this focus on the subject is conceived as a political challenge 
to linguistics, including structural linguistics, which has limited the implications of the 
sociality of language and in so doing, 
restricts the value of its discovery to the field of practices which do no more 
than subserve the principle of social cohesions, of the social contract ... a 
semiotics that records the systematic, systematising or informational aspect of 
signifying practices. 93 
By focusing on the communicative and systematic aspects of signifying systems, 
semiotics tends to ignore the relations between the speaking subject and signifying 
system: either the subject is ignored altogether or assumed as a 'transcendental ego,.94 
Such a semiotics can only imagine practices which confirm a consensual notion of the 
subject and social relations. In 'The Ethics of Linguistics' and 'The System and the 
Speaking Subject', Kristeva develops a notion of 'poetic language' which challenges 
linguistics as it is currently constituted. Originating in lakobson's definition, which 
she describes as the 'reordering of everyday communication', the poetic is what is 
conventionally excluded from linguistics.95 Kristeva asserts a political potential in 
making central what lies outside the boundary or on the periphery: 'language, and thus 
sociability, are defined by boundaries admitting of upheaval, dissolution and 
transformation'.96 Kristeva reconceptualises poetic language in terms of the relation 
between the subject - conceived in psychoanalytic terms - and the system of 
signification. In poetic language, she identifies a dialectic tension between the body as 
it attempts and desires to represent itself as rhythm (fundamentally incompatible with 
the unified subject that language as system and law proposes), and the ego, the 'I' that 
seeks and desires expression and representation 'within the space of language, crown, 
system: no longer rhythm, but sign, word, structure, contract, constraint'.97 In 
both texts, Kristeva examines this necessary conflict as semiotic productivity, 
returning to and refining it in her exploration of modernist poetics: La Revolution du 
Langage Poetique9~8 There the poetic is elaborated as 'the inclusion of the semiotic in 
the symbolic',99 where the semiotic is no longer a practice of signification but the trace 
of a 'pre-representative production' which precedes the subject's entry into the 
symbolic and the division and unity it insists upon.IOO It is a work WIthout value 
which is 'distinct ... from exchange,.IOI The symbolic is the 'domain of 
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intersubjectivity, thus of all human relations'. 102 What is crucial here is the 
relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic. Crucially, the semiotic does not 
'know' language as law. This is the precondition of its politically transgressive 
potential. It is not the other of law in the sense of being defined by it. But this is only 
the precondition of its radical potential. Because the semiotic does not know law, it 
cannot challenge it and in this sense be constituted by it. What gives the semiotic its 
disruptive potential is its manifestation in writing in and through the symbolic. 'The 
order of language has the role of enabling as well as holding in place that which both 
threatens and makes it possible,.103 This also suggests the political force that Kristeva 
attributes to the symbolic, how difficult it is to challenge. The relations between the 
semiotic and the symbolic suggest some of the ways in which Kristeva's account of 
intertextuaJity develops its 'intrapsychic aspects'. It introduces another temporality - the 
psychic temporality of the subject - into the already complex historical time of the text, 
a temporality which is also inscribed rhetorically as division and conflict. It also 
suggests that the contingencies of textual production are not only shaped by textual 
repertoires which inscribe the subject in society and history, but by the subject's 
psychodynamic relations with those discourses. We may know a language (in 
Bakhtin's sense) and be pragmatically fluent in it, yet the psychodynamics of a 
particular context may render us incapable of speaking it - to take one obvious example. 
Kristeva's contribution to the lineage of theories considered here is threefold. First, 
she pluralises the doubling of language that Bakhtin's dialogic implies, and extends the 
theoretical force and potential of the text as 'intersection and permutation. Through this 
emphasis on process she avoids the problems inherent in Bakhtin's unresolved 
insistence on the utterance as 'unique' and 'typical'. For Kristeva the text is indeed 
unique and typical (though neither of these terms belong to her lexicon), it is like those 
utterances within the General Text that it incorporates, but unlike them in the sense that 
it transforms them, figuring them into new patterns and logics. Second, Kristeva's 
theorisation of the speaking subject who is inscribed and produced within the text as 
intertextuality, who is moreover conceptualised psychoanalytically, means that 
psychic division and conflict are rhetorically inscribed in the text and its process of 
production, just as other social conflicts are. Third, Kristeva's interest in narrative 
(whether as the residue and critique of structuralist narratology or, as later, as a 
process understood predominantly in psychoanalytic terms) suggests the possibility of 
thinking genres, not only as a plurality and transformation of texts and text-types, but 
as sets of narrative possibilities, which enable a focus on the patternings of the text as a 
whole. 
62 
4. The strengths and weaknesses of intertextual theories of production 
At the beginning of this chapter, I proposed that this lineage of intertextual theories had 
a theoretical value, actual and potential, that is distinct from other attempts to figure 
meaning as work done in and through the already-written. Here, I will accent this 
value and its particularity, and, in the process, consider to what extent the weaknesses 
in intertextual theories of reception are consequent upon problems within these theories. 
As I argued above, the return to intertextual theories of production is necessary because 
of certain fundamental problems in contemporary formulations of intertextual 
interpretation or reading. Specifically, I identified a strong inclination to collapse 
reading and writing - an equation which makes it impossible to theorise the relations 
between production and interpretation; a more general vagueness around (and I use 
'around' deliberately) the types of process involved; and the dominant tendency to 
understand intertextuality exclusively as unfixity and instability in terms which license 
reader autonomy. The first question which inevitably suggests itself is this. Is there an 
equivalent collapsing the other way: do intertextual theories of production posit writing 
as reading? The answer must be no .. For although in V oloshinov, Bakhtin and 
Kristeva, writing (or speaking) always involves the imagining or constitution of a 
reader (hearer) - clearly important for any theorisation of intertextual interpretation - and 
although writing is clearly a process which includes reading, a formulation which is 
" most explicit in Kristeva and in the central role that Bakhtin assigns to evaluation within 
meaning production, there is no breaking down of the one into the other. 104 Bakhtin's 
refusal to grant the reader (however 'active') rights over the meanings of a text, his 
problematic suggestion that although readings of the text change, these are in some 
sense always possibilities that the text and the author-orchestrator licenses, clearly 
differentiates writing from reading - though not in terms which I would wish to 
pursue. l05 As with Barthes, these accounts of meaning draw attention to the 
congruences between reading and writing, not their identity. And these have 
significant value for trying to think intertextual interpretation. The central place of an 
always social value within textual production is especially suggestive for thinking about 
the role of evaluation in the processes of reading and its relation to interpretation. But 
there is nothing in this trajectory which dissolves writing into reading, paving the way 
for the reversal which is a contemporary commonplace. The writings of Voloshinov, 
Bakhtin and Kristeva offer the possibility, at least, of theorising the relations between 
production and interpretation. 
Second, within this trajectory there is a strong commitment to identifying and 
explaining the processes of textual production. In"the introduction, I suggested that 
with the exception of Riffaterre, intertextual theories of reading shared a vagueness 
about process - beyond the important assumption that reading was not a simple 
decoding process. This cannot be said of the writings of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and 
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Kristeva. The various attempts to theorise the processes of meaning are not without 
their problems, but this should not be conflated with a flight from the question. In the 
most general terms, these accounts of textual production all develop out of an explicit 
theorisation of language. An obvious point, but one that is no means shared by all 
'intertextual'theories. Thus, whilst the concept of constitutive textual relations is the 
strong presupposition of Harold Bloom and Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, and, to 
a lesser degree, Elaine Showalter, in none of these is the textual defined in relation to 
an explicit theory of language which purports to be explanatory.lo6 If a limit needs to 
be set to what is classified as an intertextual theory, and I would strongly argue that it 
does, then the presence within it of an explicit account of meaning in general seems to· 
be a good place to start. 
The most significant contribution to the question of process is, without doubt, the 
ways in which text-context relations are imagined and, in particular, the development 
of a concept of textual context. Intertextuality is not only a theory of text and textual 
production but textual context. Context can, of course, be rendered as anything from 
an irrelevance to fundamentally constitutive; and its relations to text can be figured in 
terms of parity and disparity, in various forms and to various degrees. In Voloshinov, 
Bakhtin and Kristeva context is formulated as textual (predominantly at least) and 
constitutive of text. Text and context are necessarily bound in a dynamic and historical 
process: texts become contexts. The text is at once inseparable from context, present 
within it and constitutive of it, and distinct: it permutes the textual material that it 
configures. This broad outline is shared by intertextual theories of reception but there 
also important differences which also distinguish this lineage from other intertextual 
theories of production. Here, the complex chains of verbal interaction, the 
heteroglossia and the General Text are all concepts of context which articulate the 
contestation between dominant and subordinate social forces (even though in Bakhtin 
and Kristeva this relation tends to be over-schematised), making context multiple and 
socially conflictual. This distinguishes it from Riffaterre's formulation where the 
relations between context and text are inscribed in terms of literary criteria (convention 
and innovation) which exclude the social from textual production. But it is also this 
emphasis on 'the text of history and society' that inscribes an important difference 
between this trajectory and Derrida's iterable sign. For whilst the argument that 
citationality is the general and necessary condition of language conceived as writing is 
formally congruent with the already-written that is so central to Bakhtin and Kristeva, 
citationality for him is neither the production nor the effect of conflictual social relations 
and socially contested meanings. 107 
A much more generalised division emerges in the different ways in which text-
context relations are conceived as historical. That meaning is historical is a 
commonplace of most intertextual theories of production and reception; It is the 
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meanings of 'historical' that requires attention. In the writings of V oloshinov, Bakhtin 
and Kristeva, the sense emerges - often implicit and never fully explicated - that 
meaning is complexly historical. 108 Voloshinov's distinction between immediate and 
'broader' contexts, Bakhtin's narratives of the historical forms of the dialogic, and 
Kristeva's insistence on text and culture as composed of both contemporary and 
'anterior' signifying practices, all open up the possibility of theorising context and text 
as complexly historical. These formulations therefore challenge the 'localising' 
tendencies in new historicist reading practices with their strong tendency to presuppose 
the absoluteness otherness of text and reader. Too often, intertextual theories of 
reception tend to conceive history and therefore meaning exclusively in terms of 
change, in the process losing sight of the ways in which historical process is always 
also continuity. The'inter-hyphen-textual', which named or not has had such impact 
in cultural studies, is a strong instance of this context-as-change formula which 
authorises the claim that the text has no determinate meaning in itself. Change and 
unfixity are prioritised. The banalisation of history within intertextual accounts of 
reception is licensed by a text-becomes-text-becomes-context narrative, but it is more 
forcefully shaped by a more general theoretical tendency - the war on 'nature' and 
universalism - which often seems to make historicising continuities unnecessary or 
suspect. The propensity to focus almost exclusively on one modality of a process is 
also strongly marked in the ways the production of meaning comes to be conceived 
almost exclusively as a process of unfixing. De Certeau and Chartier's metaphorics of 
the text as a plethora of fragments invoke incompleteness and multiplicity to shatter any 
concept of the text as a unity definitively aligned with the forces of authority and 
determination. 109 In the writings of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva meaning is 
always understood as a process of both fixing and unfixing. Voloshinov's 
identification of the process whereby a dominant social formation seeks to reproduce 
and generalise its values, Bakhtin's account of the role of 'literary' language and 
Kristeva's account of the dynamics between semiotic and symbolic all illustrate how 
meaning is, within this lineage, always a dynamic between fixing and unfixing. 
Consensual and authoritative meanings are always part of textual production, just as 
those which contest them are. Dominant and subordinate social forces are always 
involved in both processes. The importance of genre in these theories acknowledges the 
relative stability of both texts and contexts, even though this is sometimes resisted, 
most clearly by Bakhtin. Finally, this lineage makes it possible to develop a graduated 
formulation of the permutation that text is, from minor variation to radical 
transformation: change itself is not monovalent. 
Bakhtin's concept of the heteroglossia and Kristeva's General Culture are ways of 
conceiving textual context which necessarily bind both text and (textual) context to 
history and society as a whole. The strongest contrast here is with Harold Bloom's 
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concept of context as a specifically literary corpus which is constituted and reconstituted 
by the desires and anxieties of the individual writer, so rendering the non-literary an 
inert factor in literary textual production. IID Indeed this insistence on context and 
culture as the totality of signifying practices and their relations, is a powerful counter to 
any cultural theory which constructs an unbreachable boundary between one set of 
signifying practices - identified as literary or 'popular', or in terms of gender, 
sexuality, race, ethnicity or nationality - and others, asserting as it does the 
constitutive relationality of social difference. I I I An exhaustive elaboration of the 
meanings of a particular text within the field of signification as a whole is clearly 
impossible in practical terms. But a broad commitment to recognising the place of texts 
and genres within the general pattern of cultural relations and in particular their status 
and value is of central importance to thinking about interpretative processes. If 
Bakhtin's discussions of novelistic tradition are developed further, it becomes possible 
to see how certain patterns of textual configuration are much more or less probable or 
possible than others. This in tum has implications for thinking about the distribution of 
know ledges within and across reading constituencies and why certain know ledges are 
more or less likely to be mobilised in reading. 
These theories also share a valuable and rigorous concept of theoretical practice. 
Chartier's recasting of multiplicity and permutation as fragmentation is also a weak 
form of a much more general tendency: to turn what is, most explicitly in Kristeva, a 
self-conscious and explicit theoretical practice into the general condition of all reading. 
In the introduction, I noted that the modal status of reading in many intertextual 
accounts was frequently unclear: is this how we do read, might read, should read? 
Thus, whilst for Barthes, 'writing' (ecriture) and the writerly are critical concepts 
which expose the practices of filiation or the limited plural of realism, Fiske, 
translating the writerly into the 'producerly' in his discussion of television, renders it a 
straightforward empirical category, so making the televisual text always radically open 
to any producer-viewer's transformations. 112 What is lost here is the ideological work 
that author, genre, tradition and so on do to delimit and attempt to fix meaning. 
Contrast this with Kristeva's focus on the delimiting effects of the author-subject 
produced by the early novel or Bakhtin's account of the true and unreal character of the 
forces that seek to unify the heteroglossia. In much contemporary literary and cultural 
theory it is as if these mythologies, once identified as such, cease to exist. 
At the most general level, this trajectory understands theoretical practice as critical. 
This is most explicit in Kristeva. 
At every moment of its elaboration, semiology thinks its object, its instrument 
and their relations, thus thinks itself, and becomes, in turning back upon itself 
the theory of the science that it is. This means that semiology is in every case a 
re-evaluation of its object and/or its models, a critique of its models (thus of the 
sciences from which they are borrowed) and of itself (as a system of constant 
truths). 113 
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A theoretical practice should itself be a 'productivity', remaking its objects, itself and 
the relations between them. Crucial here is the elaboration of a theory which can 
challenge and displace the very ground of its operation. Kristeva's casting of poetic 
language as a theory of language, her centring of it against the languages of 
'communication' which structural and generative linguistics predict and constitute is, in 
this respect, exemplary. This understanding of theoretical practice, (present in 
different ways in Voloshinov and Bakhtin) is a strong counter to many contemporary 
invocations of intertextuality, where a particular signifying practice is evidenced as the 
exemplification of intertextual or, more broadly post-structural theories of language. 
Thus, so-called quintessentially post-modem practices such as the pastiche of various 
historical registers in literary fiction, or electronic hypertext are offered up as the 
evidence or 'proof' (positivistic) of the validity of intertextual theories. George P. 
Landow's work is a striking instance of this tendency which once more banalises the. 
relations between theory and practice, where the discrepancy that makes Bakhtin and 
Kristeva's work so rewarding is lost and 'theory' and practice simply license and 
exemplify one another. 114 
All this said, it is also clear that this trajectory does not offer either a complete or 
wholly plausible account of textual production. There are two types of problem. The 
firstl0cu~,;on the processes of writing or textual production as intertextual, the s~cond.· 
on the broader contours of intertextuality as a theory of culture as process. Many of 
these issues will be taken up and discussed in chapter three but some pointers can be 
laid down in passing. First, whilst Kristeva, above all, is explicitly interested in 
theorising the subject, as a psychic subject, and more generally as a social subject 
within language, there is little interest here in specifying context from the standpoint of 
the writing or speaking subject, the subset of textual knowledge that is hers and how 
this positions her within the General Culture and, in particular, its dominant values. 
Second, whilst the concept of the intertextual word indeed defines the minimal unit of 
discourse, its relation to the discourse categories which are attenuated from it - the 
'single' utterance and the intersection of utterances that constitute a larger and more 
complete text - is problematic. The word as the minimal unit of meaning is clearly 
usually more multiple and more unfixed when it is contextualised in relation to the 
totality of the heteroglossia, than when it is contextualised within an utterance or a text. 
The relations between word, utterance and text cannot be fully grasped by attenuation 
and correspondence. The delimitations of meaning that these categories of discourse 
can exert on one another also need to be taken account of. Third, whilst Bakhtin, in 
his discussions of the hybrid utterance, demonstrates a strong interest in what might be 
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termed the relative signifying force that different utterances have within a text, this is 
neither fully explicitated or developed in relation to genre. Genres intersect and 
permute one another within a text but usually one is dominant in terms of the meanings 
it delimits. 1 IS Gothic is a frequent visitor to nineteenth century realist novels, but it is 
usually subordinated to the demands of realist representation. When Pip encounters the 
apparitional Miss Haversham for the first time, we never really hesitate between a 
natural and supernatural explanation of who or what he is 'really' seeing, to follow 
Todorov's definition. 116 Subordinated but also transformed. Gothic functions here to 
reinforce the 'plausible' psychology that is central to realism: the child who is socially 
out of his depth, the embittered jilted bride. A focus on the relative signifying force of 
utterances within the text can open up further ways of thinking about how textual 
relations are ordered within the text. 
The second set of problems, which concern intertextuality as a theory of culture, 
mark out a broader and more diffuse terrain but one that is also highly pertinent to 
theorising interpretation. The epigraph from Barthes which began'this chapter has a 
double intent. Within this lineage there is a marked interest in linguistic and textual 
form, from the modalities of reported 'speech' to the narrative patternings of particular 
genres which is oriented by a critical engagement with Russian Formalism. But 
attention to form is never an end in itself, nor an autonomous answer to questions 
about the dynamics and distinctiveness of literary or poetic language; it is a key means 
by which textual relations can be shown to inscribe social relations, conceived 
historically. In this sense it can be said that for Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva, a 
lot of formalism brings history 'back' (if they ever left it behind in the first place). This 
is not an uncontroversial statement, particularly with respect to Kristeva. Simon 
Dentith, for example, contrasting Kristeva with Bakhtin argues that she 'effectively 
deracinates the signifying process', making meaning the consequence of 'purely 
textual operations independent of historical location'. 1 17 Yet it is difficult to equate 
these 'purely textual operations' with the historical contexts so strongly marked in Le 
Texte du Roman, or the critique that Kristeva, through her reading of Bakhtin, makes 
of Russian Formalism and her affirmation of the value of what she calls Bakhtin's 
'historical poetics'.118 
There is however a sense in which a certain formalism can be seen to weaken the 
claim of intertextuality to be a historical theory of textual production. The valorisation 
, of certain signifying practices by Bakhtin and Kristeva sometimes take priority and set 
limits to the ways in which text-context relations can be theorised. Crowley's argument 
that Bakhtin is incapable of imagining a historical context in which monologic practices 
might be politically progressive can also be applied to Kristeva's strong privileging of 
modernist writing. And indeed, some of the gendered and post-colonial readings of 
intertextuality duplicate the same error, identifying monologism exclusively with 
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patriarchal or colonial practices. 119 What is at issue here is not the autonomy of 'textual 
operations' but the theoretical effects of a valorisation which can render context 
theoretically subordinate to text. 
The second problem is that none of these writers consider the ways in which 
institutions shape signifying practices and their relations, or make any attempt to 
theorise institutions. This is perhaps a more permissible absence in Voloshinov given 
the explicitly programmatic form of the book. Pechey's contrast of Bakhtin with 
Foucault exposes the former's seeming unwillingness or inability to theorise 'the 
institutional sites in which the complex relations of discourse and power are actually 
negotiated'.120 Kristeva's position is equally problematic. In 'The Ethics of 
Linguistics', she declares that 'the term "poetry" has meaning only insofar as it makes 
this kind of studies acceptable to' various educational and cultural institutions' (p.2S), 
before proposing her own definition. This at once acknowledges the role of institutions 
in the production of meaning and value, and dispatches it. What is the relation 
between poetry (and Literature more generally) as it is constituted by various 
institutions and her definition of its practice? Willing to acknowledge the limits to 
meaning that particular genres produce, she does not explore the boundaries that 
institutions establish between clusters of signifying practices. Working with a literary 
corpus, she does not, as John Frow argues, take account of 'the mediation of the 
literary system' which significantly constrains the possibilities of the literary in any 
context where Literature is an established site of value. 121 This weakness marks a 
difference from a number of accounts of intertextual reception, where focus on reading 
practices and/or reading formations marks just such an interest in the institutional 
contexts of reading. 
In the introduction I noted how 'naturally' certain categories and practices asserted 
themselves in the encounter with an established literary text - how readily, for 
example, the inscription of an author entered the analysis of Emma. The author-
function proposes a particular set of textual know ledges and textual relations: the other 
novels of Austen, the classification of Emma as a 'mature' work, biographical 
knowledge and so on. 122 Beyond this, the literary status of the novel proposes various 
relations with other literary texts. Like Great Expectations, Emma is a bildungsroman, 
a genre to be sure, but one with unimpeachable literary credentials, and there are many 
other possibilities. At the furthest limits of classification lies a relation with the literary 
as a whole: we may note in Emma, the Shakespearean comedy staples of playacting, 
deception and misunderstanding. But at the same time of course the literary sets 
boundaries to these know ledges and relations. We are far less likely to interpretatively 
configure Emma with the contemporary Hollywood genre of romantic comedy (despite 
contemporary Hollywood adaptations of Austen, including Emma). 123 Various criteria 
of difference enter to render such relations less plausible: medium (but what about 
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Shakespeare?), too temporally distant from one another (but what about 
Shakespeare?). And therefore, whilst it is, of course, possible to construct contexts 
where such a patterning of textual relations was mobilised and indeed legitimated - a 
pedagogic context is one - such an intertextual context evidently has less force, is much 
less likely to be stabilised and reproduced as an interpretative framework within the 
General Text of contemporary Britain, than Austen's literary intertextuallocation. Just 
as the relations and non-relations between texts are ordered in the General Culture by a 
whole range of institutional practices, so they are ordered in the form of the textual 
know ledges of readers. 
The recast formalism of Bakhtin and Kristeva and the general absence of interest in 
institutional questions, which have particular pertinence to the reproduction of cultural 
value are indeed problems - and ones to which I will return. But what I believe this 
return to this lineage of theories has demonstrated is that there is little to encourage the 
dissolution of reading into writing, the general vagueness about interpretative 
processes, the almost exclusive fixation on unfixity and the libertarian reader that are 
the dominants of intertextual theories of reading. Such positions and arguments are not 
logically consequent upon the writings of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva, although 
there are certain ambiguities which can license or legitimate such developments. But at 
the same time, what this return also indicates is that a fully explanatory account of the 
processes of intertextual interpretation cannot exclusively be theorised out of this 
lineage. As noted above, there are weaknesses and gaps in the accounts of process 
which cannot be generated or developed from these accounts. There is another 
tradition, equally committed to explaining the always context-bound character of 
meaning, one that focuses on the relations between the production of meaning and its 
:r: 
interpretation, a tradition to which,will now turn: pragmatics. 
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narrative: 'Forms of Time .. .' is the classic instance. But although here he produces a developmental 
account of the novelistic chronotope and its relation to narrative, this is not discussed in terms of the 
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Chapter Two: Inferential Theories 
'" I do not think that meaning is essentially connected with convention. What it is 
essentially connected with is some way of fixingwhcit sentences mean: convention 
is indeed one of these ways but it is not the only one (Paul Grice).1 
The notion of inference is important because language itself is ambiguous, vague 
and fragmentary (Gert Rickhart, Wolfgang Schnotz and Hans Strohner),z 
1. Pragmatics: a sketch 
Some definitions of the object of pragmatics are disarmingly simple: 'language use', 
'the pairing of a sentence and a context'; and, most simply of all, 'utterances,.3 
While the first and third suggest immediate parallels with Voloshinov, Bakhtin and 
Kristeva, these are of limited value unless the specificity of pragmatic enquiry is 
established.4 Further, the account of interpretation which I will be focusing on here, 
Relevance theory, itself has to be situated; in particular, its a-typicality and 
idiosyncracy have to be delineated if its strengths and weaknesses are to be understood. 
This requires not only a sketch of pragmatics (this section) but also some discussion of 
the ways in which human inferential abilities have been theorised (section two), given 
the central role they are allocated in Relevance. 
The definitions of the pragmatic object offered above share two features. First they 
mark a preoccupation with definitions of spoken discourse. For although there is an 
increasing body of work in pragmatics on written and print discourse, speech retains a 
special place. Second, these definitions are clearly relational: not language in the 
ab~tract (as system: langue or competence); more than sentences: 'utterance' is a 
contrastive to 'sentence' conceived as a set of exclusively linguistic properties (although 
an: utterance can of course be less than a sentence defined minimally as noun phrase 
plus verb phrase). The utterance is a combination of linguistic and non-linguistic 
properties: it is spoken by someone, at a particular time and place, in a particular 
situation. The utterance 'it's hot' has certain invariable linguistic properties: it contains 
certain word classes (pronoun, verb, adjective), it has a declarative form and so on; 
and each instantiation of it will contain these. Yet 'it' may refer to the weather, a bowl 
of soup, the temperature in a room, or (in a slightly archaic idiom) a song or an item 
of clothing. If 'it' refers to the weather, the attitude of the speaker to the heat of the 
day may be one of enthusiasm, disappointment or irritation. The temperature of the 
bowl of soup may be a matter of pleasure or pain, it might be a warning (you may burn 
your tongue) or a polite imperative (it's ready to drink now but it won't stay hot for 
long) and so on. Central here is the idea that linguistic meaning is not the whole story, 
that the linguistically encoded meaning of an utterance is not, or at least, may not, 
determine its full meaning. Pragmatics as a field of enquiry is predicated on this, on 
the gaps, differences and discrepancies between sentence meaning and utterance 
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meaning. Its right to existence is staked on it and a number of questions follow. What 
are the best ways to describe these differences? Are they contingent features of 
communication or are they constitutive? How wide or narrow might the gaps be? And 
how might we explain them? If utterance meaning is not wholly encoded in the 
utterance, is it encoded elsewhere, for example in features of the situation? If so, 
how do hearers decode such meanings, which must clearly involve non-linguistic 
knowledge?5 Are there then 'pragmatic' rules or principles which govern utterance 
interpretation? But, on the other hand, is non-linguistic meaning encoded at all? Are 
there other processes that might govern utterance interpretation? Are these specific to 
communication, or, are they are more general cognitive principles?6 The gap between 
coded meaning and interpretation that pragmatics is predicated on will be familiar to 
those working within contemporary cultural and literary theory but what follows is not. 
In pragmatics, this founding assumption of discrepancy does not entail that 
interpretation as both process and 'result' is somehow less constrained, more 'open', 
and various, as it is so frequently presumed to be in cultural theory. As the questions 
above suggest, one of the key goals is to identify what'other (non-linguistic) factors 
may determine meaning and the processes which make such determinations possible. 
Given such questions, most definitions of the pragmatic object only begin in this 
simple way, and for good reason, for the answers are complex and in turn depend on 
a whole set of concepts and assumptions: about language users, the kinds of non-
linguistic knowledge they have and deploy in communication, how such know ledges 
are internally structured and represented. Further, what lies or should lie within the 
domain of pragmatic enquiry is strongly contested. Lawrence Horn, in his essay on 
pragmatic theory for Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey begins confidently enough: 
If the coming of age of an academic discipline is at least partly conditioned on 
the emergence of a broad, comprehensive, intellectually honest and 
pedagogically sound introductory textbook, pragmatics is in pretty good 
shape.7 
The reference is to Stephen Levinson's Pragmatics (one of the established Cambridge 
Textbooks in Linguistics Series); but a page later he acknowledges that 'the status of 
pragmatics as a field remains unsettled,.8 Horn toys half seriously with the question of 
the field's legitimacy: the argument from authority that proposes semantics as its 
'mother discipline' and the 'real-world' argument that pragmatics has applications 
(noting how ideas about human inferencing have been applied to artificial systems).9 
But what emerges most strongly is an insistence that pragmatics should not be defined 
as secondary to other kinds of linguistic enquiry. Two pairs of distinctions seem to be 
salient to most attempts to delimit pragmatics as a field and configure its relations with 
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other modes of linguistic enquiry. The first, illustrated here, relates to whether 
pragmatics is deemed to be central or peripheral to linguistics in general; the second to 
how broadly or narrowly pragmatics is defined .. These are not two ways of saying the 
same thing. Pragmatics may be defined narrowly, for example in terms of a set of 
'topics' - deixis, implicature, speech acts and so on - and yet still be (and is in these 
cases) considered central to understanding meaning as a whole. 10 
Be careful with forcing bits and pieces you find in the pragmatic wastebasket 
into your favourite syntactico-semantic theory. It would perhaps be preferable 
to first bring some order into the content of the wastebasket. II 
The rich metaphor of the wastebasket suggests something more than pragmatics as the 
remainder or residue. It does indeed suggest a lack of fit: what has to be excluded in 
order that a particular field can explain certain kinds of phenomena adequately and 
coherently. But it also suggests 'recycling': a two-way traffic which seems to 
acknowledge a concern about what has been excluded (why otherwise return to the 
wastebasket?), and the hope of constructing order within the disorder: that pragmatics 
is not just so much unclassifiable 'rubbish'. The accounts discussed in detail here all 
view pragmatics as central to the understanding of meaning, and in all cases there is a 
challenge to the explanatory scope of semantics - the strongest rival. 
Some would say that the semantics / pragmatics distinction is the competence / 
performance distinction applied to the level of meaning: semantic knowledge is 
part of linguistic knowledge while utterance interpretation is a performance 
which employs this knowledge together with a range of other competencies (for 
instance knowledge of logical principles / rules), general world-knowledge, 
and, say, special principles .... 12 
A special principle might be pragmatic, classically Grice's Cooperative Principle, 
discussed below, or as in the case of Relevance, a general cognitive principle which 
also applies - though in specialised terms - to communication. Not surprisingly, 
'strong' pragmatic accounts assign non-linguistic knowledge a fundamental role in the 
determination of meaning. This is particularly clear when the explanatory claims of 
formal or truth conditional semantics are being assessed. In formal semantics, context 
is acknowledged to the extent that it can determine the truth conditionality of an 
utterance (and is defined accordingly). 'I am Napoleon' is true if and only if the 
speaker is Napoleon and so on. But in order for a truth value to be assigned, the 
utterance requires a fully propositional representation. The example above ('it's hot') 
requires a referent for 'it', the disambiguation of 'hot' (e.g. does it have a literal or 
figurative sense?), and probably 'is' ( If 'it' is referring to the weather, does 'is' refer 
to this minute, this morning, the day etc. ?). It is only if an utterance is fully 
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'propositionalised' that a truth value can be assigned to it. Such procedures clearly 
involve non-linguistic as well as linguistic knowledge. The types of linguistic meaning 
that formal semantics concerns itself with are seemingly shot through with pragmatic 
meaning. 
Some definitions of pragmatics are challengingly (even unnervingly) broad. In the 
Handbook of Pragmatics Manual, described by its editors as a 'state of the art report', 
pragmatics is defined as a 'perspective on language rather than a component of 
linguistic theory,.13 This is a critical allusion to Geoffrey Leech's paralleling of 
grammar and pragmatics as complementary domains within linguistics. 14 But there is 
a second contrastive in view, what Jeff Verschueren refers to as topic-based 
pragmatics (speech acts, implicatures, deixis). Although this does describe the 
structure and chaptering of Levinson's Pragmatics, 'topics' seems a rather superficial 
characterisation of its scope. However, the Manual is useful to the extent that it draws 
together an extensive set of fields where language in use is studied: work on language 
acquisition, the structures and patterns of conversation, discourse and critical 
discourse analysis (of speech and writing), theories of text comprehension, as well as 
broader zones of enquiry which may take account of any of these, such as 
psycholinguistics, cognitive linguistics and sociolinguistics. 15 All of these, in 
Verschueren's words, are pragmatic: examining 'language use and the relations 
between language form and language use'. 
Speech act theory is a canonical example of a pragmatics concerned with the 
relations and frequent discrepancies between linguistic form and utterance meaning; a 
theory which powerfully demonstrates the frequent mismatch between linguistically-
encoded utterance properties such as mood, aspect or tense on the one hand, and the 
particular and often very different meanings that utterances convey in situ. 16 A 
declarative may function with the semantic force of an interrogative, an interrogative 
with the force of an imperative and so on. Yet it appears that hearers usually have little 
or no difficulty in distinguishing the particular, intended force of the utterance from its 
conventional form when these are discrepant. Likewise, accounts of implicature focus 
on the relations and frequent gap between the conventional or coded meaning of an 
utterance and what is implicated by it. Tony asks Helen where Peter is and she replies: 
'There's a silver Vespa outside number seventeen'. Tony understands from this that 
Peter may well be at Mark's house because he knows that Peter has a silver Vespa and 
that Mark lives at number seventeen. Indeed 'Peter may well be at Mark's house' is his 
interpretation of Helen's utterance. This is an implicature which is derived from a 
combination of Mary's utterance, certain kinds of non-linguistic knowledge, about 
where Mark lives and so on, and some kind of pragmatic or cognitive principle which 
orders interpretation. He does not say to Helen: 'You're not answering my question' 
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or 'But I asked where Peter was; I'm not interested in parking arrangements or 
mopeds'. He treats Helen's utterance as a reply to his question. I will consider 
particular principles in detail below but what is important here is that 'There's a silver 
Vespa outside number seventeen' does not linguistically encode 'Peter may well be at 
Mark's house'. What matters is exactly how Tony achieves this interpretation, given 
that what is 'said' is so different from what is 'meant' (to follow the Gricean 
distinction). 
Returning then to definitions of the field. I have no interest here in entering here 
into a debate about whether or not, for example, sociolinguistics should be a part of 
pragmatics (or whether pragmatics should be / is a component of sociolinguistics). 
However it seems to me that a further distinction can be drawn within pragmatics 
(conceived in the broadest terms as language use) between accounts which make it their 
primary goal to explain interpretative processes, what might be termed a 'strong' 
pragmatics, and accounts which do not. It is, of course, the former that I am 
interested in. So sociolinguistics, as its name suggests, is predominantly concerned 
with describing and explaining co/relations between social categories and relations, on 
the one hand, and language practice, on the other. For example, how is gender 
inscribed in language practice? how do certain kinds of institutional settings (the 
courtroom, the seminar room etc.) shape language use? Although there may be an 
interest in interpretation, in the main such work has drawn on and built on concepts of 
interpretative process (e.g. inference, the classification and interpretation of speech 
acts) developed elsewhere. Critical Discourse Analysis also maps such correlations but 
there is a stronger focus on how social and cultural authority and conflict are inscribed 
in language, and an explicit critique of social relations as they are and as they are 
assumed to be in much of the sociology that sociolinguistics draws on. Therefore 
while Critical Discourse Analysis is the only field within pragmatics that draws 
explicitly on intertextual theories (notably Bakhtin), it has little to offer a theory of 
interpretative processes. A further distinction is relevant here, pertaining to the object 
that the interpretative process is modelled on. The accounts of interpretation I will be 
exploring predominantly focus on utterances which comprise single sentences or 
sentence fragments spoken by a single speaker, and various multiples of this (most 
usually pairs). Text and discourse comprehension (as their names suggest) examine the 
interpretation of longer 'utterances', focusing in particular on how relations are 
established between them within a particular text. 17 Whilst the former have evident 
disadvantages for a project specifically concerned with the interpretation of print texts 
(an issue to which I will return in chapter three), I would argue that the minimal unit of 
language in use is a better starting point than 'text' or 'discourse' conceived in the terms 
above ( I emphasise 'starting point'). This is, in part, a methodological preference: 
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favouring a procedure that works 'up' whilst always acknowledging that larger units of 
discourse may require a modification of the theory being developed. I8 Second, 
theories of discourse comprehension are strongly committed to the assumption that 
texts are for the most part coherent and conceive interpretation as being predominantly a 
coherence-building exercise. Such processes clearly do playa part but such a 
framework is not a plausible starting point for an account of intertextual interpretation 
given the centrality accorded to conflict and contradiction within the utterance. Third, 
while Grice and Sperber and Wilson's brief and usually constructed examples can 
simplify or neglect certain features which shape interpretation, the 'texts' that discourse 
comprehension concerns itself with are frequently comparably simple, and certainly in 
~r -;- Si x. 
no way as complex as the kinds of texts I will be examining in chapters and fWe. 
Therefore, whilst I will be making selective contrastive reference to discourse 
comprehension (specifically the recent work of Walter Kintsch), such theories are not 
my chosen focus of interest. 19 
Such distinctions significantly narrow the field of focus, but there are also 
substantive differences in the ways in which interpretative processes have been 
thebrised: as some kind of decoding processes and as inferential processes. Further, 
both these processes and their relations have been theorised very differently and are 
clearly consequent upon the ways in which the key concepts of pragmatic enquiry are 
modelled: language, utterance, meaning, context and the speaking and interpreting 
subject. I will conclude this section by sampling a few of these definitions. The aim is 
not to be exhaustive but to suggest how such definitions inflect the characterisation of 
the interpretative process. 
No theory of interpretative process can function without some implicit or explicit 
definition of language, without some characterisation of the 'matter' that is processed 
by interpretation. Banal in itself, but what follows is not. In pragmatics, language is 
conceived either as a code which pairs phonetic or graphological representations with 
semantic ones (most explicitly perhaps in Relevance), or as a set of conventions (as in 
Grice). The latter is the legacy of ordinary language philosophy where the conventional 
meaning of an expression is defined as what 'most people' think it means. Codes and 
conventions are not the same thing. To define language as a set of conventions makes 
no claim about its systematicity. Convention may exert a strong force on interpretation 
(or not), but this force is not the consequence of an underlying and orderly system 
(langue or competence). Crucial here is the role that language, as convention or code, 
is assigned in the interpretative process. How far does linguistic meaning determine 
utterance meaning? Are utterances relatively semantically complete entities which 
require minimal extension and 'completion' by the hearer, or, are they radically and 
constitutively underdetermined (in semantic terms): 'evidence' for an interpretation but 
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only that? Intimately linked to this issue is the question of what types of meaning are 
being talked about? The gap between sentence and utterance clearly proposes at least 
two kinds of meaning: sentence meaning and utterance meaning. But does an 
utterance, realised in a particular context, have only one meaning? If the utterance is 
defined as radically underdetermined by its linguistic meaning (as it is in Relevance), it 
would seem to follow that the range of its possible interpretations must necessarily 
expand. Are all these possible interpretations of interest? The answer is both yes and 
no. Yes, in the sense that the range of interpretative possibilities is the starting point 
for theories which propose the utterance as strongly underdetermined. No, in the 
sense that such theories are centrally interested in why a particular interpretation is 
'selected' by the hearer from the range. Therefore the account of the interpretative 
process must specify not only how a hearer produces an interpretation from an 
underdetermined linguistic form in a particular situation, but how a particular 
interpretation or set of interpretations is selected from a range of possibilities. 
Central here is another distinction, between utterance meaning and speaker 
meaning, between what the utterance might mean in a particular context and what the 
speaker intends it to mean. For Grice, as for Sperber and Wilson, the pragmatic goal 
is to explain how the hearer interprets speaker meaning. And whilst not all explanatory 
pragmatic theory accords such a important role to speaker meaning (and therefore to 
intention), it is important to recognise that these three types of meaning (sentence, 
utterance and speaker meaning) are at work in most such accounts.20 Intention is 
clearly an issue to which I will return here and in chapter three as there are fundamental 
disparities between intertextual theories of meaning, which are fundamentally anti-
intentionalist, and pragmatic ones. But, as I aim to demonstrate, the place of 
intention within such theories should not be a reason for a summary rejection of 
pragmatics before its explanatory potential is evaluated. At the very least, pragmatics 
demonstrates the need for a concept of preferred meaning, whether or not this is 
aligned with the speaker. 
Definitions of context and the language user, implicit or explicit, are likewise 
central to any account of interpretation. If context makes an utterance an utterance (and 
not a sentence), then its definition has clear implications for any account of the 
interpretative process, which must explain how contexts are deployed in that process. 
And, if the interest is in interpretative processes, context must be defined, as Peter 
Mey puts it, 'from the user's point of view'.21 Context is the knowledge which 
speaker-hearers make use of in communication. It therefore needs to be distinguished 
from the situation of utterance which may of course supply contextual information to 
speaker-hearers. Definitions of context vary in two important ways: firstly, according 
to the role which context is assigned in the interpretative process; secondly and 
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relatedly, according to the way in which the speaking subject is theorised. Context 
may be defined minimally as knowledge of the referents of the situation of utterance 
which makes possible the procedures of reference assignment and disambiguation 
noted above. The classic formalisation of the relation between utterance and context is 
the canonical speech situation which assumes two speaker-hearers who are co-
temporal, co-spatial and co-present, a model and assumption in much pragmatics. If 
utterances are defined as relatively se~antically complete, then contextual information 
can be expected to playa relatively small role in interpretation. If, however, the gap 
between linguistic meaning and utterance meaning is constitutive, then context and the 
processes by which it is accessed and deployed become central to the account of the 
interpretative process. Central here is the issue (congruent to the one of 'selecting' one 
interpretation from many) of how and why certain knowledge is 'selected' as context in 
an interpretative process. Definitions of context are also shaped by the definition of the 
user. Mey, for example, in defining context as 'the total social setting', takes account 
not only of the local coordinates of the utterance situation but the complex social 
identities of the participants and their relations to society as a whole, thus proposing 
that these playa role in the interpretative process.22 Such a formulation resists the idea 
of context as 'a widening of the sentential perspective', proposing a definition of 
context which does not begin with the utterance-sentence contrast but with language as 
a sociological phenomenon.23 A significant - though clearly highly speculative - focus 
in many cognitive accounts of communication is on how knowledge is mentally 
represented, its minimal units or constituents and how these might be ordered, for 
example in the form of scripts or schemas, concepts borrowed from cognitive 
psychology. These can be understood as a bodies of assumptions and expectations 
about a particular event or object which may be mobilised and utilised as a unit in 
cognition and interpretation, for example as a default when there is no more specific 
information (the onset of specific information may of course cancel the interpretative 
value of the some aspect of the script).24 A key question relates to the fixity or fluidity 
of scripts. Kintsch notes that schema theories have shifted from being rather rigid 
formulas to being more like recipes which are generated in contextually-sensitive 
terms.25 'The supermarket script' may contain certain assumptions about the kinds of 
things that can be bought in a supermarket, the categories which order their display 
(we expect to find bacon alongside other meat products and not with washing powder, 
for example), and these will shape many of the talk-exchanges that we have. We can 
ask confidently 'where are the eggs?' but not where are the motor-cycle helmets or the 
puppies. But this script will be generated in relation to more specialised knowledges 
and expectations: I know that my local supermarket orders a significant number of 
displays around geo-cul~ural criteria: 'A Taste of Italy, Greece, The Middle East, 
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The East and so on (but no England, France, Scotland, India) - initially confusing if 
you were looking for olive oil. I expect that if I go into my local supermarket just after 
Christmas, stocks will be depleted. Schemas, of course, assume certain general 
cognitive abilities, particularly as regards classification: they presume a certain kind of 
subject; but they also presume the relative stability of many types of situations and 
encounters (in terms comparable with strong accounts of genre and/or register). I 
know, for example, that all supermarkets move certain kinds of products around. 
In more general terms, pragmatics always presumes or explicitly theorises a 
particular kind of speaking and interpreting subject. The speaker-hearer may be an 
always-already social subject (as in Mey's case, for example) or may be conceived as 
primarily (in the senses of first and fundamentally) an individual (Grice, Sperber and 
Wilson). The role of authority relations as they pertain narrowly to the participants 
within a communicative situation, or broadly to their position within social relations as 
a whole may be anything from strongly to very weakly marked. This clearly suggests 
something about the directions that accounts of the interpretative process might take. 
Pragmatics is then predicated on a gap between sentence and utterance, between 
utterance and its interpretation. A strong pragmatics is committed to explaining how, 
given such gaps, successful communication is possible, indeed probable. It is in 
inferential accounts of interpretation that this gap has been most systematically 
explored. 
2. Inference 
Although inferential accounts of communication owe a significant debt to ordinary 
language philosophy, it is not easy to stay true to the conventions of this tradition by 
starting with some 'ordinary' senses of 'inference' or 'inferencing' (and its possible 
relations with 'inferring'). Imaginable contexts of use seem very far from 'ordinary', 
inscribing highly specialised situations, know ledges and procedures: the courtroom 
('This is the only inference that can be drawn and it demonstrates without a doubt that 
you had a very strong motive for. .. ; 'I infer from your statement that...' etc.), 
possibly the police interview-room, and their many and varied representations within 
the genre of detective fiction. Such uses are in some sense suggestive, first drawing 
attention to how utterances are treated, in significant part, as evidence of particular 
meanings; and second, because inferential procedures are fundamentally concerned 
with knowledge relations. The parallel with detective fiction ends here however; a 
genre centrally preoccupied with knowledge it most certainly is, but utterances cannot 
in this tradition be treated as 'clues', as will become clear. In the most simple terms, 
inferential accounts of communication treat utterances as evidence for meaning (rather 
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than the encoded instantiation of it), evidence which is put together with other evidence 
(context) as 'premises' in order to derive conclusions, better known as interpretations. 
In this section my aim is first to sketch the types of answers that inferential accounts of 
communication offer to the questions posed by the gap between linguistic meaning and 
interpretation, and the further questions such answers prompt. And second; to offer a 
brief outline of Grice's concepts of conversational implicature and meaning. These are 
generally treated as the starting point for accounts of inferential communication, and is 
an important context for Relevance. And therefore whilst others, most notably Oswald 
Ducrot, have independently developed congruent accounts of inference, it is on 
Grice's work that I will focus. 26 It is important however to note at the outset that the 
study of inferential processes is not confined to pragmatics but plays an important role 
in cognitive psychology more generally, where Piaget's work on child development 
and particularly reasoning ability is a central reference.27 This has particular pertinence 
for Relevance which, despite its pragmatic focus, defines itself as a general cognitive 
theory which is 'psychologically plausible'. 
Inference and communication 
All accounts of human inferential abilities and processes intersect with three related sets 
of questions: about the relations between human inferential capabilities and processes 
and formal systems i.e. logics; the relations between human inference and human 
rationality; and, with questions about knowledge acquisition (though these are not 
confined to 'learning' in the formal or child-development senses). When a human 
communicative or cognitive process is treated as inferential, there is always a relation 
being proposed between such a process and the procedures of formal logic, 
immediately suggesting a comparison and contrast between interpretation and 
argumentation. Formal logics 'seek[] to make as precise as possible the conditions 
under which an argument ... is acceptable', whether the conclusion of an argument 
follows from its premises: whether it is sound or unsound, logically valid or invalid.28 
So can inferential communication be characterised as a formal deductive procedure? 
The general pragmatic answer is no. In a communicative situation, interpretative 
conclusions cannot be guaranteed by the premises that the utterance and context supply, 
in Sperber and Wilson's words, 'communication may fail'.29 Human inference is 
therefore a non-demonstrative procedure. In pragmatics, logical systems provide the 
basis for a contrastive model. Grice offers a classic formulation of this in 'Logic and 
Conversation'. Ordinary language and logical languages do not work in the same way 
(even though there is an underlying order in conversational exchanges) and Grice's 
coinage 'implicature' captures the contrastive relation between logical and natural 
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languages: it has a relation to the logical term 'imply', but implicatures are 
distinguished from 'inferences' (the result of a deductive procedure)?O In a very 
different vein, Kintsch argues that only one of the procedures utilised by interpreters in 
discourse comprehension can strictly be labelled 'inference': when new inform~tion is 
• generated from existing information. He calls this logical inference, distinguishing it 
from other procedures where existing information is retrieved from memory to plug 
gaps or build bridges within the text as it is interpreted.31 The comparison with logic 
also raises the question of whether there are specialised rules or procedures which order 
and constrain human inferencing. Formal logics have specialised rules and sequenced 
procedures whose aim is 'to control the activity of deduction [so] as to ensure that the 
conclusion reached is validly reached,.32 In the case of Sperber and Wilson, as we 
shall see, the mind has access to specific logical rules. In other theories it is proposed 
that human inference proceeds by model or/and rule. Kinstch, for example, argues 
that human inference is probably a mixture of modelling and rules: perceptual 
representations are produced by mental modelling which orders inferencing, whilst 
wholly symbolic abstract inference proceeds by rule. He also suggests that inference in 
language could involve both.33 The relation between logical and natural languages is 
clearly linked to the broader issue of human rationality. Do natural languages and 
communicative processes inscribe the natural reasoning processes of a rational subject? 
The issue here is not whether humans are rational creatures, clearly they are; but rather 
the extent to which they are. How much of communicative practice can it explain? And 
what, if any, is the role of non-rational or irrational processes in interpretation? 
Inferential models of communication also raise issues about knowledge relations: 
most obviously the production of new knowledge from existing knowledge, but also 
about how existing knowledge is used in inference. Scripts or schemas for example, 
can be understood as contexts which, when mobilised, can supply bridging 
assumptions for inferential procedures, and which may also constrain the inferential 
process.34 As noted above, such accounts must explain the procedures through which 
inference proceeds. It is important to recognise here that inferential models of 
communication are not exclusively interested in 'canonical' logical relations: those of 
consequence (e.g. if P then Q), conjunction (e.g. P and Q), disjunction (e.g. P or Q), 
negation (e.g. P or not P, P and not not P) and contradiction (e.g. P and not-P). 
Sperber and Wilson, for example, are also strongly interested in the relative force of 
assumptions and the inferential procedures by which they can be weakened or 
strengthened.35 
The most important difference between a strict en-de-coding model and an 
inferential one is that whilst the former putatively guarantees the message which is 
communicated, the latter does not. A very large number of inferences can follow from 
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an utterance-premise. Returning to the silver Vespa example. Helen's utterance 
provides evidence for a whole range of conclusions: that she is alive, that she is a 
speaker of English, that she knows what a Vespa is, that there is a silver Vespa parked 
outside number seventeen, that she has (presumably recently) seen a silver Vespa 
parked outside this house and so on. The fundamental question which inferential 
accounts must address is how a particular interpretation-conclusion is reached; an 
account which must also explain why particular contextual knowledge is used alongside 
the utterance in the interpretative process. Inferential accounts of communication 
propose that a 'principle' of some kind governs interpretation: a principle which 
constrains inferencing (I place 'principle' in inverted commas at this juncture to suggest 
loose use because the way principle is understood varies in important ways). It may be 
a general cognitive principle which applies in a specialised way to utterance 
interpretation, as is the case with Relevance. It may be a specifically pragmatic 
principle (though deemed to have parallels with practices other than communication), 
as in the case of Grice. 
3. Grice: saying and meaning 
Grice's influence is widely recognised within pragmatics, and not only by those who 
work within the 'Gricean' tradition. Levinson, who situates his own work in that 
tradition: 
The notion of conversational implicature is one of the single most important 
ideas in pragmatics.36 
Robyn Carston, a key contributor to Relevance theory writes: 
Grice's idea that there are prevailing standards of rational communicative 
behaviour, embodied in his Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims, 
has effected a revolution in the way linguistically communicated meaning is 
thought about and analysed?7 
Carston's acknowledgement is the more interesting because Relevance theory 
makes a radical break with Gricean accounts of inference. Grice's own starting point in 
his writings about meaning is the limited explanatory force of convention . 
... I do not think that meaning is essentially connected with convention. What it 
is essentially connected with is some way of fixing what sentences mean: 
convention is indeed one of these ways but it is not the only one?8 
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It is this dissatisfaction that provides the framework for his work on both implicatures 
and non-natural meaning, though it is the former that will be the focus here. Indeed 
Grice's writings on language are an attempt to radically reduce the zone of meaning 
which is governed by convention. As Levinson points out: 
Here we see that the truth-conditional content of an utterance (what, in Grice's 
special sense, is said) may be only a small part of its total meaning.39 
In Grice's writings there are two broad ways in which the force of conventional 
meaning is queried. First a clear distinction is made between the conventional meaning 
of an utteranc~ and what might be implied or, more strictly, 'implicated' by it; and 
second, a more fundamental distinction is asserted between the 'standard meaning', or 
'the meaning in general of a '~sign'" and 'what a particular speaker o~.~riter ineans by a 
sign on a particular occasion (which may well diverge from the stand meaning of the 
1\ 
sign).,4o What is necessary for A to mean something by x (Where A is a speaker and x 
is an utterance)? Crucial here is the 'by'; the question is not 'what does x mean?' 
Grice's answer in 'Meaning': 
Perhaps we may sum up what is necessary for A to mean something by x as 
follows. A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also 
intend his utterance to be recognised as so intended. But these intentions are not 
independent; the recognition is intended by A to play its part in inducing the 
belief, and if it does not do so something will have gone wrong with the 
fulfilment of A's intentions.41 
Both question and answer suggest the limits of convention and the idea that the 
utterance provides evidence for producing a belief in the audience which is recognised 
as intended by A. The definition above is of what Grice calls 'non-natural meaning' or 
'meaningNN" At the beginning of ' Meaning', he sets out to distinguish two senses of 
meaning: natural and non-natural meaning. In an utterance like 'those clouds mean 
rain', a logical relation of entailment is proposed between the clouds and the rain. It is 
not possible to say 'those clouds mean rain but it won't rain'.42 Natural meaning is 
contrasted with non-natural meaning: 'those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean 
that the bus is full'. In this case, the three rings on the bus do not entail that it is full; it 
is possible to go on and say that 'but it isn't full'. The non-natural sense of 'means' is 
easy to understand but harder to formulate. Grice characterises it thus: 
The ... sentence can be restated in a form in which the verb 'mean' is followed 
by a phrase in quotation marks, that is 'Those three rings on the bell mean "the 
bus is full. '" 43 
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We might also say that the use of 'means' in such cases is metalinguistic or, in this 
case meta-significatory and that it establishes a relation of semantic equivalence between 
the two items: 'the bus is full' is a translation of 'those three rings on the bell'.44 In 
general terms, meaningNN is the kind of meaning that we find in linguistic 
communication: not 'x means y' but rather 'what is meant by x' (when x is an 
utterance). It is interesting that Grice's distinction between natural and non-natural 
sidesteps another form of 'x means y' where x is a signifier and y is a signified and no 
logical relation of entailment is proposed: a code-message pairing. Indeed in the same 
text, Grice insists that words are not signs.45 
What is meant Qx x opens up a way of thinking of x as evidence for a meaning. It 
is in a later sequence of texts that an explicit concept of implicated meaning is proposed: 
the William James lectures, in particular 'Logic and Conversation' and 'Further Notes 
on Logic and Conversation,.46 Grice's starting point in the former is the 
'commonplace of philosophical logic' that there are divergences of meaning between 
formal logical operators such as 'not', 'if, 'then' etc. and their natural language 
'analogues or counterparts,.47 Nevertheless, he argues, there is an underlying order 
in talk-exchanges which belies what a strictly logical analysis would classify as 
disorderly. Crucially, what is said may differ radically from what is meant or 
. implied.48 For Grice, non-sequiturs, irrelevancies, redundancies, ellipses and so on 
are, in the main, only apparently disorderly. In fact they are evidence of a principle, 
. the Cooperative Principle, which underlies ordinary conversation: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which 
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged.49 
This overarching principle governs a specific set of maxims which connect the speaker 
with what is said: maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner. Quantity relates 
to the amount and extent of information provided: 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
Quality relates to the truthfulness of the information presented: 
Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
Grice terms this a 'supermaxim', and identifies two more specific ones: 
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1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for you which you lack adequate evidence. 
There is only one maxim of Relation: 
Be relevant. 
The maxims of manner relate not to 'what is said' but to how what is said is to be said'. 
The supermaxim is: 
Be perspicuous. 
But more specifically: 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4. Be orderly.50 
Immediately noticeable is the imperative form: this is how speakers should behave in 
talk-exchanges. Yet what is also obvious is that speakers do not always or indeed often 
behave in this way, and Grice knows this very well. The maxims are not an 
elaboration of the Principle: it is the Principle which governs conversation. What a 
speaker says may be literally untrue (metaphor for example), or unnecessarily prolix, 
or irrelevant, but the hearer assumes that the Cooperative Principle is still operating and 
produces an interpretation in accordance with it. Apparent irrelevance may be the 
consequence of a clash between two maxims.51 Returning once more to the silver 
Vespa example: Helen's seemingly non-sequitur response arises from a clash between 
the maxims of quality and relation. She is not certain where Peter is and she would 
violate the maxim of quality if she said, for example, that Peter was at Mark's. The 
apparent irrelevance of her utterance can be resolved if Tony assumes that the principle 
is operating and realises that Helen is upholding the maxim of quality. An utterance 
may also flout the maxims. 'Flouting' is distinguished from 'violating' a maxim when 
the speaker may mislead the hearer; or from opting out of the Cooperative Principle 
altogether. 'Flouting' means that the Cooperative Principle is in operation (despite 
appearances to the contrary).52 In one of Grice's examples, an academic is asked to 
write a reference for a student applying for an academic job. Here is his letter and 
Grice's commentary: 
'Dear Sir, Mr XIS command of English is excellent, and his attendance at 
tutorials has been regular. Yours etc.' (Gloss: A cannot be opting out, since if 
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he wished to be uncooperative, why write at all? He cannot, through 
ignorance be unable to say more, since the man is his pupil, moreover he 
knows that more information than this is wanted. He must, therefore, be 
wishing to impart information that he is reluctant to write down. This 
supposition is tenable only if he thinks Mr X is no good at philosophy. This, 
then, is what he is implicating).53 
Grice's definition of conversational implicatures is partially structured by a contrast 
with the logical definition of deduction. Whilst a logical inference is not cancellable, a 
conversational implicature can be. In the example above, the writer of the reference 
could continue after 'regular' and write that Mr X is also a brilliant philosopher. It 
would be an odd and unlikely sentence but Grice's point is that the implicature is 
cancellable. Levinson takes the contrast further and sees this as evidence that Gricean 
implicature is more akin to inductive reasoning. 54 Further an utterance can be false and 
its implicature true and vice versa (many metaphors are in a literal sense false, but 
implicate something that is or might be true). The implicature is carried, not by what is 
said but 'only by the saying' of what is said, or by putting it that way,.55 This 
differentiates implicatures from deductive inference where the aim is to guarantee the 
validity of conclusions from premises. Conversational implicatures are also, with one 
kind of exception, 'non-detachable': 'it will not be possible to find another way of 
saying the same thing which simply lacks the implicature in question'. 56 The exception 
is, of course, the maxim of manner, the only maxim where how the utterance is said 
carries the implicature. 
Grice does not explain in detail how such implicatures are produced by hearers, but 
he does argue that they are calculable on the basis of the following information: (1) the 
conventional meaning of the words used plus the identity of any referents involved; (2) 
the Cooperative Principle and the maxims; (3) the context 'linguistic or otherwise' of 
the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledge; (5) the fact that speaker and 
hearer both have access to the relevant information contained in (1) to (4) and know or 
assume this to be the case. 57 
Peter: Where's Tony? 
Helen: There's a silver Vespa parked outside number seventeen 
Helen's reply has a conventional meaning but this does not answer Peter's question; it 
also flouts the maxim of relation but, as discussed above, Peter assumes that Helen is 
being Cooperative. He also has certain contextual and background knowledge: for 
example that Tony is the owner of a silver Vespa and that Mark lives at number 
seventeen. He also knows that Helen knows these things and that she knows or 
assumes that he knows them. They have mutual knowledge, meaning that their 
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knowledge includes the knowledge that they share it. This knowledge can be 
represented as an 'argument': Tony owns a silver Vespa, Mark lives at number 
seventeen, Tony may have parked outside number seventeen, Tony may be visiting 
Mark. This suggests a further feature of conversational implicatures. Given that the 
calculation of an implicature presupposes 'an initial knowledge of the conventional 
force of the expression ... a conversational implicatum is not included in the original 
specification of the expression's conventional force.'58 
Grice's account of implicature distinguishes two other forms of implicated meaning 
besides conversational implicatures. First, conventional implicatures, where the 
conventional meaning of a word, or what Levinson describes more specifically as its 
logical and semantic properties, carries an implicature.59 One of Grice's examples: 
If I say (smugly), He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave, I have 
certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being 
the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an 
Englishman.60 
Here, it is the conventional meaning of 'therefore' that determines what is 
implicated. Second, Grice identifies generalised conversational implicatures. Here the 
implicature is not carried by the conventional meaning of an expression but 'would 
normally', 'in the absence of special circumstances' carry a particular implicature. One 
of Grice's very few examples is 'X is meeting a woman this evening' which 'normally' 
implicates that the woman X is meeting is not X's mother, wife or sister.61 The 
distinction between generalised and 'particularised' conversational implicatures (usually 
more simply termed 'conversational implicatures') foregrounds the situation-bound 
character of the latter: they are not merely non-conventional but a function of the 
particularised circumstances of an utterance situation. 
Whilst in Grice's work utterance situations and utterance meaning are highly 
variable, the practices of speakers are not: communication is centrally governed by 
human rationality. This is clearly evidenced in 'Logic and Conversation': the 
observation of the Cooperative Principle is reasonable and rational.62 It is also strongly 
marked in 'Meaning Revisited' where Grice characterises human rationality as being 
centrally about evaluation: 'a rational creature is a creature which evaluates,.63 And it 
is obvious that Grice's account of talk exchanges and the principle which governs them 
is predicated on just such an ability to evaluate. The production of implicatures 
assumes the hearer's ability to recognise that the conventional meaning of the 
expression is in some sense an inadequate interpretation. Human rationality is likewise 
a focus in 'Meaning', where the relations between rationality and intentionality are 
configured. 
102 
... [F]or x to have meaningNN, the intended effect must be something which in 
some sense is within the control of the audience, or that in some sense of 
'reason' the recognition of the intention behind x is for the audience a reason 
and not merely a cause.64 
The audience's recognition of the intention behind x does not 'cause' a belief, it is a 
reason to have it. 
Grice's work also needs to be understood within the setting of ordinary language 
philosophy, where 'ordinary language' is both contrasted with logical languages and 
an object of philosophy: 'ordinary discourse' is 'worthy' of the philosopher's 
attention.65 One of philosophy's tasks is 'to analyse, describe, or characterise (in as 
general terms as possible) the ordinary use or uses of certain expressions or classes of 
expression. ,66 If philosophy is interested in the concept of causality, for example, 
then the situations where we do (or do not) speak of cause should form part of the 
investigation.67 Grice begins a number of his discussions with what he treats as 
intuitive ordinary sense distinctions, most notably perhaps his discussion of 'say' and 
'imply', 'suggest' and 'mean' in 'Logic and Conversation,.68 The numerous 
problems of ordinary language philosophy have been much discussed and are not 
relevant here.69 What is pertinent is how this framework shapes his thinking about 
communication. As Carston points out, in the William James lectures Grice was 
addressin.g the practices of ordinary language philosophy and not simply considering 
talk exchanges.7o But what is most important is the model of language that his ordinary 
language approach generates. The maxims of manner ( 'be perspicuous' and, 
specifically, 'avoid obscurity of expression', 'avoid ambiguity', 'be brief' and 'be 
orderly') model a natural language on a logical one and make the clear exchange of 
information the priority. Grice is himself aware that the maxims generally prioritise 
information exchange and acknowledges this as a problem. This said, the maxims 
would require significant re-modelling if the other conversational goals that Grice 
identifies, 'influencing or directing the actions of others', are to be taken account 
of.7/ Influencing or, to be more precise, persuading others may precisely rest on the 
maintenance of ambiguity. Further, in certain situations - take for example the case of 
two strongly opposed political parties who enter into a tactical agreement over a 
particular issue - participants in the 'talk-exchange' may agree on a lexical formula 
which each interprets differently precisely because of its ambiguous potential. Ordinary 
language is also distinguished from Grice's sense of 'technicallanguage'.72 This 
imagines a world of language practice which is predominantly non-specialised, in 
terms which fit with his concept of convention (what most people in most 
circumstances think an expression means). As will be considered below and, in more 
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detail in chapter three, it is not a world which sits easily with strong concepts of genre 
or register. 
Grice's work has been subject to many criticisms and revisions. Levinson is one of 
a number of commentators who has both identified a vagueness in Grice's account of 
the interpretative process and sought to work within a Gricean framework. 73 A number 
of questions have been raised as to the character and number of the maxims and their 
relations: why this number? why not more? why not fewer? Is one / are some more 
important than others?74 Are maxim clashes one of the central features of talk-
exchanges and therefore central to interpretation? Or are such clashes instead evidence 
of a weakness in the principle itselC5 Other maxims have been proposed: most 
famously perhaps, the maxim of politeness which has obvious implications for the 
maxims which are centrally governed by truth, quantity and relation.76 Leech has 
proposed a potentially endless proliferation of maxims, including a modesty maxim: 
'maximise dispraise of self'.77 Others, most notably Sperber and Wilson, have taken 
a minimalist approach, arguing that one principle governs communication, though 
their concept of relevance is very far from Grice's maxim of Relation. The seeming 
universality of the maxims has likewise been criticised. Are the maxims universal or, 
are some of them culturally specific? Do certain situations prioritise one or another 
maxim over the others? 
All this is, needless to say, evidence of Grice's impact: the general pragmatic 
acknowledgement that some meanings at least are neither coded nor conventional, but 
'implied', that interpretation is in part at least an inferential process, and that it is 
governed by a specific principle or principles. Most usually this principle is identified 
as pragmatic: specific to communication. Though not always. Walter Kintsch, for 
example, not only argues that discourse comprehension is a substantially inferential 
process but classifies it as a particular type of cognitive process.78 Nor does Kintsch 
propose a specific principle which interpreters have knowledge of and apply. Rather, 
what governs comprehension is the type of process that comprehension is: a process of 
constraint satisfaction . 
... [C]omprehension occurs when and if the elements that enter into the process 
achieve a stable state in which the majority of elements are meaningfully related 
to one another and other elements that do not fit the pattern of the majority are 
suppressed.79 
Comprehension is achieved through the building of a mental model which incorporates 
textual and situational features as propositions or 'predicate-argument' schemas (though 
this does not commit them to being fully logical forms).8o The process of construction 
is achieved 'by making connections between things that were previously disparate,.81 
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,These connections or 'nodes' may be strengthened or weakened. The noun 'bear' in an 
utterance such as 'the bear killed the tourist' might initially associatively mobilise 
'honey' in a form such as 'bears like honey'. This connection may be strengthened and 
deployed in an inferential procedure if, for example, the text continues: 
The bear killed the tourist. He was eating a honey sandwich. 
'Bears like honey' enables the interpreter to produce a causal connection which is not 
semantically or logically marked: the inference to be drawn is that the bear killed the 
tourist because he was eating a honey sandwich. However if there is nothing else to 
support such a connection (The bear killed the tourist because he was dressed up as a 
bear), the connection will 'wither away,.82 One of the key differences between 
Kintsch's approach and Grice's is that for Kintsch there is no principle over and above 
the goal of the comprehension process which has to be known and applied by the 
interpreter. This rejection of a specific principle which is distinct from interpretation (in 
the sense that it is applied) is formally shared with Relevance. And its consequences 
are far reaching for theorising interpretation. 
4. Relevance and ostensive-inferential communication 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's Relevance: Communication and Cognition, first 
published in 1986, has excited considerable interest, much of it highly critical.83 The 
book is characterised by a rhetorical boldness - both in the force of its own claims and 
in its outright dismissal of many of the sacred cows of pragmatics.84 A number of 
reviewers responded antipathetically to what were perceived as deliberate provocations, 
unfounded claims and the summary rejection of established concepts.85 At least one 
reviewer however, seems to have taken Sperber and Wilson at their word. Entitled 'A 
New Theory of Communication', Alaistair Fowler proposes that Relevance 'offers 
nothing less than the makings of a radically new theory of communication.' 86 
More than fifteen years later, Relevance theory remains highly controversial: the 
answer to communication, cognition and 'everything', or the emperor's new clothes. 
Relevance now boasts its own entry in the annual Language and Linguistic Behaviour 
Abstracts, a number of published bibliographies - both indexes of output which 
suggest 'use' rather than 'mention' - and an essay in the Cambridge Survey of 
Linguistics.87 It is also interesting that much of this work has not been produced by the 
authors, although they remain committed to their account, but by others who seek to 
develop, test and extend the theory.88 
105 
There are a number of reasons why the exposition of Relevance theory below is the 
central component of this chapter. First, Relevance is a strong inferential account of 
communication, because Sperber and Wilson argue that inference is the primary 
process in all interpretation. Relevance therefore provides a single strong model of 
inferential interpretation through and against which intertextual accounts can be read. 
Second, Relevance theory aims to be fully explanatory of all types of verbal 
communication. Particularly important is the commitment to fully explicating the 
processes of utterance production and interpretation - a rigorous alternative to the 
vagueness which surrounds intertextual accounts of reading. Third, Relevance, is, ill 
important ways, a critique of pragmatics as it is currently constituted and proposes 
very different types of explanation for pragmatic phenomena. In proposing a pragmatic 
framework for intertextual interpretation, both the critique and the alternative demand 
consideration. Fourth and finally, Relevance considers a wide range of utterance types 
- direct, free indirect and indirect speech, ironic and metaphoric utterances in their bid 
to demonstrate the explanatory power of their theory. But, unlike Grice for example, 
they do not assume a zero degree of style which requires no explanation. Nor are the 
literal and the figurative conceived as separate categories, but rather as two poles of a 
continuous axis. Such assumptions and the arguments which follow them are, at least 
in theory, more compatible with the models of production that intertextual theories 
propose. 
Although Relevance seeks to answer a number of conventional pragmatic questions 
(about the interpretation of new and shared knowledge, metaphor, speech acts and so 
on), Sperber and Wilson's framework is cognitive science. Most specifically they are 
interested in developing an account of inferencing as a central thought process which 
will also throw light on the nature and functioning of mental representations.89 
Relevance, the principle which governs this process, is itself shaped by contemporary 
cognitive ideas of the human which owe much to a set of contrasts and comparisons 
with computing science: 'human beings are efficient information processing 
devices' .90 Such a framework is far from unique in contemporary 'explanatory' 
pragmatics.91 And the importance of the 'cognitive turn' is recognised by Jef 
Verschueren in his introduction to the Handbook of Pragmatics Manual, when he 
criticises pragmaticians who ignore cognitive questions.92 What is distinctive about 
Sperber and Wilson's approach is their insistence on defining linguistic communication 
as a specialised subset of cognition in general and its grounding in evolutionary 
psychology. The definition of human beings as efficient information-processing 
devices continues: 'this is their most obvious asset as a species,.93 However, whilst 
Relevance explicitly engages with a number of issues in cognitive science, the text's 
relation to evolutionary psychology is implicit and unelaborated. This context emerges 
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in Sperber's subsequent' work on irrational beliefs, human metarepresentational ability 
and the 'epidemiology' of representations.94 
Relevance: defining communication 
In the simplest terms, Relevance proposes that one process (a specific type of 
inferencing) and one principle (relevance) can explain our understanding of anything 
from the smell of gas to a complex metaphor. While communication differs from many 
other forms of cognition in that it is intentional and self-demonstrative, and while 
linguistic communication utilises a code, inferencing, governed by relevance, is 
central and primary to all forms of cognition and communication.95 Code-based 
approaches provide an immediate and illuminating contrast. First, linguistic 
communication is conceived exclusively as an en-de-coding process: it does not utilise 
a code, it is en-de-coding. Second, whilst much semiotic research treats language as a 
model for other signifying systems, Sperber and Wilson classify linguistic 
communication within a taxonomy of cognition which foregrounds its distinctiveness. 
Unlike other phenomena which may be cognised, it is intentional and ostensive; unlike 
other forms of deliberate and ostensive 'stimuli' which are communicative, it deploys a 
code. And as the last point suggests, not all forms of communication are coded 
(Relevance, pp.50-4). In the account below I will examine Sperber and Wilson's 
account of verbal communication as it is developed within a general theory of cognition. 
I will also consider a number of the criticisms that have been made of Relevance from 
within pragmatics. These concern the account of inference itself, the Principles of 
Relevance, the 'hyper-rationality' of the cognising and communicating subject that 
Relevance proposes, and the centrality of intentionality and speaker meaning within 
their model. 
The questions which a plausible theory of communication should address and the 
distinctiveness of Sperber and Wilson's approach emerge in a set of criticisms of code-
based and extant inferential accounts. Communication, they argue, involves more 
than the decoding of a linguistic signal (Relevance, p.6). There is a gap between the 
semantic representations yielded by decoding and the thoughts communicated by them 
which en-de-coding cannot explain (p.9). The code-model, defined strictly as a set of 
signal-message pairings, is supposed to guarantee an identity of representations 
between speaker and hearer, but semiotics has never demonstrated this (p.S). It is not 
entirely clear what they include under the heading of semiotics, although Saussure, 
Hjelmslev, Barthes and Levi-Strauss are all mentioned (Relevance, pp.7-S). But from 
their account it would seem that structuralism or 'high structuralism' is the focus of the 
attack. Their 'strict' definition of a code as 'a system of signal-message pairs'would 
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seem to square with the structuralist confidence of the fifties and early sixties rather 
than with work which, whilst grounded in and committed to exploring cultural practices 
as signifying systems, would contest such a definition (p.8). 
Given these problems, as Sperber and Wilson formulate them, inferencing would 
seem to offer an alternative explanation of communication; but they are highly critical 
of extant accounts. Existing theories tend to treat inferencing as subservient to 
decoding, a contingent process which can plug the gaps between sentence and 
utterance meaning. This leaves the assumption intact that at least some utterance 
meanings are fully encoded. Further, inference is often treated like a decoding 
operation: rules and premises are shared and applied (pp.12-IS). But, argue Sperber 
and Wilson, how do speaker-hearers know which rules to apply in a particular 
communicative situation (p.IS)? Even if the number and type of rules were limited (as 
they later go on to propose), how can it be assumed that they share the same premises 
(knowledge)? It cannot. First, they claim, because speaker-hearer knowledge is 
fundamentally 'idiosyncratic', certain, limited knowledge is shared but 'beyond this 
common framework, individuals tend to be highly idiosyncratic' (p.16). Second, 
speaker-hearers would not just have to share premises but also know which ones they 
shared, taking us back to Grice's account of how implicatures are 'calculated' and the 
mutual knowledge hypothesis. And Sperber and Wilson find this implausible as either 
putative empirical description or as an idealised goal (pp.17-21). 
Decoding and inference are, they conclude, very different types of process. 
An inferential process starts from a set of premises and results in a set of 
conclusions which follow logically from, or are at least warranted by the 
premises. A decoding process starts from a signal and results in the recovery of 
a message which is associated with the signal by an underlying code. In 
general, conclusions are not associated to their premises by a code, and signals 
do not warrant the messages they convey (pp.12-13). 
Once the distinctiveness of inference is recognised, a different set of issues opens up: 
... logical systems ... allow infinitely many different conclusions to be derived 
from the same premises. How then is the hearer to infer just those conclusions 
the speaker intended by the speaker (p.IS)? 
This is exactly the question that Relevance addresses. ButSperber and Wilson must 
also explain how this can happen without the guarantees of mutual knowledge. 
As mentioned above, Sperber and Wilson characterise communication as a 
specialised sub-set of cognition which they characterise as 'information-processing' 
(p.38). Information 'is [either] manifest to' or 'capable of being/becoming manifest to' 
an individual, where 'manifest' means capable of being mentally represented: 
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'perceptible' or 'inferable' (p.39). Important here is the sUbjunctive mood: perceptible 
rather than perceived. 'An individual's total cognitive environment is the set of all the 
facts that he.£ill! perceive or infer' (my emphasis): not just the knowledge the subject 
has but that which they are capable of knowing (p.39). The total cognitive environment 
is clearly dynamic: constantly subject to modification by the information that is 
processed. Such modifications are termed 'cognitive effects'.96 Individuals can share 
cognitive environments (though not of course total cognitive environments, given their 
idiosyncracy argument): in a given situation a set of assumptions may be manifest to 
two or more people (p.4I). It can likewise be manifest to these people that they share a 
cognitive environment: it is one of the assumptions that are mutually manifest to them. 
Two people are sitting in a room, the phone rings; the phone ringing is mutually 
manifest to both (p.41-42). Mutually manifest assumptions are, therefore, those 
assumptions which are manifest in a mutual cognitive environment. This is a clearly 
distinguishable counter to mutual knowledge or assumptions as they prefer.97 . First 
because it is, in an important sense, broader: incorporating what the individual is 
capable of knowing not just a fixed stock of assumptions. Second, they argue, it is 
weaker 'in just the right way' in the sense that is more plausible (p.43). Mutual 
manifestness cannot guarantee that speaker and hearer will make 'symmetrical choices' 
about code and context, this is what mutual knowledge is designed to do (p.43). 
On this approach, failures in communication are to be expected: what is 
mysterious and requires explanation is not failure but success (p.4S). 
This is consistent with their 'loose' characterisation of communication itself which does 
not guarantee an identity of representations between communicator and audience, but 
rather similarity or resemblance - a refrain in their writing and one I will return to. For 
Sperber and Wilson, communication centrally involves the focusing of the audience's 
attention and any act of communication automatically does this. This insight is, of 
course, drawn from the Grice of 'Meaning' and 'Meaning Revisited'. 
the very act of communicating creates expectations which it then exploits [and] 
the task of linguistic semantics could be considerably simplified by treating a 
large array of problems in terms of implicatures. (Relevance, p.37) 
'[T]he very act of communicating creates expectations which it then exploits'. This 
insight, which they describe as one of Grice's 'original hunches' (p.38) is their starting 
point for an explanatory model whkh, they argue, needs to be 'psychologically 
realistic' (p.38). Sperber and Wilson reframe this within their own lexicon. Whilst 
'any state of affairs provides direct evidence for a variety of assumptions', these are 
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not necessarily communicated (p.23). To communicate is to make mutually manifest an 
intention to communicate a set of assumptions and focus the attention of the audience on 
the communicator's intentions (p.lS3).98 Communication is therefore ostensive and, 
fundamentally inferential. 
Verbal communication is a special type of ostensive-inferential communication. 
Non-verbal communication can of course be ostensive, but it is weak and vague and 
'one can never be sure which of a variety of assumptions made manifest by the 
communicator she herself actually had in mind' (pp.174-17S). By contrast, in 
linguistic communication, 
[t]he linguistic description is determined by the grammar and does not vary with 
the interests or point of view of the hearers. Second, this linguistic description 
yields a range of semantic representations, one for every sense of the sentence 
uttered. Each semantic representation is a schema, which must be completed 
and integrated into an assumption about the speaker's informative intention ... 
Moreover each schematic sense is generally quite different from all the others, 
and can be completed in quite different ways ... the various possible 
interpretations of an utterance tend to be radically different from one another so 
that when one is chosen the others are automatically eliminated (p.17S). 
It is worth citing this definition in full as their account of interpretation is so strongly 
dependent upon it. Utterances yield a fixed set of semantic representations: coded 
because they are determined by a grammar. These correspond to all the possible senses 
of the sentence uttered and are usually divergent and incompatible. Sperber and Wilson 
stop short of claiming that the various semantic representations are disjunctive. The use 
of 'generally' and 'tend to' incline against such a strong reading. But the selection of 
one interpretation means that the others are' automatically eliminated'. 
Crucial here is the difference between identifying language as a code and defining 
communication only in terms of encoding and decoding. For Sperber and Wilson 
verbal communication is finally distinct from other forms of ostensive-inferential 
communication because it involves both en-de-coding and inferential processes. 
However, 
[t]he coded communication process is not autonomous: it is subservient to the 
inferential process. The inferential process is autonomous: it functions in 
essentially the same way whether or not combined with coded communication 
(p.176). 
Inferencing is not an adjunct to decoding, stepping in to fill in the gaps that coding 
cannot supply, nor is it a contingent process, not always strictly necessary - as it is in 
Grice. It is a central, necessary and above all general process independent of decoding 
and therefore language use: inferencing processes are not specifically pragmatic. The 
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semantic representations produced by decoding are only useful to the extent that they 
function as a source of hypotheses and evidence from which interpretations are inferred 
(p.176). 
The inferential process 
Sperber and Wilson's account of inference aims to specify both the rules and system 
which govern it in terms which they see as psychologically plausible. And as with 
many accounts of human inferencing, the contrast with formal logical systems is 
fundamental to the development of their formulation. But whilst strongly asserting that 
inference is 'less a logical process that a form of suitably constrained guesswork', they 
are highly critical of the vagueness of many pragmatic formulations of the relation, 
conceivingthese as 'purely negative characterisation[s], (pp.69-70). For example 
Levinson's proposal, that pragmatic inferences are 'quite unlike logical inferences' and 
K. Bach and R. Hamish's characterisation of the process as "'not deductive but what 
might be called inference to a plausible explanation!!', fail to specify the character of the 
process itself and seem, to Sperber and Wilson, to rest on the assumption that if it 
works it is not worth thinking about (pp.69-70).99 This 'negative characterisation'of 
inference formally echoes the explicit and implicit formulas for characterising 
intertextual interpretation as not (any simple form of) decoding which likewise leaves 
the question of what it is unanswered. 
As noted above, Sperber and Wilson accord with the general pragmatic wisdom 
that human inference is non-demonstrative. Conclusions cannot be guaranteed by 
premises: 'even under the best of circumstances ... communication may fail' (p.65). It 
is further specified as a global and non-specialised thought process: 'global' because 
'any conceptually represented information' can be used by the addressee as a premise 
within an inference process (p.65); 'non-specialised' because it is an 'ordinary, central 
thought process, as opposed to a specialised input process' (p.65).100 The inference 
process is also spontaneous, nearly instantaneous and unconscious. Although there 
are forms of inference which are consciously and explicitly reasoned (two examples 
they give are the interpretations of literary and religious scholars), these are not, they 
argue, the appropriate model from which to extrapolate the processes of 'most ordinary 
thinking, and in particular ordinary verbal communication' (p.75). 
It is this conjunction of characteristics of the human inference process - non-
demonstrative; global (but constrained by its speed but also, in the case of utterance 
interpretation, the helpfulness of the source); spontaneous; and, unconscious - which 
differentiates human inference from formal logical processes. This characterisation, 
they argue, makes success or lack of success and efficiency or inefficiency the criteria 
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by which the process should be judged rather than logical validity or invalidity (p.69). 
And indeed, efficiency becomes central to their account of inference and the principle 
which governs it. This emphasis on efficiency is a feature of many cognitive accounts 
of text compreliension, where the speed at which certain types of inference are 
generated and the assumption that working memory is very limited lead many to 
conclude that 'issues of efficiency and economy [are] highly important. dOI 
However Sperber and Wilson break with pragmatic common-sense when they 
assert: 
the only logical rules spontaneously available to the human mind are deductive 
rules (p.69). 
This would also seem to contradict their own argument. How can a process be at 
once logical and non-logical? Sperber and Wilson differentiate the overall process of 
spontaneous non-demonstrative inference, which is not logical, from the use of 
deductive rules within the process. A non-demonstrative inference cannot 'consist' of a 
deduction, but there is no reason suppose that it cannot 'contain a deduction as one of 
its sub-parts' (p.69). Given their cognitive framework, this claim has consequences 
for the conceptual representation system they model. If an inference contains a 
deduction and deductive rules are the only logical rules available to the human mind, 
then conceptual representations must have logical properties, which in turn suggests 
that the deductive system applies to conceptual as opposed to perceptual 
representations, thus strengthening their claim that the inference process in a 
generalised thought process (pp.72-75). Sperber and Wilson defend their claims about 
deductive inference through an appeal to efficiency which is framed in cognitive and 
evolutionary terms. A deductive system 'effects an important economy of storage' 
(p.85). Given a set of deductive rules, the logical implications of a set of assumptions 
can be deduced as opposed to being separately stored. Deductive rules are a useful tool 
to any organism which seeks to improve its knowledge of the world, enabling it to 
both work out the consequences of new assumptions and 'guaranteeing the accuracy of 
any conclusions deduced from initially accurate premises' (p.85). Finally, deductive 
rules are a tool for exposing inaccuracies and inconsistencies in its conceptual 
representations, enabling more accurate, and therefore more useful representations 
(p.85). 
They then delimit the type of deductive rules that are used. The only rules 'which 
can appear in the logical entry of a given concept are elimination rules' (p.86).102 
Again this conclusion seems to be derived from a definition of the human which is both 
modelled on but clearly differentiated from formal logical systems. Whilst logical 
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systems aim at completeness - the derivation of all the logical implications of an 
assumption or set of assumptions - human 'systems' do not. Here, the time factor and 
the interest in cognitive gains make such completeness unnecessary and the generation 
of trivial implications unlikely. This difference opens the way to another strong claim, 
namely that 
the human deductive device only has access to elimination rules (p.97). 
In certain types of formal logic, introduction and elimination rules are used to handle 
deductions which include propositions with more than one constituent such as the 
conjunction 'P and Q' or the disjunction 'either P or Q'. Introduction rules enable the 
derivation of conclusions which contain ' ... and ... ' or 'either ... or'. Elimination rules 
enable the use of premises which contain ' ... and ... ' or 'either ... or' within a 
deduction process. 103 Thus, for example the rule of And-introduction enables the 
conjunctive conclusion 'P and Q' to be derived from the separate premises 'PI and 'Q'. 
The rule of And-elimination enables the single constituent 'PI to be derived from the 
conjunctive 'P and Q'. Sperber and Wilson argue that the conclusions which are 
derived from introduction rules are 'in some intuitive sense trivial' (p.97). 
Sperber and Wilson's account of inference has prompted considerable controversy: 
Chapter two outlines a speculative psychology of inference likely to leave 
psychologists, logicians, semanticists and computer scientists in some degree 
of apoplexy. 104 
Levinson is highly critical of the argument that only deductive rules are available to the 
human mind for spontaneous inferencing and argues that there is no evidence to 
suppose that introduction rules play no part in the process. lOS In a different vein, Eve 
E. Sweetener criticises Sperber and Wilson for not making the controversial character 
of their model explicit: the strong resemblance between thought structures and 
linguistic structures that they propose cannot be assumed. 106 This raises an interesting 
issue about the relations between communication and cognition in their model. On the 
one hand Sperber and Wilson are committed to defining communication as a specialised 
sub-set of cognition; on the other they use utterance comprehension as a model for a 
general thought process. The nearly instantaneous nature of the process and the fact 
that utterances come from a helpful source constrain the inferencing process before they 
even discuss the types of rule that govern it. Is the recourse to communication as a 
model for a general cognitive process functioning here as an attempt to delimit the 
inference process? 
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Relevance and verbal communication 
An account of the inferential process, however explicit, does not explain why 
individuals process information or how they come to derive one set of conclusions 
ratherthan another. Sperber and Wilson propose that the processing of all phenomena 
and stimuli - non-ostensive, ostensive and ostensive-coded - is guided by the same 
'principle': relevance. The first Principle of Relevance: 
Human cOlmition tends to be geared towards the maximisation of relevance 
(p.260).IO'l 
So what is relevance? 'Relevance' as it is defined by Sperber and Wilson carries some 
of the senses that ordinary language uses carry: 
we believe that there is an important psychological property - a property of 
mental processes - which the ordinary notion of relevance roughly 
approximates. lo8 
Intuitions about relevance and degrees of relevance suggest the beginnings of a 
psychologically plausible account of cognition and communication; but the 
development of their definition owes rather little to this. Relevance is predicated on a 
characterisation of the human subject as an efficient information-processing device. But 
efficiency is not exclusively a matter of economy or processing costs. These have to be 
offset by the benefits or cognitive gains defined in terms of a general goal: human 
cognition in general is geared towards improving the individual's knowledge of the 
world (pp.46-48). Loosely speaking, something (a phenomenon, stimulus, 
ostensive-stimulus etc.) is relevant in so far as the cognitive gains make it worth 
processing in terms of 'costs': 
Efficiency with respect to relative goals is a matter of striking a balance between 
degree of achievement and expenditure' (p.47). 
Old information is not worth processing from the standpoint of efficiently improving 
one's representation of the world and completely new information requires too much 
expenditure for too little achievement. But new information that can be processed in 
relation to old information can produce 'new' information in a cost-effective way.I09 
The use of old information - existing assumptions - to process new information -
which is connected to it - gives rise to modifications of context. These modifications 
are defined by Sperber and Wilson as 'contextual effects' (p.108) which they use to 
measure achievement-efficiency relations and define relevance. Improving one's 
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knowledge of the world is not only conceived as extending one's stock of information 
or assumptions: a process of accumulation. What makes their picture more interesting 
is that the processing of new information may strengthen old assumptions or weaken or 
even lead to their abandonment (p.l 09), immediately marking their focus on the 
possible relations between assumptions; most importantly assumptions can confirm or 
contradict one another. They conclude: 
[w]e want to argue that having contextual effects is a necessary condition for 
Relevance, and that other things being equal, the greater the contextual effects, 
the greater the relevance (p.119).IIO 
The Second or Communicative Principle is grounded in the first: 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance (Postface to second edition, p.260). 
This presumption has two components: 
Presumption of optimal relevance (revised) 
(a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth 
the addressee's effort to process it. 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible 
with the communicator's abilities and preferences (Postface, 
p.270) 
What is immediately obvious is the break with the Gricean model. The utterance has to 
be relevant 'enough' to be worth the effort of processing, but no more than this 
(p.267). In the Postface, Sperber and Wilson distinguish their Principle from the 
Cooperative Principle very explicitly. 'Understanding and being understood' is the 
'common goal' that speaker-hearers share, but no more than this is necessary: no 
common conversational goal of co-operation is required (p.268). III 
The existence of a common conversational goal need not be built into pragmatic 
principles. We still believe this is correct. (p.268, my emphasis) 
The 'need not' in the first sentence is interesting because it follows an 
acknowledgement that 'most' verbal exchanges 'may' share a purpose beyond 'mere[]' 
understanding (p.268). But the crucial point is that such additional purposes are not 
necessary (conflictual and non-reciprocal exchanges are the examples they instance). 
Nor is relevance a 'principle' in the sense that the Cooperative Principle is. Whilst 
Grice's maxims are a set of norms which communicator and audience need to know and 
follow, relevance functions not as a general principle but as a particular presumption 
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which is communicated by and about every particular act of communication, it is not 
'followed' and could not be violated (p.162). The 'still' in the second sentence asserts 
this as a continuity with their first edition position, but also presumably as a counter to 
anyone who might detect a 'softening' of their line. In their original formulation, the 
ostensive stimulus is 'the most relevant stimulus capable of fulfilling [the 
communicator's] intentions' (Relevance, first edition, p.IS7). But now, the 
ostensive stimulus is 'the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's 
abilities and preferences (Postface, p.270, my emphasis). It may not minimise the 
addressee's effort and the communicator 'cannot be more relevant than her own 
knowledge permits' (Postface, p.270). Her own effort and various 'rules of etiquette 
or standards of ideological correctness' may 'rule out the utterance that would be easiest 
to process' (p.268). Although the first edition acknowledges the role of cultural 
prohibitions in determining the communicator's choice of a stimulus, this is a minor 
qualification which does not impact on the formulation of the principle itself 
(Relevance, first edition, p.IS7). Here such considerations enter its form. This 
suggests a minor modification in how the human is defined. The idealised model of 
efficiency of the first edition is now more explicitly subject to certain cultural processes; 
though it is interesting that culture is conceived here exclusively as a barrier to the 
smoothest possible functioning of the process. 
It is clear then that we and Sperber and Wilson have come a long way from 
'ordinary', 'commonsense' intuitions about relevance. This is nowhere more clearly 
fore grounded than in their account of the relations between relevance and context. 
'Intuitively' perhaps we assume that relevance (in the ordinary everyday sense) is 
context-bound: something is relevant in a context. Sperber and Wilson reverse this 
relation: relevance is not determined by context; context is determined by relevance. 
Context, the knowledges that hearers deploy in interpretation, is not fixed (comprising 
for example the explicit content of earlier utterances, or this plus implicated content); 
rather context is a 'variable' (Relevance, p.142). There is indeed an immediately given 
context - those assumptions mobilised or/and produced by the previous utterance 
interpretation - but this is merely an initial context which can be 'extended in different 
directions' (p.I40). The context may include the explicit or/and implicit content of 
earlier utterances; likewise it maybe extended by adding to it 'the encyclopaedic entries 
... of concepts already present either in the context or in the assumptions being 
processed' (p.I40). The encyclopaedic entry for a concept contains information about 
the extension and/or denotation of the concept: that is about the objects, events and/or 
properties which instantiate it' (p.86).112 The context can also be extended by adding 
information about the immediately observable environment. But what is most 
important here is the subjunctive mood. These are possible contexts and 
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[w]hat determines the selection of a particular context out of that range? Our 
answer is that the selection of a particular context is determined by the search for 
relevance (p.141). 
This formulation effects a reversal of much pragmatic commonsense but, Sperber and 
Wilson argue, context cannot be fixed because if this was the case then relevance could 
only be assessed after interpretation has taken place and this would be inefficient. 
Assessment of relevance is not a goal in itself but 'a means to an end, the end being to 
maximise the relevance of any information being processed' (p.142) . 
... [P]eople hope that the assumption being processed is relevant ... and they try 
to select a context which will justify that hope: a context which will maximise 
relevance (p.142). 
The selection of a context or contexts is itself shaped by its accessibility: 
just as processing an item of information in a context involves some effort, so 
accessing a context involves some effort. The less accessible a context, the 
greater the effort involved in accessing it and conversely (p.142). 
Sperber and Wilson argue that relevance not only drives ostensive-inferential 
communication but explains it. Once the ostensive nature of a stimulus is mutually 
manifest to communicator and audience, it is also mutually manifest that the . 
communicator has an informative intention i.e. that she intends to make manifest a set 
of assumptions{I}. The addressee's task is to identify this set of assumptions. They 
propose that one member of {I} is the presumption of relevance. However, it is not 
only one of {I} but 'about' {I}: it can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the other 
contents of {I}. Sperber and Wilson conceive the interpretative process as a procedure 
of hypothesis construction about the contents of {I} in order to identify the 
communicator's informative intention (p.165). These hypotheses are tested one by one: 
the order of testing being determined by the accessibility of the context in which the 
assumption is processed. As soon as an interpretation or 'conclusion' which confirms 
the initial presumption is produced, the process of hypothesis construction stops. At 
the start of the comprehension process, the evidence for the presumption of relevance 
is entirely indirect; it is entirely based on the communicators' guarantee that her 
stimulus is optimally relevant to the addressee. By processing the stimulus, the 
addressee obtains direct evidence for or against the presumption that it is optimally 
relevant. By the end of the comprehension process this direct evidence will have 
superseded the initial indirect evidence. 
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Utterance interpretation is a specialised kind of ostensive-inferential communication 
explicable in tenns of relevance. Sperber and Wilson's account concerns the 
interpretation of what is 'said' as an inferential operation (and not only what is 'meant', 
to stay within the Gricean idiom). In Relevance, the latter are still dubbed implicatures 
but they coin 'explicature' as the tenn for the explicit meaning that is recovered from the 
utterance. The recovery and/or construction of explicatures and implicatures take place 
after the utterance has been decoded into a set of semantic representations 
(corresponding to each and every sense of the sentence uttered). The production of 
explicatures is necessary because, in their view, 
semantic representations are incomplete logical forms i.e. at best fragmentary 
representations of thoughts (p.193). 
A semantic representation needs to be completed, or 'converted' into a logical fonn in 
order to be used as evidence in an inferential process. This process of completion 
transfonns a semantic representation into an explicature. 
An explicature is an explicitly communicated assumption ... An assumption 
communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a development of 
logical form encoded by U (p.182). 
This development is achieved through inference by using contextual information to 
convert a semantic representation into a fully propositional fonn. This would include 
procedures of reference assignment, disambiguation and the specification of 'vague' 
terms. But if an utterance can encode a number of (incomplete) logical fonns how is 
the correct or 'right' propositional fonn obtained? 
[T]he right propositional fonn is the one that leads to an overall interpretation 
which is consistent with the Principle of Relevance (p.184). 
By contrast, an implicature is any assumption which is intentionally but not explicitly 
communicated i.e. any assumption which is intentionally communicated but which is 
not a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance (p.182). The speaker 
assumes that the hearer will be able to access certain assumptions, use these 
assumptions as a context in which the explicatures of the utterance are processed and 
derive certain conclusions: 
(33) (a) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes? 
(b) Mary: I wouldn't drive ANY expensive car (p.194). 
The main explicature of Mary's response does not directly answer Peter's question. 
But it does allow Peter to access encyclopaedic knowledge about cars, including 
expensive cars: 
which includes let us suppose, the information in (34): 
(34) A Mercedes is an expensive car. 
If processed in a context containing assumption (34), (33b) would yield the 
contextual implication (35): 
(35) Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes (p.194). 
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Neither (34) nor (35) are developments of the logical form encoded in Mary's utterance 
(34). Rather they are implicatures. 
In Sperber and Wilson's account, the explicit meaning of an utterance is neither 
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coded nor conventional. Inferenc$entra1 to all interpretation (an utterance after all may 
have no relevant implicatures), and this is one of the key reasons why Relevance is 
such a strong account of inferential communication. Further, they extend the scope of 
pragmatic enquiry to the zone of what is explicitly 'said', the interpretation of which 
can no longer be assumed.113 What is said is far more underdetermined than 
pragmatics generally acknowledges. As Carston puts it: I not only does linguistic 
meaning underdetermine what is meant and what is said underdetermine what is meant 
but '[l]inguistic meaning underdetermines what is said'.114 This marks a central 
difference between Grice and Relevance, for as Carston argues, 'Grice seems to have 
conceived of "what is said" as fully propositional' and Carston's thesis, Pragmatics 
and the Explicit-Implicit Distinction, focuses exactly on this underdetermination and 
how explicatures are produced. 115 Even Levinson, whose review is otherwise 
consistently hostile, welcomes their characterisation of explicature because it draws 
attention 'to the role of contextual inference not only in language interpretation but in 
what many have taken to be the heart of semantics'.116 
Sperber and Wilson's characterisations of explicature and implicature are both 
comparative. An explicature may be more or less explicit, depending on its relation to 
its explicated propositional form. Implicatures vary according to their strength of 
intentionality. Some but not all implicatures are fully determinate i.e. intended by the 
speaker who takes responsibility for their truthfulness. 117 To return to the previous 
example, Mary's response to Peter's question might not only mobilise the implicated 
premise that a Mercedes is an expensive car but that there are other cars which can be 
classed as expensive (Rolls Royces and Cadillacs are examples given) and that this 
context could give rise to implicated conclusions such as 'Mary wouldn't drive a Rolls 
Royce' and 'Mary wouldn't drive a Cadillac'. Peter might also derive implicated 
premises and conclusions alorig the lines of: 
(41) People who refuse to drive expensive cars disapprove of displays of 
wealth. 
(42) Mary disapproves of displays of wealth (p.197). 
or even: 
(47) People who would not drive an expensive car would not go on a: cruise 
either. 
(48) Mary would not go on a cruise (p.199). 
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Mary may indeed want Peter to derive (42) but her expectation that Peter would derive it 
must be less strong than her expectation that he would derive the conclusion that Mary 
would not drive any expensive car (36). Otherwise presumably, Mary could have said 
something like 'No, I disapprove of displays of wealth' in response to Peter's question. 
In Sperber and Wilson's terms she gives him somewhat less 'encouragement' to derive 
(42) than (36). She gives him no encouragement at all to derive the conclusion that she 
would not go on a cruise (48), though Peter may indeed derive this. This relativising 
of determinacy enables them to distinguish implicatures in terms of their relative 
strength: 
The strongest possible implicatures are those fully determinate premises or 
conclusions ... which must actually be supplied if the interpretation is to be 
consistent with the Principle of Relevance and for which the speaker takes full 
responsibility (p.199). 
Strong implicatures are strongly encouraged but the hearer is not forced to supply them. 
The weaker the encouragement, the wider the range of possibilities and the weaker the 
implicatures. 'Eventually ... a point is reached at which the hearer receives no 
encouragement at all to supply any particular premise and conclusion .. .'(p.199). 
Beyond literal declaratives 
Sperber and Wilson extend and enrich their account of verbal communication by 
considering a wide range of utterance types - interrogatives and imperatives as well as 
declaratives, metaphor and irony as well as 'literal' uses of language - all from the 
standpoint of relevance. Whilst some of these issues, for example the representation of 
new and shared knowledge, are topoi in pragmatics, others - direct and indirect speech 
for example - are not. The aim, of course, is to demonstrate the explanatory power of 
Relevance and its divergence from other, particularly Gricean accounts. What is also 
interesting here is the focus on communicative instances where one utterance's 
resemblance to another is central to its interpretation - immediately suggestive in the 
light of intertextual theories. 
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Their discussion of diverse utterance types is predicated on a refinement and 
extension of their account of the relations between utterance and thought. Utterances 
are not only 'incomplete' representations of thoughts, they are always interpretations: 
'an interpretive expression of a thought' and the relationship between the meaning of an 
utterance and the thought that it represents is only ever one of resemblance and never 
identity (p.230).118 A hearer's interpretation is always an interpretation of an 
interpretation. It is within this framework that they distinguish literal and non-literal 
utterances 
... an utterance, in its role as an interpretive expression of a speaker's thought, 
is strictly literal if it has the same propositional form as that thought. To say that 
an utterance is less than strictly literal is to say that its propositional form shares 
some, but not all, of its logical properties with the propositional form it is 
being used to interpret (p.233). 
For Sperber and Wilson, the difference between literal and non-literal meaning is only 
one of degree: greater or lesser resemblance between utterance and thought. The 
degree of literalness or non-literalness is determined by relevance. Indirectness in an 
utterance needs to be offset by an increase in contextual effects. To describe a room as 
a pigsty (to take one of their examples) is not only to say that it is filthy and untidy: 
otherwise the speaker could have said just this . 
... [T]he speaker must have intended to convey something more than this if the 
relative indirectness of the utterance is to be justified: an image, say, of 
filthiness and untidiness beyond the norm ... (p.236). 
A metaphor does not have to be first interpreted literally and then found wanting in 
respect of (say) the maxim of quality, because non-literal language is not the 'other' of 
a default literal language. Literal and non-literal uses of language exist on a continuum 
from strictly literal through various types of 'looseness' of expression - approximation, 
certain kinds of exaggeration - through to conventionally figurative uses of language. 
Further, non-literal or figurative uses of language do not require particular or special 
skills to interpret. Nor are such uses 'special': what distinguishes a metaphor is simply 
that it can often generate a large number of weak implicatures and the hearer needs to 
take considerable responsibility for constructing them. Sperber and Wilson use these 
criteria to produce a comparative definition of the poetic: 
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In general, the wider the range of potential implicatures and the greater the 
hearer's responsibility for constructing them, the more poetic the effect, the 
more creative the metaphor. A good creative metaphor is precisely one in which 
a variety of contextual effects can be retained and understood as weakly 
implicated by the speaker ... The result is quite a complex picture, for which the 
hearer has to take a large part of the responsibility, but the discovery of which 
has been triggered by the writer ... (p.237). 
Poetic language is characterised in terms of its interpretative possibilities, which are in 
tum dependent on the foresight of the speaker. 119 Sperber and Wilson's account of 
metaphor and non-literal language demonstrates very clearly that relevance is not a rule 
which can be followed or flouted in Gricean terms, but 'a process which is triggered 
by every utterance,.120 This alternative explanation of non-literal uses of language may 
in part account for the many Relevance-based accounts of poetic effects. 121 
Consistent with the notion of the literal and non-literal as a continuum is Sperber 
and Wilson's 'naturalistic' characterisation of style, defined in terms of the relations 
between cognitive effects and processing effort: 
Stylistic differences are just differences in the way relevance is achieved. 
(p.224). 
The speaker makes assumptions about which relevant assumptions the hearer will find 
it easier to access, and more general assumptions about the stock of assumptions that 
the hearer might hold: 
(74) (a) Only amateurs can compete in the Olympics. 
(c) The Olympic Games is an international sporting competition held 
every four years. Only amateurs - that is, people who receive no payment for 
their sporting activities - can compete in the Olympic Games ... (p.218). 
In each case, the speaker makes very different assumptions about what the hearer 
knows about the Olympic Games and amateur status. These are, for Sperber and 
Wilson, differences of style: differences in contextual effects and processing effort 
which are determined by the speaker's assumptions about the hearer. Such utterances 
differ not so much in their import as in the amount of help they give the hearer 
in recovering it (p.218). 
Both utterances have similar meanings in the sense that their propositional forms 
logically resemble one another. Style also varies depending on the extent to which it 
may 'constrain or guide the hearer's search for relevance' (p.218). Very indirect 
responses to questions, for example, might encourage a 'particular line of processing' 
far more strongly than a direct answer (p.219). Sperber and Wilson contrast three 
possible answers to the question 'Is Jack a good sailor' 
(b) Mary: Yes he is. 
(c) Mary: ALL the English are good sailors. 
(d) Mary: He's English ... 
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In saying (75c), for example, Mary not only expects Peter to access and use 
the assumptions that Jack is English and infer that Jack is a good sailor; she 
also encourages him to speculate on, to derive some additional conclusions 
from the assumption that the English are good sailors. In saying (75d), by 
contrast she behaves as if the assumption that all the English are good sailors 
were mutually manifest to her and Peter and more manifest than the assumption 
that Jack is English (p.219). 
The most indirect reply to the question, (d), guides the hearer to consider certain 
. assumptions most strongly. Further, although in each of (b) to (d), the speaker 
indicates that she thinks that Jack is a good sailor, (b) (c) and (d) are not alternative 
ways of 'saying the same thing'. while the speaker's belief that Jack is a good sailor is 
one of the assumptions communicated by the utterance in each case, it is not the 
fore grounded assumption in either (c) or (d) which themselves differ in terms of the 
assumptions which are foregrounded and the expectations which are made of the hearer: 
Style arises, we maintain, in the pursuit of relevance (p.219). 
Their definition of style is therefore expansive, taking account of any expectation that 
the speaker makes of the hearer which is intentionally explicit or implicit in the 
utterance. Style is a characteristic of all language use, which in turn is governed by 
relevance. Further, in keeping with their notion that the speaker can choose one 
stimulus from a possible range (depending on the speaker's expectations), this 
approach assumes that there is a propositional core of meaning which can be expanded, 
contracted, versioned in a number of ways depending on the expectations of speaker-
hearers. Sperber and Wilson's definition of style is also markedly different from 
Grice's. As noted above, the maxim of manner is the only place where form or 'style' 
is acknowledged, and the default model of language assumes communication is a 
'maximally effective exchange of communication'. 122 
It is through this characterisation of style that Sperber and Wilson develop their 
distinction between 'interpretive' and 'descriptive' language use. An utterance is used 
descriptively if it represents some state of affairs (or desirable state of affairs) which it 
describes. An utterance can also be used interpretively, to represent something it 
resembles: another utterance (p.227). Direct quotation (direct speech), indirect 
speech, summary and translation are all characterised as a set of relations between the 
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utterance that is being represented and the utterance that is used to represent it (pp.227-
229). A direct quotation has a linguistic and semantic identity with the utterance. An 
indirect quotation, they argue, is not semantically identical - presumably because of 
the backshifting of tenses and shift from first to third person - but its propositional form 
is the same. In the case of a summary, the relationship is looser. The summary does 
not have the semantic or propositional form as the utterance but, they argue, if the 
summary of the utterance is faithful, 
... the propositional forms, though different must resemble one another: they 
must share some logical properties, have partly identical contextual implications 
in some contexts, for example (p.228). 
The degree of resemblance between the utterance and the utterance that it represents 
varies: from identity to a minimal degree of resemblance below which the utility of the 
utterance as a representation comes into question (p.229). In each case the utterance is 
an interpretation of some or all of the linguistic, semantic and logical properties of the 
utterance being represented. 
An interpretive utterances is echoic, a term immediately suggesting parallels with 
intertextual theories: it echoes or resembles another utterance. Further, echoic 
utterances are not only interpretations of existing utterances but second-degree 
interpretations of interpretations, because every utterance is an interpretation of a 
thought of the speaker (p.238). Sperber and Wilson characterise not only the various 
modes of the reporting of speech and thought as echoic, but also irony which is 
'primarily designed to ridicule the opinion echoed' (p.241). To take their own 
example: 
(112) (a) 
(b) 
He: It's a lovely day for a picnic. 
[fhey go for a picnic and it rains.] 
She (sarcastically): It's a lovely day for a picnic indeed ... 
The speaker of (112b) manifestly' believes that it is not a lovely day for a picnic. 
From this it follows that it was wrong of her companion to say that it was a 
lovely day for a picnic, that his judgement has been unsound ... and so on. 
The recovery of these implicatures depends, first, on a recognition of the 
utterance as echoic; second on an identification of the source of the opinion 
echoed; and third on a recognition that the speaker's attitude to the opinion 
expressed is one of rejection of disassociation (p.240). 
Whilst the last of these 'recognitions' relates specifically to echoic utterances, the 
account ,of implicature recovery summarises the interpretative requirements of any 
echoic utterance. 
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Sperber and Wilson's interest in echoic utterances and interpretive use (in both 
senses) is evidenced in some of their earliest work together, as well as in Sperber's 
recent writings on metarepresentation as a fundamental and evolved cognitive capacity 
which can be understood as a development. In their 1981 article, 'Irony and the Use-
Mention Distinction', they follow a similar line of reasoning and align irony with 
parody: both are instances of 'mention' rather than 'use'.123 They also offer a richer 
characterisation of the echoic: 
Some are immediate echoes and others delays: some have their source in actual 
utterances, other in thoughts or opinions; some have a real source, others an 
imagined one, whereas others have a vaguer origin.124 
They also argue that their approach can better explain a number of commonsense and 
linguistic phenomena associated with irony, for example: the notion of an ironical tone 
of voice and, the 'switch iIi style of register' which is often a feature of ironical 
utterances.125 This makes sense, they argue, precisely because irony is an instance of 
mention. They do not suggest exactly how the source of the echo might be identified 
however, or whether the identification or construction of the actual source is a 
necessary condition of interpretation. The identification of interpretive modes of 
language use seems to mark a congruence (noted above) with intertextual theories: a 
recognition of the role that utterance resemblance plays in the production and 
interpretation of meaning. But there is also an immediate divergence: in Voloshinov, 
Bakhtin and Kristeva, all utterances are 'echoic'; there is no place for the category of 
the 'descriptive utterance' in Sperber and Wilson's terms. These are issues to which I 
will return to in chapter three. 
Sperber's recent work on metarepresentation can be viewed as the broader 
framework in which the account of the echoic is elaborated. 126 His accounts of 
metarepresentation not only make the production and interpretation of echoic utterances 
possible, they also provide a cognitive and evolutionary rationale for Relevance theory. 
In a recent seminar, Sperber proposed a definition of metarepresentation in the form of 
a cautionary tale for ethnographers. 127 An ethnographer wants to discover the myth-of-
origins of a particular tribe and seeks out the relevant elder. He then asks him 
something along the lines of 'how did you come to be'. The elder replies that he is not 
that old. But by rephrasing the question in a version of 'what is the story about how 
you came to be', the ethnographer is immediately presented with the story. This 
narrative anecdote nicely illustrates the othering that ethnography and anthropology may 
effect on unfamiliar cultures, and particularly the assumption that the beliefs of the 
other are always literally held. But it also illustrates what Sperber means by 
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metarepresentation: a particular kind of representation of a representation. 128 'The 
human metarepresentational capacity ... is, first and foremost a capacity to represent 
the content of representations. ,129 Metarepresentations do not represent a particular 
state of affairs which they describe 'but representations (mental, public, or abstract) 
the contents of which they serve to render.'13o Therefore the italicised expressions of 
'Mary believes that she is seriously ill' represents a mental representation of Mary's. 
A fully-fledged metarepresentational capability such as the one found in human 
languages and in human thinking is based on the possibility of interpreting any 
expression-token as representing another token of the same expression or 
expression-type, or more generally some expression type or token it resembles 
in relevant respects. 131 
The use of an utterance which resembles another utterance is predicated on such an 
ability. 
In various texts, Sperber outlines the evolutionary rationale for just such a 'full-
fledged' metarepresentational capacity. The ability to represent the content of the 
mental states of others and various kinds of public representations as interpretations as 
opposed to as descriptions, is, Sperber argues, central to various complex actions and 
processes, for example, avoiding being deceived, taking up various attitudes towards 
beliefs - believing (at various degrees of strength), doubting and disbelieving - and 
persuading. 132 Sperber also reasons that metarepresentational ability must have 
preceded the development of language, in evolutionary terms: if language (conceived, 
of course, as en-de-coding in the strict sense of code-message pairing) had preceded 
metarepresentation, then metarepresentational ability could not have developed, 
because en-de-coding is not a metarepresentational process. 133 As might be expected, 
a general cognitive ability is proposed as central and language as subsequent and 
dependent. Indeed, Sperber seems to suggest that the ability to metarepresent is the 
most distinctive criterion of the human; and that ostensive-inferential communication is 
metarepresentational 'through and through': 134 
When we, modern humans, communicate verbally, we decode what the 
words mean in order to find out what the speaker meant. Discovering sentence 
meaning is just a means to an end. Our true interest is in the speaker's meaning. 
A speaker's meaning is a mental representation entertained by the speaker which 
she intended the hearer to recognise and to which she intends him to take some 
specific attitude (e.g. accept as true). Verbal understanding consists in forming 
a metarepresentation of a representation of the speaker ... Linguistic 
comprehension is an inferential task using decoded material as evidence. The 
inferences involved are about speaker meaning, that is, are aimed at 
metarepresentational conclusions. 135 
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Sperber's accounts of metarepresentational ability and its development can be seen as an 
attempt to ground Relevance in a plausible cognitive and evolutionary psychological 
framework, and also to strengthen the claim that ostensive-inferential communication is 
the strongest explanatory model of utterance production and interpretation. But the 
synopsis above also captures many of the general features of Relevance theory: the 
necessary but limited scope of en-de-coding; the ostensive character of utterance 
production and the role of this ostensiveness in interpretation; the notion that the 
utterance is evidence for an inferential process; and, the centrality of speaker meaning 
(as opposed to utterance or utterance-type meaning) in their account of communication. 
What is missing here is relevance: a presumption communicated by every utterance 
1$ 
which verified or confirmed by the interpretative process. This interpretative process is 
r, 
itself governed by relevance, which, like any other cognitive process, 'tends to be 
geared to the maximisation of the cumulative relevance of the inputs it processes' 
(Postface to the second edition, p.261). The balancing of processing costs and 
benefits drives the amplification and completion of semantic representations into fully 
propositional forms - explicatures - as well as the production of implicatures, including 
the mobilisation of any required contexts. The tendency to maximisation explains 
cognitive activity as apparently diverse as the smell of gas or a complex written 
discourse. Relevance is, to say the least, an elegant theory. 
Pragmatic criticisms 
The summary above also illustrates three issues which are contentious in discussions of 
Relevance: the role of the principle that is not a Principle, relevance itself; the 
characterisation of the cognising subject that Relevance assumes, seemingly 
exclusively rational; and the role of intention in the interpretative process. It is not 
surprising that both the character and explanatory force of relevance has excited 
considerable criticism. Even Alastair Fowler, whose review title celebrates 'A New 
Theory of Communication', suggests that Sperber and Wilson should have considered 
alternatives to the 'easiest path' interpretation. 136 Trevor Pateman makes the same 
point. Both seem to ignore the cognitive gains that are balanced against processing 
costs.137 Levinson, more seriously, proposes that relevance is circular. The number 
of contextual effects which a stimulus can produce is 'unrestricted in value' (unless 
context is itself 'artificially' limited), it is relevance which restricts context and 
therefore 'constructs the basis for assessing Relevance,.138 He goes on to argue that it 
is also an inconsistent principle: sometimes it seems to have a predetermined value and 
contextual effects are produced until that value is satisfied; sometimes the costs have a 
threshold value so that the first interpretation congruent with least effort is chosen. 139 
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More generally speaking, does relevance explain everything that it is supposed to? 
These are issues to which I will return in chapter three, but it would certainly seem that 
the interpretation of poetic language (with its 'gains' of many weak implicatures) does 
not seem to square with the 'threshold value' which clearly obtains on many occasions -
another reason perhaps for the Relevance-theoretic interest in poetic effects. 
These issues can only be adequately addressed if the rol~ntention in the production 
and interpretation of meaning are raised in a critical form. Indeed, the relationship 
between metarepresentation and inferential communication becomes fully explicit only 
when the central role of intention is acknowledged: the hearer forms 
metarepresentations of the speaker's intentions. Relevance is clearly a strongly 
intentionalist account of communication. It is not simply that hearers or readers 
attribute or 'construct' the intentions of speakers and writers, it is that these are central 
to successful communication and, indeed, to defining the limits of communication per 
se. 140 Only the contextual effects deemed to have been encouraged (strongly or 
weakly) by the 'speaker are recognised as communicated. 141 But even if this distinction 
is accepted, it does not take any real account of how difficult it might be to distinguish 
between the two in interpretative scenarios. This is acknowledged to be an issue, for 
example by Billy Clark, who argues that this difficulty is precisely what makes poetic 
language an interesting test-case for Relevance. 142 But it is interesting that this 
acknowledgement seems to assume that most other types of language do not present 
such a problem. 
The centrality of intention to Relevance has been variously attacked. Levinson sees 
their absence of interest in what he terms 'default' meaning as a fundamental problem: 
their exclusive focus on speaker meaning blinds them to the contribution of, for 
example, Generalised Conversational Implicatures.143/ Jacob L. Mey and Mary Talbot 
are likewise critical of their refusal to acknowledge the role of convention in the 
production and interpretation of meaning. These are issues to which I will return in 
chapter three from the standpoint of intertextuality; but there are a set of problems with 
intention which are generated by the internal logic of Relevance and which require 
noting here. First, although there is a strong commitment to specifying the detail of the 
interpretative process and its relation to intention, at times there seems flt'ti~s an 
almost naive confidence that the intentions of the communicator (which are recognised 
as potentially and frequently complex) can be successfully communicated: thoughts are 
precise though their 'public' representations are clearly not. Linked to this is an 
apparent conflict between the delimitation and specification of interpretative possibilities 
that intention is supposed to make strongly probable, and the indeterminacy of the 
utterance as concept. Utterances are vague and ambiguous evidence about a speaker's 
thought, interpretive expressions of a speaker's thought and so on. This is certainly a 
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powerful challenge to the classical en-de-coding model, as is the proposal that if 
communication is successful the hearer will entertain thoughts similar but not identical 
to the speaker's own. But does it not also undermine the possibility of 'recuperating' 
what is intentionally, as opposed to unintentionally communicated? This may account 
for the shifting terms that are employed to represent this process: most frequently 
'recovery' as might be expected, but also on occasion 'construction,.144 
Finally, the seemingly exclusively rational character of Relevance-person. 
Although Sperber and Wilson claim that human inference is 'less a logical process than 
a form of suitably constrained guesswork', logic is clearly central to their account. 145 
Within their scheme, concepts require logical entries and utterances require 
propositional formulation so that they can function within an inference procedure and 
enter into relations with other assumptions. A number of commentators have criticised 
tW<., 
what might be termedi\'hyper-rationalism' of their model: '[t]he underlying assumption 
is that all knowledge lies in deductive relations among linguistic structures,.146 It is 
perhaps pertinent to contrast this with the associative conceptual networks operating in 
Kintsch's constraint-satisfaction model, which are precisely not predicated on logical 
relations. 147 Talbot and Mey reprove Sperber and Wilson for their characterisation of 
the subject as wholly rational, instancing the Freudian concept of disavowal in an 
example which demonstrates both the difficulties which an exclusively rational model 
can encounter and the problem of intention. 148 This in turn draws attention to their 
characterisation of the 'echoic' utterance: one which echoes another's utterance and is 
nevertheless easily distinguishable from the speaker's. It is never, it would seem, 
evidence of the speaker as a divided subject. Sperber's recent writings on evolutionary 
psychology accent the role of rationality further. In 'Metarepresentation in an 
Evolutionary Perspective', he hypothesises the evolution of a 'logical module' on the 
grounds that communication, whilst offering innumerable cognitive gains, is also 
hugely risky. 'Deception' and 'manipulation' are so 'ubiquitous' in communication 
that the development of some apparatus for the testing of arguments was required, if 
the benefits were not to outweigh the dangers. 149 It is also not surprising that Sperber 
as an anthropologist should himself feel required to develop an adequate account of the 
topos of irrational beliefs which is consistent with the fundamental rationality that he 
assumes of the human subject. The very existence of irrational beliefs requires 
explanation: given the logical relations of knowledge that Relevance proposes, 
irrational beliefs should be gradually weakened and finally cancelled as they enter into 
relations with rational knowledge and beliefs. ISO The absence or avoidance of 
unrational or irrational processes in communication is an issue to which I will return in 
the next chapter. 
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The gap between sentence and utterance meaning on which pragmatics is predicated 
is the starting point for Relevance as is the commitment to explain the processes of 
interpretation - Relevance is a strong pragmatic theory in the sense identified at the 
beginning of the chapter. Its distinctiveness lies first in its characterisation of language: 
the utterance always underdetermines speaker meaning and an utterance is always-
already an interpretation of a speaker's thought. This makes inference central to all 
interpretation - hence explicatures - a process which can function independently of a 
linguistic code. What is distinctive about linguistic communication is that the evidence 
for the inferencing process comprises semantic representations and that every utterance 
communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance. Relevance is not a 
principle to 'apply', in marked contrast with the Cooperative Principle. Nor can 
relevance be 'flouted'. All modes of language use inhabit a continuum which can be 
understood in terms of the relations between processing costs and benefits. 
Relevance's strong appeal lies in the characterisation of inference as fundamentally 
different from decoding and, through this, in its specification of the distinctive 
questions and problems that an inferential account of interpretation must address and 
resolve. How is knowledge mobilised and/or constructed in an inferential procedure? 
Why do hearers reach one set of conclusion-interpretations rather than another (given 
the myriad of conclusions that can be derived from the same premises)? Why does 
interpretation 'stop'? Its strength also lies in the explicit and detailed account of the 
interpretative process - a profound weakness in intertextual accounts which Relevance 
further serves to foreground. 
There are, as I have noted, certain immediate congruences between inferential 
theories, particularly Relevance, and intertextual ones: a shared starting point - a 
dissatisfaction with en-de-coding, a belief in the constitutive polysemy or ambiguity of 
the utterance; comparable rhetorical approaches which centre on text-context relations; 
and, what appear to be, comparable arguments and formulations - I am thinking 
particularly here of Relevance's insistence on the non-identity between the 
representations of speaker and hearer within a communicative process. The intertextual 
characterisation of textual production as variation and transformation likewise suggests 
non-identity. It also suggests that the identification and/or construction of relations of 
resemblance (similarities and differences) between the text being interpreted and others 
is central to the interpretative process. Can such a process be modelled in inferential 
terms? Other questions intervene however before this one can be addressed. Are these 
apparent similarities between intertextual and inferential theories substantive? Can such 
parallels form the basis for an inferential account of intertextual interpretation, a 
synthesis of inferential and intertextual theories? Inferential accounts clearly expose a 
set of problems in intertextual ones, but intertextual theories present another 
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perspective from which to view Relevance (and inferential theories). What additional 
problems might such a perspective raise? These are the questions that the next chapter 
will address. 
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Chapter Three: The Encounter 
'Greed is good.' (Gordon Gecko in Wall Street)l 
In the 1987 film Wall Street, the corporate trader-raider Gordon Oecko (Michael 
Douglas) shares his credo with a rapt audience of shareholders: 'greed is good'. This 
simple affirmative is not only of dialogic interest, it also furnishes evidence of an 
intimate relationship between intertextuality and inference. Gecko translates a 
conventional sin into a positive value, and in the process, asserts a definition of the 
good which is exclusively self- and selfishly defined. He harnesses the rhetorical force 
of a religious moral discourse and displaces it to affirm, his own pleasure in the pursuit 
of what is usually classed as immoral. What is most interesting about his utterance 
however, is that interpretation of it relies in significant part on an inferential process: 
on the production of implicatures which are not coded in the utterance itself. A central 
component of the meaning of this utterance is that it is controversial. Its controversial 
character lies both in the proposition itself and in the very public context of its 
enunciation. It challenges 'decent' commonsense values and axioms. For 'greed is 
good' to be understood as controversial, some of the types of utterance that it contests 
must be constructed as implicatures: for example, 'greed is not good', 'greed may be 
an attribute of human nature but it is certainly not a virtue', 'we may be greedy but we 
do not admit it publicly and we certainly don't celebrate it as a value' and so on. Such 
implicatures are precisely not coded: they are proposed by the intertextual character of 
the utterance. This suggests an intimate relation between (at least) a certain class of 
implicatures and intertextual interpretation, but also that some implicatures are properly 
speaking utterances and should be treated as such. It seems indeed that the production 
of certain types of implicature is predicated on the hearer or reader mobilising or 
constructing an intertextual relation between two or more utterances. 
Yet no sustained attempt exists either to think through intertextual interpretation as 
an inferential process or inferential processes as intertextual. This then is the goal of 
this and the subsequent chapters; to stage an encounter between these two theories of 
meaning and develop a critical synthesis. Despite the connections suggested in the 
example above, it should immediately be clear that inferential and intertextual accounts 
of meaning cannot simply be adjoined to one another: the know ledges and 
assumptions, logics and languages of these theories are radically different. Nor will it 
be possible to resolve the contradictions at some 'deeper' level, exposing the conflict as 
finally, merely apparent. Read through and against one another, the explanatory limits 
and theoretical errors of each and both are exposed. That said, these differences -
substantial and substantive - should not be allowed to conceal the sites or positions of 
congruence, a 'common' ground which is inhabited by both theories, even if it is 
rarely recognised as such. It is with this common ground that I wish to begin. 
1. The 'common' ground 
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Inferential and intertextual theories of meaning begin at the same theoretical place: a 
dissatisfaction with a structuralist model of language. The limits of such a model, 
whether conceived as 'abstract-objectivism' or as the myth of a 'unitary' language, are 
a constant theme in Voloshinov and Bakhtin. The sign is not a 'self-identical signal', 
that is stable and stabilised within the linguistic system, but plastic and mobile as it is 
resignified within different contexts by different users.2 This adaptability is indeed 
. predicated on a linguistic system - a national language - which is a common resource of 
its users, but whiCh different social constituencies make mean in different ways with 
different evaluative accents. The concept of the heteroglossia takes this argument 
further: the notion of a unitary language is a fiction, though one with real ideological 
force. It is Kristeva who draws out the full implications of this. Significationcan 
never be the simple repetition or realisation of existing signifying practices: it always 
involves transformation. Further, Kristeva's positing of poetic language as the practice 
which articulates the relations between the semiotic and the symbolic, the refusing and 
seeking of language as the rule of Law, introduces an 'uncodable' dimension into at 
least some modes of discourse. In Revolution in Poetic Language, the chora is 
precisely that which cannot be codified: the pre-oedipal residue that precedes entry into 
the symbolic. Most importantly, it is Bakhtin's dialogic and Kristeva's intertextuality 
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that/text conceived as a realisation of f! single underlying code untenable. The 
permutation of texts and the inscription of the heteroglossia in discourse demolish the 
idea that meaning is governed by any single process of encoding or decoding. 
Inferential accounts of meaning are also motivated by what are perceived as the 
explanatory limits of coded or conventional meaning; and there is an explicit point of 
congruence between Relevance and intertextual accounts of meaning: both make the 
deficits of a specifically structuralist code model their starting point. Further, Sperber's 
text 'Levi-Strauss Today' where he contends that the value of Levi-Strauss's work is 
precisely not its debt, real and imagined, to structuralism, echoes, though from a 
radically different place, Derrida's 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Discourses' 
which suggests that a central value in Levi-Strauss's writings is the presence of a 
critique of structuralism, a recognition of its limits as a critical practice.3 
Second, as already intimated above, inferential and intertextual theories both define 
the utterance as polysemous or semantically ambiguous. For Kristeva and Bakhtin, it 
is the multi-accentual sign that provides the strongest evidence of this. 'Polysemy' 
,: 
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marks the conflictual social and cultural relations which are inscribed and constituted in 
language. In pragmatics generally, it is assumed that the linguistic form of the 
utterance does not or does not always, fully determine its meaning: a number of 
possible interpretations are assumed. Interpretation is often conceived as, in significant 
part, a process of 'disambiguation'. In inferential accounts, these indeterminacies are 
absolutely central: 'The notion of inference is important because language is 
ambiguous, vague and fragmentary,.4 
Third, the flaws in the code model and the ·polysemyof utterance make it difficult 
to presuppose that the hearer's interpretation of the utterance is identical with the 
speaker's intention and that interpretation is a recuperative process. For Kristeva and 
Bakhtin, there is no single or unified subject to whom a particular meaning (speaker 
meaning) can be attributed. The text 'speaks' from a mUltiplicity of places in many 
'voices' or languages and no singular intention can be recovered from this polyvocality. 
And whilst Bakhtin's characterisation of composition as orchestration implies a measure 
of authorial agency, interpretation at the very least must involve the identification of 
multiple agencies and multiple intentions. Sperber and Wilson's provisional heuristic 
assumption about communication is not to assume that it works.s And given that their 
model of communication is strongly intentionalist, this means that they do not 
presuppose that the hearer will recover the speaker's intention. Further, . this 
presupposition is embedded in their theory of communication: the speaker tries to make 
. the hearer entertain certain representations which are similar to her own; the hearer 
does not (and cannot) recover these representations which are already 'second-order' 
representations of thoughts.6 
Fourth, both inferential and intertextual theories can be characterised as rhetorical 
approaches, focusing on the relations between texts or utterances, contexts and those 
who produce and interpret them. Bakhtin and Kristeva both conceptualise context (the 
heteroglossia, the General Culture) as constitutive of the utterance. Kristeva's concept 
of the speaking subject, as socially and also psychically configured, binds questions 
of meaning inextricably to the question, 'who speaks?' In pragmatics, meaning is 
always contextually constituted and inferential accounts are no exception. The 
mobilisation and deployment of contextual knowledge is a central element in strong 
inferential accounts, as Relevance evidences. But Sperber and Wilson also define 
communication rhetorically in another sense. One of the key features distinguishing 
communication from cognition in general is its suasive aspect: the speaker seeks to 
make the hearer entertain similar representations to her own.7 This definition is given 
further force in the context of Sperber's recent writings where he attempts to locate the 
suasive character of discourse in an evolutionary framework. The human capacity to 
metarepresent mental states and then to attribute these to others means that it is only 'a 
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short step, or no step at all to ... having desires about these mental states - desiring that 
she should believe this, desiring that he should desire that - and to forming intentions 
to alter the mental states of others,.8 Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva are also 
bound to an understanding of discourse as suasive, but this is argued from a radically 
different place, made most explicit in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language: 
'Without signs there is no ideology '.9 Any signifying practice is always suasive 
because it is always ideological. It is not only embedded in social relations, it takes up 
a position or positions in relation to some part of the social: any representation is 
constituted by its affirmation orland contestation of others. 
Finally, Sperber and Wilson's interest in mention and echoic utterances as 
interpretative modalities of language use, and Sperber's current focus on 
metarepresentation suggests a closer congruence between Relevance and intertextual 
theories of meaning than other inferential accounts. From the definition of irony as a 
modality of mention, to the more elaborated treatment in Relevance of 'echoic 
utterances' and resemblance, through to Sperber's current work on metarepresentation, 
the ways in which language can be used to represent other public representations, 
which are interpreted as such by hearers, is a consistent and indeed developing part of 
their thinking about language and culture. This enriches and focuses the theoretical 
encounter with intertextual theories, but, as I will show, it also foregrounds the 
differences between the two. 
2. Inference reads intertextuality 
As seen by pragmatics, and in particular by inferential accounts of meaning, 
intertextual theories appear at once familiar and strange. The preoccupation with the 
semantic 'mobility' of signs, the context-bound character of meaning, the focus on the 
textual inscription of context (S/Z is an exemplary case), and the interest in the relations 
between language and its users, all mark a specifically pragmatic interest in language 
and meaning. Yet it is also clear that this resemblance is in significant senses illusory. 
What is also apparent, is a set of problems which inferential theories raise for 
intertextuality, all of which relate to the interpretative process. These are, first, that 
intertextual accounts of reception tend to collapse the processes of writing and reading. 
Reading or interpretation is routinely 'inferred' from accounts of writing or production 
rather than explored as a process with its own specificity. Second, intertextual 
accounts of meaning ignore inference as a process which shapes both the production 
and reception of meaning. Third, whilst intertextual theories raise interesting issues 
about the contexts or conditions in which texts are consumed, there is increasingly little 
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attempt to provide an explicit account of how and why certain kinds of context playa 
role in the interpretative process. 
The specificity of interpretation or, 'reading' isn't '.writing' 
In the introduction, I discussed various problems with existing intertextual theories of 
reception, in particular, the vagueness with which reading as a concept of process is 
characterised. Clearly not a 'simple' decoding process, this negative definition seems 
to be the only certainty which such theories share. For whether reading is conceived as 
that 'other' production, as in Chartier, or in Barthes (in a different ~ense), or whether 
it is understand as a recontextualisation - most explicitly in Bennett and Woollacott - or 
as a kind of 'recoding', as it is in much of contemporary cultural studies, the 
S 
interpretative processes involved in each case remailJ(remarkablyvague.This is largely 
because intertextual reception has largely been inertially inferred from intertextual 
theories of production. In one sense, intertextual theories of production make this 
move both possible and plausible. Voloshinov, Bakhtin, Kristeva and Barthes all 
liken reception to production.!O But, as I argued earlier, there is an important 
difference between productive comparisons and the dissolution of their difference. It is 
paradoxical that contemporary studies of television and new media technologies, which 
pay insightful attention to medium specificity as its shapes production and reception, 
should also so often be unrigorous, sometimes indeed lazy, about the collapsing of 
production and consumption in general.!! The former often acts to conceal the latter, 
as does the increasing emphasis on reading (or viewing) practices. The modalities of 
reading aloud or reading silently (Chartier), viewing alone or viewing with others, or 
repeated versus 'uncommon or unfamiliar modes of viewing', all draw attention to the 
importance of reading practices, but unless such practices are understood in relation to 
interpretative processes, it is difficult to imagine anything other than an impasse in 
intertextual accounts of viewing or 'use'.!2 
By contrast, pragmatics understands the processes of production and interpretation 
as clearly distinct. This is most strongly visible in inferential accounts of 
communication (though it is also marked in speech act theory). I, as a speaker, make 
a range of assumptions about the know ledges which you, as a hearer, might be able to 
'access' or construct within a particular situation communicative situation. But this is 
strongly distinguishable as process from your interpretation of that utterance. Sperber 
and Wilson's characterisation of communication as ostensive-inferential crystallises the 
difference between utterance production and utterance interpretation. Utterance 
production involves the making manifest of an intention to communicate: it is in this 
sense 'ostensive'. Interpretation involves the identification of a communicative 
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intention. What unites these two distinct processes is relevance as principle. The 
specificity of interpretation emerges from the very detailed account they provide of the 
interpretative process which exposes the vagueness with which interpretation is 
formulated in intertextual theories. My point here is not that Sperber and Wilson's 
account of interpretation is definitive, but that it formulates interpretative procedures 
with such rigour. Therefore, for example, it is possible to formulate their account of 
inferential interpretation as 'another' production and an active process in very specific 
terms. The procedures of reference assignment, disambiguation and enrichment, 
through which explicatures are formulated, precisely 'add to' the utterance as evidence. 
'New' information or knowledge, which is neither coded in the utterance nor in its 
explicatures, can be produced by conjoining the 'explicated' evidence ofthe utterance 
with contextual information/assumptions to derive implicatures. More generally, 
inferential accounts focus attention on the ways in which the 'active' processes of 
interpretation frequently function to delimit interpretative possibilities: interpretation is a 
production which is driven by the attempt to constrain interpretation. Polysemy is the 
condition which governs interpretation as an 'other' 'production' but this production is 
always involved in an attempt to delimit or fix meaning. 
Intertextuality and inference 
It follows from intertextuality as concept that relations of similarity and difference 
between the text being read and other texts must be central to the interpretative process: 
the reader must identify and/or construct such relations and make use of them. But how 
might such a process be rendered in explicit terms? The only certainty that accompanies 
intertextual theories is that interpretation is not simple decoding. But at the same time 
intertextual theories retain from structuralist linguistics the idea that meaning is some 
kind of coding process. Extant codes and conventions are the 'raw material' of textual 
production which are worked over and transformed in any particular 'utterance' or text. 
The meaning of a text is simultaneously underdetermined and overdetermined; 
underdetermined in the sense that its meaning is never self-contained or wholly 
'resident' or present within it; overdetermined in the sense that the text and its 
meanings are an intersection and 'permutation' of extant signifying practices. Codes 
are rendered in one sense less stable - strict repetition or identity is impossible - but it is 
still coding, best understood (if imperfectly) as recoding which shapes meaning, even 
though the semantic effects of this determination are multiple, potentially contradictory 
and unpredictable. Although the recoded character of meaning in such theories 
inevitably produces its other (Kristeva's chora is one such instance of this), there is 
little consideration of the possibility that another process or processes may playa role in 
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the production or interpretation of texts. That said, it is Kristeva who first asserted a 
relation between intertextuality and inferential procedures, because of the 'redistributive 
(constructive-destructive)' character of the text's relations with the language in which it 
is situated, it 'can be better approached through logical categories rather than linguistic 
ones,.13 And she goes on to define novelistic enunciation as an inferential process by 
which different types of language are drawn together. This formulation is certainly 
suggestive, but it is too vague to function as a definition of intertextuality as an 
inferential operation and also seems to claim the inferential process as something 
specific to the novel. 14 
At the beginning of this chapter, I considered an example of a controversial or 
contestational utterance which suggested a close relationship between intertextuality and 
inference. I now wish to develop this argument in order to demonstrate the centrality of 
implicature to intertextual interpretation in more general terms. Most simply, the 
oppositional or contesting utterance which is so central to Voloshinov, Bakhtin, 
Kristeva (and Barthes) can be understood as the 'negation' (understood here in a 
discursive rather than a grammatical or logical sense) of another utterance, which is 
strongly proposed as an implicature (or set of implicatures) by the oppositional 
utterance and which functions as at least one of its intertexts. I want to develop this 
argument through a consideration of one of Bakhtin's examples of hybrid construction, 
itself drawn from Dickens's Little Dorrit: 
That illustrious man and great national ornament, Mr Merdle, continued his 
shining course. It began to be widely understood that one who had done 
society the admirable service a/making so much money out a/it, could notbe 
suffered to remain a commoner. A baronetcy was spoken of with confidence; a 
peerage was frequently mentioned. 15 
Here, what Bakhtin italicises is understood as a narratorial commentary on the 'general 
opinion' of 'that ... great national ornament, Mr Merdle'. A formal dissonance 
between the fixed phrases of a rehearsed praise and a colloquial mode of 'plain 
speaking' inscribe two very different representations of Merdle: as a social and public 
good, and, as a self-interested and self-serving individual. Bakhtin's reading 
emphasises the 'hypocritically ceremonial general opinion' of Merdle that is exposed by 
the 'authorial' commentary.16 But what are the interpretative procedures by which 
such a reading is produced? The register dissonance identified above is not, in itself, 
enough to produce the reading that general opinion is hypocritical. To be sure, it 
produces two alternative and contrasting representations, and the parodic excess of the 
first would seem to weaken its claims to seriousness or authority. But this is not the 
same as the interpretative conclusion that Bakhtin (very plausibly) draws about 
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hypocrisy. A stronger relation between the two languages and 'opinions' is proposed, 
a causal relation: Merdle is considered a 'national ornament' because he makes so much 
money. This interpretation is an implicature; it is precisely not coded. And this 
implicature is necessary if the conclusion - that general opinion is hypocritical - itself an 
implicature, is to be inferred. 
A focus on the core of the example enables a focus on how such inferences might 
be produced: 
It began to be widely understood that one who had done society the admirable 
service of making so much money out of it, ... 
A reader must identify the utterance as controversial, if not contradictory: it challenges 
a certain set of non-controversial utterances. Such a classification depends on the 
reader identifying a certain kind of relation between this utterance and others. This in 
turn is dependent on the reader being able to access some of these other utterances in the 
form of contextual assumptions, for example, that the pursuit of self-interest and the 
achievement of a public/social good are often deemed incompatible. This, in turn, 
makes possible the accessing of related assumptions, for example that the self-
interested pursuit of profit is very rarely represented as a good in itself, which make 
possible the implicature that the excessive approbation of Merdle masks the real reason 
why he is so highly valued - the money he has made - and that therefore 'general 
opinion' is hypocritical. 17 The initial discrepancy and apparent non-compatibility 
between the two representations is therefore interpreted as 'resolved' at the narratorial 
level: there is a causal connection between the excess of praise and the excess of profit. 
What I have tried to show here is the centrality of inference to the interpretation of 
contestational meanings of a 'classicly' intertextual kind. This in turn marks the 
beginning of an attempt to think about the role that inference plays in the process by 
which utterances are classified and interpreted in terms of their differential relation to 
others - which must be a fundamental constituent of any intertextual theory of 
interpretation. There istneedless. to say, much more to be said, and I will revisit 
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these issues in chapters Hf and:&ve, where I will also consider the role of inference in 
classifying and interpreting intertextual relations which are centrally organised by 
similarity . 
Text, context and intertextuality 
Intertextuality, in redefining both text and its contexts of production and reception, has 
blurred their boundaries, making it increasingly difficult to identify the singularity that 
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is read as theoretical concept orland empirical object. The textualisation of context, 
perhaps most currently visible within new historicism, and the textualisation of the 
reading subject, as a 'site' of textual knowledges and their transformation, are, as I 
have said before, valuable and theoretically productive, but they have led to an 
impasse in accounts of interpretation as intertextual. This is nowhere more acute than in 
'new' audience studies, because it is here that the practices of actual readers (or more 
usually viewers or 'users') are a central preoccupation. The problem might best be 
summarised in a question: Is it possible to distinguish between text and context? (And 
should we even want to?). In the words of Lawrence Grossberg, 
Not only is every media event mediated by other texts, but it's almost 
impossible to know what constitutes the bounded text which might be 
interpreted or which is actually consumed. 18 
. David Morley cites Grossberg's position as one instance of 'this new emphasis on 
intertextuality' but conceives it as 'running several risks, notably that contextual issues 
will overwhelm and overdetermine texts and their specificity', arriving at a point where 
text - as concept - is 'dissolved into its readings,.19 What he is objecting to here is not 
the importance of contextual issues per se - after all most of his work insists on their 
centrality - but the threat posed by a particular set of contextual issues: those raised by 
intertextuality.20 Intertextuality is a certain type of context, but not, it seems, 
unproblematically the 'right' kind. Yet in the same chapter, he correctly challenges 
Fiske's formulation of 'the social' (understood as the contexts of reception) as a site of 
flux and diversity, insisting on the fact that the social positioning of viewers regulates 
their access to cultural codes.21 What is interesting is that Morley does not seem to 
think that what he is proposing is an intertextual approach. In his discourse, 
'intertextuality' comes to signify an excess of polysemy, an uncritical concept which 
seemingly abandons any theoretical interest in explaining the processes by which 
discourses or ideologies delimit the possibilities of meaning, and which in turn asserts 
the autonomy of both textuality and the reader, apparently cut loose from social 
relations.22 
Whilst correctly identifying some of the difficulties produced by Grossberg's 
position, Morley immediately concludes that intertextuality necessarily erodes the 
theoretical possibility of specifying the text that is 'read' or consumed. What he does 
not seem to recognise is that Grossberg's formulation of intertextuality transposes an 
abstract definition - intertextuality as the ontological condition of text and textuality - to 
the plane of the concrete - the particular text and the (particular) reader's interpretation. 
Therefore, there is no possibility of recognising and seeking to account for the 
differences (or contradictions) that might obtain between the ontological condition of 
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text as intertextuality, the reading process, and the reader's encounter with a particular 
text. Further, Grossberg seems to ignore or elide a central element in Voloshinov, 
Bakhtin and Kristeva: the fact that the permutation that is text is always an effect (as 
well as an instance) of a social struggle between languages, a conflict which 
necessarily involves the attempt to delimit meaning. This has significant implications 
for thinking about text-context relations from the perspective of interpretation. Just as 
the processes of textual production must always involve the attempt to fix meaning, so 
the processes of textual interpretation have to be thought of in terms which take account 
of a cognate process. It should go without saying that fixing is, of course, never 
secured or definitive - which clearly also follows from Bakhtin and Kristeva; but it 
does need to be said, because there is a danger of a misreading here. The attempt to fix 
meaning is a constitutive part of signification but this should not be conflated with the 
bogies of textual determinism and the spectre of a suitably 'retro' glass syringe and 
needle. We need to think about texts and contexts (understood here as the textual or 
discursive know ledges of readers) as setting limits to the interpretative process, not 
simply as conditions for unrestricted semiosis. 
In the same chapter and in a similar spirit, Morley warns against the dangers of 
fetishising context, again suggesting the dangers of an undisciplined excess, and 
approvingly citing John Corner: 'What do you include in context and where do you 
stop?!23 Corner's 'Meaning, Genre and Context: The Problematics of Public 
Knowledge in the New Audience Studies,' as the title suggests, identifies context as 
one of three concepts which require substantial redefinition if television's role in the 
production of public knowledge is to be pursued successfully. Interestingly, Corner 
invokes pragmatics, not exactly as a model - there is no detailed discussion here of 
pragmatic definitions of context - but as a potentially valuable informing parallel. 
The aim [in pragmatics] has been to analyse meaning (across all 'levels', 
though as I have pointed out this is not usually made explicit) as socially 
situated.24 
Corner's 'development' of this into a two-part definition of context, 'the social 
relations of viewing' - the structures and processes which bear on the 'sociality' of 
interpretative action - and the 'space-time setting of viewing' - the processes which 
embed tv in other practices of the everyday - might come as something of a surprise to a 
classical pragmatician, apart perhaps from the echo of deixis.25 But Corner is right to 
propose pragmatics as a model for theorising the constitutive dimensions of context.26 
In the tradition of strong pragmatics I have been considering, the concept of context 
is fundamental to a theoretical account of how any utterance means. However this does 
not make context the sole determinant of interpretation. Relevance exemplifies this 
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point, insisting at one and the same time on the centrality of inferencing - and therefore 
hearer knowledge - to any act of interpretation; and, arguing for the central role of a 
Chomsky an linguistic form within interpretative processing. Further, strong inferential 
accounts focus a particular set of issues about text-context relations. If all utterances are 
to be understood, broadly speaking, as evidence from which hearers derive 
'conclusions' (interpretations), then what needs to be specified are the processes by 
which such conclusions are derived (how and why certain kinds of knowledges - or 
contexts - are mobilised and made use of in the interpretative process and others are 
not), why certain interpretations and not others are produced, and why the 
interpretative process 'stops' - given the multiplicity of inferences that can be derived 
from any utterance (the last is central to Relevance). 
We have suggested that the context used to process new assumptions is, 
essentially, a subset of the individual's old assumptions, with which the new 
assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects ... However we 
still have to face the serious problem of how the context is determined: how 
some particuiar subset of the individual's assumptions is selected.27 
Context cannot be equated with the full extent of the reader's knowledge, it is what is 
selected and deployed in the interpretative act. As discussed in chapter two, Sperber 
and Wilson's account of the process of context selection breaks with pragmatic 
orthodoxy, which frequently defines context as given and often also determined in 
advance, already 'present in the hearer's mind at the start of the act of utterancet28 
Their counter-proposal is a dynamic definition of context formation, understood as 
process which is 'open to choices and revisions throughout the comprehension 
process,.29 The interpretation of contestational utterances of the type discussed above 
is a clear instance of this dynamic aspect of context: the implicature which makes 
possible the classification of the utterance as a contestation is a context which is 
precisely not pre-given and fixed prior to the interpretative process, but constructed 
during it. 
Sperber and Wilson's account of context incorporates further important insights 
about how text-context relations are constituted and reconstituted in the interpretative 
process. I will outline these briefly here but their implications will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. At the most general level, Relevance provides an account of how 
text can and does 'become' context via the interpretative processes of explicature and 
implicature. Yet this does not provoke the 'crisis' represented in very different moods 
by Grossberg and Morley. In Relevance, the two remain distinguishable, just as text 
remains distinct from its interpretation, precisely because of the focus on the 
interpretative process which organises their relations. Second, Sperber and Wilson 
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draw attention to the status of the knowledge that hearers select and deploy in 
interpretation: the relative 'strength' or 'weakness' with which assumptions are held by 
the hearer. Utterances may strengthen or weaken, to the extent of contradicting and 
cancelling, certain contextually accessible assumptions. This must be of central 
importance to theorising intertextual interpretation. It opens up a way of thinking more 
precisely about the role of the subject's relation to knowledge within the interpretative 
process. And it is also suggestive for thinking about the relations between contexts 
within specific acts of reading. For example, a plurality of markers of a particular 
genre can make possible not only the selection of various assumptions such as 'this is a 
romance' and so forth but, because of their 'density', strengthen that context. A genre 
shift can act both to mobilise another context and also weaken the previous set of 
assumptions - an issue to which I will return in the next chapter. 
Third, Sperber and Wilson are specifically interested in the differential 
'accessibility' of contexts within a given situation of utterance. Their formulation of 
accessibility is, of course, formulated in terms of Relevance: the greater the number of 
'steps' required to access a context, the greater the effort required, so extra processing 
must be offset by contextual effects. But even. if we bracket their formula, 
'accessibility', though the term is 'infelicitous')as a general salience for any attempt 
to theorise interpretation as intertextual.3o If we equate the totality of a reader's textual 
knowledge with context, we are indeed faced with the question of the text 'unbound'; 
but if instead, we insist on the need to hierarchise a reader's know ledges in terms of 
which are most, more, quite, less likely to become contexts within a particular 
situation of reading, we are freed from this unproductive impasse as well as being able 
to specify contingency as a gradient rather than a single term opposed to an illusory 
necessity. 
Related to this is the argument that 'the same context can be accessed in different 
ways,.31 An account of these different ways is not a central interest for Sperber and 
Wilson, given that maximal relevance involves selecting the context which makes 
possible the best 'balance of effort against effect'.32 But it is pertinent for anyone who 
is interested in comparing and contrasting the interpretations of different readers. 
Therefore, for example, the interpretations of different readers may converge even 
though the particular pattern or route of the interpretative procedure may vary. A 
particular context may be accessed from various other contexts which are either present 
at the outset (the initial context), or are extended or constructed during the interpretative 
process. 
Inferential accounts of meaning not only expose the limits and problems in 
intertextual accounts of interpretations, they also have an explanatory potential. 
Relevance in particular (though this is also true of Kinstch's work on text 
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comprehension) is above all committed to the specification of interpretative processes 
(including their difference from production processes). At the same time inferential 
theories open up a number of ways of thinking about intertextual interpretation as in 
some significant part an inferential process. 
3. Intertextuality reads inference 
Whilst a pragmatician might conceive points of resemblance between intertextual and 
pragmatic theories, even though such congruences might well dissolve on closer 
scrutiny, it is difficult to imagine a cognate experience for the 'intertextualist' 
encountering inferential theories and particularly Relevance. The proposing of 
inference as an interpretative process, bringing with it the spectre of a logical model of 
natural languages, the absence of textuality as a fundamental explanatory concept,33 
and the fundamental commitment to understanding interpretation as a process of 
resolution, are the most obvious markers of an alien discourse; a discourse immune to 
some of the central tenets of post-structural linguistics and epistemology (including 
theories of subjectivity), and where intention is not re-asserted but simply assumed. 
More specifically, the lexicon of Relevance, where utterances are 'stimuli', human 
beings are 'efficient information processing devices', and situations are 'environments' 
for cognitive processes, is not only easily identified as highly problematic, but also 
easily dismissed as tendentious. In the critique of intertextual theories, I have tried to 
show what inferential theories have to offer intertextuality, but a focalisation of 
inferential accounts by intertextual ones suggests not only differences but fundamental 
problems. These are first, the challenges that intertextual theories pose to the 
conditions of communication that inferential theories more or less strongly propose, 
namely the semantic indeterminacy of utterance and the vagaries of context (to be 
considered in the first two sections of the critique). In the third section I will consider 
the problems that intertextual accounts raise for the principle which is presumed to 
guide and govern the interpretative process under such conditions. My argument, most 
briefly, is this. Intertextual theories of meaning propose a much more plausible 
account of the conditions of 'communication', one that is incompatible with inferential 
accounts, particularly ~ Relevance and Gricean versions: intertextual accounts offer 
an account of how texts and contexts are constrained in ways in which Relevance, 
most specifically, does not consider. This requires a rethinking of the character and 
constitutive role of the various principles which inferential theories claim shape 
interpretation. These principles do not do the explanatory work that is claimed for them 
and frequently, above all with Relevance, they function as a substitute for the 
constitutive role of social relations in interpretation. As in chapter two, I will be 
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focusing primarily here on Relevance Theory, but I will draw out the implications of 
intertextuality for other inferential approaches (considered here in the same contrastive 
spirit as chapter two) so as to highlight some of the general problems in inferential 
approaches, as well as addressing the discursive particularities of Relevance. This will 
call for a return to some of the extant criticisms of inferential theories considered in 
chapter two. 
Deregulated Meaning and the textual 'remainder' 
For Sperber and Wilson, the linguistic utterance is radically semantically indeterminate. 
The linguistic form of an utterance can produce a number of coded semantic 
representations, which correspond to the possible senses of the utterance. This view is 
not at variance with pragmatic common sense. Where Sperber and Wilson differ is in 
prising form and sense much further apart. The semantic representations derivable 
from the linguistic form are incomplete representations of propositional forms which 
need to be completed in order to function as explicatures or as premises from which 
implicatures can be derived. Further, the utterance is not even a reproduction of a 
speaker's thought, but a public representation and interpretation of it. The radical 
semantic indeterminacy of utterance is one of the two conditions of communication 
which Relevance assumes. But are utterances really like this? 
One of the more entertaining examples in Relevance aims to describe what an 
exclusively code-based model of communication would look like. It takes the form of 
an anecdote about the Stalin era. Two friends in the West are arguing about the Soviet 
Union. Paul sees it as 'a land of justice and freedom' and plans to emigrate. He will 
write back to his friend, Henry and tell him 'the beautiful truth'. Henry tell him he is 
wrong - 'there was oppression and misery in Russia', his letters will be censored 
anyway - and tries to persuade him not to go. 
Since Paul would not be moved, Henry persuaded him at accept at least the 
following convention: if Paul wrote back in black ink, Henry would know he 
was sincere. If he wrote in purple ink, Henry would understand that Paul was 
not free to report the truth. Six months after Paul's departure, Henry received 
the following letter, written in black ink: 'Dear Henry, this is the country of 
justice and freedom. It is a worker's paradise. In the shops you can find 
everything you need, with the sole exception of purple ink ... ' 
The point is that when a code is used in human communication, what makes a 
communicated assumption manifest to the addressee is the communicator's 
manifest intention to make it manifest. There is no way a communicator could 
bind herself by a code or a convention to such an extent that it would be 
impossible for her not to have the intention her signal represents.,34 
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Paul and Henry try to formulate a code, most simply stated: black ink means that 
Russia is good, purple ink means that Russia is bad. Purple and black ink have the 
senses they do only because of the explicit agreement of two speaker-hearers. For 
Sperber and Wilson, the point of the example is that the two friends manage to 
communicate without a code. Here a code is something which must be agreed, and a 
constraint on communication.35 Paul frees himself from the bind of the code and 
therefore manages to communicate his intention. This concept of a code as contract and 
cipher is easy to criticise. Sperber and Wilson are right; of course communication does 
not work in this way. But there are other ways of conceiving coded meaning which 
they do not consider. Whilst it is possible to account for Henry's correct interpretation 
in terms of inference and intention, it is also possible to see that the code - purple 
equals bad - is still functioning, though the signifier - purple ink - is now lexicalised 
(the phrase 'purple ink') as opposed to being the colour of the ink in which letter is 
written. Intertextual theories offer a way of understanding how signifying practices can 
stabilise meanings which do not rely on identity or repetition. Indeed, variation needs 
to be understood as one reason for stability. The purple ink is a case in point. The 
code is not abandoned, it is varied, but the meaning of that variation is constituted by 
its relation to another code. 
Grice's formulates convention in similarly antipathetic terms: an aversion to the 
'un-useful' constraints that convention may effect on communication. He succinctly 
encapsulates his attitude to convention in 'Meaning Revisited': 'I do not think that 
meaning is essentially connected with convention. What it is essentially connected with 
is fixing what sentences mean: convention is indeed one of these ways but it is not the 
only way,.36 Conventional meanings are, as it were, available for use but they may 
equally well be disregarded in favour of alternative non-conventional choices. And this 
is supported by Grice's 'anti-authoritarian' formulation of language use and utterance 
meaning. The speaker who uses 'on the other hand' to connect two non-contrastive 
statements is not banished to meaningless land; his statement, Grice argues, is still 
truth-conditionally valid.37 This is clearly in 'some sense' true. But how does it help 
explain how a putative hearer might interpret it? His own representation of a 'baffled' 
hearer's response - along the lines of 'what do you mean by "on the other hand'" - in 
fact describes a moment of communicative breakdown which is not resolved by 
establishing the validity of the utterance.38 Grice and Sperber and Wilson are pledged 
to the idea that conventions or codes can hinder 'successful' communication. This 
involves a view of codes and conventions as either contractual or consensual, but more 
importantly as not binding. 'Opting-out' is a possibility. But codes and conventions 
are not in this sense a matter of individual choice. There are very important ways in 
which signifying practices 'choose' us - an issue to which I will return. Grice's 
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example of a speaker who has an idiosyncratic sense of 'on the other hand' also draws 
attention to the model of language which informs his theory and which is shared with 
Sperber and Wilson: a model which formulates communication in terms of only two 
explanatory categories: a language (conceived as a code or a set of conventions which 
accord with majority usage) and its individual users. There is nothing 'else', nothing, 
so to speak, 'in between'. This raises fundamental problems. The concept of 
language employed (whether as code - Relevance - or as conventional use - Grice) 
assumes a national language which when subjected to a Bakhtinian critique must be 
reformulated as a heteroglossia - there is no sin~le system or set of agreed uses, only 
multiple and conflicting modes of signification. Second such a critique itself draws 
attention to a recurring feature in the work of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva: a 
Marxist interest in the ideologies that underwrite linguistic concepts and models?9 
Voloshinov's critiques of 'individualist-subjectivism' and 'abstract-objectivism', 
Bakhtin's critique of unitary language and its ideological force, Kristeva's account of 
symbol and sign, all evidence an interest in linguistics as ideological. Grice and 
Sperber and Wilson's categories of language and its users, therefore calls for an 
analysis of the ideologies which underpin their models and also of what is ejected and 
resisted - the question of textual form. Third any account of interpretation which 
operates with only these two categories cannot see anything else playing a constitutive 
role in meaning making. There is no place for genre, register, and other kinds of 
'code', understood as textual practices whiCh shape utterance meaning and the 
interpretative process, even down to its smallest units. The multi-accentual sign 
challenges the pragmatic conception of the utterance by insisting on its textuality, not 
only, or even most importantly its linguistic form, which is itself to be significantly 
explicated in terms of the textual. But the intertextual theories of Voloshinov, Bakhtin 
and Kristeva articulate textual practices - such as genre - in a distinctive way: not as 
formal patternings but as substantive, and above all social and cultural ones which 
inscribe relations to knowledge for both speakers and hearers, writers and readers. 
This distinctive understanding of the textual creates fundamental problems for 
inferential theories as will be shown below. 
One of the most distinctive characteristics of Relevance and Grice's work on 
implicatures and non-natural meaning is a marked indifference to the role of textual 
form in the making of meaning. Such a claim clearly requires both clarification and 
substantiation. What, after all, is Grice's maxim of manner but an attempt to 
formulate the possible role of 'how' (form) rather than 'what' (content) in the 
production and interpretation of implicatures? Is not Sperber and Wilson's extended 
treatment of 'style' strong evidence of the same interest in the forms of meaning? The 
answer must certainly be yes; but when such concerns are viewed through the lens of 
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intertextual theories, the limits of the 'how' of meaning in inferential accounts - and 
indeed the very formulation of the 'how' in Gricean pragmatics - become starkly 
apparent. Paul's letter is a case in point. Another code or 'language' in Bakhtin's 
sense is at work here. A defensive pro-Soviet discourse is being parodied here: 
'country of justice and freedom', 'workers' paradise', no there aren't queues around 
the block for GUM, and so on. The parodic representation inscribed in the excess of 
markers of this language, and heightened because it departs from the expected 
conventions of 'letter to a friend', functions to delimit further the fact that Henry was 
right. This raises a more general question about the disavowal of the textual in 
pragmatics, evidenced most clearly in its use of examples. Certain types of linguistic 
example, constructed for the purpose of teaching a language, may background sense 
in order to foreground a grammatical rule.40 In pragmatics, the possible 
interpretations of the example Jltterance(s) and the means by which a particular 
interpretation is achieved are obviously strongly foregrounded. Consequently, 
examples in pragmatics are frequently constructed to produce a number of possible 
senses which usually correspond to differences within the situation of utterance. 
Perhaps the most obvious feature of pragmatic examples is their length. Examples are 
almost always either single utterances (Peter's bat is too grey) or adjacency pairs or 
triads (A: Would you like coffee? B: Coffee would keep me awake). There is an 
obvious rationale for this: short examples can be explicated more fully. But this tends 
to privilege local interpretation - the senses of individuallexemes within a sentence, 
and an account of the co-text as one or, at the most, a few of the sentences preceding 
or following. This is clearly liable to make genre and other codes less visible to 
pragmatic analysis. But not always, as this example from Relevance unwittingly 
attests: 
(a) Peter: Is Jack a good sailor? 
(b) Mary: Yes, he is. 
(c) Mary: ALL the English are good sailors. 
(d) Mary: He's English.41 
Sperber and Wilson discuss this as an illustration of the way in which the speaker can 
guide the hearer's search for Relevance and they compare the contextual effects which 
are produced in each case. But what is revealing is that the noun phrase 'a good sailor' 
is never considered potentially ambiguous in the account that follows, which is 
surprising given the general pragmatic attention to ambiguity and its frequent deliberate 
use in pragmatic examples. The phrase has the potential to mean not only 'good at 
sailing', the sense which is recognised in the example, but also 'someone who does 
not suffer from seasickness'. Why is the ambiguity of the phrase not recognised? This 
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is not a case of simple oversight: a code is operating which cancels or backgrounds the 
ambiguity. This code corresponds neither to the under-determining system which is 
their definition of a (national) language, nor to their formulation of coded 
communication as something which must be explicitly agreed upon in order to work (as 
discussed in the purple ink example above); but it is a code nevertheless. Most simply, 
this code can described as a set of possibilities which conjoin nationalities with 
particular skills or attributes, positive or negative: Scots are good lawyers and 
engineers; Americans have no sense of irony; Italians are sentimental; and so on. 
Within the framework of this code, the seasickness sense of 'good sailor' is cancelled: 
it is not an adequately strong attribute of either a positive or negative kind. But there is 
a second significant intertextual marker which constrains the possibilities of 
interpretation. The name 'Jack', when conjoined with a predicate relating to sailing, 
mobilises 'Jolly Jack Tar', a figure who personifies English seafaring excellence, and 
therefore makes the possibility of a 'doesn't get seasick' interpretation much less likely. 
This refusal to engage with the role of the textual in the making and fixing of 
meaning is not, of course, a necessity of theories which are committed to the 
interpretative importance of inference. Kintsch's theory of discourse comprehension as 
a 'construction-integration' modelling process ordered by constraint satisfaction offers a 
useful contrast: 
In all probability, genre-specific strategies exist to guide such se.arch processes. 
In a story one would look for causal links. In a legal argument, one routinely 
looks for contradictions.42 
Kintsch is talking here about the ways in which information is retrieved and generated 
through, broadly inferential procedures.43 But he does not develop this argument, 
which seems like an opportunity or insight wasted, given the focus of discourse-
comprehension on 'beyond the sentence' units of text. There is surely a 'Kintschian' 
way of understanding generic knowledge as one of the ways in which predicate-
argument structures are 'filled in' during the comprehension process to capture 
'pragmatic, rhetorical, stylistic, cognitive and interactional properties,.44 Kintsch notes 
these properties but they are not part of the representational structure he proposes. 
More pertinent here however, is that his understanding of genre is simplistic and, in 
some ways, confused. Narratives, or 'stories' as he refers to them, are not a genre as 
he proposes but a mode. Further, he seems to assume a one-to-one relation between 
text and genre which is fundamentally incompatible with intertextual theories.45 And 
whilst Kintsch, unlike Grice or Sperber and Wilson, acknowledges a determinant of 
meaning which exists neither in 'the' language nor the speaker, it is difficult to imagine 
how his model could capture the difference and variation within textual relations that 
intertextual theories predict.46 
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The ways in which textuality both produces and fixes meaning are not simply 
ignored by Grice and Sperber and Wilson, they are disavowed. Grice's maxim of 
manner is the marker of this within his theory, the place where the how of meaning is 
confined and permitted to have an effect.47 Relevance does not make the same mistake; 
'style' is a natural property of all utterance, which 'arises ... in the pursuit of 
relevance'.48 The disavowal of the textual in Relevance lies elsewhere - in their 
account of utterance resemblance'. One of Sperber and Wilson's interests in language is 
the ways in which utterances can be used to represent other utterances which they 
resemble - one use of the meta-representational potential of language.49 Resemblance 
may take various forms: a shared linguistic structure that includes a semantic structure 
(the instance given is direct speech or quotation); a shared propositional form ('classic' 
instances of indirect speech with tense and pronominal shifts); or more loosely, some 
degree of resemblance between propositional forms (sharing logical properties, for 
example, or having 'partly identical contextual implications in some contexts'; the 
instance given is summary ).50 Despite arguing that the role of such resemblances in 
'verbal communication is grossly underestimated' by 'theorists', what is interesting 
here are the limits set on resemblance.51 These are of three kinds. First and most 
predictably, there is no place for textual resemblances, most importantly those 
produced by genre or register. The sentence is the largest semantic unit understood to 
playa role in interpretation. Yet Voloshinov and Bakhtin's concept of the 
multi accentual sign inscribes genre and register within the single sentence itself as 
central to the making of meaning; and resemblance must take account of its textual 
dimension. Second, Relevance treats the interpretation of resemblance between 
utterances, conceived in what is already a limited way, as a particular type of 
communication. By contrast what intertextual theories insist on is that the production 
and interpretation of meaning is always shaped by (textual) relations of resemblance; 
utterances are always echoic. What is treated by Sperber and Wilson as a specific if 
important instance of communication is the condition of all meaning (in the expanded 
terms that intertextuality demands). Third, resemblance demands consideration of the 
role of difference: interpretation understood in intertextual terms must involve the 
identification or/and construction of differences between utterances as well as 
similarities. For Sperber and Wilson, difference is implicit in their characterisation of 
various types of resemblance (bar the limiting case of identity), but they do not 
consider how it is interpreted. 52 Relevance can of course handle certain relations of 
difference, most pertinently here the relations of contradiction that might obtain 
between two or more utterances. The interest of the Bakhtin example is that it cannot be 
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explained by an appeal to logical relations. The interpretation does not rely on the 
recognition of contradiction but the hearer identifying or constructing it as controversial. 
The vagaries of context 
In my critique of intertextual approaches, I drew attention to the precision and rigour 
which characterises the Relevance account of context, in terms of theorising the 
processes by which knowledge is mobilised, deployed and produced. Nevertheless, 
intertextual theories expose a fundamental problem with the way that Relevance 
conceptualises context. This can be seen most clearly through a consideration of the 
two modalities on which the concept of context depends: the speaker and her 
knowledge. Sperber and Wilson's formulation of these concepts and their relations is 
individualist. Just as their refusal to see the textual marks a resistance to the constitutive 
sociality of language, so their understanding of context and its modalities is shaped by 
the same liberal discourse. It is a discourse shared with much pragmatic thinking, but 
as in so many things Relevance goes one further. Their challenge to Grice's 
Cooperative Principle is the function of the more radical individualism they espouse. 
For us, the only purpose that a genuine communicator and a willing audience 
necessarily have in common is to achieve successful communication: that is to 
have the communicator's informative intention recognised by the audience. 
Grice assumes that communication must have 'a common purpose of set of 
purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction' ... over and above the aim 
of achieving successful communication,.53 
Communication is achieved in Relevance through what is formulated as a co-incidence 
of self-interest: the speaker wishes to communicate, the hearer wants to recognise her 
communicative intention. There are no overarching goals - rational orland moral -
which structure communication. By making communication a subset of cognition, 
Sperber and Wilson. seek to innoculate it against the danger of having some supra-
individual social sense. But Grice's principle and their critique and reformulation both 
belong to the same master-discourse. 
It is not that humans have no social goals or motivations in relations to others. 
Sperber's recent writing on the evolution of cognitive capacities makes influencing and 
persuading others central to human cognitive development. 54 It is that the human just 
happens to coincide with a fundamentally individualist concept of the subject. 
Sperber's human, like Relevance-person, always precedes and can be distinguished 
from social relations where the social is only ever an aggregation of individual 
behaviours. Sperber's choice of 'influence' is instructive here, and recalls one of the 
common banalisations of intertextuality, as 'influence', which marks a resistance to 
163 
meaning conceived as irreducibly social. In contrast to Sperber and Wilson, the 
intertextual theories of Vol os hi nov, Bakhtin and Kristeva formulate the subject, 
including her/his cultural practices as constitutively social. 55 We are, in every way, 
shaped by our relations with others, whether these others take the form of other 
subjects, or our relations with institutions, technologies (including those of reading 
and writing), cultural practices and so on which are only so many abstracted forms of 
social relations. Further, intertextuality inscribes an idea of social relations as 
fundamentally and structurally conflictual, making the a-priori individual and the 
aggregate social even less tenable. Utterance is indeed fundamentally suasive, but the 
tensions and conflict suggested by this cannot be understood in terms of a theory of 
individua,l relations which assume that power and authority are modifications of a prior 
state of theoretical affairs from which they are absent. Power and authority are always-
already in process when we produce and interpret utterance, and subjects speak from 
different and unequal places, with different relations to knowledge and authority. 
The individualist character of Relevance-person is fundamental to the way in which 
knowledge (as the sum of possible contexts at a given moment) is th~orised. Inferential 
theories are naturally predisposed to assume that knowledge is significantly shared by 
speaker-hearers. Given the infinity of conclusions that can be derived from the same 
premises, one move is a strong positing of the know ledges which speakers use in 
inference as shared or even 'mutual'. This is Grice's position (though it is never stated 
explicitly), but for Sperber and Wilson this option is not available. Their dispatch of 
the mutual knowledge hypothesis as infinite regress and their insistence on the 
idiosyncracy of individual knowledge are clear evidence of this. But not only is the 
tenet of 'idiosyncracy' fundamentally flawed, it is not even adhered to within their own 
accounts of interpretation. Whilst Sperber and Wilson are willing to acknowledge that 
,[m]embers of the same cultural group share a number of experiences, teachings and 
views', this is only a 'common framework' beyond which 
individuals tend to be highly idiosyncratic. Differences in life history lead to 
differences in memorised information ... Whilst grammars neutralise the 
differences between dissimilar experiences, cognition and memory 
superimpose differences even on common experience. 56 
Differences in knowledge amongst individuals far outweigh what is shared. And it is 
the differences which Relevance thinks it must tackle in order to explain successful 
communication. But is the knowledge of individuals really so idiosyncratic, so 
unpredictable? Sperber and Wilson glimpse something important about subject 
knowledge. There are indeed profound differences in the knowledges that speaker-
hearers have, differences which cannot be ignored. Their error is to explain difference 
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in terms of the individual, indeed as a property or attribute of the individual: 
idiosyncracy. What is shared is cultural, what is not is not (though of course it may 
become so). 
'Idiosyncracy' is, of course, the concept that is supposed to keep culture and the 
social from making too much of a difference. Idiosyncracy is 'proved' by resorting to 
the stock example of the car-crash, interpreted differently by different spectators, even 
down to 'basic facts'.57 Their conclusion: (even) the same event can be perceived 
differently by different subjects. The reason: differences in 'life-history'. What is 
lacking here is any conception of social relations which can explain how different 
subjects can conceive and construct the same object radically differently but also how 
different subjects can conceive and construct an object in identical or near-identical 
ways. Within intertextual theories, the constitutive sociality of subjects does not 
preclude complexity of social and cultural identity; rather the concept of culture as 
competing sets of signifying practices opens up the possibility of registering and 
examining that complexity in a highly nuanced way. But this complexity cannot be 
reduced to idiosyncracy: the unpredictable effects of 'differences in life history'. In 
Sperber and Wilson's formulation, there is no sense here of the difference that is 
constituted by 'a' culture, and indeed no sense here of what a culture is - a 'national' 
culture, a religion, a club, a school? - nor, and this is what intertextual theories 
especially demand, any glimpse of the constitutive relations between the cultural 
practices which together constitute the General Culture. Sperber's recent 
anthropological work on belief and metarepresentation can be understood as going 
some way to addressing the bland homogeneity that such a definition of cultural 
relations implies: 'members' of a culture may have different strengths of belief, 
distance and ambivalence to certain beliefs within the culture may be entertained and, 
more importantly from Sperber's point of view, represented.58 But this variation or 
development never departs from the presupposition that the cultural is only what is 
shared.59 This is not to say that Sperber's current thinking could not handle the idea of 
a culture as having an exclusional function. But what is missing is the 
acknowledgement that contestation is a constituent of culture, that culture is always 
dialogic and that it produces difference as well as producing or attempting to produce 
commonality. Sperber and Wilson's choice of 'grammar' in their formulation of 
idiosyncracy is also problematic. Once again, it seems, codes are understood as 
attempting to exert a negative if necessary limitation on individuality, 'neutralising' 
difference. But intertextual theories precisely deny this neutralising function. Codes or 
signifying practices articulate and inscribe difference; but intertextual difference is 
social and cultural not merely idiosyncratic. 
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Nor is Relevance consistent in its treatment of individuals as predominantly 
idiosyncratic. Above I drew attention to the unacknowledged codes which delimit the 
interpretative possibilities of Sperber and Wilson's examples. What is important now is 
that their examples predominantly correspond to a particular set of genres which 
minimise the possibilities of knowledge-differentials and variations between speaker-
hearers: casual conversation between subjects who know each other well in recreational 
situations: a couple at a party, a picnic, a walk in the country and so on. One of the 
important consequences of this pervasive speaker-hearer intimacy is that the social and 
cultural force of the know ledges which need to be mobilised in interpretation is nearly 
wholly banalised. A speaker simply knows that the hearer knows what os so bucco is 
(this is a real example) and can make a pretty reasonable guess that slhe has read Sense 
and Sensibility (so is this). The interpretative impact of socially and culturally specific 
know ledges is therefore virtually invisible in accounts of interpretative process, 
reduced as it is to the 'accident' of intimacy. The situations of utterance - mainly private 
and recreational - are assumed to represent voluntary relationships between speaker-
hearers, but also function as a synecdoche for the totality of speaker-hearer-relations. 
This enables a bypassing of any question of power or authority. When power intrudes 
into Relevance, it is both benign and trivial. The driver who says to the traffic warden 
'[p]retend you haven't seen me' and the teacher who does not want to use Peter's bat 
in a biology experiment are cases in point.60 The legal authority of the traffic warden is 
not to be taken seriously, as the driver's utterance makes clear. The example could 
hardly work if the driver were a burglar. The example assumes a reader who shares a 
very specific notion of what 'really' constitutes a crime. The rejection of Peter's bat is 
also benign; surely he too will benefit from the results of the experiment, even if his 
bat is too grey to be used. However these are exceptions as examples. Usually 
speaking subjects are assumed, by virtue of the situation of utterance, to be equals. 
What is also interesting is that the speaking subjects, situations, utterances and the 
know ledges upon which they depend are highly specific. 'Peter' and 'Mary' are, of 
course, only names which function to distinguish utterances but it is interesting to 
conjoin the various pieces of information that we are offered about 'them'. Mary is a 
lawyer, Peter isa surgeon. Both of them cook; they enjoy Italian food and have a 
'favourite' Italian restaurant. They take walks in the country, holiday in rural France 
and can 'get by' in French. They read Jane Austen and are familiar with the Romantic 
valorisation of nature. Peter and Mary are not 'everyperson' any more than the 
situations of the examples can be construed as a neutral 'everyday'. They are bourgeois 
subjects whose cultural knowledges and values are explicitly English, and, again, in a 
class specific sense, European - France and Italy are values, as is the inn (as opposed 
to the package holiday). The issue here is not about equal opportunities in linguistic 
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examples, it is that social specificity is naturalised, and the know ledges and codes of a 
particular class-fraction are displaced as determinants of interpretation through a process 
which naturalises similarity.61 Jack's sailing prowess is a case in point. It is 
knowledge of sailing - presumably as a leisure pastime - which is mobilised 
backgrounding the admittedly less literal sense of 'good sailor' which is accessed from 
knowledge about being a passenger. Idiosyncracy can hardly be said to obtain in 
examples which assume socially specific know ledges which function to delimit 
interpretative possibilities. 
Relevance and resolution 
In the previous sections, I have shown how the conditions of communication that 
inferential theories seek to explain are themselves fundamentally flawed. Texts and 
contexts delimit and constrain interpretative possibilities in very different ways and to a 
far greater extent than such theories allow. Consequently, a re-assessment of the 
principle or process which is assumed to govern 'successful' communication under 
such conditions is called for. Most simply, the principle in question does not do the 
explanatory work that is claimed. This is particularly 'relevant' to Relevance, given 
that it is here that the indeterminacy of language and the 'idiosyncracy' of speaker-
hearer know ledges are most strongly articulated, with the concomitant effect that 
relevance - as principle - must do a greater amount of explanatory work. But relevance 
itself, as the principle which orders communication (and cognition), also has 
autonomous problems. It is these which I wish to consider here. Whilst Grice finds an 
underlying order in communication by way of the Cooperative Principle, Relevance 
does not. The 'disorder' and semantic instability which characterise utterances and the 
unpredictability ('idiosyncracy') of subject knowledge is real: the conditions of 
communication are just this 'messy'. In Relevance, order is situated somewhere else, 
in the cognitive processes of the subject. As I mentioned in chapter two, various 
commentators have remarked on and challenged the ultra-rationalism of Relevance-
person, but the question needs to be framed here through the lens of intertextual 
theories which raise two problems for the principle of Relevance and the psychology in 
which it is embedded.62 The first relates to the subject's relations to knowledge; the 
second to the goal of interpretative resolution, to which Relevance is committed, and 
which it shares with much of pragmatics. 
Relevance theory conceives the subject's relations to knowledge in two ways. 
First, as a relation of augmentation; 'human cognition is aimed at improving the 
individual's knowledge of the world', the adding of more, more accurate information 
that is more easily retrievable.63 Second, in terms of the relations between the 
know ledges that any individual has: assumptions are tested for their consistency with 
, ~ 
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others of related content. Sperber and Wilson's emphasis on the relative strength with 
which we entertain assumptions, as well as their account of the processes of 
strengthening and weakening which may take place during cognition (or 
communication) presupposes such consistency-testing, which is itself consistent with 
their rational model of how subjects know. Within such a model, the processing of 
contradiction clearly requires explanation, but Relevance can only understand this in 
the perspective of resolution (even though that resolution is always subject to the 
possibility of revision). Intertextual theories suggest a very different model of 
knowledge relations deriving from the social theory that underwrites them.64 First, 
subjects do not always seek to ameliorate their knowledge of the world. As social and, 
Kristeva's distinctive contributions, psychic subjects, we may and do resist 
knowledge in a multiplicity of ways, including knowledge which conflicts with or 
contradict what we know. Second, we hold all kinds of assumptions which conflict 
with or contradict one another, sometimes simultaneously and consciously. To take a 
very simple example, when I look at the pictures of models in fashion magazines, it 
strengthens my (already very strong) assumptions that the hyperbolic valuation of a 
certain kind of body is oppressive to women, that it is psychologically damaging, 
inconducive to happiness and so on. But at the same time, I also 'know', almost 
equally strongly, that I, as a woman, would probably be happier if I was thinner (and 
richer). The crucial point is I hold both of these sets of contradictory assumptions at the 
same time and there is no resolution (no strengthening of one or weakening of the 
other) of this at the present time. Sperber's formulation of an irrational belief as a 
'semi-propositional representation' which 'corresponds to a half-understood idea' does 
not really help here.65 Are either or both of these beliefs half-understood? Sperber's 
formulation is also flawed in a more important sense. By treating 'irrational' beliefs as 
'semi-propositional representations', he ensures that they cannot enter in a process of 
consistency-testing. For whilst 'a plausible necessary condition for rationally holding a 
factual belief is that it should have been matched and found consistent with all beliefs of 
closely related content', an irrational belief, because of its semi-propositional form, 
cannot enter this process.66 The problem here is produced by an elision of two 
categories: the half-understood and the irrational. An irrational belief is one that is not 
consistent with other related beliefs the subject might hold, but Sperber assumes that 
this must mean that it is not fully understood. Whilst Sperber is eager to avoid some of 
the minefields of the topos - associating irrational beliefs with primitive cultures for 
example - and insists on their cognitive value for creative thinking and so on - he fails to 
understand, as does Relevance, that contradictory assumptions and beliefs can be 
simultaneously held and fully understood. 67 
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One of the most important reasons for this is that knowledge is discursive, that any 
assumption (or better, 'statement'), is in an important sense always-already ordered in 
terms of its relations with other statements; it is always part of a discourse.68 The 
relations between assumptions/statements cannot be reduced to a consistency-testing 
operation in the service of knowledge-improvement; nor can 'discourse' be adequately 
captured by understanding assumption relations as significantly organised in terms of 
likely or stereotypical co-occurrence (scripts, frames, schemas and so on)" because 
such theories do not take account of the ways in which knowledge is textually inscribed 
- an issue to which I will return in later chapters. Here, what is important are the 
boundaries between discourses, the rules by which statements are included or 
excluded, that is we are not talking about a single set of logical rules which order the 
relations between all knowledge, but the various rules which order the series of 
statements that comprise particular discourses. Within such a framework there is no 
reason why subjects should not entertain assumptions which are 'content' related but 
which conflict or contradict with one another without resolution. 
There is another sense of resolution to which Relevance is committed: the idea, 
common in pragmatics, that interpretation is an 'act' of resolution, and the 
interpretative process as one which resolves ambiguity. Relevance, as a strong 
inferential theory, is necessarily pledged to explaining why interpretation 'stops' and 
the principle of Relevance is precisely an attempt to do this: relative (rather than 
absolute) cognitive gains which are efficient in terms of effort expended. I have already 
suggested that text and context constrain or delimit interpretation and the interpretative 
process, but there is a further related constraint that Relevance theory ignores, the way 
reading practices constrain interpretation. This fundamental oversight emerges in their 
account of poetic effects: 
Let us give the name poetic effect to the peculiar effect of an utterance which 
achieves most of its relevance through a wide array of weak implicatures. 
Generally, the most striking examples of a particular figure, the ones singled 
out for attention by rhetoricians and students of style, are those which have 
poetic effects in this sense.69 
Figures can be identified in terms of the number of weak implicatures they generate, 
but, they go on to argue, these effects are not the result of syntactic or phonological 
patterning. But in attempting to keep the spectre of formalism at bay and the discussion 
of poetic effects firmly in the field of the utilitarian, a different set of assumptions 
intervene in their analysis. Style is always the effect of the pursuit of relevance: poetic 
effects either reduce effort or increase effects. Sperber and Wilson prevent 
interpretation from becoming an endless process by claiming that the first interpretation 
I> 
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consonant with the principle of relevance is the point at which the hearer 'stops' 
processing. But in the case of poetic effects, how does the hearer know that a large 
number of weak implicatures will achieve successful communication? Sperber and 
Wilson's counter-claim is that such implicatures are only weakly implicated by the 
speaker, and are not her complete responsibility. Rather it is hearers who take 
considerable responsibility for their construction. But they also characterise the kinds 
of assumption that poetic effects produce in a way which distinguishes them from other 
€J_ , 
kinds of cognitive effects. Tn~do not add 'entirely new assumptions' to the cognitive 
environment of speaker and hearer, but 'marginally increase the manifestness of a great 
many weakly manifest assumptions'; 'poetic effects create common impressions rather 
than common knowledge' and can be to used to create 'a sense of apparently affective 
rather than cognitive mutuality,.70 
But why do poetic effects create common impressions and a sense of (apparently) 
affective mutuality, as opposed to producing common knowledge and cognitive 
mutuality? 'Impressions' and 'affective' are only defined to the extent that they contrast 
with knowledge and its processing. The shift to impressions and affects (as opposed to 
effects) is the manifestation of a particular common sense about poetic language, 
namely that the poetic cannot be discussed in terms of truth claims - hence impressions -
and as a result the nature of its effects (or affects) must lie elsewhere.71 This 
classification of poetic affects is aligned with a congruent reading practice, most clearly 
visible in their reading of Flaubert's comment on the poet Leconte de Lisle: 
His ink is pale (Son encre est pale).72 
Sperber and Wilson consider many of the interpretative possibilities that Relevance 
makes possible, after arguing that a strictly literal interpretation is impossible.73 These 
interpretations are plausible and congruent with a Relevance-based approach. But what 
is lacking is any explanation of why a reader would continue to derive weak 
implicatures when some contextual effects have already been achieved. Relevance, in 
fact, cannot explain it. Sperber and Wilson's readers go on interpreting because they 
have a particular relation to the 'poetic' which strongly suggests a particular kind of 
reading practice: a version of close reading. These are careful readers who see the 
mUltiplicity of interpretative possibilities as an element of the poetic and as a value. An 
interpretative practice is being conjoined with an interpretative process - inference as 
driven by relevance - but Sperber and Wilson see only relevance. On the one hand they 
insist that style arises naturally, but on the other, poetic language and effects are 
divorced at another place from 'ordinary language' and read differently according to a 
particular reading practice. Their resolution of the interpretative issues raised by poetic 
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language is flawed because they ignore the reading practices that readers bring to texts, 
practices which are shaped not only by the text but by the situation of reading and the 
contexts that the conjunction of text and situation mobilises and demobilises.74 This in 
tum raises the issue of the gap between interpretation and reading - the two are not 
identical. As discussed in the introduction, reading includes a process of evaluation, 
evidenced here as a particular practice, but also explication. I will return to the gap 
between interpretation and reading, and their relations in the next chapter. 
Whilst Sperber and Wilson understand poetic 'communication' in terms of a 
different balance of writer and reader roles and responsibilities, this does not trouble 
their fundamental commitment to intention. Critiques of Relevance have challenged the 
central role of intention within the theory, but intertextuality suggests a distinctive and 
stronger formulation of the problem.75 The issue here is not whether speakers have 
intentions or whether hearers attribute intentions and particular meanings to speakers -
they do. The question is whether intention can function as an adequate explanation of 
the communicative process. As noted above, Sperber and Wilson do not claim that 
interpretation is the recovery or recuperation of meaning - the gap between thought and 
utterance precludes this. But interpretation nevertheless involves the hearer's 
identification and/or construction of a particular communicative intention. Intertextual 
theories fundamentally trouble this process in three important ways. First, because 
they insist on what lies between 'language' and its users: a plethora of signifying 
systems which play an important role in constituting the 'intentions' that texts inscribe. 
Second, because intertextual theories, and most particularly Kristeva's, conceive the 
text not only as a permutation of signifying practices but of subject positions: 
intentions, such as they are inscribed (as decodable or inferable) are mUltiple and may 
frequently be contradictory, making the idea of single agency and intention 
problematic. Third, because intertextual theories contest the separation of speaker and 
utterance produced by intention. In pragmatic theories, intentions are always separable 
from the utterance, even though the utterance offers evidence of them. Kristeva in 
particular insists on the ways in which the permutation that is text constitutes the 
speaking or writing subject. Intention is central to Relevance, as it to most of Grice's 
work, because of the semantic indeterminacy that follows from their respective 
critiques of the code model and conventional meaning. In the case of Relevance, 
intention is the consequence of the radical individualism of the theory, but it is also the 
resolution, which produces a problematic circularity. The instability of text produced 
by an individualist account of communication requires the resolution of an originating 
subject. Intention is also the substitute for the constraining force of social relations 
which are inscribed in the conditions of communication - in the text, in the subject, in 
the situation of reading - and in the ways in which interpretative practices delimit the 
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interpretative process. Sperber and Wilson ask the right questions about interpretation -
why stop? or, sometimes, why continue? - but the answer does not lie in the cognitive 
process and drives of an a priori individual. Communication is a not a subset, 
however specialised, of cognition; rather cognition is a mode of 'communication', 
understood, in the most general terms, as a constitutive and constituting social and 
cultural process. Why we stop interpreting and why we continue, need to be 
addressed through a consideration of reading practices and their relations to texts, 
subjects and situations. 
4. Shared problems: the horizon of the publishable 
As I began by arguing, despite the fundamental differences between these two accounts 
of meaning, there is a 'common' ground, although it is very differently focalised. 
There is also a shared problem which in turn call for a re-focusing of some of the 
difficulties identified in the critique - the task of the next three chapters. Here, then I 
will offer only an outline of the problem, ending the chapter with a summary of the 
conditions with which a convincing account of intertextual interpretation must work. 
The shared problem is, most simply, this: that neither tradition takes account of 
the specificities of reading print texts, or more particularly books. The somewhat 
awkward shifting between 'speaker-hearer' and 'reader', between 'utterance' and 'text' 
in this chapter (with the added ambiguities produced by Kristeva's polemical use of 
'utterance' and Bakhtin's frequent preference for 'voice' - and other sound metaphors, 
such as 'polyphony') evidences an important difference in the object that these accounts 
construct. Grice and Sperber and Wilson, in common with much explanatory 
pragmatics, focus on speech, Bakhtin and Kristeva (and Barthes) on writing. But 
this predictable divergence masks a common underlying absence: print, or to avoid the 
suggestion of a 'neutral' medium, publishing as a constituent in both the production 
and interpretation of meaning. 
The canonical speech situation or, communication's primal scene 
Grice and Sperber and Wilson are only doing what comes naturally to pragmatics. The 
canonical speech situation positing two speaker-hearer who are co-temporal, co-spatial 
and co-present, is not only the most usual set of co-ordinates which are assumed as the 
conditions for communication, and its explanation: it is the paradigm from which all 
other types of language practice are modelled. This claim is variously justified. Speech 
(in the terms defined by the canonical situation of utterance) precedes 'writing' and 
presumably all other media; it is the 'parent' of all other forms. The pragmatic interest 
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of deixis, for example is often formulated in precessional terms which may be 
explained phylogenetically or ontogenetically.76 What makes the canonical situation of 
utterance central to understanding language use in ~eneral is its status or classification 
as the originary medium-context conjunction of human language use. There are 
features of language and language use which can only be explained in terms of the 
canonical situation of utterance: understood as primary and indeed primal (in linguistic 
terms). And these in turn make speech the primary object and process which 
pragmatics accounts must explain. It is also of course the privileged object, with 
'writing' as its exclusive other. 
Gillian Brown and George Yule's inventory of the differences between speech and 
'writing' in Discourse Analysis make the attractions of speech as a theoretical object, 
and its valorised status very highly explicit.77 The speaker-must monitor and plan 
her/his utterances as well as interpret the hearer's, in an ongoing situation where s/he 
has no record of what has been said, runs the risk of being interrupted, and may have 
to 'embark on public repair or modification'. Speech presents challenges to speaker-
hearers and analysts alike. The writer, by contrast, has the time to monitor, plan and 
modify without fear of interruption: 'the writer can cross out and re-write in the privacy 
of his study'. It is interesting that the literary and its concomitants of profession and/or 
vocation enter at this point (and that 'the writer', like the 'generic' speaker of 
Discourse Analysis, is male). This is hardly a definition of someone who can and does 
write within the terms of a scriptorially defined literacy. The contrast is between 
anyperson (the speaker) and a Writer, which functions to strengthen the idea, so 
common in pragmatics, that speech, or more specifically conversation, is both natural 
and normal: it is the everyday, spontaneous, mode of communicative practice to 
which all other kinds can be opposed in a move which also makes writing the 
synecdoche for everything that is not speech. Within such a formulation there is little 
possibility of distinguishing between writing and print except as 'not-speech'. 
There are three fundamental problems with speech as it conceptualised in pragmatics 
which are relevant here. First, there is no understanding of speech, writing, and print 
as historical categories and practices whose constitutive relations are now inextricably 
bound up with one another. To take only one of the most obvious examples, print 
technology made possible, and its concrete development within specific conditions 
made actual, a process of standardisation which has had massive impact on the 
practices of speech and writing, understood in the most general terms. Further, there 
are forms - the novel and the newspaper, to take the least contentious examples - as 
well as a plethora of genres, the existence of which are precisely the consequent of this 
conjunction of technology and historical conditions. The idea that all modalities of 
language practice can be derived and explained in relation to speech conceived as primal 
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(ancestral or infantile) is fundamentally wrong.78 Second, intertextual accounts of 
meaning expose the fundamental flaws of speech as it is formulated in terms of the 
canonical speech situation. There are never only two 'speaker-hearers'. By the same 
token, utterances cannot be punctually timed or mapped and their meanings elicited in 
terms of the local co-ordinates of the 'now' and the 'here'. The meaning of any 
utterance is only explicable in relation to the utterances which precede and might 
succeed it, binding it semantically to a complex chain of 'thens' and 'theres'. But 
beyond this, there is a profound naivete in the categories of co-temporality, co-
spatiality, and co-presence. All of these are, in different senses, objectifications of a 
fundamental and presupposed commonality between speaker-hearers and their 
communicative 'willing'. Speaker-hearers who are in the same place at the same time 
may have radically different understandings of the spatio-temporallocation on which 
they converge. The complex of social and cultural modalities which shape identity -
including politics, class, gender, generation, religion, a sense (or sense of loss) of 
'home', with all the complexity that migration introduces - intersect, and intersect with 
(sometimes converging, sometimes conflicting) w+ih a set of dominant histories and 
geographies. Living in England, I cannot avoid 'Royal time' any more than the 
Christian time in which it is imbricated. I am also allowed to enjoy from a pseudo-
anthropological distance the time of the ethnic other, predominantly composed as ritual, 
courtesy of a public spirited, consumer-oriented broadcasting practice which knows that 
its viewers (consumers) aren't all white (or, at least, not in the graveyard slots). This 
is the 'base-line' complexity of face-to-face communication, which the canonical 
speech situation evades by displacing its assumptions of commonality onto the 'non-
controversial' co-ordinates of the co-temporal and the co-spatial. 
These problems make it easy to see why pragmatics cannot 'see' the specificities of 
writing or print. The best that pragmatics could offer as the conditions of reading 
would be something like two communicants who are neither co-temporal, co-spatial or 
co-present (though much literary criticism is even less adequate, imagining literary 
reading as the endeavour to replace the minuses of pragmatic description with positive 
values: indeed to attain the canonical speech situation itself). Frequently, even this 
level of description is lacking. Sperber and Wilson and Grice draw on print 
occasionally as examples but with~ttention to the medium and its effects on 
f\. 
interpretation.79 My point here is not that reading involves different interpretative 
processes, but that publishing introduces a specific set of constraints on meaning 
which are inscribed in the book that the reading subject encounters - constraints I will 
elaborate in detail in the next chapter. 
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The blindness of 'writing' 
Anyone with even a glancing acquaintance with Derrida may find it hard to resist at least 
a flicker of complacency on encountering the raw doxa of speech's presence and 
privilege in pragmatics. It is difficult to narrate without irony. But 'writing' as 
concept has its own problems, which are of an interestingly congruent kind. It is 
Barthes, above all, who shatters the private, autonomous senses of writing, insisting 
on the text as the site of a process which is everywhere scored and shot through with 
history and society, transposing agency from author to the text itself. This re-coding 
of writing - as both the ontological condition of text and as the specific practice which 
produces the scriptor - is theoretically bound to a critical practice which seeks to break 
down all the ideologies that seek to mask and contain the multiplicities of meaning 
(author, work, all the constraining myths of filiation). Within such a project, the 
book is at once conceived, correctly, as a limiting constraint on meaning and 
hyperbolically dispatched as a set of boundaries which foreclose the possibility of 
understanding how meaning 'works'. But what is called for here is another, earlier 
mode of Barthesian reading, that suggested in 'Myth Today': reading the 'book' as 'at 
once true and unreal'.80 It is also necessary to formulate the various ways in which the 
book attempts to delimit and constrain meaning. 
Whilst Bakhtin's text about speech genres evidences an awareness of the 
differences between the spoken and the written at the most general level and Kristeva is 
interested in the transposition of the spoken into the written, there is, however, no 
sense of print and publishing as specific technology and set of processes and 
practices.8l One response to this would be that such absences are in fact apparent: 
writing - which, after all, hardly corresponds in any straightforward way with the 
empirical category of 'what is written' - is a synecdoche for textual production as a 
whole. There is nothing that prohibits establishing the relations between the 
'innumerable centres of culture,82, which are inscribed in the text and various cultural 
institutions (including publishing) which make possible their reproduction and 
variation, their legitimacy and so forth. But whilst this is precisely what I am intending 
to do, it cannot be done under the 'banner' of writing. Writing is indeed a synecdoche, 
but one that obscures publishing as constitutive of meaning. This blindness of writing 
is clearest in Barthes who also gets closest to it in 'From Work to Text' where he 
mentions copyright as a processes offiliation.83 Publishing enters, but the practice of 
filiation proposed is exclusively concerned with establishing the author's relation with 
the book. Are not publishers, series, formats part of this process of determination? 
Barthes overturns literary and Romantic theories of authorship, but not it seems the 
model of publishing that such theories propose, best understood as a making public of 
something which essentially and fundamentally always-already exists. A process of 
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mediation, which acts on something (the manuscript) which always precedes it. 
Alteration, modification, even improvement, but in all cases, there is always an a-
priori something that is mediated. Barthes's 'writing' is a powerful challenge to 
various ideologies of composition and the compositional process, but does nothing to 
counter the model of publishing implicit in them. There is no possibility of thinking of 
publishing processes - editing, marketing, design and so on - as constitutive of 
writing, or of composition as only one - and rarely the most important one - of these 
processes. Barthes insists quite correctly that we need to rethink the temporality which 
governs the relations between writer and text. But what is also needed is a reversal of 
the temporal relations which govern how we think about writing and publishing. 
Publishing, or rather the horizon of the publishable, precedes and constitutes both 
what can be written and, what can be read. 
As I noted in the introduction, not all intertextual accounts of meaning neglect the 
book orland publishing. Genette's Para texts is precisely an attempt to think the book, 
or better the edition - as a specific publishing instance. Likewise Chartier whose 
formulations of the materiality of the book and of reading practices, are amongst the 
most interesting of contemporary attempts to 'think' the book. These considerations, 
however, belong to the next chapter. What I want to insist on here is the centrality of 
publishing' to any account of intertextual reading. First, because it calls for a 
strengthening of the distinction between textual production and textual reception - there 
can be no collapsing of reading and 'writing' when the written is the published, is the 
edition. (And indeed the reversed or synecdochic status of writing has doubtless 
encouraged the inertial inference that writing is reading) Second, because the 
publishing practices which are inscribed in the edition function explicitly to configure 
the text within a network of intertextual relations with other texts, which themselves 
suggest reading practices. One of the points of interest which will emerge is that the 
text may be 'caught' in various networks of intertextual relations which do not cohere, 
which conflict and contradict with one another. But the important point here is that the 
edition has to be understood as set of textual contexts which play an important role in 
producing and delimiting interpretative possibilities. 
What then should an intertextual theory of interpretation look like? And what are 
the theoretical conditions of which it must take account? First, such an account must 
rigorously differentiate and specify the processes of production and interpretation - in 
terms which go beyond conventional pragmatics - to take account of the specificities of 
the medium, here print. This distinction is central to redressing the central shared 
problem in intertextual and inferential accounts. But it needs to be formulated in terms 
which make possible an understanding of how publishing processes shape 
interpretative processes; particularly the ways in which genres (intertextually 
," 
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conceived) are constituted by the totality of production practices - composition, editing, 
marketing design, and so on - and their role in interpretation. The edition, defined as 
the material form in which the reader always encounters and reads the text, is a site 
where the processes of production can be theoretically 'read' but and also the place 
where the possible impact of such processes on interpretation can be assessed. Second, 
any such account must be embedded in a model which understands meaning as a 
process of transformation. The processes of interpretation have to be theorised in terms 
which take account of textual 'resemblance', both similarity and difference. Third, the 
model must be inscribed with an understanding of social and cultural relations as 
inherently and constitutively historical and conflictual, which will shape all its 
concepts. Fourth, such a model calls for a clear distinction between process and 
practice, which applies to both production and reception, where a practice is the 
actualisation of a process or set of processes within specific constitutive conditions. 
Interpretation is always the actualisation of decoding and inferential processes in the 
form of specific practices, shaped by the text, reader and conditions of reading. Fifth, 
such an account will not approach utterance interpretation as a process of resolution and 
equate that resolution with either the author's intended meaning or the text's preferred 
meaning. Nevertheless, it must.recognise that meaning is always an attempt to fix, to 
delimit; and be able to differentiate possible interpretations and explain why certain 
interpretations are more possible or probable than others in particular conditions of 
reading. Finally, it must also consider the relations between interpretation and reading. 
The two are not identical, reading is 'more' than interpretation - understood loosely 
here in terms which will soon be specified as translation. It also involves other 
processes: explanation (attempts to answer the question why a text means) and 
evaluation (the process by which readers evaluate texts and their meanings). Their role 
in shaping interpretation and interpretative practices also need to be assessed. Reading 
is not writing, but nor is it (only) interpretation. 
1 Oliver Stone (director), Wall Street (US, 1987). 
2 'What is important for the speaker about a linguistic form is not that it is a stable and always 
self-identical signal, but it is always a changeable and adaptable sign', Voloshinov, Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language, p.68. 
3 Sperber, 'Claude Levi-Strauss Today', On Anthropological Knowledge (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985): 'For Levi-Strauss, all his work is a defence and illustration of 
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structuralist method ... But I shall argue, structuralism has become an uninspiring frame for an 
otherwise stimulating and inspired picture', (p.69). In 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of 
the Human Sciences' in Writing and Difference (London, Routledge, 1990), Derrida discusses Uvi-
Strauss's work on the incest taboo, which is both natural (universal) and cultural (a prohibition), as a 
scandal if the conceptual system presupposes a difference between nature and culture (p.283). Uvi-
Strauss's method, argues Derrida, 'consists in conserving all these old concepts within the domain of 
empirical discovery while here and there denouncing their limits, treating them as tools which can still 
be used ... This is how the language of the social sciences criticises itself (p.284). 
4 Gert Rickhart and Hans Strohner editors, Inferences in Text Processing, Introduction, p.5. 
Compare, and contrast this with Lecercle's 'maxim of vagueness' in Interpretation as Pragmatics, 
articulated from a, broadly speaking, post-structuralist position: 'Natural languages have fuzzy rules 
and indulge in vague reference. This goes far beyond ambiguous utterances, which are determinate in 
that the possibilities of choice are limited ... Not so innumerable other forms of under- or over-
determinations of meaning, from non-dit to Gricean implicature, to slips of the tongue, taking in 
portmanteau-~ords, malapropisms and all manners of wordplay' (p.77). 
5 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p117: 'Of course misunderstandings ... occur. They are not 
attributable to noise in the acoustic channel. The question is whether they happen because the 
mechanisms of verbal communication are sometimes improperly applied, or because these mechanisms 
at best make successful communication probable, but do not guarantee it. We will pursue this second 
alternative. ' 
6 Sperber, 'The Epidemiology of Beliefs', Explaining Culture, p.83: ' ... what human 
communication achieves in general is merely some degree of resemblance between the communicator's 
and the audience's thoughts. Strict replication, if it exists at all, should be viewed as just a limiting 
case of maximal resemblance, rather than as the norm of communication'. This 'loosening-up' of the 
communicative process, does not of course do anything to moderate the very strong intentionalism 
which is central to Relevance. But Sperber does explicitly formulate here the idea that 'a process of 
communication is basically one of transformation' (p.83). 
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7 As mentioned in chapter two, in 'Irony and the Use-Mention Distinction' (Radical Pragmatics, 
p.297), they make it clear that they see their work as founded in rhetoric, and in terms which go 
beyond a pragmatic account of figures: 'There are a number of obvious similarities between linguistics 
and the study of rhetoric ... A GENERAL theory of rhetoric should be concerned with basic 
psychological and interpretative mechanisms which remain invariant from culture to culture', And 
indeed, the proposed title for Relevance at this juncture was 'Foundations of Rhetorical Theory'. 
8 Sperber, 'The Modularity of Thought and the Epidemiology of Representations', in Mapping 
the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, edited by Lawrence A. Hirschfield and Susan 
A. Gelman (Cambridge, CUP, 1994), p60. 
9 Voloshinov, Marxism, p.9. 
10 The read-write distinction and its breakdown is discussed in the introduction and in chapter one. 
11 John Ellis's discussion of the differences between film and television, including those of 
reception and how this shapes the medium's mode of address is one much cited instance of the interest 
in the specificities of medium. Cited in David Morley's 'Changing Paradigms in Audience Studies', 
in Remote Control: Television, Audiences and Cultural Power, edited by Seiter et aI, pp.16-43, 
p27. John Fiske's notion of 'the producerly', is elaborated in the same volume ('Moments of 
Television: Neither the Text Nor the Audience', pp.56-78). Fiske tries to adapt the Barthesian 
'writerly' to the producerly which he proposes as a central characteristic of television and its reception. 
This is a 'classic' instance of just such a lazy collapsing of production and reception in general which is 
willed rather than effected by the tendentious lexical choice of 'producerly' with its suggestions of the 
power and final decision making role of the producer. (It is also as it happens rather weak on medium 
specificity). But in what sense can the practice of reception proposed by Fiske's producerly televisual 
text which 'delegates the production of meaning to the viewer-producer' (p.63) be comparable with the 
institutions, practices and technologies of television production? 
12 On these distinctions, see for example, Charlotte Brunsdon in 'Text and Audience', Remote 
Control, pp.116-129, p.125. 
13 Kristeva, 'The Bounded Text' in Desire in Language, p.36. 
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14 There is also a tendentiousness in the way that Kristeva argues that novelistic inference is non-
logical, shaped by Kristeva's assertion of the special challenge that poetic languages poses to the usual 
object of a would-be 'scientific' linguistics. I do not debate the incommensurability of logical and 
natural languages. What I take issue with is that the difference seems to be assumed to be the 
characteristic of a particular type of language. 
15 Quoted in Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the Novel', The Dialogic Imagination, p.306. 
16 'Discourse in the Novel', p.306, my emphasis. 
17 In this context, Gordon Gecko is the arch anti-hypocrite. 
18 Lawrence Grossberg, 'The In-difference of TV', Screen 28, 2 (1987), pp.28-45, p.33. 
19 David Morley, Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 1992), 
p.27. 
20 See for example, Family Television (London: Comedia / Routledge, 1986). 
21 Morley, Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies, pp.27-8. He also argues for are-focus 
on genre as a central concept in audience studies, see for example pp.127 - 30 where he discusses work 
which has explored the popular in terms of the particular cultural competencies of social constituencies 
and how this maps with the genres which are popular with these groups. 
22 There is, of course, a paradox in this binary between hyperbolic intertextuality and the more 
'limited' polysemy that Morley continues to propose. Hall's encoding-decoding model (mentioned in 
the introduction) which Morley continues to view as a productive starting point for thinking about 
meaning is itself, of course, indebted to Voloshinov. 
23 John Corner, 'Meaning, Genre and Context: The Problematics of Public Knowledge in the 
New Audience Studies' in Mass Media and Society, edited by James Curran and Michael Gurevitch 
(Sevenoaks: Edward Arnold/Hodder and Stoughton, 1991), pp.267-284, p.269. 
24 Corner, 'Meaning, Genre and Context', p.278. 
25 Corner, 'Meaning, Genre and Context', pp.278-9. 
26 Corner also mentions text-comprehension models and, what he terms, 'implicatory' meanings, 
though there is no detailed reference crdevelopment of either. See p.274 and p.271. 
27 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p.132. 
28 Relevance, p.133. 
29 Relevance, p.137. 
30 'Accessing' and 'accessibility' are one of a number of terms in the Relevance lexicon which 
model human cognition and communication from a paradigm of information-processing. 
31 Relevance, p.l44. 
32 Relevance, p.l44. 
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33 This is not true of Kintsch, but, as I will show below, his model of the textual is somewhat 
crude and at odds with intertextual theories. 
34 Relevance, p.170. 
35 Further, the example in question suggests a connection between censorship and codes: both 
constrain speaker 'freedom'. 
36 Grice, Meaning Revisited', Studies in the Way of Words, p.298. 
37 Grice, 'Retrospective Epilogue', Studies in the Way of Words, p.361. 
38 'Retrospective Epilogue', Studies in the Way of Words, p.361. 
39 As discussed in chapter one, Voloshinov's work is the most explicitly Marxist, but Kristeva's 
emphasis on the totality of signifying practices which together constitute the General Culture and her 
interest in the ways a broadly Marxist sense of history and society are inscribed in texts and subjects 
evidences a similar commitment. Bakhtin is, of course, more ambivalent and his politics have been 
subject to considerable analysis (see chapter one above), but his emphasis on what is clearly social and 
cultural conflict within texts and the heteroglossia as a whole are compatible with a broadly Marxist 
position. 
40 The classic discussion of this is in Barthes's 'Myth Today' in Mythologies. See in particular 
pp.115-6. 
41 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p.219. 
42 Kintsch, Comprehension: A Paradigmfor Cognition, p.191. Further: 'All text genres 
require domain-specific strategies and knowledge', p.167. 
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43 'Broadly' inferential because, as noted in chapter two, for Kintsch, only the controlled 
processing of logical inference which generates new information, strictly deserves to be called inference 
(Kintsch's category D) though the other categories do describe inferential processes. 
44 Kintsch, Comprehension: A Paradigm for Cognition, p.38. 
45 Further, the only logic which could make stories and legal arguments comparable categories is 
the particular comprehension strategy: the former focusing on causal relations, the latter on 
contradiction. This is perhaps not surprising, given Kintsch's interest in the process, but the neglect 
of the textual (as a particular type of 'surface structure') is not the necessary consequence of any theory 
of psychological process. Kintsch deduces that it is: 'therefore' .. .'the text structure is only indirectly 
important' (pA). But this seems to mistake a particular kind of approach for a choice between two 
objects whose relations must surely be stron'gly imbricated in any account of text comprehension or 
interpretation. He is assuming that text structure is only indirectly important. But why shouldn't a 
theory of comprehension as psychological process be interested in considering the role of surface 
structilre in the 'extended' textual sense and consider how it might be cognitively represented? 
46 The same goes for the onlyit1e attempt to consider explicitly and in detail the relations between 
Relevance and genre, On the Cognitive Role of Genre: a Relevance-Theoretic Perspective (University 
of London thesis, 2001). As the title suggests, Relevance is the dominant through which genre is 
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conceived and considered. As in the case of Kintsch, genre is not considered in terms which are 
congruent with intertextual theories, although Unger's understanding of how genre can inflect tense and 
mood for example is a significant improvement. Unger argues that 'each individual utterance may 
create its own expectations of relevance' and therefore may contribute to expectations of the discourse as 
a whole' (p.136). The main problems are twofold. First, generic knowledge is a variety of 
encyclopaedic knowledge, the latter conceived in terms of the singular logic that Sperber and Wilson 
accord to it (p.296). Secondly, and following from the commitment to Relevance as the explanatory 
model for theorising communication (Relevance theory has implications for literary theory (P.ll} but 
not the other way round; 'the role of genre in communication [can] be best explained with Relevance 
theory' (p.286), genre is not a necessary part of interpretation, it mayor may not be an 'influence' 
(p.289): 'genre does not always playa part in utterance interpretation' (p.293); 'genre does not always 
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have a hermeneutical [Le. interpretative] function, when it ha~ this function may be strong or weak 
(p.292, my parenthesis). 
47 As discussed in chapter two, manner is the only maxim which generates detachable 
implicatures. The other maxims (the 'content' maxims) generate non-detachable ones. This assumes 
that 'it is not possible to find another way of saying the same thing (or approximately the same thing) 
which simply lacks the implicature', Grice, 'Further Notes on Logic and Conversation' in Studies in 
the Way of Words, (p.43). The problem as discussed in chapter two is that Grice seems to be 
assuming that form only sometimes plays a part in meaning, that it is possible to say 'the same thing' 
or something approximating to it without impacting on the implicatures produced - the effect of his 
naive form/content distinction, which makes manner the special place where form matters. 
48 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p.219. 
49 'A full-fledged meta-representational capability such as the one found in human languages and in 
human thinking is based on the possibility of interpreting any expression-token as representing another 
token of the same expression, or the expression-type, or more generally some expression-type or 
token it resembles in relevant respects', Sperber, 'Metarepresentation in an Evolutionary Perspective', 
http II perso.club-internet.frlsperber/metarep.htm., January 2000, p.l 
50 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p.228. 
51 Relevance, p.227. 
52 Relevance, p.229. 
53 Relevance, p.161. 
54 This is also true of the way in which Sperber discusses the development of logic as a cognitive 
response to the deception of others and the advantages of communication in general, which extend the 
range of informational resources available. See 'Metarepresentation in an Evolutionary Perspective', 
p.6. 
55 Bakhtin's emphasis on the ways in which languages inscribe belief systems and Kristeva's 
account of the speaking or writing subject's intersubjectivity which 'follows' from intertextuality are 
obvious instances here. See chapter one. 
56 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p.16. 
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57 Relevance, p.16. 
58 Hence one of Sperber's uses of 'quotation' and 'disquotation'. Disquotation does not always 
suggest a distance to the belief however, as in the example 'I am one of the people who believes that 
... where what follows is still quoted (though clearly such statements can be asserted in the negative). 
Sperber's use of quoting and disquoting seems to be in significant part motivated by a desire to 
distinguish the categories of intuitive and reflective belief. The elaboration of 'distance' or proximity to 
knowledge and belief would seem to require further·elaboration to take account of the subject's position 
and relation to it. Contrast the following: he is one of the people who believes that x, I am one of 
the people that believes that x, we are some of the people who believe that x ... and so on. I will 
return to the subject's relation to particular knowledge and its role in interpretation in subsequent 
chapters. 
59 The assumption that the cultural coincides with what is shared can obviously be critiqued from 
non-intertextual positions as well. See for example, D. Hymes, 'Toward Ethnographies of 
Communication: The Analysis of Communicative Events' in Language and Social Context, edited by 
Pier Paolo Giglioli' (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p.35: 'I subscribe to the view that what is 
distinctively cultural as an aspect of behaviours or things is a question of capabilities acquired or 
elicited in social life, not a question of the extent to which the behaviour or things themselves are 
socially shared ... To restrict the concept of the cultural to something shared to the limits of a 
community is an arbitrary limitation on understanding, both of human beings and the cultural.' 
60 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, pp.190-1. 
61 Most of Grice's examples are similar in that a shared social and cultural world is usually 
presupposed. The 'world' however is somewhat different from Sperber and Wilson's, and if anything 
narrower: professional, gossipy and frequently sexist - 'X is meeting a woman tonight' is his first 
example of a Generalised Conversational Implicature in 'Logic and Conversation' (Studies in the Way 
of Words, p.37). The world of the Oxford Common Room perhaps, the 'common' of which shares 
something with his notions of shared or common knowledge. On the subject of 'equal opportunities', 
it should be noted that Sperber and Wilson are consistent in their use of 'she' for the generalised speaker 
and he, for the hearer on the grounds of 'ease of exposition'. This choice flouts conventional 
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expectations suggesting that 'ease' is somewhat tendentious; but more importantly and in ways which 
are petfectly consistent with their arguments, it suggests a complete disregard of gender as a social 
process which shapes the speaker or hearer's relation to knowledge. Talbot and Mey also mention the 
'characters' in the Relevance examples in their review, 'Computation and the Soul', Semiotica, 72, 
3/4 (1988), pp. 291-339. However their comments are not particularly salient. Of course it is 
stereotypical to make Peter the surgeon, and Peter and Mary may well classify as 'yuppies' (p.324); 
but the important point, as made above, is that the construction of characters who are socially. and 
culturally so similar banalises and indeed rende~s invisible the social character of knowledge. 
62 On other non-intertextual critiques of Relevance's ultra-rationalism, see for example Talbot and 
Mey's review, 'Computation and the Soul', mentioned directly above, where they describe Sperber and 
Wilson's conception of the humari as 'ontological logicism' (p.315). Kintsch's account of the multiple 
ways in which representations might be organised is much more flexible in this sense, allowing, for 
example, for associative relations which would take account of the impact of the psychic on 
interpretative and cognitive processes, see Comprehension, pp.34-7. 
63 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p.47. 
64 I say 'suggest' because this theory is only sometimes fully explicated, most obviously in 
Voloshinov and in Kristeva's account of psychic processes. 
65 See Sperber, 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs' in On Anthropological Knowledge, especially 
pp.58-9. 
66 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs', p.55. 
67 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs', p.53. 
68 The relations between intertextuality and a broadly Foucauldian idea of discourse will be 
discussed in some detail in later chapters. 
69 Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, p.222. 
70 Relevance, p.224. 
71 It is not surprising in this context that Sperber treats poetic language as semi-propositional in 
his discussion of irrational beliefs, 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs', p.53. 
72 Relevance, p.237. 
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73 Their grounds for this are rather weak. They ask how the colour of the ink might be of import 
(p.237). Given that in the case of the Paul and Henry example the colour of ink was of crucial 
importance this seems a rather summary dismissal. 
74 Their characterisation of a 'good creative metaphor' is similarly flawed: 'The surprise or beauty 
of a successful creative metaphor lies in this condensation, in the fact that a single expression which 
has itself been loosely used will determine a very wide range of acceptable weak implicatures', (p.237). 
The tension here, between the description of a cognitive process and a vocabulary of aesthetic 
appreciation marks the same conjunction of process and practice. The shadow of Romanticism that is 
visible here is perfectly congruent with their commitment to the centrality of intention. A. Furlong 
(University of London PhD, 1996), attempts to resolve the problem of why readers of literary texts 
might either stop or not stop interpreting by creating a category of 'literary interpretation' which 
involves 'a much more systematic assessment of all of the evidence provided by the text' (Cited in Billy 
Clark, 'Stylistic Analysis and Relevance Theory', Language and Literature, 5, 3, (1996), pp.163-78, 
p.175). This is clearly another name for a particular interpretative practice and further its only other is 
'spontaneous' interpretation. There is of course no practice-free interpretation - an issue I will return to 
at length in subsequent chapters. 
75 See for example Talbot and Mey, 'Computation and the Soul' p293-4. Note also Levinson's 
review which draws a distinction between Relevance as a theory of speaker meaning and utterance token 
meaning and work on Generalised Conventionalised Implicatures which is 'in contrast a theory of 
preferred or default interpretation, of utterance type meaning', 'A Review of Relevance', Journal oj 
Linguistics, 25 (1989), pp455-472, p461. 
76 For example, the phylogenetic argument is made by John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), quoted in Levinson, Pragmatics, p.63: 'There is much in the 
structure of languages that can only be explained on the assumption that they have developed for 
communication in face-to-face interaction. This is clearly so as far as deixis is concerned.' Levinson's 
comment introduces the ontogenetic one: 'Deictic systems in natural languages are not arbitrarily 
organised around the features of just any of the many different kinds of medium and context in which 
language is used. Rather there is an essential assumption of that basic face-to-face conversational 
context in which all humans acquire language' (p.63). 
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77 Brown and Yule, Discourse Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ppA-
19. Citations below all refer to ppA-5. 
78 I emphasise historical conditions in the above to avoid any suggestion of a technology 
determining meaning, a view or inflection which is widespread and which appears in some surprising 
places. For example, Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London, Verso, 1983), whilst clearly aware of the dangers of proposing a 
determining relation between print technology and the novel still seems to fall into the trap, see pp.46-
49. 
79 'Son encre est pale' is one such example in Relevance. Grice includes amongst his examples cif 
conversational implicature in 'Logic and Conversation', a letter (p.33), a review (p.37) and some lines 
from a poem by Blake, (p.35). 
80 'Myth Today', Mythologies, p.128. 
81 Kristeva's analysis of the way that the proto-novel resignifies the blazon - a spoken or indeed 
shouted genre - which is transposed or translated into 'laudatory description' is one clear instance of this 
interest. See chapter one .. 
82 'The Death of the Author', Image, Music, Text, p.I46. 
83 'From Work to Text', Image, Music, Text, p.161. 
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PART TWO 
Chapter Four : Theoretical Preliminaries 
The aim of this chapter is to elaborate the terms, conditions and goals of a mode of 
intertextual analysis which will be developed in chapters five and six through a detailed 
examination of two case-studies. Its starting point is a conceptualisation of the text as a 
set of multiple; often divergent and indeed contradictory interpretative possibilities - a 
position grounded in both intertextual and pragmatic assumptions. The aims of the 
analysis are first to capture, represent and articulate these possibilities and their varying 
contingency - that is which interpretations are most, more, less and least likely. Such 
an analysis must specify not only possible interpretations, but also interpretative 
processes and their instantiation as practices in particular conditions of reading. This in 
tum calls for a focus not just on the text but on the reader and the situation of reading: a 
rhetorical approach. A fundamental modality of. the conditions of reading is the 
material form in which the reader encounters the text, and the analysis focuses 
therefore on the interpretative possibilities and practices proposed by particular editions 
and not 'the text' understood as some essence of all its versionings. Furthermore, the 
analysis must represent and articulate the edition not only as the always-already material 
form of the text as it is encountered by the reader, but as a site where publishing 
processes intersect in the form of particular production practices which can be 
understood as intertextual in specific ways. This'focus is inscribed in the choice of 
object for the two case-studies which, involve publishing categories: classics (chapter 
five) and literary theory textbooks (chapter six). In each case the analysis aims to 
elaborate the role of publishing in shaping, not only the meanings of particular texts, 
but also the genres and other categories which playa central role in delimiting and 
fixing interpretation. 
1. A framework of concepts 
The representation of interpretative possibilities and what might be termed their 
graduated contingency is a necessary counter to the ungraduated and monolithic 
contingency that intertextual theories tend to assume, and to the pragmatic goal of 
interpretative resolution. Central here is what governs this variable contingency: the 
reader's knowledges, the know ledges inscribed in the situation of reading, the genres 
and discourses of the text, all of which will be designated in the analysis as types of 
interpretative context which may be mobilised and/or constructed and deployed in 
interpretation. There is a potential ambiguity in the use of 'context' here which requires 
clarification. Any account of the interpretative process which assigns a central role to 
i 
l: 
f 
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inferencing is required to specify how particular knowledges are mobilised and/or 
constructed and deployed. In using the phrase 'interpretative context', I mean 
knowledge that may be utilised in interpretation, a 'may' which also has variable 
strengths, which can be specified. Given the pragmatic neglect of the textual, a central 
interest here will be the role of genre and other textual categories as interpretative 
contexts, more simply referred to as textual contexts. 
Following on from this, the analysis must further specify interpretative processes 
(given the critique of intertextual accounts), and in particular, the role of inferencing 
within a process conceived as intertextual and constrained by both the textual and 
discursive character of knowledge as it is inscribed in the text and as it exists for the 
reader. I wish to draw attention to two issues here. The first relates to my use of the 
terms 'implicature' and 'implicate' in this and subsequent chapters. My usage breaks 
with the necessary relation that Gricean and Relevance:-based accounts propose between 
an implicature (or set of implicatures) and the individual signatory who is 'responsible' 
for them. In my analysis, implicatures are made possible by textual and discursive 
relations and not bound to signatories. Implicatures may be weakly or strongly 
implicated, but they are always made possible by intertextual relations. I am retaining 
the terms implicature and implicate, albeit in this recast sense, because I wish to 
maintain the distinction between pragmatic and logical categories. My interest is in 
implicatures (and implicating), and not implications (and implying) - the objective 
properties of an utterance. In this sense then, implicature seeks to foreground the 
discursive character of knowledge, the absence (in contradiction with much pragmatic 
common-sense) of a singular logic. This is tum links to the second issue~I am drawing 
a theoretical distinction here between the textual and the discursive. Genre is a 
fundamental textual category and although one of my aims is to elaborate a stronger and 
more expansive definition of genre, a brief provisional definition is called for here. 
Bakhtin's definition, a typical set of relations between writing subject, reader and the 
always-already textualised object of utterance, with its strong rhetorical emphasis, is 
the obvious starting point. However given the problems discussed in chapter one, 
certain modifications are required. Both writing and reading subject are definitively 
conceived here as inscribed in and prescribed by the genre. This is the Kristevan 
version, which avoids the difficulties produced by Bakhtin's slips between 'real' and 
'inscribed' or prescribed reader and writer. Throughout this analysis, 'prescribed 
reader' is my preferred locution for what is elsewhere most frequently referred to as 
'the implied reader'. Given the concern here with implicature and implied meanings in 
strict and specialised senses, 'implied reader' could easily be confusing. But the 
choice also marks both a distance from Iser's phenomenological approach and an 
attempt to represent the rhetorical force of address: hence prescribe rather than 
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inscribe. l A second inconsistency in Bakhtin's account of genre, his retreat from the 
concept of situation that his strong account of genre proposes, is not conceived as a 
problem here. The 'horizon of the publishable' is explicitly intended to capture some of 
the institutional dimensions of genre production. Third, The Problem of Speech 
Genres' in particular neglects narrative. Retextualisation does not preclude 're-
narrativisation', but I wish to foreground this explicitly because I am aiming to 
illustrate the importance of narrative within genre. I am indebted here to Genette's 
categories in Narrative Discourse, in particular 'order' (the 'anachronies' between the 
order of events as they can be presumed to have happened diegetically and the order in 
which they are narrated), 'duration' (what Genette terms the 'speed' of narration: the 
relative speeds at which events are narrated) and 'freQuency' (the relation between the 
number of times an event is narrated and the number of times it occurs.2 Therefore any 
genre has typical textuaIisations of order, duration arid frequency. This foregrounding 
of narrative, and in particular narrative order, is also intended to draw attention to the 
textual character of knowledge, which scripts, schemas and the like do not. Needless 
to say, there is no one-to-one relation between text and genre, the genres that 
constitute the text are mUltiple but one or more genres may exert more signifying force 
on the permutation that is text. Often indeed, a particular genre functions as the 
dominant within a text. Conventional romance, for example, often configures a 
relation between the romance narrative and the bildungsroman (the heroine acquires 
self-knowledge and a place in the world by hero's side) and/or the heroine may play at 
being a detective (why did the hero leave the party so abruptly when ... ?, why will he 
never talk about ... ? etc.). But these genres (and others) are subordinated to and 
transformed by romance: the heroine's self-knowledge is limited by the gender 
relations that romance makes possible: hero and heroine will not decide to pursue an 
on-off affair so that the heroine can pursue her all-important career; the hero will not 
tum out to be a serial killer. Finally, the possibilities of a genre always exceed any 
particular instantiation of it: a genre is never wholly encapsulated in a single text. 
Discourse is understood here in broadly Foucauldian terms as both knowledge and 
the conditions of its possibility. The objects, concepts, rules, procedures and 
positions which together constitute what Chartier terms, in an illuminating article, the 
'limits of the thinkable' at a particular historical moment? My focus here, however, 
is on particular discourses: in chapter five, for example, discourses of the author, of 
the work, of literary value. My interest does not lie in the conditions of emergence of 
these discourses, or in elaborating the discontinuities of knowledge more generally, 
but in their formal workings, their internal logics and mechanisms of self-regulation. 
For example, what makes it possible to define a novel as a relationship between author 
and characters? (a concept of the work as the instantiation of authorial experience and 
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presence; a fundamental refusal of the formal character of 'the work' and so on.). The 
debt to Foucault is of a strictly limited kind and, as should be clear, does not 
encompass the conviction that his analysis of the processes of power are adequate.4 
However the formal, almost sealed quality of The Archaeology of Knowledge and 
'The Order of Discourse' in particular, seem particularly valuable because they leave 
open the possibility of formulating and addressing the question of what, other than 
discourse, might govern djscourse: defined in this way, discourse is a powerful 
counter-concept to the knowledge relations that Sperber and Wilson and inferential 
pragmatics more generally tend to assume. 
The distinction between' genre and discourse that I am drawing is of course 
theoretical. Genre, conceived in broadly Bakhtinian terms, and discourse are 
congruent to the degree that both are centrally concerned with the historical situation of 
utterance or enunciation. But what I want to assert here and demonstrate in subsequent 
chapters is the contingent and various relations between genre and discourse and the 
signifying constraints that each may effect on the other. For example, a discourse may 
continue across genre shifts within a text; alternatively, a shift of genre may effect a 
shift of discourse (this is a detailed point of discussion in chapter six); the same 
discourse may operate in and over a number of different genres. In nineteenth century 
English writing for example, . certain physiognomical discourses ranged over numerous 
genres, including those of science and the novel.5 T S Eliot's 1948 essay-polemic, 
Notes Towards The Definition of Culture, and Ruth Rendell's 1978 thriller 
Judgement in Stone, share the same anti-mass civilisation discourse and the first 
sentence of Rendell's novel memorably attests its continuing force: ' ... Eunice 
Parchman killed the Coverdale family because she could not read or write.,6 
Alternatively again, the operating discourse of a genre may change. Nineteenth-
century romance narratives configured a number of ethical, in particular Christian 
ethical discourses - the sinner Rochester's suffering and final redemption in Jane Eyre 
is one obvious example? This is but a residue in the ultimate cinematic romance of the 
1990s, Titanic, where the dominant discourse of individual freedom is modulated 
within the specific terms of the American dream.s These contingent relations are 
clearly central to interpretative practices. To take a simple example, the contemporary 
reader of romance may not mobilise the ethical meanings of character attributes and 
behaviours in nineteenth century romance narratives and/or may translate these into the 
discourses of individual choice and self-improvement. 
Following on from this, the mode of analysis must configure the interpretative 
process and its possibilities in rhetorical terms. First, interpretation as it is considered 
here in relation to print texts is always conceived as a part of a larger process: reading. 
Whilst interpretation and interpretative processes are the central interest of this thesis, 
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these cannot be abstracted from reading, which also encompasses the processes of 
explication and evaluation. Interpretation, is, as mentioned in the introduction, 
conceived broadly as a process of translation. To answer the question what does the 
text mean (the question that interpretation poses), the reader must both identify its 
languages (in Bakhtin's sense) and transpose the text into these languages. Conceiving 
interpretation as a translative process is clearly compatible with conceiving the text as 
intertextuality. The text incorporates a mUltiplicity of languages which frequently 
converge on lexical and other resources. The multiaccentuality of the work render the 
issue of which language or languages are present in the text central to interpretation. 
Interpretation defined as translation is also intended to capture the ways in which 
interpretation always transforms, varies or alters meaning. This understanding of the 
interpretative process as changing the matter that is interpreted accords with both 
inferential and intertextual accounts given their fundamental challenges to en-de-coding 
as.a singular process: there is always a gap between production and interpretation. But 
as in the case of textual production, where for example a genre may be radically 
transformed or minimally varied in a new textual context, the gap varies. The changes 
or alterations it effects may be minimal (interpretation as a case of variation) or 
extensive (interpretation as a case of transformation). It is also important to note here 
that the reader's interpretation-translation is not dependent on correctly identifying the 
languages of the text, some or all of these may be misidentified, but a transposition of 
the text into the identified languages, an interpretation, can still take place. I will 
return to these issues in chapters five and six, where I examine the translative 
interpretative practices that texts and editions propose. 
This in tum is a reminder that interpretation and reading are always instantiated as 
practices, governed by the text, the reader and the situation of reading. These 
modalities give specific contents to interpretation, explication and evaluation, order 
this economy of reading in different ways and render particular practices more or less 
explicit. Detective fiction and thrillers both propose that we interpret a set of seemingly 
random objects and events as clues which may signify identity and/or motivation and 
which together form a meaningful pattern. In a very different vein, the 'cosy kitchen' 
of estate-agents' copy is immediately translated as 'poky kitchen with no ventilation' 
and 'loads of potential' as 'you'll have to take out a second mortgage to make this place 
habitable'. These interpretations are governed by a particular type of explication and 
knowledge of the genre which in this case proscribes any representation that could be 
construed as negative. When we read interviews with government ministers or their 
shadows, our evaluation may not only encompass our own relations to what they say 
(do we agree or not? is what they say true or not?) but their performance (we mayor 
may not admire their ability to evade or deflect difficult questions). The situation of 
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reading likewise shapes the instantiation of these processes as particular practices. The 
literary studies seminar, to take a very obvious case, renders explication (which may 
of course take many forms) an explicit practice which often follows highly prescribed 
procedures. The reader whose evaluative practice includes the minister's performance 
is familiar with a variety of political genres and discourses which are a staple of the 
contemporary representation of politics within the media. These brief examples also 
show that the relations between the practices that constitute reading vary. In detective 
fiction, for example, interpretation is the dominant which subordinates and transforms 
explication and evaluation. 
A rhetorical approach must take account of who reads and in what situation: the 
conditions of reading. However, whilst I will on occasion hypothesise particular 
readers and situations, this is not central practice to the analysis. First, because, in 
keeping with the general direction of the thesis, I will characterise the conditions of 
reading in abstract terms: in terms of the know ledges that are constructed and deployed 
in interpretation. Central here is the status of the knowledge for the reader and within 
the situation (its status may conflict in this respect). 'Status' here suggests a number of 
modalities: the presence or absence of particular knowledge, its familiarity or relative 
novelty, its perceived authority and legitimacy. These modalities are central to 
assessing the varying possibilities and probabilities of its use or non-use in 
interpretation. A further reason for characterising conditions of reading in these terms 
is in distinction from the canonical speech situation and its problems. The categories of 
particular reader and particular situation cannot capture the complex rela!ions between 
knowledge and authority and their role in interpretation: some concep:fue 'General 
" Culture' (Kristeva's term for the totality of signifying practices and their relations) 
must inform the analysis, but one which also takes accounts of institutions (a 
weakness in Bakhtin and Kristeva). Further, given the attention that rhetorical 
approaches demand for the context-bound character of utterance (with context 
understood in its broadest sense and not exclusively from the standpoint of the 
hearer/reader), the book or, better, the edition - the material form in which the text is 
encountered - is a fundamental constituent of the conditions of reading. Its neglect, in 
intertextual accounts of production, inferential pragmatics and pragmatics more 
generally, makes it the central interest of the rhetorical approach developed here. The 
analysis will therefore focus in most detail on what might be termed the 'supply' side of 
the interpretative process: the interpretative possibilities that the edition proposes. I am 
using 'propose' and 'proposal' to underscore the fact that no interpretation is necessary 
and that what counts is relative strength or weakness. 
I' 
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2. Theorising the book 
As noted in the introduction, the book has become a renewed site of theoretical interest 
over the last twenty or so years - in literary studies (where the interest is predominantly 
driven by new historicism), and also in the narrower field of textual studies, 
specifically in debates about the theory and practice of textual editing. It is in the latter 
where the book as object and the processes and practices of int~rpretation most clearly 
intersect. Here, a range of post-structuralist and historicist critiques have both 
challenged the long established ideal of securing a single, definitive and authoritative 
text that accords with the author's will and intention, and provoked a powerfully 
formulated defence of 'traditional' practice.9 
It is now almost impossible to represent the orthodoxies of bibiographicalltextual 
studies without a certain post-structuralist irony: a set of practices primarily organised 
by an anxious narrative of textual decline, understood as the inevitable if lamentable 
wear and tear of cultural reproduction and circulation. Its vocabulary of 'corruption' 
and 'purgation' defines the scholar's work as a kind of textual cleansing, exemplified 
in Williams's and Abbott's An Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studie~: 
Clearly, a doctrine of textual original sin should be one of the credal statements 
of literary scholars. Not only do texts have lives but these lives tend to go from 
bad to worse. IO . 
As Jerome McGann, one of the most interesting critics of textual studies, points out, 
the recuperative or restorative goal of textual studies was always, in some sense, 
acknowledged as impossible, but it was still pursued as 'a heuristic operation': a 
measure of Romantic defeat would always accompany the heroic effort. I I . Within this 
paradigm, authorial intention was the key to recuperation and restoration, although its 
place of residence was always a vexed question (In the manuscript? In the first 
edition? In the final edition sanctioned by the author?). 12 
Critiques of the assumptions and practices of textual editing have foregrounded the 
difficulties raised by intention and the theorisation of the text itself. As George 
Bornstein points out in his introduction to a recent collection on editorial theory, the 
text is no longer conceived as 'unitary and received', but as 'contingent and 
constructed,.13 The fundamental and explicit assumption governing the 'new' textual 
studies is that meaning is fundamentally and irrevocably unfixed: there are no final 
fixities to recuperate. This assumption may be mobilised in different discursive forms 
but in all cases it has a significant impact on textual editing, making possible a critique 
of its established practices, and the proposal of new protocols. For example, a 
symptomatic critique of 'traditional' scholarly editing might expose the variational crux 
(Is Hamlet's flesh is too 'solid' or too 'sullied'?) as a disavowal of textuality, the 
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carefully managed moment which acknowledges as a-typical and aberrant what is in 
fact the everyday condition of meaning and interpretation. 14 Alternatively, textual 
editing becomes the attempt to find ways of representing textual contingency in editions 
which represent the text as an ongoing process, where, for example, the apparatus is 
foregrounded and the status of the editor as a reader is marked. ls At the same time, the 
practices of textual editing are also conceived as a kind of a bulwark against the 
perceived 'excesses' of post-structuralist theory. The same Bornstein who asserts that 
the text is 'contingent and constructed' also challenges the notion of an 'endless 
freeplay' of meaning with the empirical reality of a finite number of versions of the 
text. 16 Likewise, Philip Cohen in his introduction to another collection welcomes the 
insights and challenges of such critiques but also has hopes for a middle ground: 
which will not result in 'the unqualified substitution of structuralist and 
deconstructionist truisms for traditional intentionalist ones'. 17 
These arguments are valuable to the extent that they foreground the signifying 
functions of particular editorial practices. They can also underscore the historicity of 
both the book and editing practices: McGann's proposed protocols for a historicist 
mode of critical editing, for example, includes an account of the relevant discourses 
which informed the text's various and variant versionings. 18 But there are two specific 
issues which make the 'new' textual studies a problematic starting point for a general 
theoretical model of the book or edition. The first is not specific to textual studies; 
rather, it replicates a theoretical error in intertextually-inflected accounts of reception: 
the binary of necessity versus a monolithic contingency. Therefore, whilst it is 
acknowledged that editing generates and delimits interpretative possibilities, there is an 
over-hasty shift from this to the contingencies of editorial practice as they are 
represented in different editions of the same text, which diminishes the value of the 
general insight. The fact of interpretative variation across editions does not undercut 
the process of fixing produced by anyone. The second problem is that the 'middle 
ground' that much of the new textual studies wishes to occupy is not really a middle 
ground at all: it is half-way between two wholly incompatible modes of discourse: 
intertextuality and intentionality, for example. 19 Further, the obvious focus of critical 
editing on historical, literary and most frequently fiction texts makes it impossible to 
generalise a model of the book or publishing in general terms. Such limits may not be 
surprising, but they do restrict the extent and force of its critique. For example, there 
is no general attempt to consider the. ways in which the very work of critical editing 
contributes to the construction and reproduction of the text's value - a central issue if 
the proposed reading practices an edition proposes are being examined. An edition 
which represents the text as a contingent process, as variation and so forth may 
challenge the orthodoxies of traditional critical editing but do nothing to foreground the 
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processes which inscribe its value in general terms: a variorum edition (which 
represents the base text and its variations) of a Barbara Cartland novel is an 
impossibility. The new textual studies draws attention to many interesting aspects of 
scholarly editing but it cannot fully capture its specificity because this depends on a set 
of contrasts with other publishing categories and practices, configured within a concept 
of publishing processes and institutions in general terms. By contrast, Gerard 
Genette's Paratexts does suggests a general model of the edition, and one explicitly 
formulated in intertextual and pragmatic terms.20 
Paratexts is the first and only sustained attempt to theorise the interpretative and 
reading practices proposed by the edition in general terms.21 Genette coins 'paratexts' 
to describe and classify two kinds of phenomena. The first of these, which is my 
focus, is the peritext: all the signifying matter of the edition apart from the text. The 
contents pages of Paratexts suggests the range: formats, series, the name of the 
author, various kinds of title, dedications and inscriptions, epigraphs, prefaces and 
notes.22 Epitexts, in contrast, are interviews with the author, publicity material such 
as catalogue copy, press releases, and authorial reviews (signed or unsigned), all of 
which are generated by the production apparatus. Epitexts are originally located outside 
the material form of the edition, though they may subsequently become peritextual.23 
Paratext and text are defined in a relation of mutual dependence. Thetext: 
is rarely presented in an unadorned state, unreinforced and unaccompanied by a 
certain number of verbal or other productions, such as an author's name, a title, 
a preface, illustrations. And although we do not always know whether these 
productions are to be regarded as belonging to the text, in any case they 
surround it and extend it, precisely in order to present it, in the usual sense of 
this verb but also in the strongest sense: to make present, to ensure the text's 
presence in the world, its 'reception' and consumption in the form (nowadays 
at least) of a book.24 
Genette's aim is to resolve this classificatory uncertainty. The differentiation between 
text and peri text, he emphasises, is based on a theoretical abstraction: the reader never 
encounters the text, unadorned, though the extent and type of the paratextual apparatus 
varies. 'The heterogeneous group of practices and discourses' which together comprise 
the paratext share a specific function: to suggest ways of reading the text.25 '[H]ow 
would we read Joyce's Ulysses if it were not entitled Ulysses?,.26 Paratexts are 
therefore a particular kind of textual context. Genette figures paratexts within the 
locutions of speech act theory, as having illocutionary force, a force which whilst not 
necessarily syntactically marked, nevertheless seeks to direct the prescribed reader's 
reading of the text. 27 Thus the subtitle 'a novel' can function as a request to the reader 
to summon at least some of their expectations of the novelistic, for example 
I, 
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fictionality.28 His treatment of paratexts is then broadly pragmatic: paratexts are 
messages with senders and implied receivers who are contextually located in time and 
space. The paratexts of a particular text may have a number of senders and prescribed 
receivers. Senders may include the author, an editor (in the case of an editor's 
introduction), a series editor, a reviewer (where review extracts are published as part 
of the blurb or in the prelims), or, in more general terms, a commentator. Genette 
also makes the crucial point that the different paratexts of a text may address very 
different implied audiences. The title, he argues, is addressed to the 'public' at large, 
many paratexts are addressed to the prescribed reader, some to a particular constituency 
of prescribed readers (one thinks here of the acknowledgements page).29 Both sender 
and receiver are defined in relation to the text's temporal and spatial existence. The 
paratext may be contemporaneous with the text, or precede its circulation - as certain 
kinds of publicity material do - or succeed it - as in the case of new editions. A 
paratext may be located within or without the edition - the peritext/epitext distinction -
but the peri text's location is also plotted according to its relative placing to the text: 
before it, within or after. Within these categories there is a further dimension of 
proximity: closer to or further away from the text. Paratext and text are also 
distinguished in terms of their relation to history: 
the paratext provides a kind of canal lock between the ideal and relatively 
irnmutable identity of the text and the empirical (socio-historical) reality of the 
text's public ... the lock permitting the two to remain 'level' ... Being 
immutable, the text in itself is incapable of adapting to changes in its public in 
space and over time. The paratext - more flexible, more versatile, always 
transitory because transitive - is, as it were, an instrument of adaptation.30 
Whilst the text remains the same over time, in an idealised sense at least, the paratext is 
the means by which the text can be adapted to a socio-historically changing readership. 
The richest and most suggestive aspect of Paratexts lies in the detailed examination 
of the text's peritextual features?1 His elaboration of different peritexts and how these 
vary across genres, as well as historically and geographically (though the primary 
example is France), opens up a range of ways of thinking about how the epitextual 
apparatus functions to propose possible reading contexts. Particularly interesting, but 
also representative, is Genette's discussion of titles. Titles can obviously generate 
expectations about the text and function as strong interpretative and reading contexts.32 
There are titular styles peculiar to certain authors ... There are connotations of a 
historical kind: the classical dignity of generic titles, the romanticism (and post-
romanticism) of parageneric titles, the eighteenth-century flavour of long 
narrative titles a la Defoe, the nineteenth-centuryish tradition of full names of 
heroes and heroines ... There are also genre connotations: the single name of the 
hero in tragedy ... , the name of the dramatised characteristic in comedy ... , 
the suffix -ad( e) or -ide e) in the titles of classical epics ... ?3 
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Whilst Genette separates 'genre connotations' from 'connotations of a historical kind', 
it is clear that historical connotations can also establish generic expectations. The 
'nineteenth-centuryish tradition' of hero and heroine titles - Jane Eyre, Daniel Deronda, 
Therese Raquin, Anna Karenin - may not only function as a marker of the historicity 
of the text for contemporary readers, but can also operate as a strong generic marker of 
the bildungsroman. 
However his discussion of titling also exposes a general problem with the paratext. 
For Genette, titles are, of course, paratextual, and propose strong reading contexts. 
This is their defining attribute and what distinguishes them from the text is precisely 
their functionality. For Genette the text is 'dumb' ('tout a fait muette' - completely 
mute as to the matter of its own reading): 
The novel does not design itself explicitly as novel, nor the poem as a poem. 
At the limit; the determination of the generic status of the text is not its affair, 
but that of the reader, the critic, the public,.34 
But how is it possible to ignore or resist the strong interpretative contexts that texts (as 
opposed to paratexts) propose? Generic markers are the most obvious and strongest 
case of interpretative contexts. The variety of conventions which form the introductions 
to so many academic articles and papers: 'In this paper I will argue', 'my aim is to 
demonstrate' etc., followed by a synopsis of the order that the text will follow is a clear 
example. These are evidently explicit directions for reading. In Gothic narratives, 
literal bad or unusual weather - violent storms, an unseasonable dark sky on a summer 
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afternoon and so on - are often premonitors of dangerous supernatural events as well as 
markers of a disruption of the natural order. Within Gothic, such representations not 
only propose a specific kind of reading - symbolic and literal - but also propose 
particular kinds of narrative relation between what is happening and what will happen. 
The notion of a text that does not suggest ~ts reading contexts is a fiction. This is a 
fundamental problem in Genette's accoun~ and derives from his limited conception of 
intertextuality as transtextuality, defined as: 
a relation of co-presence between two or more texts ... most frequently the 
effective presence of a text within an other.35 
His definition of intertextuality always retains the sense of individual texts relating, one 
with another, and provides a strong contrast with Kristeva's 'permutation of texts' 
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where a simple plural dismisses the possibility of separable entities. For Genette, text 
is always a distinguishable unity. 
Genette's commitment to unity is also the effect of a residual Romanticism. His 
differentiation of the 'public' ('the public in general - that is every Tom, Dick and 
Harry') here and elsewhere from the prescribed reader is instructive.36 The term public 
has specific and derogatory meanings in Romantic discourse, often invoking a 
distinction between the serious reader and the marketised consumer?7 The paratext 
does the utilitarian work of addressing an audience, of making public that which the 
silent text cannot and must notdo. Further, whilst Genette elaborates the ways in 
which the peritextual apparatus of a single edition can have a complex historicity, 
incorporating prefaces or consolidating authorial and/or editorial notes written at 
different times, he does not recognise the complex historicity of the text as 
intertextuality. His conception of text is, at root, Romantic; a unified whole which in 
ideal terms can be separated from history and the market. The paratext is a threshold 
between text and world (history) but also, and equally importantly, a boundary which 
separates the utilitarian practices of the paratextual apparatus, from the text itself, 
which is not functional or instrumental. 
This Romanticism is foregrounded in Genette's distinction between paratextual and 
other reading contexts. 'In principle', he suggests, 'every context serves as a 
paratext,.38 A reader's knowledge of the age or gender of the author, her/his sexuality 
(one could add here her/his class, nationality or ethnicity), can all shape how the text 
is read.39 The 'commonsense' axiom and complex mythology that all women's writing 
is experiential and autobiographical and that all black women's writing is doubly so, is 
an obvious case and may mobilise expectations and practices which weaken fictive 
expectations - about the meanings carried by narrative patterning for example. But 
whilst 'in principle' any context may serve as a paratext. 
By definition, something is not a paratext unless the author or one of his 
associates accepts responsibility for it, although the degree of responsibility 
may vary.40 
This notion of responsibility is both literal and metaphorical. Literal, in the sense that a 
paratext may be officially signed by the author. Metaphorical because in much 
publication and almost all posthumous publication, the publisher can be seen as 
metaphorically enacting the authorial will, even if this will is defined rather abstractly 
as the authorial wish for the text to remain in circulation. Genette clearly recognises the 
possibility of disagreement between author and publisher and also of misinterpretations 
- including deliberate or wilful ones - of the presumed will of the author.41 There is a 
clear parallel here with the role that traditional critical editing assigns to the author. And 
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it is interesting to note that the majority of engagements with Paratexts have been of a 
rather traditional, bibliographical and descriptive kind rather than with the pragmatic 
issues that Genette, raises, albeit in rather formal terms.42 What distinguishes a 
paratextual context of interpretation from any other is its relation to authorial 
responsibility: strong or weak, literal or metaphorical. Within this definition, a review 
that is written by one of the author's 'associates' is an epitextual paratext, whilst a 
review written by someone who has no association with the author isjust another 
reading context. 
Genette's definition of publishing therefore has two elements. First, it is a process 
conceived as the author 'writ large'; second, it is a mediation, modification or 
'adaptation' (his preferred lexeme) of the text to the changing demands of different 
reading constituencies. But to call this a 'definition' is a misnomer because publishing 
is nowhere explicitly conceptualised in Paratexts. (this is likewise the case in the 'new' 
critical editing). Genette's implicitly assumes that publishing is the enactment of the 
authorial will and always limits its role to modifying the text that always precedes it. 
McGann's position is more interesting in this respect: 'texts are produced and 
reproduced under specific social and institutional conditions' and all texts, even the 
most 'private', are socia1.43 Publishing is not conceived here as the author 'writ large' 
but what is interesting is his locution: 'texts always stand within an editorial horizon' 
which McGann glosses as the horizon of the text's production and reproduction.44 
What is interesting about this formulation is the conjunction of vagueness and 
particularity. What does it mean for a text to 'stand' within this horizon? What exactly 
are the constitutive relations between text and horizon? And why the editorial horizon? 
This seems to define publishing predominantly as editing: editing becomes a metonym 
for publishing. In this at least, McGann is typical of the new textual studies.45 More 
frequently the centrality of editing is proposed in deconstructive terms and the relations 
between composition and editing are reversed: David Greetham's suggestion that 
commentary goes 'on top' is one such instance, a metaphor which plays rather 
uneasily with conventional hierarchies of space and gender.46 This rewriting of 
publishing as editing, of the totality of processes as one (or two if we include 
Greetham's subordinated composition) is once again not surprising given the objects of 
textual studies. The new textual studies attack on the old centres on editorial practice, 
and questions about other practices or processes and their relations are, in the main, 
subordinated to editing. But is editing always the dominant process in publishing? 
And is the 'editorial horizon' an adequate formulation of the text's location within 
publishing processes and institutions? 
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3. From editing and composition to the horizon of the publishable 
In contrast I would argue that it is the horizon of the publishable which constitutes 
texts, writerships and readerships. Authors don't write books, as Roger E. Stoddard 
reminds us, they write and submit manuscripts (or nowadays disks and hard copies).47 
What governs the readable and the writable and their relations is what it is possible or 
plausible to publish in a given context. The horizon of the publishable is neither a 
singular category, nor an autonomous logic defined by the industry. The publishable 
is defined by the relations between publishing and other institutions: most obviously 
perhaps other media, but also, educational, cultural and legal ones. Second, within 
publishing, there is clearly a range of horizons of the publishable, some of which 
intersect with specific genres or categories. Others are not category-specific but are 
differently implemented within categories: celebrity publishing, of the kind where the 
author's name precedes and is unrelated to writing would be one case of this. 
The publishable is clearly a complex and multiple horizon but it is precisely this 
complexity and multiplicity that give the publishable as a concept such strong 
explanatory value. For example, it becomes possible to systematically specify 
particular publishing categories in terms of the distinctive horizons which constitute 
them. Some of these are highly specific, for example the role of various educational 
institutions and discourses in constituting the horizon for children's publishing, or the 
role of the legal practices which organise the relations between publishers and museums 
and archives in the case of illustrated art books. Others have a much more extensive 
range and force. For example, the publishing horizon of many genres, from 
biography and autobiography through many categories of popular fiction, is 
increasingly shaped by the horizon of possibilities of other media. The publishable is 
increasingly required to be malleable, usable in a range of media forms: as tv 
adaptation or film, extractable or abridgeable for newspapers and magazines and so on. 
The case-studies explored in the analysis below are in a different way evidence of the 
central role of 'versioning' in publishing, as in all contemporary media. Such a 
characterisation is only possible if publishing is defined to include the totality of 
publishing processes: composition, editing, design, production, marketing and 
publicity. 
This conceptualisation. sees composition as one of the processes of publishing: it 
has its own specificity but it is not a practice of a different order, as Genette seems to 
assume. Nor can composition be understood as a process which precedes publishing: 
the matter that is modified or mediated by publishing processes. First, because within 
contemporary publishing (as in all modes of cultural production), the processes of 
production are frequently co-temporal. Books can be marketed and publicised before 
they are written or at least completed. 48 Second because, as noted above, the horizon 
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of the publishable itself constitutes what it is possible to write, and in significant terms, 
how it is written, edited, designed, produced and so on. Once more the picture 
becomes more complex and more theoretically productive. It becomes possible to 
differentiate publishing categories and genres in terms of the relations between 
processes and, in particular, to identify the dominant process in different types of 
publishing, a dominant which subordinates and transforms other processes. In literary 
and intellectual publishing, . it is clear that the writer or author has greater freedom and 
sanction, and the compositional process a more constitutive role than in probably any 
other mode. (There is a certain irony in the fact that the various critiques of authorial 
intention have focused so much of their attention on a mode of publishing where the 
author has an a-typically important role) Celebrity publishing is an apparently 
paradoxical case, where composition and all other processes are subordinated to 
marketing and pUblicity. It is not simply that the celebrity signature is no guarantee of 
authorship. What the name inscribes is not the dominance of composition but of 
marketing. Illustrated books, as a general category, make a particular conjunction of 
design and production the dominant. Specifying the relations between processes within 
different types of publishing also makes it possible to differentiate processes - such as 
editing, design, marketing and so on - in relation to particular categories of 
publication: as practices. Clearly, the editing practices of classics are very different to 
those of contemporary literary publishing. An obvious difference is the visibility of 
editorial practice in the former, where particular choices are explicitly represented and 
explained (for example in terms of printer or authorial error) and its invisibility in the 
latter. 
Such an understanding of processes and practices opens up a different way of 
thinking about genre in relation to books. Different genres can be explored and defined 
in terms of both a dominant publishing process and a set of specific practices. This 
characterisation of publishing, which takes account of both its institutional dimensions 
and relations, and its processes - their relations and instantiation as practices in the 
constitution of particular publishing categories, is necessary if its role in interpretation 
is to be assessed. It suggests a different way of theorising the edition, not merely as 
the material form in which the reader encounters the text but as the intersection and 
instantiation of production (publishing) practices. This in turn suggests a different way 
of defining and formulating the relations between text and edition. Text is anything 
which the author either consents to sign or which is signed on behalf of the author, 
most usually by an editor (e.g. the posthumous publication of letters, diaries etc.). 
This definition is author-centred only in so far as the author is a legal entity 
contractually constituted by copyright. The text may be co-written with an editor, who 
may compose more of the text than the author does but the manuscript (for this 
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definition of text is largely co-extensive with the manuscript) is published under the 
signature of the author. The author may write the jacket blurb and/or play an important 
role in the design of the cover but these texts are not signed by the author. The title 
however is frequently signed by the author. The text, defined in this sense, does not 
correspond to a time anterior to publication or publishing processes, nor does it 
demarcate an object which exists outside of publication. 
In defining the text in this way, my aim is to identify an extant material object - one 
always-already structured by the variable horizons of the publishable - which enters 
into a set of relations with various institutionalised practices which transform it. This 
definition of text as that which is signed can also further the differentiation of the 
practices of media institutions and to some extent genres. In the case of much print 
journalism, the signed text may have been extensively subbed with little or no authorial 
involvement. In the case of literary fiction and many genres of intellectual writing, 
negotiations between author and editors may be extensive, with the author retaining the 
right to veto editorial suggestions. House styles (ranging from preferred spelling to 
prescribed narrative conventions) as well as editorial instruction and discussions can 
significantly structure compositional practice. It should be clear that the reader of the 
book, article and so on never encounters the text as it is defined above, although that 
is often precisely the object that readers think they are encountering. By edition I mean 
the material form that the reader encounters and/or reads. The edition is the final 
transformation of the 'text': it therefore includes the text rather than treating it as 
separable. This distinction captures, in ways which Genette's text-paratext formula 
does not, the reader's relation to the edition. For example, the reader often treats the 
author as the signatory of the title and intertitles. And if the author is a legitimising 
concept for the reader, this may encourage the reader to treat such titles as strong 
contexts. This may in tum lead to the weakening of other non-authorially sanctioned 
contexts. 
The edition itself is intertextual in distinctive ways. Genette correctly recognises 
that the editional apparatus is fundamentally metatextual. Titles, blurbs, prefaces, 
introductions, indexes and notes are all texts which 'speak about' the text: comment 
upon it, represent it, read it. But to conceive this metatextual function exclusively as 
textual commentary is too narrow. To represent Jane Austen's novel Pride and 
Prejudice as '[o]ne of the most perfect, most pleasurable and most subtle - and 
therefore, perhaps, most dangerously persuasive - of romantic love stories' does 
indeed represent the text but it also represents the text as an instance of a particular 
genre which may function as an interpretative or reading context.49 The relation is 
reciprocal: to classify this text as romance also contributes to a definition of romance. 
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This reciprocal relation requires consideration if the horizon of the publishable and its 
role in the production of genre is to be kept in the frame of the analysis. 
What Genette does not acknowledge, given his limiting definition as intertextuality 
as transtextuality, is that 'paratexts', like any other text are always-already intertextual 
whether or not they are explicitly metatextual. (All modalities of intertextuality are 
metatextual, given that any text always takes up a position to the texts, genres, 
languages which it varies, even if there are differing degrees of explicitness) Whilst 
making the valuable point that different paratexts may have different addressees, he 
cannot conceive the potentially multiple addressees of anyone paratext: the multiplicity 
that marks the various permutations of the text as texts. A key focus of chapter six is 
the ways in which the same text may prescribe different and conflicting readerships, 
whose know ledges are incompatible. This, in turn, marks a more general feature of 
the editional apparatus, where conflicting interpretative and reading contexts are 
proposed both within particular metatexts and across them. 
Beyond this, editing, design and production are all signifying practices and as 
such they are all intertextual. But the 'moment' of signification varies across practices. 
Meaning-making is clearly central to editing and this is why it is so central in the 
analysis that follows. The same is not true of pricing. Price can and does signify: the 
first Wordsworth classics editions which sold for £1.00, also included the legend 
'complete and unabridged' on the front cover, as if the relative cheapness (as compared 
with other classics editions) might suggest a cost-cutting which including the cutting of 
the novel. But such meanings are an instantiation of a process not centrally governed 
by meaning-making. Production practices are then intertextual to the extent that they 
signify. 
4. The case-studies 
Given the multifarious modes of intertextuality, I will limit my analysis to three 
overlapping practices, each of which provide rich opportunities to explore genre, 
discourse and their relations. I will note them here and elaborate them in further detail 
in chapters five and six. The first is classification: the various categorisations of the 
text within the edition and the intertextual relations configured by these. Classification 
is the focus of chapter five. In chapter six, I will examine the practices of translation 
and topicalisation. Translation is, as suggested above, the transposition of an 
utterance from one language into another or others, where a language is conceived in 
Bakhtinian terms (most of the translations examined are intra-linguistic). Topicalisation 
is the practice which produces and reproduces topoi, where a topos is understood as an 
established mode and matter of argument. Each of these has relations with the practices 
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codified by classical rhetoric. The rhetorical emphasis, part of the common ground 
shared by intertextual and inferential theories, is intended to convey the situation and 
purpose-bound character of such practices and the ways in which they constitute 
arguments; topicalisation is clearly pertinent to the goal of mapping possible inferential 
procedures and their discursively governed character. 
My two case studies, classics and academic textbooks in literary theory - Readers 
and Introductions - are considered here as publishing categories. Both typify the 
contemporary practice, common across all media and a staple of many genres, of 
versioning or re-versioning the 'same' text. Classics and academic textbooks 
recontextualise texts in new editional contexts, addressing different constituencies of 
readers. More specifically, the horizon of the publishable of both categories overlap; 
higher educational institutions, practices and personnel play an important role in each -
an issue to which I will return. Further, both classics and textbooks re-present or 
version texts which are assumed to raise specific interpretative difficulties for the 
prescribed readerships. Much of the editional apparatus of classics is seemingly 
warranted by just such an assumption (endnotes would be one obvious case). 
Academic textbooks likewise recognise the interpretative difficulties of the re-versioned 
texts and the rendering of the difficult text in more accessible form is a staple of 
'Introductions to'. 
The two case-studies are also contrastive. In the case of the classic, the text is 
reproduced with little or no variation, the differences are substantively editional. In the 
case of Readers, however, the texts are frequently abridged, so the differences 
between versions are both textual and editional. Academic 'Introductions to' also 
reversion extant texts, though the practices of reproduction and variation are different. 
Varieties of direct, indirect and free indirect speech or writing are the predominant 
modes of representing the extant text - a practice shared with the introductory materials 
of Readers. The case studies also differ insofar as they reflect the development of the 
mode of intertextual analysis. In chapter five, my focus is not on 'texts' (in the special 
sense identified above) but on the editional apparatus and the interpretative and reading 
practices it proposes. In chapter six, my focus is expanded to take account of the 
relations between 'textual' and editional practices. Finally, classics and textbooks 
organise the three modalities of reading (interpretation, explanation and evaluation) in 
very different ways with, it will be seen, very different effects. As both case-studies 
will demonstrate, we do not simply first interpret, then explicate and finally evaluate: 
evaluation and/or explication may precede interpretation. 
In this chapter, I have outlined the terms, conditions and goals of a mode of 
intertextual analysis which will be developed through the two case-studies. The 
framework of concepts draws on the strengths of intertextual and inferential approaches 
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but also seeks to remedy their individual and shared weaknesses, in particular the way 
both traditions ignore the edition as a central condition of reading. I have also shown 
that contemporary accounts of the 'book' and the practices which constitute it do not 
adequately theorise these and their relations with interpretation and reading. My 
alternative, 'the horizon of the publishable' is a concept which situates the particular act 
of reading in both broad and local contexts and delineates some of the central relations 
between the key concepts defined here: genre and discourse, process and practice, 
reader and conditions of reading, text and edition. 
1 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978). 
2 Gerard Genette, Narrative Discourse, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). See in particular, on order, 
p.35; on frequency, pp.87-88; and on duration pp. 114-116. Two issues are relevant here. First, the 
relations Genette identifies are textual: there is no 'natural' order of events which contrasts with the 
order of telling: both are effects of the text, of the relations between diegesis and narrative. Likewise 
there is no natural speed or duration: even dialogue, which comes closest, Genette argues, does not 
represent the speed of 'real' conversation as it cannot represent its· pacing. The second issue is that 
Genette's account of narrative is not, of course, intertextual; nor is he, strictly speaking, interested 
in genre. Although he discusses realism (which I would classify as a genre) he treats it more generally 
as a mode of narration. That said, it is clear that his definition of narrative can be recast in intertextual 
terms, particularly with respect to genres which have particular and specifiable orders, durations and 
frequencies. To take a very simple example, the discovery of a body at the beginning of much 
detective fiction presumes a death and most usually a murder (however disguised) and one of the key 
ordering strategies of such texts is the reconstruction of the events that precede the discovery which 
places the beginning of the narrative as some kind of mid-point of the story. 
3 The texts I have in mind here are The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock Publications, 
1972), and 'The Order of Discourse' in Untying the Text, edited by Robert Young. It therefore forms 
part of what is now represented as the archaeological phase of Foucault's thought, defined in The Order 
of Things (New York: Vintage, 1973), as 'an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis 
knowledge and theory became possible' (pp.xxi-xxii). On archaeology versus genealogy see for 
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example, Hubert L. Drefus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), and C. G. Prado, Starting with Foucault (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1995). The citation in the body text is taken from Chartier's text, 'Intellectual 
History/ History of Mentalites' in Cultural History: Between Practice and Representation. This is not 
in fact a text 'about' Foucault as such and in fact the citation is taken from a discussion of Lucien 
Febvre, Marc Bloc and 'the first Annales generation' (pp.21-27). The text does however locate a very 
valuable trajectory and set of contexts in which to locate Foucault's writing and Foucault (and Bourdieu) 
are clearly viewed as inheritors and transformers of this 'tradition': 'After Foucault, it is quite clear that 
we cannot consider ... 'intellectual objects' as akin to 'natural objects' that change only in their modes 
of existence through history. Madness, medicine and the state are not categories that can be 
conceptualised in terms of universals: every age makes their content unique.' (pA7). 
4 I am thinking here of the way in which discourse often seems to function in Foucault's writings as 
wholly autonomous and self-regulating, a formulation clarified by a contrast with the way he 
formulates ideology. In an interview entitled 'Truth and Power' in Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), 
Foucault says that he finds ideology 'difficult to make use of' in important part because it posits an 
alternative and singular concept of truth, and because ideology 'stands in a secondary position relative 
to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant etc.' Both 
arguments appear to me to be problematic. Barthes's formulation of ideology in 'Myth Today' which 
defines the 'myth' as both unreal and true (in its force and effects) is clearly not limited in this sense . 
. {, 
Foucault's infrasructure (or base) superstructure argument depends on a narrow formulation of economy 
/, 
or the economic which is by no means the only reading of 'mode of production'. 
5 And with very different effects. In Elixabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton, (1848), (London: Penguin, 
1996) for example, the scientific authority of physiognomy is both acknowledged and challenged. An 
amateur physiognomist's evaluation of Jem Wilson when he comes to trial for a murder he did not 
commit convicts him; but this discourse is immediately contested as the knowledge of a stranger: 
'Poor Jem! His raven hair (his mother's pride, and so often fondly caressed by her fingers), was that 
too, to have its influence against him? Local, traditional or, here, family know ledges are valued 
over the modem, impersonal knowledges of the stranger. 
6 T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards The Definition of Culture (London: Faber and Faber, 1948). Ruth 
Rendell, Judgement in Stone (London: Arrow, 1978). 
7 Charlotte Bronte, Jane Eyre (1847) (London, Penguin Popular Classics, 1994). 
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8 James Cameron (Director), Titanic (US: 20th Century Fox, 1997). Rose's definitive break with her 
family and fiance are key markers of this freedom. Literally she chooses meritocracy over aristocracy 
and privilege which are closely identified with patriarchy and oppression. Rose renames herself Rose 
Dawson as she arrives in New York, and although she is already an American citizen (returning to the 
States), she takes on something of an immigrant identity: making herself anew and successfully. The 
fact that she is American and the privilege that she rejects is likewise is a register of the film's 
conservatism. Rose (and Jack) may be definitively modem but they are only reclaiming the right to the 
dream which has been corrupted by others. 
10 William Proctor Williams and Craig S. Abbott, An Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual 
Studies (New York: Modem Languages Association of America, 1989). The book offers a very useful 
summary of the fields and practices encompassed by Bibliography and Textual Studies and their 
relations. 
11 Jerome McGann, 'The Case of the Ambassadors and the Textual Condition' in Palimpsest: 
Editorial Theory in the Humanities edited by George Bomstein and Ralph G Williams (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993), p.152. 
12 Williams and Abbot provide a useful if somewhat innocent summary of this process in their 
discussion of critical editing (a set of processes which produces a new text based on the evidence and 
interpretation of several documents, or versions of the text, together with various editorial 
emendations) The result is conceived as the realisation of a modal version of authorial intention: what 
the author would have wanted. See in particular p.58. 
13 Bomstein, 'Introduction', Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities, pp.1-8, p.2. 
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14 William Shakespeare, Hamlet (composed 1600-1 approx.). The solid / sullied (sallied) crux is 
something of a topos. The Signet Classic Shakespeare edition for example, prints 'sullied' with the 
following footnote: 'Q2 has sallied, here modernised to sullied, which makes sense and is therefore 
given; but the Folio Reading, solid, which fits better with melt ['0 that this too too solid flesh 
would melt'], is quite possibly correct' (New York: Signet Classic, 1963), p.44. 
15 Jerome McGann's on-line Rosetti Archive is at www.iath.virginia.edulrosetti/index.html. 
16 Bornstein, Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanties, p.3. 
17 Philip Cohen, 'Introduction' in Devils and Angels: Textual Editing and Literary Theory, edited by 
Philip Cohen (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991), p.xvii. 
18 Jerome'McGann, 'The Monks and the Giants' in Textual Criticism and Literary Interpretation 
edited by McGann (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), ppI81-199. 
19 On the awkwardness that this desire for a moderate middle ground can generate see for example, 
Ralph G. Williams, 'I Shall Be Spoken: Textual Boundaries, Authors and Intent' in Palimpsest: 
Editorial Theory in the Humanities, pp.45-66. Here he asserts both the intertextualities of the text 
(though in rather narrow terms) and the need to treat the author, albeit understood as a convention, as 
'one of the determinants of the text' (pp.49 - 62). He does not however consider what an intertextual 
concept of the author might look like. The same middle ground can also generate somewhat dissonant 
defences of traditional practice. For example Clayton Delery in 'The Subject Presumed to Know', 
Text: Transactions of the Society for Textual Scholarship 5, (1991), pp.63-80. Delery argues in a 
Lacanian vein that facsimile or diplomatic editions are the most authoritative (in terms of their 
representations of the multiple versions of the text) and the least phallic because no flaw, error or 
disruption is veiled: they are editions with holes. By contrast, most critical editions seek to veil or 
cover up the holes and the editor's authority goes unquestioned. 
20 Gerard Genette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation (Cambridge: CUP, 1997). It was 
originally published in French as Seuils by Editions du Seuil in 1987; 'seuil' has the figurative sense 
of threshold as well as alluding to the publisher. On Genette's definition of intertextuality and his 
pragmatic approach, see below. 
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21 Whilst Paratexts is unique in respect of its range and generality, Genette's many references to other 
writers and texts furnish evidence of a wide range of interests in the book and the edition, from 
Philippe Lejeune's Le Pacte Autobiographique (Paris: Seuil, 1975) whom Genette cites in the 
introduction (pp.2-3) to Claude Duchet 'who gave the name titology [French titrologie after "titre", the 
word for title] to this little discipline, which to date is the active of all the disciplines - if any -
concerned with studying the paratext.' A half-page of references follows (p.55). 
22 Paratexts, pp.vii-x. 
23 Paratexts, p.344: 
24 Genette, Paratexts, p.1 
25 I will use the term 'reading' rather than interpretation when I am discussing Genette's arguments 
because I want to distinguish his usage of reading (which is not specified) from the particular sense of 
interpretation which I am trying to develop here. 
26 Genette, Paratexts, p.2. 
27 Genette, Paratexts, pp.1O-12. 
28 The subtitle 'a novel' may also act to counter expectations suggested by the title. A constructed 
example: 1789: A Novel. 
29 Genette, Paratexts, pp.8-9. 
30 Genette, Paratexts, p.408. 
31 The detailed inventory of the form and function of paratexts and their relations occupies the greater 
part of the book. The epitext is dispatched in just under sixty pages, on the grounds that epitextual 
reading contexts, such as authorial interviews and other autobiographica, are conventionally accepted 
as discourses which explicate and provide reading contexts for the text (p.347). 
32 Titles are discussed on pp.55-104. Titles are also interesting in that in certain situations the 
meaning of a title can be redundant. In certain situation indeed their very meaning can be completely 
demobilised: 'When I ask a bookseller, "Do you have Le Rouge et le Noir?" ... the meaning attached to 
this title ... counts for nothing' (Para texts , p.80). In situations such as these, the title functions in 
the same way as a certain type of brand name, the 'opacity' of which cancels extant semantic 
possibilities. Car names are a classic example here: Jaguar, Mini, Ford. 
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33 Genette, Paratexts, p.90. 
34 Gerard Genette, Palimpsestes: La Litterature au Second Degre (Paris: Editions du Seuils, 1982), 
p.12, my translation. 
35 Genette, Palimpsestes, p.8, my translation. 
36 Genette, Para texts , p.9 
37 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society, pp.50-2. The coupling of structuralist commitments 
with a Romantic conception of text is not in itself surprising: the unity proposed by structurally 
governed relations of meaning can function to reinscribe the organic unity that underscores the 
Romantic conception of text. But it is surprising in Genette's case, given that The Architext is an 
explicit critique of the way that Romanticism has distorted the classical definition of genre in terms of 
who speaks: Genette, The Architext: An Introduction (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1992), see in particular p.2 and pp.36-44. 
38 Genette, Para texts , p.8 
39 'For example, most readers of A La Recherche du Temps Perdu are aware of the two biographical 
facts of Proust's part-Jewish ancestry and his homosexuality. Knowledge of those two facts inevitably 
serves as a paratext to the pages of Proust's work that deal with those two subjects (Paratexts, p.8). 
40 Genette, Paratexts, p.9. 
41 Genette, Paratexts, p.347. 
42 This traditional bibliographical focus also seems to be a popular way of treating the concept of 
paratexts. See for example Mireille Hilsum, 'Le Preface Tardive D'Aragon pour les Oeuvres 
Romanesques Croisees' in Poetique 69 (1987), pp.45-60, a special issue on the paratext. The article 
explores the joint republication of many of Louis Aragon's and Elsa Triolet's writings and the new 
intertitles which sequenced them, an interesting case-study but the focus is bibliographical: how the 
edition came to be. What is also interesting is that the article is almost exclusively concerned with the 
author's contribution to the edition. What is also interesting is that despite Genette's commitment to 
viewing the paratextual apparatus in pragmatic terms, he volunteers no elaborations of the 
interpretative possibilities proposed by the multiple peritextual examples he instances. 
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43 Jerome McGann, 'Literary Pragmatics and the Editorial Horizon' in Devils and Angels: Textual 
Editing and Literary Theory edited by Philip Cohen, p.2. 
44 McGann, 'Literary Pragmatics', p.3, my emphasis. 
45 Whilst editing practices are the main focus, this is not to say there is no interest in other 
,Ik,rh (1,CF, 
production processes meaning-bearing. D. F. McKenzie is one 'big' bibliographer ('big bibliography' 
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is his term) who argues that bibliography or sociology of text should encompass the study of the 
meanings produced by all publishing processes. See for example his Bibliography of the Sociology of 
Texts: The Panizzi Lectures 1985 (London: British Library 1986). In 'Communities of Readers' in 
The Order of Books, Chartier discusses McKenzie's studies of how shifts in the design conventions of 
. printing plays ('moving from a quarto to an octavo edition, numbering scenes ... recalling the names 
of characters present at the beginning of each scene, marginal indications of the name of the character 
speaking') created a new readability which 'reproduced within the book something of the movement of 
the staging' (pp.lO-11). 
46 D. C. Greetham, 'Editorial and Critical Theory: From Modernism to Postmodernism' in 
Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities edited by Bornstein and Williams, pp. 9-28. 
47 Roger E. Stoddard, 'Morphology and the Book from an American Perspective', Printing History 17 
(1990), pp.2-24, cited in Roger Chartier, 'Communities of Readers' in The Order of Books, p.9. 
48 Thomas Harris's Hannibal, (London: Arrow, 2000), his sequel to The Silence of the Lambs is a 
canonical instance of this. 
49 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (London: Penguin, 1996), back cover blurb. This example will 
be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
c' 
-Chapter Five: The Case of Classics 
'The classics are the books of which we usually hear people say, 'I am rereading ... " and 
never 'I am reading ... ' (Italo Calvino)! 
1. What is a classic? 
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Diversity is the most visible hallmark of the texts published as classic. The range of 
titles published by Penguin, the institution most associated with classics in Britain, is 
indicative of this: works originally composed in English and numerous translations; 
prose, drama and poetry; philosophical, auto /biographical, scientific and political 
texts as well as the more familiar fiction; a historical span from Plato to Bellow; texts 
whose value is definitively established and those whose reputation is recent and/or 
seemingly precarious.2 As the last suggests, the classic is not a category whose 
contents are fixed and finite. My focus here is on fiction, a particular type of classic 
constituted by distinctive practices and representations. The choice is aimed partly to 
contrast with chapter six, but also because fiction is a site where multiple interpretative 
possibilities are acknowledged (though this acknowledgement is often provisional), 
and where the question of the relative strength of these possibilities, their graduated 
contingency, is fundamental. Within this category I am examining what might be 
termed the unmodified classic, not 'modern' or 'twentieth-century' or 'contemporary' 
classics but the default classic with its immediate accent of longevity and association 
with the past. This longevity is intimately bound with its proposed value - its 
. . 
perdurance is precisely a marker of its worth - and with specifically interpretative 
issues: the gap between the 'then' of original publication and the 'now' of this 
contemporary may present difficulties for the prescribed reader. Indeed the classic as 
publishing category is structured around a contradiction that is conditioned by this 
defining longevity. On the one hand, the practices of classics publishing participate in 
reproducing the commonsense definition of the classic as a text which has enduring 
relevance: it is defined as universally intelligible (not only in the transience of 'the now' 
but in any imaginable time, past or future). On the other this definition is accompanied 
by procedures which recognise that some of the classic's meanings and values are 
opaque because distant from us. 
The classic has of course been defined in literary-critical discourse, most famously 
perhaps by T. S. Eliot as a conjunction between a mature mind and a mature culture.3 
In contemporary publishing discourse, 'a book that is out of copyright' is one popular 
half-joking and unattributed definition. The juxtaposition clearly foregrounds a 
discrepancy between literary-critical and industry discourses and the classic as 
publishing category is clearly not identical with definitions of the 'Literary'. It does 
however participate in a number of its familiar discourses. Both continuity and 
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discrepancy are strongly marked in the choice of case-study: Jane Austen's Pride and 
Prejudice, first published in 1813. The literary value of Austen's writing, with the 
possible exception of Northanger Abbey, is uncontested.4 And Austen is definitively 
an 'author' in the terms defined by Foucault.5 But her writing, and Pride and Prejudice 
is 
in particular, :are also popular. The recent spate of television and film adaptations, 
sequels, and elaborately constructed and highly active Austen websites (many of 
which incorporate carefully regulated terms and conditions for writing fan fiction) all 
attest this.6 Austen" like Charles Dickens, and unlike Henry James, is, in important 
ways, constituted as classic because of her proposed popularity with (generations of) 
readers. This double figuration of Austen and her writing as both Literary and popular 
makes editions of Pride and Prejudice particularly interesting because the two 
categories preclude and significantly define each other and suggest very different 
reading and interpretative practices. 
There are numerous editions of the novel in print, but not all of these constitute the 
novel as classic and my choice of editions reflects this. The Penguin 1995 edition does 
not publish Pride and Prejudice as classic (I will substantiate this point below) but it 
contrastively focuses the specificity of classics pUblishing. The other three editions do 
constitute the novel as classic. Two of these, the Everyman 1993 edition and the 
Penguin 1996, have an extensive editional apparatus, incorporating not only 
introductions and notes, but chronologies of Austen's 'Life and Times', plot 
summaries, and synoptic accounts of Austen criticism. The only hardback edition is 
published by the Folio Society. Here the textual apparatus of the edition is minimal 
(there is only an introduction) and the high 'production values', including specially 
commissioned illustrations, contribute strongly to the inscription of the text's classic 
status.7 Taken together, the choice suggests the variety of classics publishing in 
contemporary Britain. One of the most visible differences is price. The Folio Society 
edition costs £16.00 but is also available as part of a boxed set, comprising all 
Austen's novels, novel 'fragments' and juvenilia, which costs £112.00. By contrast, 
the Penguin 1996 paperback retails for £2.50. The presence of the two Penguin 
editions represents another increasingly general practice of the major classics publishers 
- Oxford, Everyman and Penguin - who publish more than one edition of the same 
novel, addressing different readerships, for example student and 'general'. This 
attempt to synergise the product is also reflected in the 'non-classic' edition considered 
.,..-
here: the Penguin 1995 edition is the official tie-in with the BBC television adaptation 
from the same year. Another contemporary edition, the Sceptre paperback, also 
references the television series on the front cover and ties the novel to two recently 
published 'sequels' by Emma Tennant - Pemberley and An Unequal Marriage - also 
published by Sceptre.8 These differences of publishing practice obviously intersect 
with the primary focus of this analysis: the intertextuallocations produced by the 
classifications of each edition and the interpretative possibilities suggested by them. 
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The various editions of the novel abound in classifications of the novel which are 
textualised in very different ways: as single lexemes, for example on the back covers -
'Fiction' (the 1995 Penguin), 'Literature' (the 1996 Penguin) - but also in more 
complex formulations which range from simple noun phrases - 'Jane Austen's best-
loved work' (1995 Penguin) - to more extended and elaborate formulations - 'one of 
the enduring classics of English literature' (1995 Sceptre), and indeed whole 
arguments and texts, such as blurbs and introductions. Each of the classifications 
above both defines the novel and proposes arguments about it. 'One of the enduring 
classics of English Literature' is a complex and hyperbolic act of classification: the text 
is a member of the class of literary texts, but also of a national sub-class of Literature, 
a sub-class of the classic (a sub-sub class of the enduring classic?).9 But the 
classification simultaneously proposes and presupposes a set of arguments: Pride and 
Prejudice is 'one of the .. .'; there is a category English Literature, and so on. Here 
the latter is masked by the textual form of the classification: the title is lexically 
substituted by a noun phrase which defines it in relation to other texts of its type. In 
classical rhetoric, definition is frequently codified as a central practice of inventio, 'the 
finding of discovering of material pertinent to the cause', and classificatioIl:S", 
constituting the subject matter in terms of-its 'species' or 'genus', is one of its 
modes. 10 Within the generality of'classificatory definition, the figure of renaming or 
antonomasia is a particularly interesting case. 'Jane Austen's best-loved novel' is 
another name for Pride and Prejudice. The novel is categorised as one of Austen's - a 
closed set of six with the exception of the ambiguous Sanditon, completed by 'another 
Lady' - which the author as concept makes possible. However it is the particularity of 
Pride and Prejudice that is most strongly marked within this set, distinguished on the 
grounds of the emotion it has inspired in its readers. This invocation of rhetoric is 
intended to capture the situationally-constituted character of such representations and 
their argument patterns. Therefore whilst 'Jane Austen's best-loved work' is a strict 
case of lexical substitution, antonomasia is my preferred locution. 11 However these 
concepts are conceived in intertextual terms, terms which are clearly incompatible with 
the assumptions of classical rhetoric. First, there will be no attempt here to bind 
particular forms to particular functions. The purpose of antonomasia may on particular 
occasion be euphemism, or hinting without stating or amplification but such purposes 
and effects are mUltiple and variable according to the textual context which the figure 
inhabits. Likewise, one of the strongest assumptions of rhetoric is a form/content 
dichotomy, suggested, perhaps most strongly by eiocutio, the fitting of language to 
audience and context, a faculty separated from" both inventio and dispositio (the 
arrangement of material and most specifically its sequence), and assuming a core of 
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meaning which can be reversioned without any substantive change to sense.12 Whilst 
this distinction is interestingly compatible with Sperber and Wilson's account of the 
interpretative dimensions of the language use and in particular resemblance, it is not 
compatible with intertextual accounts. My aim is not to rediscover rhetoric as always-
already intertextual as a theory of language practice but to characterise and specify some 
of the many modes of being intertextual. 
2. Descriptions 
The paragraphs below provide a paratextual description of each of these editions to 
serve as a basis for the analysis that follows. Colour photocopies of the covers are 
appended. 13 All text is black out of white unless otherwise stated. Titles and the names 
of author and publisher are capitalised unless otherwise noted. Body text is upper and 
lower case unless otherwise noted. 
The front cover of the Everyman 1993 paperback edition of Pride and Prejudice 
comprises a colour reproduction of an early nineteenth century painting - a detail - of 
two young women with their arms around each other's shoulders. 14 The publisher's 
logo and name, the title and the author are overlaid on the painting in a dark blue box, 
white framed, towards the bottom right of the cover. The spine, from top to bottom, 
prints the title and the author vertically with the logo in between. This combination of 
dark blue and white is reproduced on the spine and on the back cover. The back cover 
names the writer of the introduction and the textual editor beneath a publisher, title and 
author sequence. Below this is a blurb of twelve lines and a note summarising the 
editional apparatus. Beneath this is the provenance for the cover illustration. In the 
bottom left and right hand comers respectively are the price (in the UK £2.99, USA 
$3.95 and Canada $5.99) and the bar code, which is blue text out of white. The 
prelims are extensive. The first page reproduces the Everyman logo and motto and the 
second comprises a sixteen-line history and declaration of aims of the Everyman 
library. IS After this comes the title page, which also reproduces the names of the 
editor and the writer of the introduction, the biblio page (the publishing history is 
recorded from the first Everyman edition of 1906) and a content's page where the 
novel's title marks the division between two sets of editional apparatus. Before the 
novel: a page supplying a biographical note on the author (eighteen lines), the editor 
(five lines), the writer of the introduction (six lines) in that order; a 'Chronology of 
Jane Austen's Life and Times': given as a double page spread with three columns 
under the headings of 'life', 'literary context' and 'historical context'; an introduction 
without notes of just over eighteen pages; and a note on the publishing history of the 
text. The novel follows. It is divided into chapters (arabic numbered), running from 
one to sixty one, a total of 292 pages. The original three-volume format chapter 
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sequence is not reproduced. After the text: four pages of notes to the text; a thirteen-
page resume of Austen criticism from first reviews to 1986; suggestions for further 
reading under the headings of 'reference', 'biography' and 'criticism' of one and a half 
pages alphabetically arranged; a chapter-by-chapter text summary of just under five 
pages, and finally an acknowledgements page listing the permissions granted for the 
reproduction of the critical extracts. The extensive editorial apparatus immediately 
suggests a prescribed reading constituency of students. The chapter-by-chapter 
summary (for example, chapter five: 'Mrs Bennet and her daughters are visited by their 
neighbours the Lucases. They discuss the ball and the proud Mr Darcy,16) is the single 
strongest piece of evidence for this and the chronology, summary of Austen criticism, 
suggestions for further reading, endnotes, and the blurb's listing of these features 
seem to confirm it. However, this inscription of a student readership is in part offset 
by two features. 17 The renumbering of the chapters which negates the three-volume 
form of the original and the introduction, which has no notes and makes no explicit 
reference to any Austen criticism. 
The Folio Society's hardback 1957 edition provides an interesting contrast both in 
its editional apparatus and the prescribed readership. The only text on the cover, in 
gold lettering, is on the spine: at the top, the author's name followed by the title, at 
the bottom, the publisher's name. All text runs horizontally and in between are a series 
of small stylised images: a flower, a harp and a fan, each bounded by a narrow band. 
The text and images are gold on a grey cloth binding which extends about an inch onto 
the front and back boards. The rest of the cover is paper-bound and salmon pink with a 
small, regular leaf motif of a deeper browny red. The first printed page reproduces the 
text's title. The full title page includes the names of the writer of the introduction and 
the illustrator as well as the text's title, the names of the author and publisher, and the 
date and place of publication. The text is italicised and bounded by a small patterned 
black border. On the accompanying page, framed by the same border is a wood-cut 
style illustration of a man and women in early-nineteenth century costume who stand 
facing each other in the foreground; a house, partly obscured by foliage, occupies the 
background. The biblio page refers only to the first Folio Society publication in 1957, 
but also thanks Oxford University Press for their permission to print the Chapman 
edition. 18 On the facing page, the first of the five pages of introduction. A 'Select 
Bibliography' of six titles occupies the following page and the novel begins on the 
next. The novel, which runs to 308 pages is divided into the original three volumes 
which are numbered in roman; the chapters are in arabic. Each chapter heading is 
decorated with a horizontal band of a leaf motif. There are sixteen illustrations within 
the body of the novel, not regularly spaced. 19 Some represent specific points in the 
narrative - Mr Collin's proposal to Elizabeth Bennet, Elizabeth's surprise encounter 
with Mr Darcy at Pemberley - others are generic and do not correspond to particular 
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moments in the text - a group of four young women (presumably all but one of the 
Bennet sisters) in a bedroom, where one is dressing another's hair.20 The endlims are 
blank apart from the page immediately following the last page of the novel, which 
details the typeface, point-size, leading, the type of paper and cloth, and 
acknowledges the illustrator as the book designer. Is this edition meant to be read? 
This must be one of the first questions that it provokes. The weight and size of the 
book seem to deter reading. And the solidity itself belies fragility: the easily stainable 
fabric binding suggesting perhaps that the best place for the book is in the slip case with 
the others. The design of the book, in particular the chapter decorations and the 
illustrations, seems to propose it as an object to be looked at and admired, rather than 
read. The book's classification as an art object are confirmed by the acknowledgements 
which suggest an artisanal item. Its status as a commodity is minimised: there is no 
bar code and the price appears nowhere within the edition. The implied purchaser is 
necessarily limited to members of the Folio Society bookclub, a 'membership' which 
requires a minimum outlay of approximately £80 per year for a minimum of four 
titles.21 The membership is addressed through a catalogue which is published annually 
and supplemented with updates. However the 'complete Austen' has often been 
advertised as a special offer or free gift to new members, suggesting the enduring 
attraction of Austen to members and potential members. 
The PenguinlBBC 1995 television tie-in edition suggests a very different kind of 
appeal. The front cover comprises a full page four-colour photographic image of the 
two stars of the 1995 television adaptation, Jennifer Ehle and Colin Firth, in character 
in a rural setting. At the top of the jacket, a small Penguin logo (an orange oval with a 
stylised black and white Penguin) is ranged left and the author's name in large white 
letters is ranged right. The title, in matte gold with red decoration, occupies most of 
the bottom third of the cover. Beneath the title is the legend: 'The award-winning BBC 
Television adaptation'. The spine on the text runs vertically: author (white), title 
(gold), ISBN (white) and logo. The back jacket comprises, in the following order, 
the blurb, which covers just under half a page; an advertisement for a book about the 
making of the series (The Making of Pride and Prejudice, co-published by Penguin 
and the BBC), a provenance for the photograph which identifies the actors and their 
characters, and the credits for the other major production roles in the television 
series.22 All text is white out of black. A white band at the bottom of the page 
reproduces the logo and the classification, 'fiction', to the right with the price beneath 
(£2.99 UK, $9.95 Aust.) and the bar code to the right in black. The first page of the 
prelims consists of a twenty two-line biography of the author. The next page is blank 
with the title page (author, title, publisher and logo) following. Next the biblio page 
which notes the date of first publication and this Penguin edition - no other history is 
recorded - and its status as a tie-in. After this the text which runs to 346 pages, an 
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indication (when compared with the identically formatted Everyman and the larger 
formatted Folio) of the larger point size of this edition. One blank page follows. The 
most obvious feature is the dominance of the tv series. The front cover text is 
organised around the photograph of the two actors; and the text design of the title 
strongly alludes to the television series's titling. The text below the title - 'The award-
winning BBC Television adaptation' - is not a modifier of the edition: this is not a 
video or screenplay. Rather it seems to fix the title far more strongly to the adaptation 
than to the author. An assumed familiarity with the series is employed as a mode of 
address to potential purchasers and readers. What is also noticeable is minimal editorial 
apparatus: there is neither an introduction nor endnotes. 
The second Penguin edition, published in 1996, offers a strong contrast. The 
front cover is divided into three parts: a cream border which acts as a frame for both 
the text and illustration. This box is divided into two. At the top, a rectangular black 
. box in which are printed the publisher and series (classics) separated by the Penguin 
logo, the author's name and the title in white out of black. Within this three-element 
sequence, the author's name and title are more closely connected, sharing the same 
point size and emboldened style. This occupies just over a quarter of the space. The 
rest of the cover is occupied by an illustration of a medieval stone gateway and an array 
of small, period, predominantly rurally-dressed figures in the foreground. A white 
out of black circular sticker marks the price (£2.50) and reproduces the publisher with 
the legend, 'quality and value'. On the spine at the top, a narrow red box, followed 
by the author's name and title printed vertically. At the bottom of the spine are the 
ISBN and the logo. On the back cover the conjunction of publisher, logo, author and 
title is reproduced at the top of the page in the same sequence and format as on the front 
cover. All text is black out of cream, the same colour which frames the front-cover 
illustration. The text on the back cover is reproduced in the following sequence: 
accreditation of the editor and writer of the introduction (the same person), an 
attributed quotation by Austen, the blurb, a provenance for the front cover illustration. 
At the bottom of the page, on the left, the publisher's logo, title and publisher's 
classification, formatted in the same way as the other Penguin edition, with one 
exception: the classification is 'literature' (not fiction). Below this the price (UK 
£2.50, CAN. $5.99, U.S.A $7.99). On the right is the bar code and ISBN. 
As in the Everyman edition, the prelims are extensive. On the first page, the 
publisher, series and title are reproduced. This is followed by a twenty one-line 
biography of Austen, a five-line biography of the editor (who is also the writer of the 
introduction) and a mention for the 'textual advisor'. The next page is blank and is 
followed by the title page, which also reproduces the name of the editor. The biblio 
page gives the date of first publication and this edition. Opposite this is the content's 
page. Like the Everyman edition, the novel falls between substantial editorial 
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apparatuses. Before: an introduction of twenty one pages (including references); 
acknowledgements of six lines (the editor's thanks); 'The Penguin Edition of the 
Novels of Jane Austen' - an account of Penguin's general editing of Austen (from first 
editions, not from Chapman, although he is acknowledged), and the rationale for the 
chaptering is given; 'Note on the Text' - an account of the editing history of Pride and 
Prejudice: Further Reading - eleven alphabetically listed critical texts about Austen 
published between 1971 and 1992. The next left-hand page is blank and on the right is 
a facsimile reproduction of the original title page. The text is divided into its original 
three-volume structure, and each volume is introduced by an intertitle page. The 
original volume and chapter numbers are reproduced in roman on the top centre of each 
left-hand page and at the beginning of each new chapter. Another chaptering system 
(running from chapter one to sixty in arabic) is reproduced on the top centre of each 
right-hand page. The text runs to 312 pages. The endlims comprise one and a half 
pages of emendations to the text, which b~gin on the page opposite the final page of 
the text; and 22 pages of notes, which include, at the beginning, 'general notes' on 
three topics: 'social class', 'allusions' and 'language', all with references. A blank 
page follows. On the next right hand page is an advertisement for the Penguin 
Website. This is followed by a ten page listing of Penguin classics: a page of contact 
addresses is followed by six pages of classic titles; The remaining three pages list 
Austen's other titles in Penguin Classics. Like the Everyman, this edition most 
obviously addresses students but there is a more explicit scholarly inflection. The 
introduction, which is referenced, the extensive endnotes (compared with the four 
pages of the Everyman edition) and the representation of the text's editing history all 
suggest purposive study. Further, this edition foregrounds its own editorial practices: 
the Penguin Classic Austen is based on a new editing of the first and subsequent 
editions, including Chapman but not based on him.23 The cover blurb suggests a 
wider readership, fore grounding the text as romance, in both the precis of the plot and 
the description of the introduction. 
3. Analysis: beginnings 
While the analysis will concentrate on the readings and reading practices proposed by 
verbal classification, certain general issues are raised by the cover designs of these four 
editions. The Penguin 1995 edition's formatting of title, author and publisher on the 
front cover is very different to the other two paperbacks. The Penguin 1996 and the 
Everyman conjoin four elements - logo, publisher, author, title - in a text box distinct 
from the illustration; each is emphasised, but more importantly, a relation is suggested 
between them. In this case, a kind of contagious authority seems to operate. The 
publisher 'catches' the value of text and author, but the conjunction also seems to 
suggest that the relation is reciprocal: the category and series confer value on the 
author. This is one of the conventions of most classics publishing: the publisher is 
strongly marked within the edition and contributes to the value of the text.24 
219 
By contrast, the Penguin 1995 backgrounds the publisher - only the logo is 
reproduced, separated from the title and author. The design of these two elements -
name at the top, title at the bottom - reproduces one of the two standard sets of 
conventions for fiction publishing, literary and popular (the other positions the author 
under the title). This strengthens the relation proposed between the edition and the tv 
series (Penguin is backgrounded as 'producer'). The cover illustration further 
strengthens this. The photographic image is not a 'still' in a conventional sense; the 
characters neither look at each other nor at the same point in front of them. Taken as a 
whole, the cover design strongly classifies the novel as a period romance. First, the 
image itself of a young woman and a youngish man, both conventionally good-
looking, attired in period dress complete with gloves (the woman bonneted, the man 
holding a cane) in a rural setting. Even if the reader does not know the identities of the 
actors, or the series, their co-presence in conventionally gendered terms (she appears 
shorter, though this may be an effect of her half-sitting on a wall; one of her hands 
clasps her other wrist; his visible hand holds the cane; she is in the foreground and 
more brightly lit) proposes them as hero and heroine: they are equally important in the 
novel as they are in the image (however unequal their social relations may be) which 
implicates a romance narrative. The implicature is strengthened by the slightly surly, 
or moody look of the hero and the bright smile of the heroine (who, we assume, will 
eventually win him over and make him sJJ?ile too). By contrast, the title proposes an 
allegorical mode of reading: a translation of the plot and characters into the concepts it 
conjoins. A formal knowledge of allegory, where frequently the recoded reading 
articulates a moral parable, could fix and enrich the explicated senses of 'pride' and 
'prejudice' as ethical defects. But the image, design and format of the front cover 
strongly counter such possibilities. The strong interpretative context of romance 
backgrounds the moral accentualities, proposing them abstractly as the obstacles which 
must be overcome for the happy resolution of union to be reached. 'Pride' and 
'prejudice' are anthropormorphised exclusively as character flaws which have particular 
salience for the plot and the dynamics between hero and heroine. Most strongly 
however, the front cover addresses those who have watched and enjoyed the tv series: 
the novel is proposed as an extension and more importantly a re-experiencing of that 
pleasure. The tv series itself strongly fore grounded the romance narrative, as did its 
reception and the novel proposes itself as a text to be 're-read', in part at least as an 
aide-memoire for the tv series.25 
By contrast the cover image of the Penguin 1996 edition proposes nothing about the 
novel's narrative or, more broadly, genre. The multiple figures, who do not form a 
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single group or story, and the many sites of focus and detail- the cart, the couple to 
the right who seem to be entering a garden, the open window, the cat - act to 
background particular interpretative possibilities. The illustration does contribute to a 
broader classification however: the text as classic. As in the Everyman edition, which 
is more specific in its interpretative suggestions, what is important here is the presence 
of a painting whose time of composition is loosely proximate to that of the text in 
question?6 It may mobilise particular expectations and propose specific interpretations, 
but most significant is the presence of the painting qua painting and its framing: 
classics do not bleed.27 These are markers of the text's classic status.28 The continuity 
of design that is so marked in classics publishing, particularly in the case of Penguin, 
not only confers value on the particular text (in ways comparable with the strong 
foregrounding of the publisher's name and logo), it also constitutes the text 
recognisably as a classic. 
As Genette notes, cover texts are not exclusively addressed to the reader.29 The 
whole outer-facing of the 1996 edition makes assumptions about the situations in which 
the edition might be purchased. Viewed from the perspective of the bookshop (the 
bookseller as well as the prospective customer), the narrow red band at the top of the 
spine of the Penguin Classic is a distinguishing feature. The minimal text on the Folio 
edition, the blank front and back covers, inscribe different situations of purchase and 
'use'. These books are not available in a bookshop: they can only be purcha&ed new 
as 'live' at the Folio Society itself. The main purchasing tool is a catalogue, which 
emphasises the craft qualities and artisanal value of the edition and often includes 
photographs of the illustrations.30 Likewise, the 'blank' front and back covers make 
sense in the light of the slip-cases which are ubiquitous. Often a single slip-case is 
designed for the whole &eries and the spine becomes a design-site for Folio editions: 
placed in the correct order, spines out on a bookshelf, the Sherlock Holmes series 
shows a silhouette of Holmes and Watson in profile.3 ! This strengthens the suggestion 
that display rather than use is the dominant. Having outlined some of the ways that 
design and illustration propose readings, I will now move to the core of the analysis. 
In what follows I will explore three constituents of the editional apparatus in detail: the 
blurb and other back cover text, the introduction and the endnotes. These three 
elements are central to the constitution of the text as classic and are also contrastively 
interesting, particularly in relation to prescribed readerships and the mode and order of 
reading they propose. The back cover, for example, most explicitly addresses a 
possible reader, the notes an actual one; introductions are proposed as a pre-text to the 
novel, notes are configured to accompany the reading of the novel. 
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4. The back cover 
The blurb on the back cover of the 1995 Penguin edition proposes eight classifications 
of the novel: as a classic, a text by Jane Austen, a text published by Penguin, an 
allegorical novel, a comedy, a love-story and as a work of Literature, specifically 
English Literature. Only two of these are signed, one by the author, the genre markers 
of the title itself which propose the novel as allegorical; the other by the editor (Vivien 
Jones), classifying the novel as a romance (in an extract from the introduction).32 
Some of these classifications presuppose one another: En~lish literature presupposes a 
category 'Literature' which is differentiated according to national criteria. All these 
classifications generate interpretative and reading possibilities, but the goal here is not 
just to identify them but to assess their graduated contingency. Do all these 
classifications have. equal strength as interpretative and reading contexts? And are they 
consistent in their definitions of the novel and proposals as to how it should be read? 
Can the novel be defined and read as both 'Literature' and 'love story' for 
example? These are categories which, in dominant cultural discourses, are deemed to 
be mutually excluding and call for very different reading practices.33 Often, Literature 
and genre-writing function as defining binaries, a relation closely akin to the literary / 
popular division mentioned earlier. Literature is that which is not genred, is not 'like' 
any other text it is unique and cannot be replicated. The genred is precisely that which 
is institutionally, mechanically repeatable. But even within the category of so-called 
genred writing, romance is often devalued. Despite the attempts of feminist cultural 
criticism to reappraise romance and its conventional terms of criticism, 'Mills and 
Boon' or 'Harlequin', still function as antonomastic renderings of romance, the 
publisher's name strongly accenting the mechanised, formulaic nature of romance 
writing.34 
The classification of the text as Literature is proposed twice: in the tripartite 
conjunction of publisher's name, logo and classification in the bottom left comer, and 
in the blurb. The romance classification is asserted in three ways in the blurb: in the 
synoptic representation of the novel, in the summary of the editor's introduction and in 
a citation from the editor's introduction. The first classification of the text as Literature 
is attributable to the publisher. 'Literature' is below publisher, both are left aligned 
and printed in black in the same sans-serif type face (although 'Penguin' is in upper 
case and 'Literature' is in upper and lower case). The two are further linked by the 
third item in the conjunction, the Penguin logo, which is reproduced just to the left of 
the publisher and the classification. This classification asserts 'Literature' as neutral 
description and classification itself as an impartial procedure. This is emphasised by its 
proximity to the price guides, the bar code and ISBN. The price guide is in the same 
sans-serif type, while the rest of the text on the back cover is in a serif face. The 
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second categorisation of the text as Literature is proposed in a relative clause within the 
synopsis: 
... Mr Darcy - who is quite the most handsome and eligible bachelor in the 
whole of English literature 
The 'text's literary status is only weakly proposed however and it is doubtful whether 
this is the preferred interpretation. First, the explicit categorisation is light and 
somewhat odd: the Tatler -style list of English Literature's most eligible bachelors. 
Second, the blurb assumes the reader knows that Pride and Prejudice is a work of 
Literature - it is proposed as shared knowledge, not new - and the primary function of 
the clause seems to be an attempt to register the extent of the heroine's initial 
misjudgement: his superlative attractions are the very measure of her error: ,[h]er early 
determination to dislike Mr Darcy 'who is quite the most handsome and eligible 
bachelor .. .' is a misjudgement only matched in folly by Darcy's arrogant pride'. The 
weakness of the claim is in fact an effect of its textual context. Another classification -
the text as romance - is being strongly asserted: 
Few readers have failed to be charmed by the witty and independent spirit of 
Elizabeth Bennet. Her early determination to dislike Mr Darcy - who is quite the 
mosfhandsome and eligible bachelor in the whole of English literature - is a 
misjudgement only matched in folly by Darcy's arrogant pride. Their first 
impressions give way to truer feelings in a comedy profoundly concerned with 
happiness and how it might be achieved. 
This synopsis represents a number of the standard elements and sequences of a 
conventional romance narrative: two protagonists, female and male, a first encounter, 
an obstacle (in this case mutual misunderstanding), and its removal. Further, the 
emphasis on the heroine, whose attributes are presented first, as is her initial 
erroneous evaluation of the hero, suggests the genre's gendered centring on feminine 
experience. The possibility of the 'text-as-literary' classification is consequently 
backgrounded. What is also interesting is the pastiche of a certain style of writing: 
'period', and, if not Austenian, certainly not contemporary or twentieth century. The 
synopsis is peppered with archaic formulations: the characterisation of readers' 
responses in terms of 'charm' (in contemporary usage 'charm' is frequently an epithet 
ascribed to 'period' objects); the attribution of 'spirit' to Elizabeth; the lexeme 'folly'; 
and the fixed phrase, 'eligible bachelor' to describe Darcy.35 This last is most often 
comedic or ironic in contemporary usage, an inflection which the text seems to 
reproduce at the same time as rendering Darcy a period hero, a suggestion strengthened 
by the fact that his first name is not revealed?6 These strongly discernible archaisms 
'periodise' other lexical items: 'witty', 'handsome', 'pride'. By co-textual 
223 
association these items acquire a period connotation. By contrast, the characterisation 
of Elizabeth as 'independent', and the use of 'arrogant' as a modifier for Darcy's pride 
seem discordant, contemporary ascriptions. The pastiche summary therefore 
resembles (in Sperber and Wilson's sense) both a narrative summary of the text as 
romance and a certain kind of period literary language. Both types of resemblance share 
formal linguistic properties with what they purport to resemble: in some ways they 
'look like' the types of text they resemble. This is the most distinctive aspect of their 
metatextuality. On the one hand, as already suggested, the synoptic rendering of the 
text as a romance narrative makes possible implicatures such as: the novel will end 
happily, or, more specifically, the novel will end with the marriage of the hero and 
heroine and not trespass beyond this point. It is romance of a particular kind - 'period' 
but romance nevertheless. But the paragraph cited above is not exclusively synoptic, it 
is also markedly evaluative and in this sense resembles a literary-critical discourse. 
This is most strongly marked in the last sentence: 'a comedy profoundly concerned 
with happiness and how it might be achieved'. This is not 'just' a comedy, any more 
than it is just a romance: it has serious concerns. The happiness in question is not 
simply that of individual characters, its sense here is conceptual. In turn this suggests 
an allegorical or symbolic reading of the text for its 'deeper' significance. It is these 
interpretative possibilities which I would argue are more strongly proposed: the 
valuations which mark a literary-critical register, the fact that this literary interpretative 
context is strengthened by the authorial quotation (would it carry the same authority if it 
was signed Jeffrey Archer?), and the multiple but diffuse markers of the text's classic 
status. The final result: the novel is a romance but it should not be read exclusively as 
such, because it exceeds the bounds of such a definition. 
A brief contrast with the Everyman 1993 blurb is pertinent here because it too offers 
a synoptic representation of the novel: 
Belonging to the minor gentry, the Bennets live at Longbourn in Hertfordshire. 
Mother of five daughters, Mrs Bennet's chief interest is their marriage 
prospects. At neighbouring Netherfield, the arrival of a rich young bachelor, 
Charles Bingley, his two sisters and his friend Fitzwilliam Darcy fires Mrs 
Bennet's aspirations. 
The comedy which ensues, of ardent declarations and proposals, of rejections, 
infidelities, elopement and finally - if you will believe it - happy marriages, has 
made this Jane Austen's most popular novel. 
What is pertinent here is the backgrounding of romance: the heroine is not identified 
and there is no strong suggestion that the novel focuses on feminine experience. 
Although the matter of romance - proposals, rejections, marriage and so on - is 
mentioned, romance is not a strong interpretative or reading context. The listing of 
these actions, not linked to named characters, the focus in the first paragraph on the 
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Bennet family as a collective, in particular Mrs Bennet (rather than the usually 
unmarried individuals whose particular desires underscore romance), and the 
classification of the novel as a comedy all make romance a very weak implicature and 
subsequent context,37 
5. Introductions 
Unlike covers, an introduction mayor may not form part of the editional apparatus. In 
Britain, contemporary fiction is not usually accompanied by an author's or editor's 
introduction, and the Penguin 1995 fiction edition follows this convention. The other 
three do incorporate introductions and both the Penguin 1996 and the Everyman 1993 
mention theirs in the blurb. But introductions are not necessarily part of the editional 
apparatus of the classic. Whilst the default classics published by Penguin, Oxford and 
Everyman always include them, a number of the green-backed Penguin Twentieth 
Century Classics do not?8 In general terms, the presence of an introduction is itself a 
marker of a certain kind of text, one whose value is thereby confirmed and secured. It 
is noticeable that the pared down apparatus of a Wordsworth Classic, which has no 
notes (and none of the paraphernalia of critical extracts, text summaries and life-and-
times chronologies) does incorporate a two-page introduction. In this case it would 
seem that the presence of an introduction, however modes~inscribes the text's value: it 
merits an introduction, even if it does not necessarily need one. 
Richard Church's introduction to the Folio 1957 edition is the shortest and proposes 
the simplest argument, making it a useful place to begin. The first and longest part of 
his introduction is a biographical narrative which assumes from the first sentence that 
the life of the writing subject is a natural topic for an introduction: 
The fact that comparatively little is known about the private life and character of 
Jane Austen is due to the person who was most intimate with her, the beloved 
confidante and sister Cassandra, who destroyed much of her correspondence.39 
However, most of the actual information presented is presumed to be new to the 
prescribed reader. It is the logic of the relation that is assumed not the specifics of life 
and works. We are told, for example, that Chawton, where Austen lived, is 'now a 
national monument and may be visited,.40 The unequal knowledge of writing subject 
and prescribed reader is a standard convention of the two genres that predominantly 
constitute the introduction and shape the interpretative and reading practices proposed: 
biography and literary criticism. Thus, the frequent use of the present tense to 
represent the actions of the writer ( 'She [Austen] says of it herself that .. .'; 'Nor is 
Pride and Prejudice so artlessly effervescent as Jane Austen pretends'; 'Austen writes 
about .. .' and so on [my emphasis]) provides no evidence that the writer is alive.41 
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This convention often has a particular purpose, for example, facilitating the 
representation of a range of texts by the same author without having to resort to 
complex internal chronologies and awkward locutions such as 'will have written'; it 
may also, in particular contexts, accent the perennial quality of the writer in question. 
The identification of the broad categories of biography and literary criticism in Church's 
introduction is not intended to simplify its textual form. These classifications are 
provisional, locating features of the introduction within certain broad generic 
classifications, the specific forms of which will be explored further below. This broad 
categorisation also makes it possible to observe variation and divergence from the very 
general set of conventions which characterise these genres. Thus whilst Church's 
introduction follows certain conventions of biography and literary criticism, 
specifically the writing subject's marked knowledge of the object of utterance and 
authoritative relation to the prescribed reader, there are occasions when these relations 
are deviated from. On occasion, a solidarity is constructed between the prescribed 
reader and the writing subject, both of whom are asserted to be 'primarily interested in 
the magic of the books' and who are distinguished from the 'bibliophil', 'scholar' and 
'grammarian,.42 'Magic' contests, although lightly, the scholarly discourses of 
demonstration. Indeed the 'I' strongly implicates that he is not a critic: 'not only I, but 
critics,.43 But this locution, which is apparently self-deprecating, also claims the 
authority of a shared judgement. The writing subjectis knowledgeable and conversant 
with disciplinary discriminations. The 'I' may resist naming himself a critic but he is 
familiar with critical repertoires. This reinforces the differential knowledge that the 
writing subject and the prescribed reader have, and the writing subject's authority. The 
writing subject is familiar with scholarly discourse but this knowledge is not proposed 
as pertinent to the reader's reading of the novel. 
The biographical narrative begins with a standard Austen topos - 'comparatively 
little' is known of her life, an assertion which would seem to differentiate Austen from 
other, more richly documented biographical subjects. However: 
Sufficient has been found out about her, however, to correct the view held 
until comparatively recently that the six immortal books were written under 
cover of a blotting pad, in furtive moments of semi-seclusion by a timid 
spinster fearing the ridicule of her family.44 
Biographical and literary critical genres are conjoined here in a parodic representation of 
Austen's compositional practice. The 'corrected' version, authorised by the work of 
Chapman in the second paragraph, refutes a narrative of Austen's writing career as 
furtive, timorous and fearful; she is now revealed to have written her novels in 'the 
most happy of circumstances', fully supported by her family.45 Her familial context 
was materially comfortable and culturally 'sophisticated' and the primary setting for her 
226 
formal education which was also an ethical and emotional training.46 . But the family is 
also represented as a conduit to the outside world. The biographical narrative proposes 
Austen's life as rich and wide-ranging in experience and knowledge, a representation 
which dialogically opposes a much iterated version of the Austen narrative: a woman 
who hid her creative ability under a stock of blotting paper and knew little of the 
world.47 It is this dialogic rebuke which drives the representation of the complete life. 
It is this very completeness which might account for the gap of eight years when she 
wrote nothing: perhaps she was just too busy having a good time.48 But perhaps most 
importantly, this corrected biography makes sense of the 'six immortal books' in ways 
which the characterisation of the author as 'timid spinster' cannot. The erroneous story 
of the timid spinster creates a paradox which Chapman's narrative and its re-
representation in the introduction resolves. The authorial classification and the reading 
proposed by it is therefore of a specific kind. It is not simply that any life explains any 
work, it is, more particularly, the proposal that a certain kind of life is a necessary pre-
requisite to lasting literary achievement: a life that is rich in certain kinds of experience 
and knowledge. Biography therefore explicates 'the magic of the books'. This is turn 
suggests that this biographical knowledge is an explanatory context. If, as Church 
argues, Jane Bennet is modelled on Cassandra, we can implicate by analogy that the 
rich and varied acquaintance that Austen made in London and Bath became models for 
characters, that her possible 'affairs' may furnish some of the romantic incident in the 
novels, and that her two sailor brothers might likewise have become models of 
masculinity.49 It is explanatOly contexts and possibilities that Church's introduction 
propose most strongly, but these order interpretative and evaluative ones. For example, 
biographical explication may well weaken or cancel the meanings proposed by the 
formal narrative patternings of the text because it is the text's likeness to life and a 
particular life which is foregrounded. The explicatory emphasis also orders evaluative 
possibilities: the completeness of the works makes sense of the completeness of the life 
and vice versa. 
Austen's life is the guarantee of a certain quality: maturity. This is the value that 
binds the particular and complete life to the text, it is also proposed as the central 
preoccupation of a serious reading. This emphasis on maturity is evolved through a 
conceit which compares the experience of first reading with the first version of the 
novel and a second reading with the final version. The novel retains in palimpsest 'the 
freshness of youthful lyricism' but: 
The second reading reveals the mature character of the author, her shrewd 
wisdom and its capacity for appreciation of suffering, her economic delineation 
of personality and its differentiation from character. These are qualities that not 
even literary genius can guarantee in youthful writers.5o 
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Maturity is the central value proposed here and is the explicit means by which the 
relations between 'art' and 'life' are understood. The sense of maturity here is highly 
specific. It is not predominantly biological, nor is it socio-cultural (someone who has 
passed into whatever the society defines as adulthood), though it clearly draws on 
these senses as the reference to youthful writers demonstrates. But beyond this, 
maturity is proposed as a contingent property which some people have and others do 
not and which can also be applied to a text. 'The second reading' is not simply another 
reading, one which takes place after the first. It is proposed as a reading of a different 
type: attentive, careful, 'close'. It is the true or 'correct' reading, indicated in a 
strongly contrastive choice of verb and mood: 
At first reading it may seem to consist wholJlt of light comedy, built upon a 
structure as artificial as a play by Sheridan'. 1 
The choice of 'seem' and the subjunctive mood strongly inscribe the writing subject's 
distance from the classification and evaluation which follows. The second reading 
'reveals'; the declarative form and the choice of verb and determiner ('the') mark the 
writing subject's assent to the evaluation which follows. There is only one type of 
second reading - the correct one. What gives this particular sense to maturity is the 
conjunction of a literary-critical genre and a particular kind of authorial discourse. The 
genre banishes strictly 'biological' senses and proposes maturity as an evaluative 
category (evaluation is after all a staple of literary critical discourse and strongly marked 
here). The authorial discourse conceptualises the authorial subject and their works as 
interchangeable terms of explanation, as the anthropomorphism of the category 
suggests. The text 'reveals' the authorial subject but the authorial subject also explains 
the text. 
The genre most strongly marked in Conrad's introduction is literary criticism, but it 
is its divergences from convention that are interesting. The introduction makes no 
specific reference to any Austen criticism. 'Critics', when referred to, are a collective 
who are differentiated from the writing subject on the grounds of their naivete, 'critics 
have taken [Austen] at her word'.52 As in Church's introduction, the writing subject is 
knowledgeable about scholarly discourse but refrains from explicit identification. But 
while Church does not comment explicitly on the bibliophile's concerns, Conrad 
makes a definitive (indeed hyperbolic) judgement on critics - they have all gotit wrong 
- and a very definite proposal to the reader: slhe should not reproduce the errors of the 
critics but follow the writing subject who definitively holds the key to the correct 
reading.53 
Conrad's introduction is, like Church's, author-centred in its discourse and 
constructed against scholarly norms and procedures, but the effects and reading 
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proposals are very different. One immediate reason for this is the editional context as a 
whole. The Everyman 1993 edition, like the Penguin 1996 and unlike the Folio 1957, 
strongly inscribe within themselves their strong relations to higher education 
institutions. Thus whilst Conrad's mode of writing is essayistic, the 'Note on the 
Author and Editor' informs us that he, has 'since 1973 ... taught English at Christ 
Church Oxford' and is the author of 'numerous works of criticism,.54 The long-
standing institutional affiliation confirms his authority as editor and likewise the 
authority of the edition as a whole. In this case the authorial classification does not 
emerge so insistently at the outset, though its main theme, irony, does. Austen's 
irony is claimed to account for a general misunderstanding of the novels, and her 
correspondence, including her remarks about Pride and Prejudice. Everything in the 
novel is explicable in terms of irony: 
Pride and Prejudice is not only ironic in its procedures and assumptions: it is 
also about irony ... irony is both form and content. 55 
Irony is defined simply as meaning the opposite of what you say ('As always [Austen] 
means the opposite of what, with apparent innocuousness, she is saying') and each of 
the main characters in the novel is examined by Conrad as a more or less successful 
ironist.56 Taken together, they exemplify the pleasures as well as the pitfalls of irony 
as practice, a practice governed by societal hypocrisy which makes truth-telling 
difficult or impossible.57 However, irony is always part of an authorial classification 
and one of Conrad's preferred modes of designating Austen is as 'the ironist'.58 This 
antonomastic locution enables a set of shifts between a category of writing subjects 
(ironists in general), Austen herself, her characters and readers. Reflecting on the 
familial disbelief that greets Elizabeth Bennet's confession of her attachment to Darcy, 
Conrad comments: 
The ironist's evasions have trapped her; and Jane Austen has suffered the same 
ignominy as her heroine. 59 
Elizabeth and Austen are both members of this category of ironists. The shifting and 
slipping between author and character is one of the most distinctive features of the 
introduction. And it suggests a specific mode of reading the novel which is organised 
by the authorial classification: 
Nor is Pride and Prejudice so artlessly effervescent as Jane Austen pretends. Its 
light, bright and sparkling high spirits are either, as in Lydia's case, a reckless 
volatility indifferent to the consequences of its actions, or, as in the different 
cases of Elizabeth and her father, an ironic discipline, forcing oneself to laugh 
at a fate which if taken seriously would be ruinously depressing.60 
229 
'Light, bright and sparkling' alludes to Austen's own description of the novel as 'rather 
too light and bright and sparkling' - which Conrad, characteristically, does not 
provenance. These qualities are now anthropomorphised as 'spirits' and contrasted 
with various characters in the novel. The anchoring of the text within a dominant 
authorial classification and an explicating authorial discourse are what enables this 
personification of the text's 'spirits'. The spirits are the inscribed presence of an 
authorial subject, making characters the assumed commonsense point of comparison .. 
There is no suggestion that these qualities of lightness and brightness could be 
attributed to register or 'tone' or to narrative incident. The reading strategy proposed is 
centred on characters, conceived in the introduction as people who can be compared 
with the author. The heroine of the novel is most strongly comparable with Austen but 
the fact that Elizabeth shares certain attributes with her youngest sister and with her 
father implicate that these characters too have something in common with Austen.61 
This discourse precludes a number of commonsense distinctions: the text is not a 
translation of life into art; nor is it a reflection of its author's experiences. Rather, the 
novel as concept is the instantiation of authorial experience., and what more obvious 
place to look than at the 'people' who populate them? Within Conrad's argument and 
the discourse which shapes it, Elizabeth's fate at 'the end of Pride and Prejudice' is 
'ignominy': no one will believe that she is in love with Darcy.62 Given his argument 
that Austen is misunderstood and that character is the instantiation of authorial 
experience, it is not surprising that Conrad views this as 'the end'. But if we know the 
novel we might well ask whether it is really ignominy to 'suffer' the fate of a happy 
marriage to 'the most handsome and eligible bachelor in English Literature'. Such a 
discourse severely limits how character can be read. They clearly cannot be interpreted 
and explicated as indices of values or structural positions for example. In more general 
terms, it backgrounds narrative as a mode of meaningful patterning since formal 
categories play no part in the analysis. 
Author and character are likewise comparable with actual readers. Elizabeth and her 
father's irony are strategies against depression, 'forcing oneself to laugh ... ' (my 
emphasis).63 The choice of 'oneself expands this practice of ironic discipline beyond 
the characters to include people in general. 'We', as readers, can compare our 
responses to situations with these characters. Indeed we are encouraged to identify 
with them: to insert ourselves within the text rather than observe it from the outside. 
The authorial discourse and the reading strategy it proposes are not biographical. 
Unlike Church, Conrad supplies no biographical information about Austen. This 
absence is ostensibly justified by other parts of the apparatus: specifically the 
biographical sketch and the chronology of Austen's life-and-times, both of which 
precede the introduction. But this commonsense explanation is inadequate. Conrad's 
introduction is not simply avoiding redundancy. Rather it is an indicator of the type of 
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authorial discourse that organises the introduction.64 This is centred around a 
conception of a generic human subject whose presence is instantiated in 'other' human 
subjects: characters. Character is defined as the site of presence of the authorial 
subject. These interpretative and reading proposals are strengthened by the 
introduction's mode of referral to other texts .. 
Austen is compared to and contrasted explicitly with Sterne, Defoe, Joyce, 
Shakespeare, Charles Dickens, Swift, William Wordsworth, Lord Byron and Henry 
James.65 All but three of these references are made by allusion to characters. Indeed 
the only texts referred to by name in the introduction apart from Pride and Prejudice 
itself are Wordsworth's Prelude, Swift's 'Day of Judgement' and James's The Turn of 
the Screw and The Aspern Papers.66 Typically: 
The great novelist is generally one whose characters are too volatile and various 
and too rapt in their own delighted self-discovery to endure control. But Jane 
Austen is a great novelist almost despite herself, for whereas egotistic monsters 
like Uncle Toby or Mr Dick, Moll Flanders or Molly Bloom, are created by the 
novelist's indulgence and affection as if yielding composition of the novel to the 
characters, Jane Austen's creativity is a reflex not of generosity but of baffled 
impotent ill_will.67 
This strengthens the reading strategy proposed by the relationship between author, 
character, and reader discussed above: authors 'create' characters who they are then 
unable to contro1.68 The novel is a kind of battle between author and characters who 
have the same status as 'people'. More generally, this defines the novel as a 
relationship between author and characters, which the reader can enter in the terms set 
out above. 
This form of reference to other texts is in significant part determined by a prescribed 
reader, idealised as an interlocutor whose cultural knowledge is equal to the writing 
subject. The casual, allusive gesturing to other texts rather than a more explicit form of 
reference seems to inscribe a spoken situation rather than a written one, conversational 
and informal in its patterns of interaction. The allusion to text by character assumes a 
shared cultural knowledge of the texts and their authors, a familiarity with a particular 
history of the novel. This shift to a representation of a spoken conversation is one of 
the markers of the text's resistance to written scholarly norms. The effect of this is a 
perhaps paradoxical augmentation of the writing subject's authority, whose knowledge 
is, so to speak, on the tip of his tongue, and a strengthening of the interpretative 
practices proposed. 
What informs the plane of comparison and contrast and the intertextuallocation of 
Austen within it is, of course, literary value. This is the only discernible criterion and 
it requires no justification. The relations proposed are not form specific: the list 
comprises poets and a dramatist Ipoet as well as novelists; nor is it nationally specific: 
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James is American, Sterne, Swift and Joyce are Irish.69 Nor is it period specific. 
One of the most obvious effects of this intertextuallocation of Austen is the 
demobilisation of historical reading practices. Both Byron and Wordsworth are 
historical contemporaries of Austen: Wordsworth was born in 1770, five years before 
Austen, Byron, although born in 1788, published his first collection of poems in 
1807 and Childe Harolde's Pilgrimage in 1812, a year after Austen's first novel, 
Sense and Sensibility was published and a year before Pride and Prejudice. And 
indeed, Conrad asserts a contrast between Byron and Wordsworth on the one hand 
and Austen on the other: 
The ironist's exhausting dialectic finds society and solitude equally 
insupportable. The predicament is a romantic one but Jane Austen lacks the 
romantic temperament which can make the self an all-engrossing world, as 
Wordsworth in The Prelude or Childe Harold do. Hers is the underside of their 
egot~stical sublimity... 70 
This contrast makes possible a set of implicatures about a period-specific 'zeitgeist' 
which the three writers responded to differently: a certain kind of constituting context 
which shapes and informs their writing. These implicatures are certainly encouraged by 
the immediate textual context in which these remarks are made, but only for the 
idealised reader-interlocutor characterised above. Such implicatures can be derived by a 
reader who has knowledge that (a) the three writers were near contemporaries (and 
were publishing simultaneously) and (b) that Romanticism was an important 
contemporaneous and historically particular framework of thought. The register, and 
specifically the mode of address assumes this knowledge as shared. There is no strong 
marking of the contemporaneity of the writers' texts. It is only if the reader knows that 
Byronis creator of Childe Harolde or that 'romantic temperament' and 'sublimity' 
gesture to Romanticism, that a connection becomes possible. The lower case 'r' and 
the fact that sublimity is not glossed suggests all prescribed reader conversant with 
Romantic preoccupations. But the lower case 'r' also opens up another sense of 
'romantic' for a reader unfamiliar with these knowledges, one which connects with the 
genre of romance, a sense which could be seen to be strengthened by its conjunction 
with temperament. 'Romantic temperament' re-constitutes a discernible historical 
movement as an emotional propensity in certain human subjects. Further, the broader 
intertextual context of the introduction as a whole, weakens such interpretations and 
explanations about what (other than the abiding genius of the author) might have shaped 
the novel. 7 ! None of the other writers with whom Austen is compared are 
contemporaneous with her. Joyce and Defoe, Dickens and Shakespeare are 
comparable with Austen and one another according to a criterion of value which 
transcends time and space. Whilst a period-specific comparison is locally encouraged 
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of a particular and idealised reader, the specific authorial discourses which govern the 
introduction weaken such interpretative possibilities and contexts. Beyond this, it is 
arguable whether the location of Austen within a classificatory category of great writers 
generates any specific intertextual interpretative contexts at all. The abstract and 
unexplicated character of the category render such a location an intertextual 'blank': 
what is asserted is the uniqueness of Austen (and Dickens and Shakespeare). 
The genre most strongly marked in Vivien Jones's introduction is again literary 
criticism, but history writing is also an important interpretative context. Of the three, 
Jones's introduction is the most conventionally scholarly in its interpretation of the 
conventions of literary criticism. Texts and citations are fully provenanced and there 
are a number of proleptic summaries of the introduction as a whole and of various parts 
of it.72 It explicitly addresses a contemporary reader, conversant with popular forms 
and in particular romance, but this prescribed reader is also a serious reader, probably 
a student, as the detailed argument about the complex political and intellectual codings 
of the 'standard' romance narrative seems to suggest. The classifications proposed for 
the novel are many and certainly more various than either Church's or Conrad's. The 
text is classified as a novel by Austen, a romance, a political novel, an early 
nineteenth-century novel, a novel by a woman writer, and a c1assic.73 Each of these 
classifications can be seen to propose different intertextuallocations for the novel and 
different interpretative and reading strategies. The classification 'romance' locates 
Pride and Prejudice within a huge class of texts - historical and contemporary, popular 
and literary - which also cuts across media. This proposes a mode of reading which is 
centrally focused on pleasure and escapism, a suggestion explicitly inscribed in the 
textual contexts where this classification is proposed. Darcy: 
... epitomises the romantic hero, the ideal object of desire, in popular romance 
fantasy [my emphasis]. 74 
Elizabeth's marriage to him, 'is the stuff of wish-fulfilment'. Further, the romance 
plot is not only 'conventional' but 'pleasurable' and: 
The romantic fantasy which so effectively shapes Austen's early nineteenth 
century novel is still a powerful cultural myth for readers in the late twentieth 
century. We still respond with pleasure to the rags-to-riches love story ... [my 
emphasis]. 75 
What is the relation between writing subject, object of utterance and prescribed reader 
here? While Jones's introduction is the most conventionally scholarly of the three, in 
most of the textual contexts where the classification of romance is embedded, the 
writing subject's generic authority is, to a significant extent, conceded, in favour of 
an appeal to the shared know ledges of writing subject and prescribed reader. Above, 
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the clearest instance of this is the inclusive 'we', a pronominal form which here binds 
together writing subject and prescribed reader. This is even more explicitly marked 
elsewhere in the text: 'as every reader of romance fiction knows' and, '[a]s good 
readers of romantic fiction, we know long before Elizabeth ... 176 Both configure 
writing subject and prescribed reader as familiar with the romance narrative that shapes 
Pride and Prejudice, a familiarity which enables this collective 'we' to predict the 
denouement and enjoy the gap in the heroine's knowledge, a gap that will eventually, 
certainly be filled. This shared knowledge is also signalled in such markers as: 'the 
rags-to-riches love story' and so on. The fixed phrase 'rags-to-riches', a departure 
from the general formality of the introduction, marks the pressure of the rhetorical 
appeal to the reader to recognise the novel as a familiar object. This commonality 
between writing subject and prescribed reader is strengthened by the gendering of both 
as feminine. It is Darcy who is the object of desire and Elizabeth's marriage that is the 
stuff of wish-fulfilment. It is gender which seems to explicate this familiarity with the 
romance form. Further, this 'we' 'may feel slightly disturbed by the inequality ... at 
the heart of (their) ... union'. Interestingly, this feminist 'we' is not as confidently 
shared as the 'we' who knows romance. The subjunctive form and the minimising 
effect of the modifier 'slightly' suggests that this proposition is more controversial and 
less likely to be shared by the reader. 
Familiarity with the romance form is also a proposed strategy for the reading of 
romance. It is the very recognisability of romance as a genre that is strongly suggested 
as one of its key pleasures. The prescribed reader will identify the romantic hero and 
heroine immediately, she will know that by the end of the novel, all obstacles to their 
happy union will have been overcome.77 She will be able to read the ostensible 
hostility of the protagonists as suppressed desire and so on. Above all, the reader is in 
a position of superior knowledge to both the hero and heroine because she knows how 
to read these signifiers and the 'happy ending' denouement from the very beginning. 
Knowledge of the genre constitutes the reader in a position of authority to the 
characters. The other pleasure strongly proposed here is escapism. In the 
representations cited above, the definition of romance is located within 'a discursive 
binary offantasy/reality, mythlreality, ideal/real. Romance is fantasy, myth and 
idealisation, the opposite of reality and the everyday. The reader is not supposed to 
measure fantasy or romance against the everyday and find it wanting. The fact that the 
heroine's inner and initially invisible beauty is finally exfoliated as outer radiance, and 
the stagy coincidences that keep bringing the hero and heroine together, are not 
evaluated as implausible. The rules of the everyday do not apply to romance. Reading 
romance is an escape from the everyday including the everyday of many other modes of 
fiction. Romance is therefore predominantly reader-centred in its definition. These 
pleasures are not only derived from the familiar narrative form. The gendering of the 
prescribed reader suggests a particular way of 'reading' character: the strategy or 
practice of identification with the heroine. 
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However, Jones's classification of the novel as a romance functions as a move 
within two larger arguments which rely on different classifications and different 
discursive assumptions. First, the romance narrative goes some way to explain the 
text's perdurance, a feature which, to some extent, reduces the gap between the early 
nineteenth and late twentieth centuries: 'romance is still a powerful cultural myth', we 
still respond with pleasure ... ' Romance enables an understanding of its continued 
appeal. The text's classification as romance gives one of the reasons why it is a classic 
and a popular classic at that. Second, the romance narrative and its persuasive 
pleasures are 'deployed' by Austen for particular ends: to construct a set of arguments 
about the social and political order, and about women's place within it.78 The romance 
form is presented, by Jones, as the deliberate choice of an authorial agent: as the ideal 
rhetorical form for a political argument that is also specifically political in its address, 
in that it is explicitly and intentionally suasive. Further: 
... to point out basic structural similarities between Austen's novel and a Mills 
and Boon or Harlequin romance is not to reduce Austen's achievement.79 
These similarities are simultaneously asserted and more strongly, resisted. 'Basic' 
modifies 'structural', limiting the plane of comparison to certain formal resemblances. 
The contrast between the specificity of 'Austen's novel' and the generic romance 
signified by 'Mills and Boon or Harlequin', un-authored, untitled and designated only 
by publisher, like the blurb, sets strict limits for a comparative reading strategy. Even 
so, 'Austen's achievement' must be strongly asserted. The classification of the text as 
romance may suggest certain reading strategies but this is not the only or the most 
appropriate way to read it. Romance as a category and reading practice is subordinated 
to two other classificatory contexts which shape the reading and interpretative 
possibilities proposed by the introduction: authorial and historical. 
'Discourse that possesses an author's name is not to be immediately consumed and 
forgotten; neither is it accorded the momentary attention given to ordinary fleeting 
words'.80 Whilst romance is an object of consumption and any particular instance of it 
is forgettable - Mills and Boon, Harlequin - the authorial text demands a different mode 
of reading. The authorial classification, and the discourse which operates it, is 
inscribed in the marking of Austen's deliberate intention: 'Austen's use of romance', 
'Austen's skilful use of romance', 'Austen's deployment of the conventional, 
pleasurable romantic plot'. 81 Notonly does she knowingly utilise the romance plot, 
she knows that it is conventional and pleasurable; convention is a conscious choice 
which serves her substantive purpose. As in the blurb, the novel is proposed as more 
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than just a love story. Reading the novel r~~uires an understanding of the way that the 
romance form is coded, to mean more tha~ppears to say. The other central 
classification of the introduction is organised by a historicist discourse. Jones, unlike 
Church or Conrad, acknowledges that the text meant differently in an early nineteenth-
century context and she is specifically interested in: 
The meanings that Austen's use of romance might have had for a contemporary 
audience.82 . 
Indeed the romantic form of the novel is conceived by Jones as a potential hazard for 
the prescribed reader: the very familiarity of the narrative may mask its 
preoccupations.83 These are embedded in original and originating context that can only 
be addressed through a cultural and intellectual history of England in the 1790s.84 The 
meanings of specific words in the novel, for example, 'rational' and 'elegant', are 
discussed as key terms within a contemporaneous debate about femininity.85 The 
reading strategy proposed is very different from and indeed incompatible with the one 
proposed for romance. As a romance, Pride and Prejudice is proposed as a familiar 
object, as a historical text it is alien. As is often the case with new historicist argument, 
the historical moment of the text and the text itself are in part represented as a foreign 
country: 'strangeness' is the chosen lexeme.86 And what is fore grounded are the 
interpretative difficulties for the contemporary reader. Austen's texts 
work on the shared assumption that nuances of language, or dress, or 
behaviour can carry very particular implications: as comparatively 
straightforward signs of social status for example ... ; or - more problematically 
for modern readers - as conscious references to the terms and issues which were 
being contested in contemporary cultural debates.87 
Jones's argument focuses on the latter, again insisting that such issues are 
'consciously' referenced: part of a deliberate authorial design. This renders the 
authorial and historicist classifications and the practices they propose congruent and 
compatible. Whilst Church and Conrad propose predominantly explicatory strategies, 
Jones's are predominantly designed to facilitate interpretation. Interpretation is 
explicitly conceived here as a process of translation which can only be undertaken if the 
reader knows the discourses and languages that constitute the text. It is these that the 
introduction seeks to supply as contexts which will both 'thicken' the reader's 
interpretation and, more importantly, lead her to something approaching the intended 
reading: authorial and historical. Darcy, for example, is not merely the generic 
moody-but-eligible hero of romance, he is the 'new aristocratic man' who 'uses his 
power and knowledge to re-establish social harmony' (p.xxvi).88 Beyond this, his 
character, as both a set of positions within the structure of the narrative and as a cluster 
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of values, is allusive in specifically literary terms. By the end of the novel, 'as at the 
end of Shakespearean comedy', he is a figure of comic reconciliation; he is also 
likened to a protagonist of Richardson's, Sir Charles Grandison.89 What is important 
here is less the detail of Jones's own reading however, than the reading and reading 
practice it proposes: 
We could hardly fail to sympathise with Elizabeth's acute sense of [Mr 
Collins's] awfulness as prospective husband ... It may be less obvious, 
however, that when Mr Collins obtusely insists on praising Elizabeth's 
modesty and economy (p.90), his terminology aligns him with advocates of a 
middle-class idea of submissive domestic womanhood, an ideal which was at 
the time an influential aspect of reactionary political discourse.9o 
Jones goes on to specify the terms of this discourse, but what is pertinent is the 
contrast between what is obvious ('[w]e could hardly fail to sympathise ... ') and what 
'may be less obvious'. This 'may' is an understatement for any reader unacquainted 
with these discourses. Like Church and Conrad, Jones contrasts less with more 
adequate readings: it is not sufficient to read Pride and Prejudice as 'just' a romance. 
This, in turn, opens up an interesting general comparison with the Folio and 
Everyman editions where the construction and position of the writing subject is 
explicitly authoritative, and serves to strengthen and legitimate the reading contexts 
proposed. The writing subject of Jones's introduction begins by asserting a 
commonality with the prescribed readership; nor are the pleasures of the romance plot 
represented as trivial or 'wrong'. When the writing subject first introduces the 
historical-discursive knowledge that she argues is so critical to interpreting the text (as 
quoted above), the distance that it opens up between her and the prescribed reader is 
downplayed: 'what may be less obvious ... ' That said, the authority of the reading 
proposed, has, if anything, more force than either Conrad or Church. For what a 
historicist method of this kind suggests is less a reading practice that the prescribed 
reader can deploy, than g reading which slhe should follow. Given the value and 
indeed necessity that is attributed to historicist reading in the introduction, it is very 
likely that the reader will either mobilise an existing assumption that historical context is 
important to understanding literature, or at least Austen (which would doubtless be 
strengthened by this text), or produce it as an implicature. To take the text cited above 
as only one of many examples: if what Mr Collins says is part of a particular discourse 
'at the time', and if knowledge of this identifies him in specific political-historical 
terms, then the conclusion-interpretation is that such contexts are pertinent to the 
understanding of the text. However, this general assumption does not, in itself, 
supply particular interpretative contexts for interpretation or reading: these can only by 
supplied by the elaborating decodings of the introduction. The prescribed reader does 
not know the particular accentualities of 'family' in Burkean discourse for example 
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which is here proposed as central to understanding the text.91 S/he is wholly reliant on 
the writing subject for such knowledge. What the introduction does not translate 
remains foreign or strange, all the reader can do is keep in mind as they read that there 
is more going on than meets the eye. 
This historicist reading is specifically concerned with gender regimes. The writing 
subject explicitly identifies herself as sympathetic to feminism, quoting with approval 
'the important feminist insight from the late sixties ... [:] "the personal is political"'. 
This opens up the possibility of a more abstract practice of gendered reading. 
Austen writes about '3 or 4 Families in a Country Village' - 'the very thing to 
work on', as she told her niece Anna (Letters, p.275) - and about the fates and 
choices of their marriageable daughters. She writes, therefore, about 
femininity and about class: about forms of identity and about marriage as a 
political institution which reproduces - symbolically as well as literally - the 
social order. 92 
She then goes on to cite the dictum 'the personal is political'. Again a translative 
interpretative practice is proposed. The register or language shifts from the particular 
scenario and narrative to a gloss or translation which is markedly conceptual and 
governed by a feminist discourse. This translative practice is not necessarily dependent 
on particular historical know ledges and it suggests ways of reading (in particular 
interpreting and explicating), many aspects of Austen's writing (given the strong 
authorial classification discussed above). For example, Elizabeth Bennet's relations 
with Fitzwilliam Darcy are not merely interpretable as a complex meshing of love and 
misunderstanding, but must also be interpreted and explicated as a representation of 
gender and other social relations, particularly as they pertain to authority. Further, 
'marriage' does not simply or even most importantly mean the legally binding and 
public union of a man and a woman, it is an institution which contributes to 
reproduction and legitimation of social relations, including most specifically here, 
gender relations; and the marriages which are represented in the novel, and particularly 
those which take place within the narrative are to be interpreted in these terms. 
Such a reading offers a set of primary conceptual categories and relations -
femininity, masculinity, patriarchy and so on - through which the narrative and 
argument of the novel can be read. Such a mode of reading is clearly strongly 
'symbolic' in that it reads particularised events and characters in specifically social 
terms. And although Jones figures gender in historicist terms, the general gendered 
reading sketched above is authorised by the introduction because of the strong terms in 
which the translation is legitimated: 'she writes therefore about ... '; and because of 
the approving citation of 'the personal is the political'. The likelihood of such a reading 
is, of course, dependent not only on the know ledges of the reader, but on their 
relations to that knowledge. For the feminist reader, such a reading strategy may 
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already be mobilised, and may simply be confirmed or strengthened by the discursive 
context. To the reader unfamiliar with such translations, the context may be more or 
less suasive, or not suasive at all. Various relations to knowledge may block the 
gendered reading instanced above, most obviously a hostility to feminism and/or a 
hostility to conceptualising and reading 'Literature' in explicitly political terms. Both 
assumptions form part of the set of possible statements in a number of dominant 
discourses. The situation of reading may likewise strengthen such interpretative 
possibilities or weaken them. A pedagogic situation where gender as a concept and set 
of discourses is central, or at least foregrounded, may strengthen such a context, and 
the kinds of reading that follow from it; it might however entrench antagonism, 
ambivalence or uncertainty about the values of such a practice. 
This focus on gender marks a strong contrast with Church and Conrad. Church's 
life of Austen is clearly also the life of a woman - the narrative possibilities (and 
limitations) of Austen's life, the inevitable focus on romance and the domestic, the 
claim that she was pretty and so on - and his o'wn preferred naming of her as 'Jane' 
open up the interpretative context of Austen as a woman writer.93 Likewise, Conrad's 
argument that a profoundly censoring society makes irony a valuable weapon can, with 
the knowledge that women were subordinate to men in every respect during this period, 
construct such implicatures as: for women, irony may have been the only weapon, 
or/and that censorship and self-censorship were imposed and self-imposed on women 
even more severely and so on.94 But, in both cases, though for different reasons, 
such contexts and implicatures are unlikely. In Church's case the comparison of 
Austen with Mozart (and the fact that no other women writers are mentioned), the 
complete absence of socio-historical context and the fact that the text is never classified 
as a romance make such contexts and implicatures highly unlikely.95 Likewise, 
Conrad's generic human cannot, in explicit terms at least, be gendered, any more than 
it can be geographically or historically located. 
As noted above, the authority of the editor is a marked feature of each introduction. 
But while the authority of Conrad and Jones is in part constituted by their 
representation as institutionally affiliated scholars, Church's authority is more 
explicitly dependent on the rhetorical self-representation that emerges in the 
introduction. However, this difference is less significant than the fact that each of the 
editors is named, each introduction is signed. This is a distinctive feature of classics 
publishing in Britain and differentiates it from the majority of other categories. Unlike 
television or film in particular, where a credit is the 'right' of everyone involved in the 
production, however lowly, the edition is, with the exception of the author, 
anonymous. The naming of the editor (and in the case of the Everyman 1993 and 
Penguin 1996 editions, the representation of their professional life), constitutes a 
relation of intimacy between text and editor: a personal and personalising process.96 
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Therefore whilst a number of the texts of the edition (the blurb, the biographical 
summaries and so on) remain unsigned and there is no credit for any other editing 
function, the naming of 'the' editor inscribes the distinctiveness of the classic. Not 
only does the editor have a particular role and function, but her very naming asserts the 
discreteness and the finite character of the text which is presumed to precede all editorial 
intervention. 
The introduction seem to exemplify the contradiction that orders and constitutes the 
classic. The introduction must justify its presence and the difference that this marks 
from many other modes of fiction publishing; yet the' cost' of this must be to 
demonstrate that the legibility inscribe~ in the classic's perdurance is in some sense 
vulnerable. Here the relation is most explicitly represented in the ways that each 
introduction contrasts one kind of reading with another. Church contrasts the first and 
second reading as the immature versus the mature: the latter obviously is the goal or 
ideal; Conrad proposes that all other critical readings of Austen are wrong and that she 
is fundamentally misunderstand; Jones does not deny the pleasures of the immediate 
romance reading, but, she argues, this is not an adequate reading. Such 
discriminations and differentiations foreground a more general issues about the 
category of the classic. Each of the introductions suggest in different ways the 
possibilities, the ease of misinterpreting the text. Unless we read 'maturely', unless 
we fully understand and appreciate the work that irony does, unless we situate the 
novel in its immediate discursive contexts, we are liable to misunderstand the text's 
meanings. The tensions between intelligibility and opacity are most acutely marked in 
the noting practices of classics, and it is these I will consider now. But what noting 
practices also suggest is a negotiation and resolution of the conflict between 
transparency and opacity. 
6. Notes 
Notes are not a necessary feature of the classic. Wordsworth editions, for example, 
do not include notes. However the established classics publishers in Britain - Oxford, 
Penguin and Everyman - do. And indeed the notes to the Penguin 1996 and Everyman 
1993 editions are 'advertised' on the back cover. This marks an important contrast 
from the non-classic Penguin 1995: notes may not be necessary to the classic, but their 
presence is a definitive marker of classic status. Notes are clearly a site of interest for 
any analysis concerned with interpretation and interpretative practices, as many notes 
specifically gloss a word or phrase in the text and so propose a particular meaning to the 
reader. But the interpretative possibilities of notes are not punctually confined to 
proposing particular senses of words or phrases; they may and do propose 'global' 
rather than local readings and interpretative practices, as well as participating more 
generally in the constitution of the classic as category. 
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At first sight, notes appear very various. Lexicographical notes, glossing words or 
phrases within the text; notes which accompany narrative informants (places, events, 
people); those which acknowledge errors or editorial corrections which might be 
attributed to printer's error, authorial redrafting or slips and so on; a wide range of 
biographica; notes which identify cruces of scholarly contestation; those which 
provenance allusions. Nevertheless, it is possible to classify all of these into two 
broad categories, both of which can propose interpretative and reading contexts. The 
first are those notes which seek to recover or recuperate a meaning or value within the 
text, one that is assumed to be unavailable to the present-day reader. Lexicographical 
notes are the most obvious case. Thus the Everyman 1993 edition informs us that a 
'ragout' means a 'meat and vegetable stew', and the Penguin 1996 that 'draughts' 
mean 'doses of medicine'.97 But recuperative notes can also accompany narrative 
informants, again fulfilling the role of recovering what is presumed to be a lost 
meaning, knowledge or value. For example, the note to 'ragout' in the Penguin 1996 
edition not only cites an OED definition ('a dish usually consisting of meat cut in small 
pieces, stewed with vegetables and highly seasoned') but comments that this is '[0 ]ne 
of several examples of the Hursts' sophisticated metropolitan tastes' .98 This is 
presumably one of the many complex indices of values and behaviours in Austen's 
writing that Jones is concerned with. Recuperative notes attempt to position the 
prescribed present-day reader as the prescribed original or contemporaneous reader: an 
ideal reader who is assumed to have shared the intended meanings and values of the 
text. This repositioning of the contemporary reader asserts the text's fixity: it is the 
reader who 'moves'. The Penguin 1996 edition notes are, in the main consistent with 
the arguments of the introduction and are 'signed' by Vivien Jones. Indeed the notes 
are accompanied by a brief (seventeen line) introduction which takes issue with Tony 
Tanner the editor of the previous Penguin Classics edition who included only four 
notes on the grounds that the novel has an 'element of timelessness,.99 Jones's notes 
are then a deliberate counter to this and continue the historicist reading of the text. The 
ragout note is just one of a number which classify characters in relation to 
'metropolitan' fashion or plainer 'country' values, which in tum propose that 
characters are to be read symbolically and not simply 'literally'.lOo 
The second type of note seeks to amplify or augment the prescribed contemporary 
reader's reading of the text in ways unavailable to the prescribed original reader. These 
notes offer the prescribed present-day reader the benefits or enrichments of subsequent 
scholarship. 'Enrichment' notes are most frequently those which supply biographical 
information about the author, but they may also supply information about errors or 
corrections and interpretative cruces. The Penguin 1996 edition enriches an allusive 
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reference to the picturesque by informing the reader that 'Jane Austen's brother Henry 
records that "at a very early age [Austen] was enamoured of Gilpin on the 
Picturesque",.lOl The same edition, under the note to a particular instance of 
'continue' informs us that 'in the first edition of the novel which belonged to Cassandra 
Austen, "continue" is corrected to "contrive" ... but it seems unnecessary to emend the 
more subtle expression of the original'.lo2 This note is in one sense redundant -
'contrive' is not offered as an alternative. The rationale for not emending the original 
correction is that it is 'more subtle' - itself bound to a particular assessment of Austen's 
writing which proposes subtlety as one of its values. Even if it was Austen who made 
the less subtle change, the refusal to emend is somehow true to the 'spirit' of Austen, 
if not to the 'letter' fith the editor functioning momentarily as the author's 'better' self. 
But what is propos~ here, as with all notes, is the imperative 'read carefully'. If the 
difference between 'contrive' and 'continue' is important enough to warrant a note, the 
very least the prescribed reader can do is read attentively, which includes travelling 
between the novel and the notes when prompted. Both these enrichment notes 
demonstrate a particular kind of scholarly practice which confirntthe editorial identity 
as such: the investigation of family correspondence in one case, a familiarity with the 
first edition in the other. But beyond this, the value of the text and of Austen's writing 
more generally is confirmed by the very fact that such an archive exists and is read and 
re-read. In both cases this is knowledge presumed to have been unavailable to the 
original reader and is dependent on subsequent scholarship: a scholarship which marks 
the value of the text and confirms its perenniality. The extent of scholarship, measured 
not only in volume but over time marks the interest that attests the text's enduring 
releyance. In the Everyman 1993 edition, this representation of a body of knowledge 
is proposed most strongly, not by the notes but by 'Jane Austen and Her Critics', a 
synoptic review of Austen criticism from 1812 to 1987 and the bibliography which 
follows it. 103 
Both types of note suggest reading contexts. Recuperative notes do acknowledge 
minor interpretative difficulties but these notes, which are few, function primarily in a 
contrastive role, to assert the text's overwhelming semantic fixity: that which is not 
noted. Thus the contrast between the Penguin's twenty three pages of notes and the 
Everyman's four is less interesting than the contrast between the Penguin's three 
hundred and eight pages of text and twenty three pages of notes. Indeed, recuperative 
notes affirm, in the very unequal division between the noted and not noted, the 
enduring relevance and interpretability of the text: the occasional semantic 'disruption' 
which confirms the text's interpretability in a contemporary context. This confirmation 
of the text as interpretable is supported by the ways in which notes in classics are 
presented as marginal. The very marginality of notes is one significant way in which 
the contradiction between enduring relevance and certain difficulties of interpretation is 
negotiated: notes are not strictly necessary, precisely because the text does have 
enduring relevance. 
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The ·relation between what is noted and not noted needs to be understood in terms of 
a specific definition of literary language that recuperative, and in particular, 
lexicographical, notes reproduce. What is noted is that which is assumed to depart or 
deviate from the definition of the literary, which itself constitutes the unmarked or 
unnoted term of the binary. Most commonly, lexicographical notes accompany words 
or phrases of three types. The first are recognisably foreign words: 'ragout', 
'Boulanger', 'quadrille,.104 The second type are words or phrases from non-dominant 
varieties or dialects. These occur very rarely in Austen editions but are a feature of 
many other classics, for example: 'hurt: dialectal word for hurtleberry or 
whortleberry'; 'scroff: kindling (West country)'; 'belly timber: food (Yorkshire). 105 
The third type comprises words or phrases from specialist or technical registers: legal, 
medical, architectural, agricultural and so on. In the case of Austen these are most 
frequently ecclesiastical, military, naval and above all domestic. These are the three 
types of word or phrase that are routinely assumed to present interpretative difficulty. 
By again focusing on the relations between the marked and the unmarked, a particular 
definition of literary language becomes visible. The marking of recognisably foreign 
words suggests a definition of literary language as a national language, one which, 
whatever its history, does not openly chronicle its relations with other national 
languages. The marking of non-dominant varieties establishes 'Standard English', the 
socially dominant variety, as the appropriate form for literary English. Taken together, 
the literary is defined as an idealisation of a national language which displaces the 
divisions and potential contestations suggested by non-dominant social and 
geographical varieties by constructing the dominant variety, in this case Standard 
English, as the norm of literary language. The third type of lexicographical note - that 
which accompanies specialist or technical registers - is the most interesting. The 
indexing of terms from technical registers indicates an understanding of these as 
specialised, utilitarian and demarcatable zones of language use. By contrast, literary 
language is that which is not a specialised and demarcatable zone, it is that which is 
common to and interpretable by all readers. It is shared, common and interpretable 
because it is not 'narrowly' circumscribed by or measurable in terms of a particular use 
or function. Literary language is defined as 'register-free' in the sense that registers are 
always 'constrained' by purpose and a specifiable and limited constituency of users. It 
is stable and transhistorical: its meanings are available because its preoccupations and 
overarching referent - the essentially national-human - is deemed to be shared with all 
implied readers. This definition of the literary's referent as the national-human is a 
paradoxical but familiar construction of humanist literary criticism - Leavis is a 'classic' 
case. 106 Here, it is a specific effect of the defining distinction between the literary and 
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the non-literary: where the literary specifies both an ideal national language, from 
which the markedly foreign is marked out as 'other', and a zone of practice not 
circumscribed by a specifiable use or constituency of users which transcends social and 
cultural specificity. 
The definition of literary language inscribed in classics dissolves the difference 
between contemporaneous and contemporary reader, which notes partially 
acknowledge. Interpretative difficulty is sited in the non-literary. Foreign languages, 
non-dominant varieties and technical registers are permitted to present interpretative 
difficulties because these are not constituents of the literary. The very act of noting 
such elements functions as a kind of excision which asserts the separability of the 
literary from the non-literary. Whilst the literary is transhistorical and open to all 
readers, the non-literary is historical and restrictive. The historical situation of the 
reader is construed as contingent and secondary: the knowledges of the reading 
moment - 'then' or 'now' - are a matter of chance but these know ledges do not disrupt 
the -processes of the interpretation of the literary. Enrichment notes frequently 
corroborate this distinction between the literary and the non-literary. What is most 
noticeable is how many propose an authorial classification, specifically organised by 
the author-function. 'Continue' / 'contrive' is one such, predicated on an oeuvre and 
an archive, but others propose more particular reading contexts. The note 
accompanying 'transport' in the Penguin 1996 edition speculates that: 
Elizabeth's outburst in favour of nature rather than humanity is perhaps, a relic 
of First Impressions, which might have been a more explicitly satirical novel 
along the lines of Northanger Abbey. 107 
In the same vein, the note accompanying a reference to Edward Street informs us that 
this was also a venue in an early work of Austen's, Lady Susan. The mention of a 
governess in Pride and Prejudice prompts an allusion to Emma and the mention of a 
shrubbery prompts a reference to Fanny in Mansfield Park. Mansfield Park is also 
mentioned in the Everyman 1993 in a note which elaborates the distinction between 
'natural beauty' and 'awkward taste,.108 Each of these assert the author as a context for 
reading. The outburst containing transport is the most interesting. The note 
acknowledges a genre shift but explains it exclusively through an appeal to the 
authorial: the trace of the first version of the novel. The possible interpretative issues 
raised by the shift are dispatched by the explanatory force of the authorial. 
The relationship between the noted and the not-noted is a central key to 
understanding how the contradiction between enduring relevance and interpretative 
difficulty is negotiated in classics publishing. Interpretative difficulties are 
acknowledged but marginalised, not only in the position of notes and their number, 
but because notes recover or account for meanings, values and know ledges which are 
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defined as non-literary. The distinction between the literary and the non-literary 
constructs the literary as an enduring zone of semantic fixity: a zone which is shared by 
all readers, contemporaneous and contemporary. 
7. Conclusions 
As suggested in the introduction, 'pastness' is both a central and ambiguous 
accentuality in the constitution of the classic. This may be marked in a range of ways: 
the contemporaneous cover images of paperback editions, the contemporaneously 
styled illustrations of the Folio, the inclusion of facsimile title pages (which also 
propose the text as historical artefact), the noting practices, the inclusion of life and 
times chronologies and historically sequenced critical extracts. This pastness is distinct 
from the period quality proposed by the in-costume cover photograph of the tie-in 
edition where what is signified most strongly is a type of text: period drama. Pastness 
here is an index of value. While 'period-ness' is a distinctively modern pleasure which 
draws a sharp distinction between past and present, the pastness of the classic is a 
marker of its perdurance which renders the text always-already contemporary. Yet at 
the same time this pastness can pose interpretative difficulties, the text is, in certain 
respects, opaque. This opacity is a necessary condition of the classic, for it is finally 
revealed as superficial and superseded by a definitive legibility. This process is most 
clearly visible in the parts of the editional apparatus which most strongly acknowledge 
this apparent opacity: notes and introductions. In the former, the constitution of the 
literary and non-literary distinction where the literary is the majority zone of unmarked 
semantic stability. In the case of introductions, misunderstanding and misreading are 
readily acknowledged but a correct reading or a richer and truer one is offered as the 
stable and authoritative alternative to error and ignorance. Crucially, this 
misunderstanding is always characterised in relation to the reader (immature, in the 
case of Church; incapable of reading ironically, in Conrad; in knowledge-deficit, in 
Jones). The interpretative difficulties that the text poses are not finally present in the 
text itself. This is particularly noticeable in Conrad. His focus on irony as the key to 
the text's meaning might appear to acknowledge interpretative difficulties in the text 
itself; but irony, on his account, is the simplest of figures to decipher. Although 
Jones's solution is more complex, it is still the prescribed reader of the edition who is 
likely to misinterpret the text, the contemporaneous reader is presumed to have had no 
such problem. In all cases, the text is clear, lucid and intelligible, it is our 
understanding of it which is or is potentially at fault, but this can be remedied. 
The pastness that is constituted by classics publishing has a distinctive relation with 
particular concepts of the literary which is most explicit in the interpretative and reading 
practices proposed. As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, Austen presents 
245 
an interesting case-study because much of her writing is represented as both literary and 
popular, in a particular sense. The strongest reading context proposed in these editions 
is authorial. On occasion the authorial context proposes explicatory contexts (most 
strongly in Church, and also to some extent in Jones). But what is most 
fundamentally proposed is evaluation, an evaluation most strongly committed to the 
proposition that the text is unique. From the blurb of the Penguin 1996 cover which 
cites and signs Austen's own evaluation of Elizabeth Bennet; through the design of the 
author-text conjunction in the two paperback classic editions; the centrality of the 
author as life and/or works in notes; the Everyman's life-and-times chronology, which 
is ordered by the left hand page - 'Chronology of Jane Austen's Life' - and which can 
include no literary or historical event prior to her birth or subsequent to her death; to 
the introductions which all render the author as the central category. In the case of both 
Church and Conrad, the strongest effect of the authorial context is to weaken or even 
block interpretations and readings which are bound to concepts such as genre and 
narrative. Jones's introduction is different in this sense: contemporaneous discourses 
are proposed as central to understanding the novel's narrative form. But Austen does 
not simply replicate romance conventions, the argument continues, she deliberately 
deploys them for her own ends to make a particular argument. In all cases, the 
uniqueness of the text is foregrounded, reinscribing its status and suggesting a 
generalised literary reading practice. This is best summarised as a negative injunction: 
do not read for the plot. 
In the Everyman 1993 and Penguin 1996 editions, the plot or significant parts of it 
are everywhere represented. The blurb of the latter does not simply present a scenario 
and establish the hermeneutic code of enigmas, it reveals the ending. l09 Both 
Conrad's and Jones's introduction elaborate much of the plot: in the first four pages of 
the Everyman, most of its substance is elaborated. I 10 Church's references to the story 
are more oblique, but the prescribed reader is left in no doubt as to the novel's 
resolution, as the three Bennet marriages which take place in the novel are all listed. III 
'Giving away the ending' is, of course, a staple of literary-critical practice where the 
strong assumption, not always warranted, is that the prescribed reader is familiar with 
the text under discussion - and besides, the object of study requires representation. 
But in the context of an edition, the meanings of such representations are inflected 
somewhat differently. The Folio edition may want to assume a reader who is 
painstakingly assembling a library which includes old favourites but the Everyman 
1993 and Penguin 1996 editions do not. We may read the introduction after we have 
read the novel, or we may not read it at all, but it is strongly proposed as a pre-text. 
In the case of Pride and Prejudice, revealing the story obviously proposes the text as a 
familiar object. The reader may not have read the text but she will know something 
about it, or she should. As is often the case, nothing confirms the existence of a 
strong convention more than its breaking. On page fifteen of the introduction to the 
Penguin 1998 edition of Mary Braddon's Lady AudZey's Secret, a sensation novel 
first published in the early 1860s the reader is offered the following warning: 
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Note: if you do not wish to discover Lady Audley's secret, read the rest of the 
introduction after you have finished the novel. 112 
What is most interesting about this practice of telling the story is the generalised literary 
reading practice it proposes, which is the opposite of reading for the plot. Within the 
terms of this discursive opposition, to read for the plot is to be exclusively concerned 
with what happens next and to whom. It is above all to read 'literally', and in the 
process, we may speed, skim and skip. The end is definitive and exhausts any further 
interest in the book. To read for the literary is to background our concern with what 
Elizabeth Bennet did next. It is to read carefully, slowly, attentively, respectfully: for 
to read in this way confers respect and confirms the nove1's authority over us. It is to 
traverse beyond the literal to the higher generalities of the symbolic: nothing is ever 
simply or even primarily what it seems: everything requires transposition to another 
plane of meaning. The text is never exhausted by any or all of its readings, it is finally 
a surfeit: one reason to re-read it. In the case of Pride and Prejudice, the mUltiple 
representations of the plot have a further function. The novel is 'popular' or 'well-
loved', the latter suggesting a degree of feeling rather than mass popularity. In the case 
of the well-loved classic, these multiple representations conjoin two types of reader: 
the serious reader for whom the story is of minimal interest, and the popular reader, 
the lover and re-reader of Austen who knows very well what happens next. It is a 
surface'resolution: to know what happens next does not mean that the pleasures of the 
plot are exhausted. The chapter summary which accompanies the on-line version of 
Pride and Prejudice at Austen.com, for example, introduces its summaries as designed 
for people 'who are familiar with the book to help them find the chapter they want', 
suggesting a re-reading which is significantly shaped by the story. I 13 
Yet the literary and the popular cannot have equal force: more than just a story, 
more than mere romance. And it is interesting in this context that neither Church nor 
Conrad invoke the romance narrative. I 14 Indeed, the introductions all dispatch a 
popular reading: Jones insists that we cannot read the novel as we might read romance, 
Church's contrast of the immature first and mature second reading, and most obviously 
perhaps, Conrad, with his argument that everyone has misunderstood the text and his 
association of the popular with the Hollywood error of locating the adaptation in the 
Victorian period. lIS This counter to the popular is also inscribed more diffusely in the 
edition as a whole. The Everyman 1993 and Penguin 1996, as noted above, evidence 
a particular form of contemporary classics publishing where the relations with higher 
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education are central to the classic's production, distribution and sales. The choice of 
named editors and their representation within editions, the marked inscription of 
scholarly practices within the apparatus, and the incorporation of critical and contextual 
materials, all propose the text as an object of serious study. The Everyman 1993 
edition not only most explicitly prescribes a student reader, but also a student writer: 
the edition is a one-stop-shop for an essay, complete with text summary and critical 
extracts. Editing and marketing conjoin here as the dominant publishing processes. 
But the apparently seamless relation between this mode of classics publishing and 
higher education, which supplies both editorial labour and purchasing and reading 
constituencies, can also generate tensions in the definition and representation of the 
classic. Jones's introduction definitively challenges the perenniality of the novel 
(except as a pleasurable romance), which the rest of the apparatus seeks to persuade us 
of: historicist reading, which has become central to contemporary literary criticism, 
conflicts with the established practices of classics publishing. In the case of the Folio, 
with its minimal apparatus, the seriousness of the text is proposed very differently and 
most strongly through production practices. It is in the production values of the edition 
itself - the weight and quality of the paper, the illustrations and chapter decorations, 
the overall design - that the seriousness and value of the text is most strongly inscribed. 
These features seek to challenge the book conceived as just another commodity of mass 
consumption: it deserves a more fitting embodiment. This likewise proposes its 
seriousness and is congruent with the self-representation of the Folio Society as a 
whole where potential purchasers are addressed as members who may visit its premises 
to sit and peruse the books in a comfortable reading room, echoing the traditions of a 
London club. 116 But beyond this and perhaps most strongly, the production values 
valorise the text as furniture and decor. 
The negative imperative not to read for the plot and its positive corollaries show that 
classics publishing of this type prioritises the evaluative modality of reading. In 
Austen's case, this takes the specific form of reconfirming the text's value. It is not 
necessary to argue that the text and the author have value, this is presupposed and 
reconfirmed by the practices of the edition. ll7 An acknowledgement of the text's value 
is the prequel or pre-text for any reading of it. This evaluative practice precedes and 
orders interpretation, and applies to both the editor and the prescribed reader. Their 
relations to the text, however, aredifferent. Both accept the value of the text without 
question and reproduce its authority, but the reader must also submit to the authority of 
the editor. Indeed the very possibilities of misreading that introductions and notes in 
particular acknowledge increase the reader's dependence; such opacities are always 
finally resolved as merely apparent, but they cast a shadow of doubt, a doubt which 
can never concern the text, only the reader. 
1 Italo Calvino, 'Why Read the Classics?' in The Literature Machine (London: Picador, 1989), 
p.125. 
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2 One recent example of the 'precarious' classic is Isabella Whitney, Mary Sidney and Aemilia Lanyer: 
Renaissance Poets (Penguin: London, 2000). In the case of much marginalised writing which finally 
finds its way to the centre, the strong suggestion is that the text was in some sense 'lost' and has now 
been're-discovered'. 
3 T. S. Eliot, What is a Classic? (London: Faber and Faber, 1945), p.10. Eliot does not however 
offer a definition of maturity, but ' ... if we are properly mature, as well as educated persons, we can 
recognise maturity' (p.10). 
4 See Marilyn Butler, 'Introduction' to Northanger Abbey (London: Penguin, 1995), especially 
pp.xiv-xv. 
5 Foucault, 'What is an Author?' in Language-Counter-memory-Practice (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1977. See in particular p.128 where Foucault elaborates the strategies by which 
authors are defined and the assumptions which underlie these: 'The author explains the presence of 
certain events within a text, as well as their transformations, distortions and their various 
modifications ... The author also constitutes a principle of unity in writing where any unevenness of 
production is ascribed to changes caused byevolution, maturation or outside influence. In addition the 
author serves to neutralise the contradictions that are found in a series of texts ... Finally, the author is 
a particular source of expression who, in more or less finished forms, is manifested equally well and 
with similar validity, in a text, in letters, fragments, drafts and so forth.' 
6 For example: the BBC television adaptation of Pride and Prejudice, directed by Simon Langton 
(UK: BBC/Arts and Entertainment Network, 1995); Sense and Sensibility, directed by Ang Lee 
(USA/UK: Columbia, 1995); Emma, directed by Douglas McGrath (UK: Haft 
Entertainment/Matchmaker Films/Mirimax, 1996); Mansfield Park, directed by Patricia Rozema 
(USA/UK: BBC Films/Mirimax, 1998). There are also two contemporary adaptations: Metropolitan, 
directed by Whit Stilman (USA: New Line/Westerley Film and Video, 1990) which situates Mansfield 
Park in the 1980s New York debutante scene, and Clueless, directed by Amy Heckerling (US: 
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Paramount, 1995), a contemporary adaptation of Emma set in a high school. Emma Tennant has 
written two sequels to Pride and Prejudice, Pemberley (Sevenoaks: Hodder and Stoughton, 1993) and 
An Unequal Marriage (London: Sceptre, 1995). There are a number of major Austen websites 
including The Republic of Pemberley - the legend of which runs: 'Your haven in a world programmed 
to misunderstand obsession with things Austen' - Austen.com and Austen-LArchives. The first two 
S. 
run highly active fan-fiction sites. Austen.com encourages two carefully distinguishe'd types: 
'Epilogue Abbey~stories written out of the novels and set within the historical period and 'Fantasia 
Gallery', which as the title suggests, is where anything goes, for example: 'Something in the Rain 
by Mary Collette. In the wine country of California, Lizzy Bennet and Fitzwilliam Darcy come in to 
conflict as she advocates for the workers and he owns a large vineyard'. It is also interesting that the 
majority of the fan fiction texts are written out of Pride and Prejudice. In the Fantasia Gallery at 
Austen.com for example, as of July 122001, out of a total of 205 stories, 168 are based on Pride and 
Prejudice, though it is often fused with other novels and films. 
7 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (London: Penguin, 1995); Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice 
(London: Everyman, 1993); Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (London: Penguin, 1996); Jane 
Austen, Pride and Prejudice (London: Folio Society, 1957/1975). As it is the apparatus and not the 
text which is the focus, I will refer in both the body text and footnotes to the editions: "Folio'. 
'Penguin 1995', 'Penguin 1996' and so on. 
8 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (London: Sceptre, 1995). 
9 This classification also seems to generate redundancies: is the definition of a classic not precisely a 
function of its endurance? 
10 Richard Dixon, Rhetoric (London: Methuen, 1971), p.24. Dixon's account of the rules and 
practices of classical rhetoric draw predominantly on Cicero, in particular his De Inventione (p.21). In 
A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms (California: California University Press, 1968), Richard A. Lanham 
defines antonomasia as 'the substitution of a descriptive phrase for a proper name' (p.12). 
11 This also distinguishes discussions of antonomasia and other cognate concepts from the concept of 
cohesion as developed by M. A. K. Halliday and Rukaiya Hassan in Cohesion in English (Harlow: 
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Longman, 1976). Antonomasia can of course produce cohesive effects but my concern here is with the 
interpretative practices which such substitutions suggest. 
12 On the division of the faculties of rhetoric, see Dixon, Rhetoric, pp.24-35. 
13 See appendix A. 
14 The painting is Congratulations by George Henry Harlow whose dates are 1787-1819. 
15 The Everyman motto is 'Everyman, I will go with thee and be thy guide'. The aims of the 
Everyman Library are represented by a narrative of naming: 'The Everyman Library was founded by 1. 
M. Dent in 1906. He chose the name Everyman because he wanted to make available the best books 
ever written in every field to the greatest number of people at the cheapest possible price'. The 
narrative also explains the logo, a small oval which frames a pilgrim, 'the character in "Everyman", a 
medieval mystery play, a proud link between Everyman past and present'. 
16 Everyman 1993, p.313. 
17 Different parts of the editorial apparatus would seem to address different types of student reader. The 
text summary perhaps addressing a school reader, the summary of Austen criticism and the suggestions 
for further reading addressing university students. 
18 R. W. Chapman's edition of The Novels of Jane Austen (Oxford: Clarendon, 1923) is usually 
thought to be the first serious scholarly edition of Austen's writing. It was itself revised but 'all recent 
editions have either been based on Chapman's text or acknowledge debts to it' (Penguin 1996, p.xxix.). 
19 For an example, see appendix A. 
20. These illustrations are on p.94, p.201 and p.273 respectively. 
21 The figure is approximate because the prices of editions vary considerably. 
22 Sue Birtwhistle and Suzy Conkin, The Making of Pride and Prejudice, (London: PenguinlBBC 
books, 1995). 
23 Penguin 1996, pp.xxix-xxxii. 
24 This practice is not, of course, exclusive to classics publishing. Faber, the British poetry 
publisher, employs similar practices in many of its cover designs. Probably the most well known 
instance of this is the front cover design where a title and author box is framed on a 'wallpaper' of 
stylised double lower-case 'rs (representing Faber and Faber). See for example, T. S. Eliot, The 
Wasteland and Other Poems (1940) (London: Faber, 1983). 
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25 The force of the romance narrative within the 1995 BBC adaptation and its reception as such is 
formally exemplified in Helen Fielding's Bridget lones's Diary (London: Picador, 1996}. Not only is 
the plot modelled on Pride and Prejudice - with the hero of the novel also called (Mark) Darcy - but 
Bridget is fixated by the BBC television series and in particular the hero: '1O.30am. Jude called and we 
spend twenty minutes growling, "Fawaw, that Mr Darcy." I love the way he talks, sort of as if he 
can't be bothered. Ding-Dong!. Then we had a long discussion about the comparative merits of Mr 
Darcy and Mark Darcy, both agreeing that Mr Darcy was more attractive because he was ruder but 
being imaginary was a disadvantage that could not be overlooked.' (p.247). The recent film adaptation 
of the novel directed by Sharon Maguire (USA: MirimaxlStudio/Canal/Universal/Working Title, 
2001), cast Colin Firth (who played Fitzwilliam Darcy in the tv adaptation of Pride and Prejudice) as 
Mark Darcy. 
26 To anyone with some knowledge of Austen's narratives however, the Everyman choice seems 
perverse. The cover image most strongly suggests a two sisters narrative, very appropriate for Sense 
and Sensibility but certainly not for Pride and Prejudice. Some images are far more explicitly 
interpretative of the text or some aspect of it. The Penguin classic edition of Mary Elizabeth Braddon's 
Lady Aud/ey's Secret (London: Penguin, 1998) features a reproduction of Dante Gabriel Rosetti's 
'Monna Vanna', a painting of a classically Pre-Raphaelite women richly and exotically attired. What is 
interesting here is how the reading of the novel and the introduction proposes particular senses for the 
painting. In the novel, there is crucial scene where a painting of Lady Audley in Pre-Raphaelite mode 
is described and viewed; Lady Audley is also a conspicuous consumer of jewels, furs and the like. 
Because of this, the choice of the painting seems explicitly motivated and the woman in the image 
comes to signify, not Lady Audley as such, but a look and style which the reader associates with her. 
27 Or at least default or unmodified classics do not. One feature of Penguin Twentieth Century 
Classics series is an unframed, usually photographic image on the front cover. The interpretative 
possibilities are however, likewise, oblique. The cover image of the edition of Jean Rhys's Wide 
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Sargasso Sea (London: Penguin, 2000), for example, is a green tinted photograph of three bananas 
lying on a piece of matting. 
28 In contrast, both the fiction editions mentioned above do bleed: there are no borders. 
29 Genette, Paratexts, p.9. 
30 The Society also publishes a magazine, Folio, four times a year which includes features on 
forthcoming publications. Again there is a frequent emphasis on illustration which foregrounds the 
artisanal. For example the Summer 2001 issue of Folio included an article by Steven Devine entitled 
'Once more over the Orwell' on how he illustrated the Folio George Orwell. 
31 Arthur Conan Doyle, Complete Stories oj Sherlock Holmes (London: Folio Society: 1993) It 
was in fact an American play, Sherlock Holmes, written by actor-manager William Gillett and based 
on the first and last of Conan Doyle's Holmes short stories ('A Scandal in Bohemia' and 'The Final 
Problem') which first introduced the deerstalker hat and the curved meerschaum pipe which later became 
the signatures of the Holmes profile. See Christopher Frayling, 'The Greatest Shaggy Dog Story Ever 
Told', The Independent on Sunday, 1 July 2001, 'Life Etc.', p.8. 
32 'One of the most perfect, most pleasurable and most subtle - and therefore, perhaps, most 
dangerously persuasive - of romantic love stories' (Penguin 1996, back cover). I will discuss the back 
cover text of this edition in detail below. 
33 The use of locutions such as 'dominant cultural discourses' or later in this section 'predominantly 
conceived' and 'dominant judgement' is, I am aware, vulnerable to criticism. A reasonable critical 
response - but where's the evidence? - is easily proffered. It is more difficult to address the criticism 
that such locutions homogenise cultural practices. I hope that the use of dominant and predominant 
here suggests or at least gestures to a relationship between discourses not all of which reproduce these 
positions. 
34 One of the most important of these is Janice Radway, Reading the Romance: Women Patriarchy 
and Popular Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984/91). This utilises 
structuralist and psychoanalytic concepts of narrative as well as empirical research into the reading 
practices of a group of romance readers in the Midwestern US town of Smithton to explore the role of 
romance narratives in their lives. Radway cites P. J. Fennell who directed the early stages of the 
development of Silhouette (the Simon and Schuster romance imprint) on his conception of popular 
romance novels: 'Readers of books of this kind ask not, "have I heard of this book?" but, "Did I 
enjoy the last dozen Silhouettes?'" (p,43). This illustrates one of the key differences between the 
individual text with a particular reputation and the multiple and substitutable romance. 
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35 The fixed phrase 'period charm' is a staple in estate-agents copy. 'Eligible' may sometimes have a 
more serious and positive accentuality (as in The Tatler example mentioned above). 
36 Only one of the blurbs mentions Mr Darcy's first name: the Everyman. However the Sceptre 
edition is potentially ambiguous, referring only to 'Darcy' and allowing for the possibility of this 
being understood as the character's first name. This possibility of error is strengthened because Darcy's 
name appears in a conjunctive phrase with 'Elizabeth'. The Sceptre edition is, I would argue, 
deliberately ambiguous, an attempt to resolve a potential archaism which would conflict with the 
modernising idiom of much of the. synopsis, for example 'before wedding bells chime'. In this context 
it is worth noting that many of the contemporary fan-fiction narratives of Pride and Prejudice 
'modernise' the hero's name to William (from Fitzwilliam). 
37 The heading to the blurb strengthens the comedy classification by describing the novel as 'Jane 
Austen's elegant and witty social comedy'. 
38 See for example, James Baldwin, Another Country (London: Penguin Twentieth Century 
Classics, 1990). 
39 Folio (1957), p.5. 
40 Folio (1957), p.7. 
41 The examples in parenthesis come from Richard Church (Folio, 1957), p8; Peter Conrad 
(Everyman, 1993), p.14; Vivien Jones (Penguin, 1996), p.x respectively. 
42 Folio (1957), pp.8-9. 
43 Folio (1957), p.9. 
44 Folio (1957), p.5. 
45 Folio (1957), p.5. 
46 Folio (1957), p.6. 
47 For example Vivien Jones's citation of George Steiner: 'At the height of political and industrial 
revolution ... Miss Austen composes novels almost extra-territorial to history'. Jones describes 
Steiner's comments as 'myopic' (Penguin, 1996, px). Likewise both Raymond Williams in The 
Country and the City (London: Hogarth, 1985) and Marilyn Butler in Jane Austen and the War of 
Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) critique the representation of Austen as unengaged with the 
political and social context in which she is writing. 
48 Folio (1957), p.5. 
49 Folio (1957), pp.5-7. 
50 Folio (1957), p.8. 
51 Folio (1957), p.8. 
52 Everyman (1993), p.xiii. 
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53 Everyman (1993), p.xiii: 'But instead of decoding the ironist's mysteries and deciphering these 
remarks by turning them into their opposites - for Jane Austen's is an extended, exploratory, 
dangerously subversive art, and is neither harmlessly decorative nor picturesquely provincial - critics 
have taken her at her word.' 
54 Everyman (1993), p. vii. 
55 Everyman (1993), p.xiii. 
56 Everyman (1993), p.xiv. 
57 Everyman (1993), pp.xiv-xv. 
58 Everyman (1993), for example: p.xiii, p.xviii, p.xv, p.xxviii, p.xxviii. 
59 Everyman (1993), p.xiii. 
60 Everyman (1993), p.xiv. 
61 For example, Elizabeth 'acknowledges this kinship with Lydia when the latter condemns Mary 
King's nasty freckles: the ugly sentiment was "little other than her own breast had formerly harboured 
and fancied liberal'" (p.xx). Also: 'Grim inevitabilities are overcome by happily sacrificing oneself to 
them: thus Mr Bennet nominates Wickham as his favourite son-in-law. Elizabeth has inherited this 
philosophical pessimism from her father' (p.xix). 
62 Everyman (1993), p.xiii. 
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63 Everyman (1993), p.xiv. 
64 This claim would seem to be supported by the fact that Jones's introduction, discussed below does 
supply biographical information, even though a biographical sketch precedes it. 
65 Everyman (1993): pp.xvii-xviii (Sterne, Defoe, Joyce, Shakespeare, Dickens, Swift), p.xxviii 
(Wordsworth Byron) and p.xxii (James). 
66 Everyman (1993), p.xxviii, p.xvii and p.xxii. 
67 Everyman (1993), p.xvii. 
68 Everyman (1993). See for example p.xvi where Austen's 'victims' (characters) are described as 'safe 
in their resilient obtuseness' . 
. 69 Having said this, it is clear that Conrad has an 'English' tradition in view which owes much to 
Leavis and in particular The Great Tradition (London: Chatto and Windus, 1973). 
70 Everyman (1993), p.xxviii. 
71 There is one other place where historical interpretations surface as a possibility. This is on the first 
page where Conrad criticises the 1940 Hollywood adaptation of the film: '[i]t is significant that the 
MGM film of the novel should have shifted the work's period forward from the panic of the Regency's 
preparations for war with France ... to the less anxious, more opulent, frilled and crinolined Victorian 
era.' Here the serious argument is seemingly undermined by the focus on the frills of Victorian a: 
'crinolines slow Elizabeth down' (p.xii). 
72 For example: 'And in this introduction I will be focusing primarily on Austen's immediate social, 
political and fictional context' (p.viii); and, ' ... I want to go on now to explore in more detail ... ' 
(p.xii), Penguin, 1996. 
73 The predominant classification is as a novel by Austen, and 'Austen's novels' is one form of this 
(p.xi). The authorial classification is also strongly marked in representations of Austen's agency as a 
writer: for example 'Austen provides' (p.vii), 'Austen's deployment' (p.ix), 'Austen depicts' (p.xxiii). 
The novel is explicitly discussed as a romance (pp.vii-x); as a political novel (pp.x-xxvii); as a late-
eighteenth/early nineteenth century novel, for example, pp.xii-xvii; as a novel by a woman writer, 
for example, p.xii; and as a popular classic, p.viii. 
74 Penguin (1996), p.vii. 
75 Penguin (1995), all the above pp.vii-ix. 
76 Penguin (1996), p.vii and p.ix. 
256 
77 Of the forty two women whom Radway interviewed, thirty two chose the happy ending as one of 
the top three ingredients of a romance, the highest score accorded to any feature (p.67). 
78 Penguin (1996), pp.ix-x. 
79 Penguin (1996), p.viii. 
80 Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author', Language-Counter-memory-Practice (New York, Cornell 
University Press, 1977), p.123. 
81 Penguin (1996), pp.viii-ix. 
82 Penguin (1996), p. viii. 
83 Penguin (1996), p.xi. 
84 Penguin (1996), pp.xii-xvii. 
85 'Rational' is discussed on p.xvii and 'elegant' on p.xviii. 
86 Penguin (1996), p.xi. 
87 Penguin (1996), p.xi. 
88 Penguin (1996), p.xxvi. 
89 Penguin (1996), p.xxvi. 
90 Penguin (1996), pp.xi-xii. The reference to the page reference for this moment in the novel is 
typical of Jones's scholarly practice. 
91 Penguin (1996), see in particular pp.xiii-xviii. 
92 Penguin (1996), p.x. 
93 Church names her as 'Jane' seven times and four times as 'Jane Austen': for example, 'Jane's 
grandfather' (p.6); 'Jane was born' (p.6); ' ... Jane revised a book written earlier ... ' (p.8). 
94 Everyman (1993), pp.xiv-v. 
95 Marriage as a theme is the way that Church represents the matter that Jones classifies as romance. 
Folio 1957, p.9: By the time the novel is resolved, 'marriage has been examined from many points 
of view, including its most base (Lydia and Wickham), its most innocent (Jane and Bingley), and its 
most deeply spiritual'. 
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96 This same intimacy is asserted in the naming of the designer in the Folio edition although the Folio 
Society have taken this further in one of their complete leather-bound Shakespeare editions where 
members could have their own initials stitched into the spine of each volume. 
97 Everyman (1993), p.294; Penguin (1996), p.323. 
98 Penguin (1996), p.323. 
99 Jones cites Tanner on p.315 of the Penguin 1996 edition. 
100 For example on p.323: 'Cheapside: in the City of London and therefore unfashionable and 
associated with trade. The implicit contrast is with the new residential areas around Oxford Street'. 
(This is where Jane Bennet stays when she visits London). Or its complement on p.328: 'Grosvenor 
Street: just south of Oxford Street, in the fashionable residential area of London'. (This is where the 
Bingleys stay in London.) 
101 Penguin (1996), p.331. Likewise in the Penguin 1981 edition of The Tenant of Wild fell Hall, 
where the note which accompanies the mention of a painter's easel informs us that 'Anne Bronte, like 
her sisters and brother, was a competent artist' (p.499). The issue here is not that the prescribed 
present day reader does not know what a painter's easel is - this is assumed as shared knowledge - but 
rather that this biographical information will in some sense enrich the prescribed reader's reading of the 
text. Here, the reader is asked to forge a connection between the heroine of the novel, whose easel it 
is, and the author. This is one of the many notes in this edition which strongly suggests a 
biographical reading of the novel, a reading which adopts the conventional Bronte-Bell narrative of 
familial relations and treats the Brontes as a single author function. 
102 Penguin (1996), p.321. 
103 Everyman (1993), pp.298-312. 
104 All from the Penguin 1996 edition: ragout - p.323; Boulanger - p.319; quadrille - p.325. 
105 'Hurt' from E. M. Forster, A Room with a View (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), p.248. 
'Scroff' from Thomas Hardy, Far from the Madding Crowd (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), p.492. 
'Belly-timber' from Bram Stoker, Dracula (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), p.512. 
106 There are many possible examples here but perhaps one of the best is Leavis's attempt to configure 
Joseph Conrad as an English writer in The Great Tradition. As Conrad had the possibility of writing in 
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French, Leavis contends that: 'Conrad's themes and interests demanded the concreteness and action -
the dramatic energy - of English'. The positive attributes of English make an interesting contrast with 
the implicit characteristics of French: lacking in clarity, purpose and force and, finally unmasculine. 
See F. R. Leavis, The Great Tradition, 2nd edition (London: Chatto and Windus, 1973), p.17. For 
a superlative account of the social specificities that structure Leavis's 'human', see Francis Mulhern, 
'English Reading' in Nation and Narration, edited by Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 
pp.250-264. 
107 Penguin (1996), p.329. 
lOS Penguin (1996): 'Edward Street' - p.333; 'governess' - p.329; 'shrubbery' - p.327. Everyman 
(1993): 'natural beauty' - p.181. 
109 Roland Barthes, S/Z, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), p.19: 'Under the hermeneutic code, we list 
the various (formal) terms by which an enigma can be distinguished, suggested, formulated, held in 
suspense and finally disclosed.' 
110 Everyman (1993), pp.xiii-xvii • 
III Folio (1957), p.9. 
112 Mary Elizabeth Braddon, Lady Audley's Secret (London: Penguin, 1998), p.15. The introduction 
is written by Jenny Bourne Taylor . 
• 113, See Austen.com: http://www.austen.com/pride/. The summaries are also described as 'designed to 
be very vague and cryptic' and they are. For example: 'Volume I, Chapter IV -- After the assembly. 
One Miss Bennet is already smitten'; 'Volume II, chapter IX (32) -- A gentleman finds a lady alone at 
Hunsford. What is fifty miles of good road. You can not have been always at Longbourn'. These 
coded representations are explicitly 'not designed for the student who might be looking for a quick way 
to get out of reading the novel' (my emphasis). 
114 Everyman (1993). Conrad, in his character-centred fashion, does antonomastically represent 
Elizabeth and Darcy as 'the lovers' on occasion (for example p.xiii), but the challenge that Darcy poses 
to Elizabeth is conceived in terms of irony: '[f]or the ironist Elizabeth, Darcy represents the most 
alluring of challenges ... '(p.xx). 
115 Everyman (1993), p.xiii. 
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116 The Folio Society is based at 44 Eagle Street, London WeIR. 
117 This is clearly not the case with all classics. The blurb of the Penguin 1998 edition of Mary 
Elizabeth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret, a sensation novel of the early 1860's, begins by announcing 
that the novel has 'weather[ed] critical scorn'.117 The introduction never makes the case for its literary 
value, arguing that its predominant interest is as a historical document. See Jenny Bourne Taylor's 
introduction, .in particular pp.xxi-xxv and pp.xxv-xxxiii. 
Chapter Six: The Case of Literary Theory Textbooks 
When it was proclaimed that the library contained all books, the first impression was of 
extravagant happiness (Jorge Luis Borges)! 
1. What is a textbook? 
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Textbooks are a ubiquitous category in educational and academic publishing. Whilst in 
science, law and accountancy, textbooks have long been the primary prescribed 
reading matter for particular subjects and courses in higher education, in Britain, the 
literary studies textbook is a recent innovation. Fuelled in significant part by the 
un(der)funded expansion of student numbers in tertiary education in the 1990s, which 
severely constrained student and institutional expenditure on books and journals, 
textbook publishing nas become the staple practice of many academic publishers, as an 
increasing range of knowledges have been encompassed by its rubrics. I am interested 
here in a particular type of literary studies textbook - that representing the object that has 
come to be called 'Literary Theory', or sometimes just 'Theory' - and in two modalities 
of its representation, Introductions and Readers.2 Introductions explicitly prescribe a 
student reader who is unfamiliar with the subject matter, and its representations of 
texts, topics and concepts are substantially governed by an attempt to facilitate the 
student reader's understanding. Readers bundle together original texts or extracts 
according to authorial, thematic or disciplinary identities. Like textbooks, Readers 
have a long history. And the extracting of texts, abridged or not, into Readers or 
digests, is not unique to educational pUblishing. Digests of various kinds, frequently 
fiction, were an important and profitable area of publishing in eighteenth century 
France and a digest was commonly referred to as a bibliotheque or library.3 In Britain, 
'Reader' had acquired the pedagogic sense of a book containing passages for 
instruction or reading practice by the end of the eighteenth century.4 In contemporary 
textbook form, the Reader does not inscribe the student's knowledge deficit as 
explicitly as Introductions but the negotiation of possible, indeed probable, 
interpretative difficulties are a feature of both. Whilst classics represent the text as an 
object that is or ought to be familiar to the prescribed reader, the textbook makes no 
such assumption. That said, the subject or field of the textbook is always represented 
as not simply extant but established. The prescribed reader of the literary theory 
textbook is positioned at the beginning of a story which is always-already written. But 
the writer of this story is not the author or editor as such. Herlhis position is, in the 
main, constituted as a representative of the field in question, not an author but an 
inhabitant of the discursive world that the textbook represents, and this is the rationale 
for their authority. Their legitimacy is confirmed and adjudicated by the culture of 
discourse that slhe participates in. The practices of peer review of manuscripts, post-
publication review and 'adoption' are all instances where the field as 'adjudicator' 
asserts itself. 
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What makes literary theory textbooks a particularly interesting case is their 
permutation of a mUltiplicity of languages, a historically" and culturally various 
heteroglossia encompassing numerous modes of writing - biography, history, 
philosophy, literary criticism, poetry, drama, novels - instantiated in a range of 
generically specific forms - inscribed in and alongside metatextual and conceptual 
commentary and often explicit pedagogic instruction and explicit editorial rationales. 
Some of these languages are marked out as attributable utterances by conventions - of 
typography, italicisation, indentation, quotation marks - or/and particular lexical 
formulations; many are not. Practices of attribution range from the explicit and 
elaborate to the most casual mention. Readers and Introductions are similar in their 
permutation of this multiplicity, but whilst Introductions represent other texts 
predominantly through the modalities of reported speech - both indirect and free indirect 
- Readers reproduce original texts or extended extracts in direct form as 'citation'. In 
doing this, Readers incorporate a further intertextual dimension, when the sometimes 
multiple previous publishing contexts are inscribed in permissions, titling procedures 
and footnotes. Whilst the representation of particular texts and authors is a staple of 
Readers and Introductions, equally if not more important is the representation of a 
body of discourse and its relations. Whilst the reading practices proposed by classics 
are oriented to the particular text and the particular author, Readers and Introduction~ 
propose particular intertextual relations between texts, authors and theories, particular 
orders and priorities of reading and it is these relations and the interpretative and reading 
possibilities they delimit that I am concerned with here: how such books propose that 
we read 'Theory'. 
The central aim of the analysis is both to elaborate these possibilities, and to show 
how these are governed by the particular practices which constitute the publishing 
category. What is particularly interesting are the ways in which Readers and 
Introductions explicitly propose intertextual relations as central to reading. The 
textbook as a general category is firstly ordered by accessibility: a criterion - for 
incorporation and representation - a goal - facilitating the reader's understanding of the 
subject matter - and a value. It is accessibility which accounts for one of the most 
distinctive features of textbooks: their many modes of translation. Many of the texts 
represented in literary theory textbooks are translated from other national languages: 
French, most frequently, but also German and to a lesser extent, Russian. Further, 
these texts and those composed in various national Englishes make significant use of 
foreign language terms and citations. Many theoretical terms (whether neologistic or 
semantically re-accented)- 'langue', 'parole', 'differance', 'jouissance', 'ostranie'-
are deployed in the original in English-language texts. The post-structuralist 
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reinvention of classical rhetoric and philosophy has incorporated a variety of Greek and 
Latin words into the lexicon of contemporary literary theory - 'catachresis', 'chora', 
'logos' for example - some of which have had a historical life in various national 
Englishes, but whose foreignness may be refigured and strongly asserted, in 
accompanying etymological narratives for example. This second example draws 
attention to the extent to which the presence of foreign words may be marked or 
unmarked in particular contexts and for specific reading constituencies. To a non-
French native speaker familiar with structuralism, 'langue' and 'parole' are not foreign 
words, they are the usual terms for a pair of relationally defined concepts.5 The use of 
such terms proposes both precision and conciseness as values but, more pertinently 
here, also marks the presence of a particular language, not French, but the language 
of structural linguistics. It is on intra-linguistic translation such as this that I will focus. 
Any practice of translation must assume at least two languages: the language to be 
translated and the language of translation. Most simply, the translating utterance is 
presumed to iterate the original but in a different language; it is an interpretation of the 
original which is intended to render it in a familiar, intelligible form. Understanding 
'language' in Bakhtin's sense can extend the scope and interest of translation as a 
conceptual category and re-inscribe it as a central modality of intertextual practice. 
What I will be focusing on here is translative practices where 'original' and translation 
are co-present in the edition. The 'original' mayor may not be a direct citation; what is 
common to the set of practices explored below is that they all re-iterate in another mode. 
The translating language may be another 'national' language, another register or genre, 
but it can also take the fonn of an illustrative example or analogy which iterates and 
interprets an original represented in another mode. I am using 'translation' here in an 
expanded and to some extent figurative sense, as a practice which includes, for 
example, the analysis of the contents page as a translation of the title, as well as more 
canonical instances. 
The textbook is not exclusively governed by accessibility and the practices of 
translation that it engenders. Coverage or covering the ground of the field in question is 
likewise a criterion, goal and value which shapes the representations of texts, concepts 
and theories. And it is coverage which accounts for the extent of topicalising 
representation in textbooks. Like translation, topicalization encompasses a wide 
variety of practices, which are not unique to textbooks but take particular and 
distinctive fonns in such contexts, specifically because of the co-presence of a set of 
accessibility-governed translative practices. Classical rhetoric distinguishes two types 
of topos which are modalities of'inventio'. An analytic topic presumes a set of always-
already existing practices of argument (the argument from tradition, the argument by 
analogy etc.) which can be used to fonnulate particular arguments about particular 
subjects.6 It also suggests how new ones can be generated: existing reasoning 
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conventions intersect or permute with new and particular subject matter, which by 
implication can be topicalized in various ways. The cumulative topos or commonplace, 
which will form the focus of this analysis, is an established intersection of a mode of 
argument and a particular subject matter: an institutionalised mode of discursive 
representation: 'the fickleness of woman', life as 'a game of chance' or 'a road with 
many crossroads', 'the tears of a clown', In each case, the topos can be versioned in 
a multiplicity of languages and indeed media, but the organising discourse remains, 
broadly speaking, the same.7 'The tears of a clown' is a much iterated topos which 
assumes and articulates the disjunction between the public and the private, between the 
performed and the authentic: relations which are charged by the apparently absolute 
opposition between laughter and tears. This topos can be realised and elaborated in a 
multiplicity of ways: the familiar filmic image of the circus clown taking off his make-
up after the show is one instance. Here, the liminality of the dressing room - the place 
where public and private identities are made and un-made and the symbolic role of the 
mirror - as a silent witness configuring both the other of audience and the image of self 
reflected and reflected upon - underscore the dichotomy and ambiguity of public 
performance and private identity. 
Translation directs attention to the shifts between original and translating lan~ua~es 
(registers, genres, narrative codes and so on), topicalization to discourse as an 
interpretative modality. In each case, however, my aim is to underscore the relations 
between languages and discourse as central to elaborating the interpretative process. 
Whilst accessibility configures practices which are characteristically committed to the 
representation of the new and difficult in familiar and facilitating forms, coverage is 
predicated on the shared, pre-given character of the field which is being represented, 
and topicalization is one of its fundamental intertextual forms. In the analysis, I aim to 
show that the values and practices engendered by accessibility and coverage pull in 
opposite directions, often proposing interpretations and readings which conflict and are 
incompatible. Accessibility is a reader-centred concept and is obviously both relative 
and variable. But accessibility is more than a set of assumptions made about the reader: 
it has a more specific and institutional character. Whether the subject matter is 
gardening or Freud, accessibility always presumes that subject matter as an established 
and valued field of knowledge and practice. Accessibility is a frequently stated aim of 
Readers and Introductions and a common cause for comment in reviews where a 
textbook may be deemed to have succeeded or failed to achieve it. The blurb of Raman 
Selden's A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory, for example, 
represents it as 'the first easily accessible account of contemporary theory'.8 
Accessibility may also be represented as problematic. The possible dangers of 
accessibility - usually perceived as banalisation or bowdlerisation - may also be 
acknowledged. In the preface to Literary Theory: An Introduction, Terry Eagleton 
remarks: 
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Though such a project obviously involves omissions and oversimplifications, I 
have tried to popularise rather than vulgarise the subject. 9 
Accessibility has a number of meanings in relations to textbooks. It most obviously 
indicates the 'stylistic' representation of the subject matter, but it may also refer to the 
facilitating ways in which the book configures its own use - bibliographies which 
classify 'further reading' in terms of relative difficulty, for example. 10 'Accessibility' 
can also refer, especially in Readers, to the convenient accommodation of a group of 
texts in a single place of publication. 11 Accessibility does not presume the intrinsic 
difficulty of the subject matter, though in the case of literary theory textbooks, this is a 
frequent assumption. In the introduction to A Practical Reader in Contemporary 
Literary Theory (1996), the editors paraphrase K. M. Newton's introduction to Theory 
into Practice (1992) as a rationale for their own 'theory into practice' Reader: 'the ... 
book is a response ... to students who find that the high level of abstraction of much 
theory makes it difficult to grasp and deploy'.12 
In Readers and Introductions, accessibility always intersects with a set of practices 
shaped by coverage. A number of publishing categories valorise coverage. The tourist 
guidebook, the listings magazine or supplement, and in a different vein, the 
encyclopaedia and dictionary are all instances where an always-already modified 
inclusiveness is a central goal. Like accessibility, coverage presumes a field which 
pre-exists any mapping or delineation. And whilst any mode of representation of a field 
is always a making and remaking, the presumption of the pre-given object, in 
academic textbooks in particular, is of prime importance to the processes and practices 
of both production and reception. Like accessibility, coverage is an avowed aim and, 
on occasion, a site of anxiety in the prefaces of Introductions and Readers, surfacing 
most commonly in comparisons and contrasts with other textbooks or earlier editions of 
the 'same' book. In the preface to the second edition of Modern Literary Theory, the 
editors refer to the date of publication of the first edition (1988) and comment: 
Since then all foundations of Western thought and representation have 
increasingly been held up to critical gaze and for that reason we have a revised 
and expanded section on Postmodernism to reflect this most recent 
development. 13 
Coverage most obviously pertains to questions of selection - is Formalism to be 
included or not? - and to inclusiveness. Readers and Introductions do not necessarily 
seek to map the field exhaustively, but it is an important value and modality of practice 
and one which is complicated by the recognition that the field is ·subject to change: 14 
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The task of selection for this anthology has not been an easy one, for the field 
which has to be mapped continuously changes its boundaries as new relations 
and combinations move in and out of the foreground. 15 
. Change is suggested here as an inherent aspect of the field which the book must map. 
The practices which accessibility and coverage configure and the interpretative and 
reading practices which they propose are visible in all parts of the apparatus of 
textbooks. I will begin by examining titles and intertitles. 
2. Accessibility and coverage: translation and topicalisation 
Titling practices 
Titles, as discussed in chapters four and five, are important intertextual contexts for 
reading, generating expectations - thematic and rhematic, to use Genette's terms - of 
the text's content and form. 16 Most simply, titles propose a preliminary or provisional 
context which may be confirmed or challenged by the processes·of reading. Flaubert's 
novel Madame Bovary, for example, acquaints the reader with two 'other' Madame 
Bovarys - Charles's mother and his first wife - before the third - Emma - is introduced. 
But the novel's progress and particularly its ending secures Emma as the true referent of 
the title. This is not simply because she is the central character: she is also the subject 
of a scandal which the novel retells, a literary recoding that 'still' bears the markers of 
its languages - gossip and intrigue, official and unofficial versions of events and so on. 
EmmaBovary will be remembered: she is Madame Bovary and part of the history of 
the provincial town which scrutinised her so closely.17 
Readers and Introductions are rich in titles and intertitles (Genette's term) which 
have a distinctive set of framing functions. 18 Apart from the title of the book itself 
there are a range of intertitles: chapter and section headings, subheadings within 
chapters, sections, and often within bibliographies. The book titles of Readers and 
Introductions are highly general: A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory; 
Literary Theory: An Introduction; Studying Literary Theory: An Introduction; 
Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory; A Practical 
Reader in Contemporary Theory and Modern Literary Theory: A Reader. 19 None of 
these offers a gloss or translation of what literary theory might be despite the 
presumption, in many cases explicit in the title, of the prescribed reader's unfamiliarity 
with the object, but they do all strongly propose that literary theory does not merely 
exist but is an established object. What gives this interpretation its force is the way in 
which the titles conjoin a representation of their content with one of their form. It is the 
very representation of these texts as Introductions or Guides or Readers which 
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proposes the established character of the object: this is a particular treatment of literary 
theory (whatever that might be). It the very inscription of accessibility that effects this 
formal topicalisation. The marking of a particular context - 'studyin~ literary theory' -
in one case, and of a particular moment in the reader's relation to theory - be~innin~ 
theory - in an other, assert, even more strongly, the stable existence of the object that 
the reader is presumed to be unfamiliar with: to be studied, to be 'begun', the object 
must have an already institutionalised existence. The particularised present of the 
prescribed reader who is here and now beginning or studying literary theory enriches 
the established and above all prior temporality of theory. The titles which modify 
literary theory, with 'contemporary' or 'modern' for example, also foreground 
institutionality: contemporary or modern (as modifiers) presuppose the pre-existence of 
a second object: literary theory, which precedes contemporary l~terary theory. 
The established character of the object, although a given, is not represented as 
shared between addresser and addressee. The title of the introductory textbook 
proposes a field that is established and shared amongst some but new or unfamiliar to 
the prescribed reader: a significant distance exists between writing subject and reading 
subject. The former is not simply knowledgeable about a certain set of objects which 
are new to the reader, but shares this knowledge with others in a common zone of 
discourse. This discourse is not the exclusive property of the writing subject, or rather 
the writing subject is only one of a number of authors or signatories. But the reader is 
(for the moment at least) presumed to be outside this discourse and the title proposes a 
way of opening it up. 
Whilst Introductions explicitly inscribe their status and propose their accessibility, 
Readers operate slightly differently, and the introductory status of the book mayor 
may not be strongly marked. The title Modern Literary Theory: A Reader does not 
inscribe a reader who has little or no knowledge of the field which the book covers, 
Rather, it is the collection and accommodation of a number of texts in one volume that 
render it 'accessible', and indeed the sheer size and weight of Readers proposes both 
inclusiveness (coverage) and accessibility. A Practical Reader in Contemporary Literary 
Theory configures accessibility somewhat differently. The strongly proposed sense of 
'practical' is constituted antonymically by 'theory': practical as opposed to theoretical. 
This enriches the sense of 'practical' to include facilitating, suggesting that the object is 
being modalised in introductory terms. This is turn makes possible other implicatures: 
'contemporary literary theory is difficult' and various versions of a criticism of the 
theoretical qua theoretical. 
On the contents page of Readers and Introductions, the book title is supplemented 
by a range of intertitles which together constitute a representation of the book, and in 
particular its structure. The contents page is 'metastructural'; representing something 
of the book's architecture: its order, and perhaps, something of its emphasis - as 
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measured by duration - as well as its content. It may also suggest reading strategies: as 
will be shown, Readers and Introductions do not privilege a linear reading practice. 
But in the case of Readers and Introductions, the contents page can also be understood 
as a translation of the title. 
The contents pages of A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory inform 
us that the book consists of six chapters, preceded by an introduction and followed by 
an index.20 The chapters are titled and ordered as follows: 'Russian Formalism', 
'Marxist theories', 'Structuralist theories', 'Post-structuralist theories', 'Reader-
oriented theories' and 'Feminist theories,.21 Chapter length varies: the shortest (on 
formalism) is thirteen pages, the longest (on post-structuralism) is thirty three. Each 
chapter is subdivided into sections which are also titled. The number of titled sections 
also varies (from four - structuralism - to nine - reader-oriented). The section titles of 
the contents pages correspond to the chapter organisation and intertitles (except that 
each chapter also includes a bibliography which is not mentioned in the contents pages). 
The contents page proposes an immediate semantic enrichment of the 'contemporary 
literary theory' of the title. Comprising nearly two pages, the contents gloss or 
translate literary theory as a general term for a multiplicity of theoretical practices; what 
is more, each of these theories is itself multiple - Feminist theories and so on. But it is 
the prior classification proposed by the book title which enables this variety to be 
configured in the same context. Multiplicity is not only asserted by the plural form that 
attends all but the first chapter title, but by the thirty six chapter subheadings, which list 
a variety of usually conjoined names and concepts: for example, 'Roland Barthes: the 
plural text', 'Discourse and power: Michel Foucault and Edward Said'. Coverage and 
accessibility clearly intersect in the textual practice of representation here. This is most 
clearly manifest in the prevalence and multiplicity of author names, which suggest the 
broad scope of the field, a range extended by the presence of many names whose 
morphology would be marked as foreign to a native English speaker (whether or not the 
national language could be identified): Shklovsky, Althusser, Levi-Strauss, Husserl, 
for example. A certain cultural richness is proposed. But this plurality of names is also 
perhaps paradoxically shaped by accessibility. Whilst the majority of the names are 
assumed to be unknown to the prescribed reader, the proper names represent a certain 
will to 'humanise'; a textual practice translates the abstract into a formally more 
accessible concrete. Accessibility also shapes the contents page in other ways. Chapter 
titles and sub-headings are all page-numbered: any section can be looked up, 
suggesting that the book's format is reader-friendly. The criterion of accessibility is 
substantively marked in the number of subheadings and their correspondence with 
particular page numbers. A glance at the page numbers informs the reader that no 
named section of a chapter is longer than seven pages, most are two or three. The text 
is divided and arranged in small segments, which is presumed to render and distribute 
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the matter of the text in a facilitating form. But this conciseness also implicates, though 
less strongly, the scope of the field of coverage. Succinct representation is informed 
by the size of the field covered or mapped, although this is subordinate to accessibility. 
The starkness of the contents page of Eagleton's Literary Theory provides a useful 
contrast. Here the contents, spaciously formatted, cover only half a page. The five 
named chapters are listed as are the (also named) introduction and conclusion?2 But 
there are no subheadings (either on the contents page or within the book itself, where 
section breaks are marked exclusively by spacing). Compare this to the contents page 
of Beginning Theory which runs to nearly four packed pages.23 Chapter subheadings 
abound (the average number per chapter is eight), and, as in A Reader's Guide, all 
correspond to the chapter intertitles. What is most noticeable about the linguistic form 
of these intertitles is the degree of both lexical repetition and lexical and syntactic 
parallelism. Every chapter has two fixed sections: 'Stop and Think' and 'Selected 
Reading', both of which explicitly address the prescribed reader. All chapters apart 
from the first have sections entitled 'What x critics do' (where x might be structuralist, 
Feminist, new historicist etc.) and 'x theory/ x criticism: an example / examples'. The 
criterion informing this practice is accessibility: the formal repetition and parallelism 
promising uniformity of treatment. Substantively, and in terms congruent with A 
Reader's Guide, the marking of 'doing' and of examples translate the abstract object 
of the title - 'Theory' - into practice and illustration. 
The contents page is, as noted above, one manifestation of the organisation or 
architecture of the textbook. Within such structures, particular texts, authors, 
concepts and discourses are embedded in multiple intertextual patterns of classification 
which propose a range of reading relations, most obviously within chapters, sections 
and subsections, where they may be classified according to 'theory' (Structuralism, 
Feminism, Marxism, and so on); and/or to 'topic' (,The Subject', 'Language and 
Textuality', 'Discourse and the Social').24 Texts may also be located within a range of 
macro- and micro-genealogies, and configured in comparative and contrastive patterns 
(Like Derrida, Barthes is interested in ... ; Unlike Greimas, Genette focuses on ... ). 
These proposed relations intersect with the always-already intertextual character of the 
texts and discourses themselves (an intersection more strongly marked in Readers 
where the mode of representation is extended citation). 
The patterns of textual relations within Readers and Introductions are substantially 
shaped by assumptions about the state of the field at a particular moment, its perimeters 
and dominants: those objects, practices and sites of debate or contestation which are 
perceived as the most central, most important and most characteristic of the field in its 
contemporary form. These patternings are represented not as the individual work or 
mapping of the author(s) or editor(s) of the textbook, but as a set of relations which are, 
in the main, the common property of the field and are 'underwritten' by it. The author 
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or editor is not assumed to be the formative agent of either the field (in its most general 
sense) or its particular textual patternings and relations; rather the author is a 
representative of the field in which these relations originated and were legitimated. This 
augments the authority of the textual relations proposed: not the idiosyncratic whim of 
an individual but the consensus of a field. However, this ordering is also governed by 
the principle of accessibility: the grouping of texts under headings should facilitate 
reading. The classifications effected by headings (,Feminism', 'The Body' etc.) filter 
the myriad of intertextual reading contexts that any text can propose, creating a focus or 
perspective through which the texts, so grouped, can be read and related to one 
another. Classificatory practices order and delimit textual relations and the reading 
practices proposed by them. 
Sectioning Practices 
Central to the ways in which textual relations are configured in Readers and 
Introductions is the concept of representativeness: the text or body of work that is 
representative of a particular object, author, theory or historical moment within a 
particular theory. The Death of the Author', for example, is ubiquitously classified ,as 
a quintessential representation of the emergence of post-structuralism, and Barthes's 
writing in general is often represented as an instantiation of the shift from structuralism 
to post-structuralism.25 In the most general sense, such classifications propose a 
reading practice where each modality of reading extends beyond the text itself: to read 
The Death of the Author' is also to read in a more general sense about post-
structuralism and other post-structuralist texts. The meanings of the text are not 
exclusive to it but pertain to and are present in the discourses of post-structuralism in 
some wider sense. The text is a kind of map or guide and may also function as a frame 
through which other post-structuralist texts are read. The proposal of relations between 
particular texts and the wider world of discourse in which they participate is a typical 
feature of these textbooks. The value of such texts lies precisely in the extensions 
proposed by its classification as 'representative'. Within Introductions and Readers, 
texts are also given as more or less representative within the general category. There is 
a difference between a text which is classified as 'an example of or even 'a good 
example of and one categorised as emblematic or epitomatic.26 The exemplary or 
epitomatic text is proposed as having more value than the mere example or 
representative, in the sense outlined above. In the first case, the text could be 
substituted for a range of other typical texts within the field. In the second, the group 
of texts which could substitute for it is necessarily significantly smaller: not merely 
typical but epitomatic. In both cases however, what is strongly proposed is that the 
field is larger, more extensive than any particular instance of coverage or mapping. As 
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in realism, metonymy suggests more, more than is actually represented in the 
particular instance. But every category has its opposite. And whilst the majority of 
texts discussed or extracted in Readers and Introductions are representative, some are 
not: they are unique and unsubstitutable. 'Unsubstitutability' is not a fixed quality of 
the text which is presented as such. It is an attribute and value which is proposed 
within particular intertextual classifications and locations. Thus, for example, in 
Modern Literary Theory, the extract from Saussure's Course in General Linguistics is 
unsubstitutable because of the genealogy asserted in the Reader as a whole, where 
Saussure is posited as the originary and founding moment of literary theory: 
Saussure's theory offers the possibility of a different perspective and gives rise 
to a wholly different epistemology. This perspective has been referred to as 
'post-Saussurean'; it generally includes structuralist and/or post-structuralist 
theories.27 
The explicit and implicit values of this perspective shape the genealogy proposed. 
Within it, there is no alternative to Saussure: no equivalent or near equivalent text 
which could substitute. Whilst coverage is generally predicated on the notion of the 
representative text, the unique and necessary text does not undermine the established 
metonymic 'more' that the representative asserts. The uncommon (in practice) and 
unsubstitutable text is a valorised constituent of the field as it is proposed. 
The concept of representativeness is also central to the relations' that are proposed 
between individual texts and discourses within Readers and Introductions. First, as 
noted above, representativeness implicates a field which the text or discourse is 
representative of. Second, the representative is the category which mediates the 
ordering, including the reading order of the texts and discourses that the textbook 
configures. The uniformity of treatment that is accorded to each theory in Beginning 
Theory proposes first that each theory has a formally identical relation with theory, 
and second that these various practices are comparable, indeed even substitutable (all 
can be practised and exemplified, all 'generate' their own particular kind of critic and 
so on). This in turn proposes that the book does not require or privilege a linear 
reading, but that the chapters may be read in any order. And indeed within the body 
texS the segues and references back to previous chapters are minimal, furthering the 
sense of the individual chapter's discreteness.28 
In strong contrast and more typically, Modern Literary Theory: A Reader proposes 
a definite narrative and particular orders of reading. The book is divided into two parts 
which are in turn divided into sections. The texts in Part One are, with one exception -
'Saussure' - arranged under headings of named theories: 'Formalism', 'Structuralism', 
'Marxism', 'Reader Response' and 'Feminism'. The texts in Part Two are classified in 
two ways; first, under subject headings - 'The Subject', 'Language and Textuality', 
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'Discourse and the Social'; and second, under named 'theories': 'New Historicism' 
and 'Postmodernism'.29 This Reader makes a relatively clear and strong distinction 
between Parts One and Two: 
Part One of this book deals with the initial break with the orthodoxies of literary 
studies. The material for this part has been selected to exemplify its less radical 
questioning and undermining of the literary studies enterprise. But while it is 
less radical it does prepare the ground for the work represented in Part Two 
which generally adopts a more interrogative and disruptive perspective.3D 
It is clearly assumed here that the prescribed reader will interpret 'radical' as a term of 
approbation, and that 'undermining' and 'disrupting' are goods in this context.31 I will 
return to the issue of assumptions when I discuss topicalisation later on in the chapter, 
but it is the narrative and evaluative relations proposed between Parts One and Two that 
are of interest here. The value of Russian Formalism, Structuralism, Marxism, 
Reader Theory and Feminism is primarily as a discursive prequel and intertext for what 
follows. The texts in Part One are proposed as explicatory of those in Part Two 
('prepare the ground'). This in turn implicates that the latter have an autonomous and 
not a dependent or relative value (Part Two is not a preparation for anything, it is the 
'main event'); as such they call perhaps for a more careful reading. What is also 
proposed is a reading practice which will draw out the contrasting 'radicals' of each 
part, and, given the positive accent of 'radical', evaluation here precedes both 
interpretation and explication. The value of Part Two is also proposed by its duration: 
251 pages, against the 107 pages of Part One. The broad expanse of ground that post-
structuralism is presumed to cover suggests that it exceeds a single classification, and 
whether or not the reader is familiar with the use of 'social' as a noun (,Discourse and 
the Social' [my emphasis]), for example, its scope may be implicated from more 
familiar related lexemes (society, social life and so on). 
An evaluative ordering of textual and reading relations also occurs in the section 
introductions, but here it is the pre-texts which are accorded the greater value. In the 
introduction to 'Discourse and the Social', Bakhtin and Foucault are both proposed as 
. the authors of the 'formative writings in this trajectory,.32 The section comprises six 
texts: Bakhtin, from 'Discourse in the Novel'; Tony Bennett, 'Texts, Readers, 
Reading Formations'; Foucault, from 'The Order of Discourse'; Homi Bhabha, 'Of 
Mimicry and Men: the Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse'; Ian Hunter, from 
'Reading Character'; and, Edward Said, from 'Opponents, Audiences, 
Constituencies, Community'. All but Said's are bound to either Bakhtin or Foucault.33 
Bennett's is the text most explicitly located in relation to Bakhtin. The editors bind the 
two through a contrastive: whilst Bakhtin's work on the 'interanimation' of languages 
is oriented towards literary production, Bennett's focuses on reception. The repetition 
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of ' inter animation', a word introduced in the context of Bakhtin and also applied to 
Bennett's conceptualisation of language, strengthens the relation.34 Bhabha's 'Of 
Mimicry and Men' 'deploys a Foucauldian method' and the 'mode of investigation' of 
Hunter's 'Reading Character' is 'suggested by Foucault's later work'.35 However the 
relations proposed in each case differ. Bakhtin is marked as a precursor and context for 
Bennett. But in Foucault's case, his originating authority is explicitly marked. Bennett 
is not described as 'Bakhtinian'; it is Foucault who is the more established author 
function. This is partly because 'Foucauldian' so strongly asserts Foucault's impact and 
also because the narrative strongly marks the shifts of focus between early and later 
work which is part of the stated rationale for the choice of text - 'The Order of 
Discourse' - 'balanced between this shift in emphasis,.36 In contrast, the Bakhtin 
extract is not named in the introduction and no rationale for its inclusion offered: the 
extract is 'representative Bakhtin'. Whilst we may not then be strongly encouraged to 
read Bennett through the lens of Bakhtin, we are certainly encouraged to read Bhabha 
and Hunter as illustrations of Foucauldian practice. This delimits a particular set of 
interpretative possibilities and constrains others. 
Bhabha's text is indeed a study of a discourse and its effects, spoken from a 
particular place at a particular time; and more specifically certain Foucauldian categories 
and preoccupations are inscribed within it: 
Mimicry is also the sign of the inappropriate, however, a difference of 
recalcitrance which coheres the dominant strategic function of colonial power, 
intensifies surveillance, and poses an immanent threat to both normalised 
knowledges and disciplinary powers.37 
However, other intertextual relations are at least as strongly if not more strongly 
marked: Derrida's concept of differance, Freud and psychoanalysis more generally, 
and theories of colonialism. The conjunction of the first two is observable in the 
synoptic summary of colonial mimicry in the second paragraph of the text as 'the desire 
for a reformed recognisable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same but 
not quite. ,38 A citation from Freud on fantasy, and local contextual markers inscribe a 
number of lexemes with a specific, though not exclusive, psychoanalytic sense: 
'ambivalence', the 'splitting' (of the subject within discourse), 'castration', 
'desire'.39 Colonial theories are likewise an important set of intertexts. The work of 
Said, Cesaire and Fanon is referred to and footnoted, a textual context which is 
strengthened by the corpus of object texts to which Bhabha refers: eighteenth and 
nineteenth century accounts of India and Indians; and the writings of Kipling, Forster 
and Naipaul (cited) where the figure of the mimic man occurs.40 The introduction to 
'Discourse and the Social' does mention that Bhabha's text: 
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also resonates with other post-structuralist theory. His analysis of a particular 
colonial subject, interesting in its own right, is also invaluable as an illustration 
of post-structuralism in action.41 
However, given that this 'other' post-structuralist theory is not named and one of the 
text's representative virtues is an instance of a generalised post-structuralism 'in action', 
these other interpretative contexts are less likely to be mobilised than the named 
Foucauldian one which directly precedes it in this section of the Reader.42 The Reader 
prioritises a particular set of intertextual relations and weakens other interpretative 
possibilities. 
3. The relations between translation and topicalisation 
So far I have focused on the ways in which accessibility and coverage and the practices 
of translation and topicalisation operate together in Readers and Introductions and how 
their relations define the content of each and their instantiation. To render the field 
accessible, what is shared 'and familiar to the field must simultaneously be represented 
as both new and familiar to the prescribed reader. This is the challenge. What I wish to 
examine now is the tensions which are generated by it, tensions which in turn generate 
conflicting interpretative and reading possibilities. I will begin by exploring a further 
. set of translative practices, where original and translation are co-present in the local 
textual context. 43 
Some of the practices of translation which such Readers and Introductions employ 
are clearly common to textbooks in general, and to other modes of discourse -
instruction manuals for example - where intra-linguistic translation is an established 
practice of representation. In all such cases, rendering accessible is a central goal and 
criterion of a translative practice which is reader-oriented: the original language is 
assumed to present interpretative difficulties to the prescribed reader and the aim is to 
find a translating language which the reader is familiar with. But the discursive oQject, 
'literary theory', poses particular problems for realising this purpose of language 
learning and indeed for intra-linguistic translation in general. 
The concept of intra-linguistic translation is strongly associated with Roman 
lakobson, as one of three types distinguished in 'On Linguistic Aspects of 
Translation,.44 lakobson defines intra-linguistic translation as 'rewording', a linguistic 
interpretation within a single language.4s In pragmatics the concept of 'reformulation' 
captures some of the properties of lakobson's definition (though it also includes such 
modes as summary) and it has been argued that reformulation often functions to delimit 
interpretative possibilities.46 The constraining of interpretation is precisely the focus in 
the discussion which follows but here translation is conceived ill intertextually and not 
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in the terms of either lakobson or canonical pragmatics. Bakhtin's concept of the 
heteroglossia troubles the sameness inscribed in lakobson's definition. Understood as 
a process which takes place within the heteroglossia, intra-linguistic translation is the 
set of practices whereby one 'language' - in Bakhtin's sense - is rendered into another, 
a process which seeks to retain the referent and represent it within another signifying 
practice. Likewise, intertextual theories expose the ordinary-language assumptions 
which are particularly pertinent to pragmatic 'reformulation'. Diane Blakemore, for 
example, characterises specialised languages (one of her examples is botanical . 
language) as both 'difficult' and 'costly' in processing terms, suggesting an ordinary 
language, everyday language which is by contrast 'processing-light,.47 But 
intertextual theories disturb the simplicity of such a distinction: there is no singular 
everyday language. Bakhtin and Kristeva's attention to the discourses which 
underwrite linguistic practices also draw attention to the assumptions which govern 
translation in textbooks, which in tum shape and constrain interpretative possibilities.48 
In the case of literary theory books (and in many other modes of intra-linguistic 
translation} languages are predominantly classified as either specialist (or 'technical') or 
generalist (or 'common'), and translation is conceived as the practice and passage from 
special to general. The difficulty that the original technical language poses to an 
'ordinary reader' may be justified, for example on the grounds of precision or 
concision; or it may be challenged - as unnecessary 'jargon' or deliberate obfuscation -
as part of an argument which valorises 'plain speaking'. But this 'calling a spade a 
spade' discourse is bound to the fallacy that there is a common language, real or ideal, 
that can be, or should be, understood by all. In 'Words from Abroad', Theodor 
Adorno argues that the use of 'foreign words' is a critically productive counter to tp.e 
chimera of a common language.49 For him, the presence of foreign words (he is 
talking specifically about national languages) is a marker of the non-presence and non-
existence of a common, organic language, which exposes desire as illusion. Further: 
'Foreign words teach us that language can no longer cure us of specialisation by 
imitating nature; it can do so only by assuming the burden of specialisation,.50 For 
Adorno, the inruptions of other languages are valorised. Likewise, for the 
contemporary translation theorist, Lawrence Venuti, the 'foreignising' translation is 
valued on the grounds that it marks, not only the original but, through careful and 
explicit attention to the language of translation, what is foreign and uncanny about it 
also.5! He opposes this potentially radical practice to forms of 'domesticating' 
translation, which attempts to absorb and appropriate the original into the national 
culture of the translating language, erasing the otherness of both. Adorno and Venuti 
both valorise the 'unhomely', though in different ways and for different reasons, and 
although both treat translation (or non-translation) as a set of practices which are 
contextualised to some extent in terms of reading, in each case there is a formalist 
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correlation between the marking of the other and a radical value of disturbance and 
denaturalisation.52 However what both Adorno and Venuti do draw attention to is that 
translation is never a narrowly 'linguistic' practice but always-already cultural - just as 
the difficulties proposed about literary theory are in textbooks - and, that practices of 
translation are strongly governed by particular discourses about language as well as by 
assumptions about the prescribed reader. 
In literary theory textbooks, the translation of the difficult into modes presumed to 
be more familiar and intelligible to the prescribed reader is shaped by a range of 
assumptions and discourses. First and most obviously, the prescribed reader is 
assumed to be in 'knowledge deficit' as regards the substantive matter of these texts -
literary theory. But it is also important to remember the know ledges the reader is 
presumed to have. The 'reader' addressed and constituted in the title of Raman 
Selden's introduction - A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory - is, a 
reader already educated in and familiar with 'Literature', (predominantly English, but 
also sometimes a more broadly European and on occasion North American literature) 
attested by the ways in which canonical literary knowledge of authors and texts is 
invoked as shared knowledge.53 Second, as discussed above, such textbooks are 
strongly ordered by the presumption of a common language or set of languages into 
which the specialised, rarefied original can be translated. For example Saussure's 
'sign' - a lexical item within the language of structural linguistics - is often translated in 
textbooks as 'word', which is presumed to be an everyday or colloquial re:-rendering 
of the 'same' concept. Third, translation is shaped by particular understandings of the 
difficulties that literary theory poses, the difficulty of 'abstraction' (which can be 
countered by translative examples: the Saussurean sign system as traffic lights); the 
difficulty of theory as theory which can be translated into 'practice' (illustrative analyses 
of particular theories 'in action'), or the difficulty of theory as far distant from the 
prescribed reader's everyday, a distance which can be overcome by are-rendering 
within the terms of what are assumed to be familiar objects and practices. I am 
classifying all these as practices of translation because they all seek to render or 
domesticate a difficult original into the form of a more accessible translation. Below I 
will analyse, in some detail, some examples of such translative practices, focusing in 
each case on the relations between original and translation as semantically constitutive. 
The examples discussed all represent some aspect of Saussure's linguistic theory, a 
choice which, I hope, both facilitates comparison and contrast but also suggests at 
least something of the range of possible representations that translation can effect. 
Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction furnishes the first example. An 
account of langue and parole and Saussure's proposed object of linguistic study is the 
final element in the representation of Saussure 
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Finally, Saussure believed that linguistics would get into a hopeless mess if it 
concerned itself with actual speech, or parole as he called it. He was not 
interested in investigating what people actually said; he was concerned with the 
objective structure of signs which made their speech possible in the first place, 
and this he called langue. Neither was Saussure interested in the real objects 
which people spoke about: in order to study language effectively, the referents 
of the signs, the things they actually denoted, had to be placed in brackets.54 
One of my reasons for choosing this example is that it illustrates an important point 
about translation strategies in textbooks. Not every 'gloss' or definition is a translation. 
Here the definition of 'langue' is non-translative; the phrase 'the objective structure of 
signs which made their speech possible in the first place' defines langue within the 
language of structural linguistics i.e. within the language that langue is part of.55 By 
contrast, the definition of 'parole' as 'actual speech' and 'what people actually said' is 
a translation which re-writes the original in another language. It is the register of 
translation which marks the presumed to be familiar contours of an easily recognisable 
object. 'Actual speech' would not be significantly dissonant within a text about 
linguistics. But neither would it be out of place in a multiplicity of contexts which have 
nothing to do with linguistics. For the prescribed reader (presumed not to be familiar 
with linguistics) it is more probable that a non-specialised sense, a non-linguistic sense 
is invoked. This 'everyday' sense is strengthened by the register of 'get into a hopeless 
mess': the fate of linguistics if it should meddle with actual speech. This incursion of 
colloquial speech into formal writing is another marker of the everyday that is parole. 
This 'ordinary' or familiar sense is proposed more strongly because of the register 
contrast in the definition of 'langue' - 'the objective structure of signs which made their 
speech possible in the first place'. The length and formal complexity of this defining 
translation - a noun clause which incorporates an embedded restrictive relative clause -
is, as noted above, a markedly different type of definition or gloss from 'actual 
speech'. Descriptively speaking, this shifting between translational and non-
translational definitions is a common feature in literary theory textbooks, but what is 
the probable interpretative effect for the prescribed reader? The iteration of 'actual' and 
'real' in the translations and representations of both parole and the referent - 'actual 
speech', 'what people actually said', 'the real objects which people spoke about', 'the 
actual things they denoted' (my emphasis) - proposes a strong contrast with the 
'abstract' nature of langue. Parole or actual speech is proposed as both concrete and 
familiar to the prescribed reader; but equally importantly, the obviousness of parole as 
an object renders the definition of 'langue' obscure: a rarefied abstraction. The 
generalist mode of translation of parole and the register dissonance between it and the 
definition of langue mobilises a familiar empiricist discourse, which delimits the senses 
and values of actual/real and simultaneously invokes its other: the abstract. 'Abstract' 
is not lexicalised but the discourse invokes it as the other of real/actual and as such it 
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collocates with (and modifies) langue, given the strongly foregrounded opposition 
between the two terms. The relations between actual and abstract are alsoevaluative: 
whilst the actual is palpable and clear, the abstract is obscure, even obfuscating. This 
discourse strongly proposes a certain set of implicatures: 'real speech (and not the 
abstract system on which it is based) should be the starting point of linguistic enquiry', 
'the objects which are spoken about should not be put in brackets'; and perhaps more 
weakly in this expli~it form: 'Saussure was wrong'. 
What is interesting here is that this discourse directly contradicts the arguments of 
the book as a whole and the critique of structuralism that follows. For Eagleton, 'what 
people actually said' and 'the real objects which people spoke about' are indeed central 
to any properly explanatory account of linguistic practice, rendering language 
. historically specific and subject to the modes of analysis that follow from this. This 
definition of 'actual speech' however is hardly commonsensical, nor could it be 
presumed to be a familiar interpretative sense for the prescribed reader. The . 
conceptualisation of language which Eagleton is seeking to counter is not abstraction 
qua abstraction but an abstraction which denies a specifically Marxist conception of 
historical process. This argument is..,. explicitly substantiated in the account of 
Voloshinov/Bakhtin's critique of Saussurean linguistics later on in the same chapter, 
which is clearly valued as definitive. 56 However, the empiricist, anti-theoretical 
discourse articulated by these dissonant definitions (one translative, the other not) is 
much more likely to organise the interpretation of the prescribed reader. In drawing on 
a 'familiar' language, Eagleton unwittingly mobilises a discourse which, because it is 
familiar, is far more likely to order interpretation: it carries all the 'obvious' force of 
common-sense precisely because it is a dominant discourse. This example illustrates a 
more general argument. Within such textbooks, the translation from what is presumed 
to be difficult and unfamiliar into what is as~umed to be a more intelligible everyday 
'idiom' is also often accompanied by a translation of the concept or object into another 
discourse. Indeed, translation of this type often effects a simultaneous shift into 
. another discourse, formulating the object of translation within a different field of 
knowledge relations, reformulating it, in fact, as another object. This is an issue to 
which I will return. 
The second example occurs in Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader 
published in a series entitled 'Critical Readers in Theory and Practice', whose stated 
aim is to bridge 'the gap between theory and practice [which] can often seem far too 
wide for the student of literary theory'. 57 Bakhtinian Thought is cortstituted out of two 
genres of textbook, the Introduction and the Reader, and combines an introductory 
student-oriented account of some of Voloshinov/Bakhtin's central ideas written by 
Simon Dentith with a selection of extracts from various texts by Bakhtin and 
Voloshinov. In the first chapter, entitled 'Voloshinov and Bakhtin on Language', a 
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brief account of Saussure's distinction between langue and parole is offered by way of 
an introduction to Voloshinov's critique of 'abstract objectivism,.58 The distinction 
proposed between langue and parole is sandwiched between two versionings of an 
answer to Saussure's question: what is the object of linguistic science? 
He concludes that the vast number of actual uses of language cannot possibly 
form the object of a science; rather linguistic science must concentrate on the 
underlying system which enables each and every use of language to be 
meaningful ... 
... If linguistics is to be like a science, like say geology, it has to study the 
types of rock and not each and every pebble on the beach.59 
This example clearly illustrates the practice of analogical and metaphorical translation. 
The second versioning of the answer translates by analogy and metaphor the first. 
What would seem to motivate the analogy with geology is the assumption that geology 
is uncontroversially a science, an assumption presumed to be accepted by the 
prescribed reader. This maps with the repetition of 'science' in the first answer where it 
is strongly proposed that Saussure seeks to make the study of language scientific. This 
marks the second iteration relatively strongly as a translation. The analogy presupposes 
firstly and most strongly that one important property of sciences is that they are 
classificatory: scientific practices typologise and codify, they do not simply list or 
inventory. However, a more specific relationship between geological practice and 
Saussurean linguistics is also proposed by the metaphoric representation of linguistic 
practice: the classifying of rocks is paralleled to langue and 'each and every pebble' 
stands for parole, 'the vast number of actual uses of language'. The latter is proposed 
more strongly as the 'quantity' of parole is emphasised in both representations. But the 
translating metaphor constructs a very different representation of langue and parole and 
their relations from the representation that precedes it. The first or original 
representation proposes langue as an object with a causal relationship with parole, it is 
langue which makes possible any instance of parole: langue is 'the system which 
enables each and every use of language to be meaningful'. The metaphorical 
translation, by contrast proposes that the distinction between langue and parole is 
between utterances (pebbles) and utterance types (types of rock). No causal 
relationship is implicated between the two: a typology or classification of different 
types of rock does not generate the mass of pebbles on the beach. The translating 
metaphor permits the interpretration that langue is a (scientific) practice, a procedure. 
The original proposes that langue is an object of study. The choice of an 
'uncontroversial' analogy and its metaphoric extension to emphasise the scientificity of 
Saussure's project has the effect of proposing two incompatible interpretations or 
readings of the objects in question. But which of these is more strongly proposed? It 
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is the register of the metaphor which suggests, not a resolution - both interpretations 
are indeed proposed - but rather a preferred interpretation. The shift of register in the 
last sentence marks a distinction between a scientific practice, marked by a scientific 
language, that of geology which 'has to study types of rock' and a non-scientific one, 
which is less valuable but in effect impossible. Pebbles and beaches collocate strongly 
to suggest a familiar recreational narrative; the aimless (if pleasurable) pastimes of 
counting and collecting. What is being most strongly proposed here then is Saussure's 
commitment to establishing linguistics as a science. The shift of register backgrounds 
the interpretation of langue and parole directly proposed by the metaphor and 
foregrounds a set of implicatures about the scientific commitments inscribed in 
Saussure's project. It is therefore langue as object of study that is more strongly 
proposed. 
Finally, a related example of a different type of trarislation taken from Raman 
Selden's A Reader's Guide To Contemporary Literary Theory. First published in 1985 
and subsequently revised to accommodate and more adequately represent the expanding 
and elastic bou!1daries of the field, it is currently in its fourth edition. The example 
however is still in place: 
The elements of language acquire meaning not as the result of some connection 
between words and things, but only as part of a system of relations. Consider 
the sign-system of traffic lights: 
red - amber - green 
si~nifier (,red') 
signified ('stop') 
The sign signifies only within the system 'red=stop / green = go / amber = 
prepare for red or green'. The relation between signifier and signified is 
arbitrary: there is no natural bond between red and stop, no matter how natural 
it may feel. Since joining the Common Market the British have had to accept 
new electrical colour codings which may seem unnatural (now brown, not red, 
= live, blue, not black, = neutral). Each colour in the traffic system signifies 
not by asserting a positive univocal meaning but by marking a difference, a 
distinction within a system of opposites and contrasts: traffic light 'red' is 
precisely 'not-green'; 'green' is 'not-red,.60 
This sequence translates by example the structuralist concept of how a code works. 
The logic of choice is its apparent simplicity: both these sign systems have very few 
terms and all of the meanings and their relations can be identified and described 
precisely and concisely. But it also seems plausible that the examples were chosen 
because traffic lights and plugs are familiar objects to the prescribed reader, and in 
particular because the meanings of the signs are assumed to be uncontroversial. The 
embedding of the second example within a fragment of a historical narrative of 
European integration and Britain's role within it strengthens the notion that familiarity is 
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a key rationale for the choice of example; it presumes to invoke a particular, shared 
(British) experience and a punctual moment: 'since joining .. .' The example seeks to 
translate a difficult, anti-commonsensical concept into a more reader-friendly form; 
and familiar objects are the mode of domestication. However, at the same time, and 
perhaps more strongly, familiar objects are made strange. Traffic lights are now 'a 
sign-system', red is 'a signifier', stop is 'a signified', 'each colour ... is a distinction 
within a system of opposites and contrasts'. These objects, invoked as the reassurance 
of the everyday, are translated into an unfamiliar language: the discourse of semiotics. 
Within the lexicon of Russian Formalism, this is ostranenie. The example therefore 
pulls in opposing directions: towards domestication (to stay within Venuti's idiom) and 
away from it. 
The everyday examples of traffic lights and plugs also propose something about 
sign systems in general, and it is worth considering the meanings of 'system' that are 
proposed here. Both of the illustrative sign systems are, in different ways, embedded 
in official legal practices. To drive through a red light is illegal: flouting the code in 
this sense may lead to prosecution, it may also be dangerous, even fatal. The re-
coding of plugs is a demand of law: a legally binding requirement for electrical goods 
manufacturers. More explicitly, the recoding of plugs is represented as an imposition. 
'Have had to accept', within the invoked narrative of Britain's awkward and often 
hostile relationship with 'the Continent', suggests an unwilling and even an enforced 
acceptance of a code whose legitimacy and logic is sanctioned by another system. A 
sign system is therefore implicated as having a quasi-legal character ('the new coding 
for plugs was imposed by law', 'sign systems are imposed by something like law'). 
What is also implicated (though more weakly) is that a sign system may be imposed by 
another system (it is European law that demands this coding). This counters the self-
sufficiency of Saussure's langue, which is explicitly proposed in the Same passage: 
'[t]he elements of language acquire meaning not as the result of some connection 
between words and things, but only as part of a system of relations.' 
These accounts of translative practice show that certain translations are more 
strongly marked as such than others but also that different types of translation suggest 
different strategies for reading the relations between original and translation. 
Definitional translations of the 'parole is actual speech' variety propose original and 
translation as substitutable: different signifiers which have the same signified (to stay 
within the Saussurean idiom). Analogical and metaphoric translations do not propose 
semantic identity for the original and its facilitating iteration. If linguistics is 'like' a 
science, it shares some but not all of its 'properties' with other sciences: 'like' in such 
a context suggests non-identity but also a resemblance which makes the simile in some 
sense useful or facilitating as a way of characterising linguistics. Analogy retains a 
distinction between the object and what it is likened to, metaphor meshes the two, but 
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both rely on the reader being able to identify the common ground which makes the 
comparison valid. If langue is types of rock and parole is all the pebbles on the beach 
then the common ground is a relation between type and instance (and langue as a 
classificatory practice). Clearly, the interpretative practice does not propose parole as a 
large number of pebbles, what is proposed is a resemblance which, it is assumed, 
will facilitate the understanding of the original. These differences, however, do not 
invalidate the classification of these pedagogically motivated strategies of analogy, 
metaphor and example as practices of translation. On the contrary, reconceptualising 
such 'figures' or rhetorical strategies as translative whilst, at the same time, 
foregrounding their intertextuality can disturb and trouble a sometimes unthinking 
valorisation of the domesticating translation. Translation by example and analogy in 
particular draw attention to the situation of reading and to readers. As I suggested 
above, such practices operate by proposing, not identity, but some shared properties 
between 'original' and 'translation'. But given the assumptions about the prescribed 
reader which order such texts - a prescribed reader who is above all unfamiliar with the 
matter that is literary theory - it is surely unlikely that such a reader will be able to 
distinguish, as part of the interpretative process, which are shared properties and 
·which are not.61 
Whilst the translative representations of Readers and Introductions, prescribe a 
reader who is in knowledge-deficit as far as the subject matter is concerned, these 
representations intersect with another set, strongly topicalised, which seem to imagine 
a very different reader and reading practice. My main interest here is in the form of 
topicalised representations, the know ledges that they assume and the relations 
constituted between writing subject and prescribed reader. As already suggested, my 
focus is on the cumulative topos or commonplace: an established intersection of a mode 
of argument and a particular subject matter. Fundamental to the definition of the 
commonplace is that it is always-already much cited. Any versioning of a 
.commonplace presumes the addressee's familiarity with a particular case of the already-
said, a familiarity which is shared, common and makes appeal to a common culture: 
the addressee is not only familiar and conversant with the commonplace, but, in a 
certain sense, a co-author of it. The always-and-already and much-versioned character 
of the commonplace is the 'source' of its authority: its invocation or versioning is 
always an assertion of its already-existence and, crucially, its suffusion, its mUltiple 
iterations within a zones or zones of discourse. Every field has its commonplaces, 
however specialised its domain. The 'common' of the commonplace should not be 
aligned with 'ordinary' 'non-specialised' language use, nor should suffusion be 
mapped and measured against and within the General Culture as a whole. Many 
commonplaces cross the boundaries of many 'languages' (in Bakhtin's expansive 
sense) but this is a special case of the general phenomena, not the definition of it. 
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It should therefore be no surprise to encounter commonplaces in such highly 
regulated zones of discourse as disciplines and the fields that comprise them. Within 
the field comprised by Literary Theory there are many contemporary commonplaces: 
meaning is radically and irrevocably unfixed; identity likewise; history is exclusively a 
process of change; Saussure is the origin of modern literary theory and so on. The 
identification and differentiation of Anglo-American and French feminisms for example 
is treated as an uncontroversial classification of a particular passage in the history of 
feminist theory. Mary Eagleton for example, in her introduction to Feminist Literary 
Crtiicism, writes that '[Toril] Moi's suggestion is that Anglo-American feminism does 
not possess the necessary theoretical apparatus to respond adequately to Woolf.' (This 
section is titled 'Anglo-American and French Feminisms'). Likewise, Peter Barry in 
Beginning Theory, who elaborates the topos further: 
What is usually called the 'Anglo-American' version of feminism has tended to 
be more sceptical about recent critical theory, and more cautious in using it than 
the 'French' feminists, who have adopted and adapted a great deal of (mainly) 
post-structuralist and psychoanalytic criticism. 
Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl, the editors of the Reader Feminisms 
explain their rationale in terms of the same opposition.62 Most Readers on feminism, 
they argue, are too methodologically narrow and widening the perspective in one 
dimension often means a narrowing in another: '[g]enerally, if an anthology focuses 
on French feminist theories, it excludes American approaches ... 'i What is interesting 
here is that the French/Anglo-American binary is treated as a neutral classification rather 
than an argument, and that its origins and provenance as such are no longer deemed to 
warrant attribution.63 And indeed, the obvious peculiarity of the commonplace as form 
within academic discourse is that its frequent non-attribution conflicts with conventions 
which privilege the situation and marking of the origins of arguments. 
Whilst it seems evident that the commonplace would be a common form of 
argumentation within particular fields, it is perhaps less obvious that it would be a 
common form of representation in the textbook - modalised for a readership assumed to 
be in knowledge-deficit about the focalised matter of the text. T~e commonplace is, 
however, a staple of Readers and Introductions, and perhaps the strongest marker of 
coverage understood in terms of the logics of the field. A commonplace presumes the 
addressee's familiarity with a particular case of the already-said, something that is held 
to be common and uncontroversial: a representation upon which we can all agree. The 
characteristic form of the commonplace is elliptical: most usually an abbreviated 
representation which it is presumed the prescribed reader can elaborate or expand. 
Ellipsis of this kind is central to the definition of the enthymeme, the canonical mode of 
topicalized argument. Whilst some contemporary commentators define the enthymeme 
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as either fonnally or materially deficient in that one of the premises is either absent or 
questionable, James C. Raymond in 'Enthymemes, Examples and Rhetorical Method' 
suggests a more properly rhetorical definition, focusing on the context of utterance and 
specifically the relations between speaker and addressee.64 Enthymemes, are, 
suggests Raymond, not 'deficient'; rather, the 'missing' premise is presumed to be 
knowledge that the audience has and will supply. For example, when Vivien Jones in 
her introduction to Pride and Prejudice cites Austen's own representation of her subject 
matter - '3 or 4 families in a country village' - and concludes that 'she writes therefore 
about gender and class', her argument elides a premise. To write about gender and 
class if you write about the family is true if and only if the family is conceptualised as a 
social and specifically patriarchal institution. What is important here are the 
interpretative effects of such assumptions about readers' knowledge. 
In the final sentence of the preface to Modern Literary Theory, the editors express 
their hopes for the reader of the book: 
We hope that the experience of reading the book will stimulate further interest 
and help to clarify the major theoretical positions and their relations to each 
other. But beyond that (and in the spirit of contemporary theory) we hope that it 
will encourage readers to contest and challenge the very structures of knowledge 
and understanding we have used in compiling this book.65 
Two dramatically different hopes are expressed here the relatively modest expectation 
that the Reader will elucidate literary theory and engender further interest, and the 
somewhat grandiose prospect that readers will themselves contest the discursive 
assumptions that order the book. The second desire is made 'in the spirit of 
contemporary literary theory'; the value accorded to its practices is strongly, even 
forcefully, proposed as the ideal outcome of reading. Here as elsewhere, the value of 
. literary theory is a strong assumption of the field which coverage presupposes.66 But a 
general, indeed generic partiality for theory as such, and a marking of its positive 
value within a modernist argument, are more primary assumptions. Put in its simplest 
terms: challenging orthodoxy or tradition is good; the more deeply established or 
deeply grounded the orthodoxy the better; change of a radical and disruptive kind -
'revolution not evolution' - is good. The point here is not whether these are 'in reality' 
positive values but how they are represented here in a topicalised mode. Why radical 
change and transfonnation might be a good is not explicated, it is assumed as shared 
and uncontroversial knowledge between the field and the prescribed reader who is 
addressed here as belonging to it. This is the missing tenn of the enthymeme: 
Literary theory challenges traditional criticism. 
[Challenging tradition is a good]. 
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Literary theory is a good. 
Literary theory is a good, if challenging tradition is good. The conclusion of the 
argument is dependent on the bracketed middle term. But this is nowhere represented 
in the preface or introduction of a book that represents itself as 'a pedagogic 
introduction,.67 
A more 'developed' and elliptical topicalization of literary theory is proposed in the 
opening paragraph of Beginning Theory: 
The 1980's probably saw the high-water mark of literary theory. That decade 
was the 'moment' of theory, when the topic was fashionable and controversial 
... the moment of theory has probably passed. So why another 'primer' so late 
in the day? 
Here it is the controversy of theory that is the commonplace: 'literary theory is 
controversial'. But why it was (or is) is nowhere inscribed in the sentence or the 
surrounding context. A controversy presupposes protagonists and a 'site' of struggle. 
The substance of these is not even gestured to in the introduction as a whole.68 But the 
knowledges required to understand the controversy of literary theory cannot be 
presumed of the 'official' prescribed reader, the student who is 'beginning theory'; it 
is the consensus of the field ordered by coverage which shapes this topicalised 
representation. 
These sentences in fact look back to the point at which textbooks such as A 
Reader's Guide and Literary Theory were written and first published, a moment which 
is contrasted with the present of Beginning Theory - the middle 1990s. In A Reader's 
Guide, literary theory is also characterised as controversial but the terms of the 
controversy are explicated: those who participate in it and their rationales are 
particularised and on occasion named. The difference between the two books is formal 
- one is a topicalized mode of representation, the other is not - and historical. A 
Reader's Guide (1985) and Beginning Theory (1995) mark very different moments in 
the life of literary theory. The first belongs to a stage when the pedagogic possibilities 
of theory were in the process of being recognised for the first time; the second to a 
moment when the teaching of theory is a staple of the curriculum and a requirement of 
the institutions which oversee the teaching of English Studies. But the intensification 
of topicalisation - both in terms of their number and their ever more abbreviated form -
is not explicable in terms of different prescribed readerships, both of whom are 
presumed to be unfamiliar with the matter of literary theory. And if anything, less is 
assumed about the reader's acquaintance with literary theory in Beginning Theory. and 
Barry's summary of other Introductions suggests that these are in the main too 
difficult.69 
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These examples of translation and topicalisation demonstrate the ways in which 
accessibility and coverage order conflicting practices of representation which presume 
very different prescribed readers and very different reading practices. The 'official' 
prescribed reader, with little or no knowledge of the subject, is inscribed in the 
translati ve practices required by accessibility, but the addressee of the many topicalised 
representations is always-already a participant in the field and shares its know ledges 
and its values. This 'doubling' of the reader and the incompatible interpretative 
practices proposed by translation and topicalisation are often strongly manifested in 
passages of theoretical critique: 
Like Russian Formalism, structuralism believes in the possibility of a 'science' 
of literature, one based on form rather than content. For structuralism, such a 
science means it could potentially master and explain the world of signs through 
exhaustive detailing and analysing of the systems that allowed signs to speak. 
Though this science would itself have to be carried out in language (the 
dominant sign system) the language of criticism was deemed to be a 
'metalanguage' - that is a language that can speak about and explain the 
workings of 'object' languages (languages that seem to speak directly about the 
world). Structuralism's claim to be operating through a metalanguage cannot, 
however, overcome the criticism that it is actually no more than a powerful 
interpretative schema for analysing texts. Moreover, while rejecting the idea of 
a unified meaning occupying the text, structuralism still seeks unity or 
unification in the literary system as a whole, recourse to which can then 
'explain' the individual work. It also tends to treat the text as a function of the 
system of literature, divorcing it from historical and social context.70 
'Metalanguage' is a term which is presumed to require definition, one in the same 
. language and discourse as the concept itself ('a language that can speak about and 
explain the workings of "object" languages'). A part of this definition, in turn, calls 
for a translation (an object language is one which 'seem[s] to speak directly about the 
world'). Indeed, the definition of metalanguage is double-voiced or hybrid in register, 
in part shifting away from the specialised discourse of the term itself but at the same 
time reinvoking it in the choice of 'object languages'. The paragraph continues by 
summarising a series of criticisms of structuralism. First, it is not a language which 
explains other languages, rather it is, at most, a strong mode of interpretation; 
second, it seeks unity in the system, if not in individual texts; and third, it is a 
theoretical practice which tends to separate text from social and historical context. Each 
of these arguments is highly elliptical in form and relies on knowledge which is not 
recuperable in the preceding textual context (either in the section introduction to 
structuralism or in the general introduction and preface). All these arguments version 
established critiques of structuralism: they are topoi. Only the first is explicitly 
classified as a criticism. It is the 'moreover' and the 'also' which introduce the second 
and third arguments which suggest the continuity of the classification. There is no 
elaboration of why the search for a unity within the text or divorcing it from context 
might be errors. 
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In the first case, the criticism that structuralism is only a powerful interpretative 
scheme is only valid if the prescribed reader has some knowledge of any (or all) of the 
various critiques of meta-language that are an important constituent of many post-
structuralist critiques of structuralism: metalanguage as an attempt at 'mastery' of the 
'other' language which at the same time always remains locked within it, for example. 
In the second case, unity is represented as futile ('still seeks'), but the illusory nature 
of this quest is only explicable if the prescribed reader is aware of what follows the 
'still' and interprets it with this inflection. Unity as principle or goal is weakly 
proposed as an error but why it is an error is not recoverable from the textual context, 
and relies on knowledge, which draws on post-structuralist formulations of meaning as 
multiple and conflictual. In the third case, divorce from context is suggested as 
problematic but why is not recuperable unless the prescribed reader both knows and is 
committed to the value of context as a modality of literary critical practice. The 'why' 
here can be variously supplied - by Marxism, Feminism, certain strands of post-
structuralism - no knowledge of a particular domain of theoretical discourse is required, 
but some theoretical knowledge of this type is. In all three cases the criticisms are 
represented as common-sense. But this is the common-sense of the field, and 
precisely not that of the 'official' prescribed reader, who does not know what 
metalanguage means. Here topicalisation enters the language of translation: 
'languages that seem to speak directly about the world' (my emphasis).71 The 
epistemic modal is seemingly out of place within a definition. But the doubt inscribed 
in this definition is the topicalized marker of the critique of metalanguage in even more 
elliptical form, and anticipates the sentence which follows. Translation and 
topicalization pull in different and opposing directions. 'Metalanguage' requires 
translation but an understanding of a post-structuralist critique of it is assumed. 
4. Conclusions: the constitution of 'Theory' as a meta-discourse 
The extent of topicalisation in Readers and Introductions itself marks the strongly 
institutionalised character of the field demarcated by 'Theory'. This institutionalisation 
is clearly not governed exclusively by 'textbooking', it was significantly shaped and 
made possible by the ways in which certain texts and intellectual formations have been 
'taken up' and metabolised in various forms over the past thirty or so years.72 In a 
different vein, 'Theory' is now a professional identity within academia. But whilst 
textbooking alone cannot be said to have institutionalised Theory, I would argue that as 
one (and perhaps the most important) of the modalities of pedagogy in higher education 
and academic publishing, the Literary Theory textbook has significantly contributed to 
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the constitution of the field that is now 'Theory', and, most specifically, to the 
construction of a discourse about its object. In this final section, I will outline the 
terms and conditions of this discourse and show how it too is shaped by the goals of 
accessibility and coverage, suggesting at the same time the reading possibilities that the 
discourse proposes, possibilities which pertain most closely to evaluation, and to the 
relations between texts and/or theories. 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault elaborates the rules of formation 
which together govern the relations between statements within a discourse.73 A 
discursive fields is constituted by and constitutes particular 'objects' - which are 
configured and recognised as legitimate 'sites' of investigation. Concepts make it 
possible to order statements about objects into series or sequences which have a unity 
and internal logic. In feminist discourse for example, it is the concept of patriarchy 
which makes possible a set of comparisons and contrasts between the family and say, 
the workplace and/or a religious institution, all of which are conceived as patriarchal. A 
discourse has one or more enunciative modalities - or institutional sites from which the 
statements of a particular discourse can be 'spoken' and which render it legitimate. A 
particular organisation of concepts, grouping of objects and set of modes of 
enunciation together comprise a 'strategy' or theory.74 
Is it possible to argue that 'Literary Theory' is a discourse in this sense? From a 
critical perspective, the answer must be no. The various theoretical practices which are 
configured under the heading of Theory do not in any way satisfy the conditions of 
definition of a discursive field. Under this banner are a multiplicity of conflicting 
objects, concepts, enunciative modalities and therefore strategies. Most importantly 
there is no singular set of truth conditions which order and are ordered by Literary 
Theory. Whilst divergence and conflict 'in the true' are constitutive and productive 
aspects of a discourse for Foucault, the truth conditions of the various theoretical and 
critical practices classified as Literary Theory are multiple, divergent, contradictory. 
These discourses do not diverge in the true but 'about' the true and its conditions of 
existence.75 However, it is also clear that in a specific set of contexts, literary theory 
is indeed a discourse or, more precisely, a meta-discourse. These are predominantly 
educational or pedagogic and within it, Literary Theory does indeed exist as a unified 
object within a particular discursive field. The history of teaching and learning 'theory' 
over the past fifteen years or so, the proliferation of courses and, in particular, I 
would argue, textbooks, above all at undergraduate level have substantiated and 
institutionalised Literary Theory as the unified object of a distinctive meta-discourse.76 
But how is this unity constructed and what does it suggest about how we should read 
Theory? 
The unity of Theory is firstly constituted in relation to another object which is 
likewise configured as a singularity. The introduction to Modern Literary Theory 
begins by asserting that: 
What characterises contemporary literary theory is, on the one hand, its 
heterogeneity and on the other, its unprecedented attack on the grounding 
assumptions of the Anglo-American critical tradition.77 
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Whilst the text goes on to acknowledge a pluralism within the 'Anglo-American critical 
tradition', this is subordinated to what is conceived as 'a broad consensus, about the 
author, the nature of the literary work, and the purpose of criticism' and the 
'epistemological and ontological certainty' which inform its practices.78 The argument 
that Literary Theory is likewise itself a unity is made possible by the relation between 
the two: the 'unprecedented attack' by contemporary Literary Theory on assumptions 
of the Anglo-American tradition. The unified object of the challenge proposes the unity 
of the antagonist. In Modern Literary Theory, the naming and renaming of the Anglo-
American critical tradition strengthens and consolidates this. 
In the blurb, preface and general introduction, the object of critique is variously 
named as 'the Anglo-American tradition', 'the Anglo-American critical tradition' and 
'Anglo-American critical practice,.79 These locutions are supplemented with a range of 
more abstract and general formulations: 'the critical orthodoxy' (twice on the same 
page), 'tradition', 'traditional literary criticism', the orthodoxy (twice on the same 
page), 'the orthodoxies of literary studies' and 'traditional forms of literary criticism'.80 
The latter in particular act to assert a unity which is the object of literary theory's 
critique. It also sets a minimum condition on literary theory as practice: it must critique 
traditional literary criticism. These representations also foreground another attribute of 
Literary Theory which is likewise unifying. The two objects are the protagonists in a 
narrative which is iterated in more or less abbreviated or elaborated forms in the 
editorial apparatus: a narrative of modernity: ,tradition, convention and orthodoxy are 
challenged by the new, which is a strongly positive value. This narrative of a valorised 
new is modalised in various ways in Readers and Introductions. Sometimes it is 
asserted chronologically, embedded in various narratives of the twentieth century. The 
cover illustration of the 1985 edition of A Reader's Guide is a reproduction of a 
painting by Pierre Bonnard, 'The Window', and whilst the painting obliquely alludes 
to the matter of the book - the bottle of ink, the quill pen, the papers - it is the 
modernist mode of representation that is more strongly proposed as illustrative of the 
title.8! The view from the window is the primary focus of the painting, a focus 
directed by a figure in profile who stands at a balcony observable from the window and 
watches the scene beyond. The aesthetic challenge of modernism is proposed as an 
analogy for the intellectual challenge of literary theory. The frequent invocation of 'the 
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sixties' or the late sixties as a moment of challenge to cultural common-senses, or, 
more frequently, as a new moment within the new of literary theory draws on a more 
general narrative of a decade where many long-established institutions and practices 
were contested.82 Sometimes the valorised new is rather simplistically bound to its 
chronological proximity to the present of publication, a 'logic' which can pose 
classificatory difficulties. 'In recent years the work undertaken by Voloshinov/Bakhtin 
has proved fertile ground for literary theorists, for though aspects of the work mark it 
as "of its time", it also contains some remarkably post-structuralist insights,.83 The 
fact that the Bakhtin text is dated 1934 presents a problem for a discourse which aligns 
the new or the modem with the chronological contemporary. Bakhtin is granted here 
the gift of prescience: a post-structuralist avant Ie mot, a literal avant-gardist. The 
aspects of his work which mark it as 'of its time' can be bracketed in favour of his 
remarkable foresight. 
The introduction of A Practical Reader in Contemporary Literary Theory, whilst 
more sceptical about the claims of Theory than some other textbooks also iterates this 
narrative of modernity.84 In the first paragraph, Frederic Jameson's argument that 
Theory has dislodged the boundaries between a mUltiplicity of theoretical practices and 
disciplines is cited: 
This 'theoretical discourse' has marked 'the end of philosophy as such' and is 
'to be numbered among the manifestations of postmodernism' - that eclectic and 
self-reflexive mode which for Jameson and others, friend' and foe alike, has 
come to signal a new phase in the correlation between cultural forms and social 
and economic life.85 
The naming of Theory as postmodern. a naming which is doubled in force since it is 
cited and endorsed, and the glossing of it as 'a new phase' clearly proposes an 
alignment of the object with the new, a new which is transforming, productively 
destructive and so on. This definition is strongly asserted throughout the introduction, 
most interestingly perhaps in the assessments of whether theory has succeeded or 
failed. Something called 'bad theory' is acknowledged, but, the editors argue, it is 
more important to recognise that the answer does not lie in either 'pure theory' or 'a 
return to a "theory-free" Romantic or New Criticism,.86 'Return' marks a temporal 
relation between theory and its other, which is prior, old(er): we cannot and should 
not want to go back. 87 
The valorised new of Literary Theory is also proposed in the ways that new 
(second, third and even fourth) editions of Readers and Introductions are rationalised.88 
Established titles (and to a lesser extent authors) are refigured to take account of 'recent 
developments' which inscribe continuous change as both the 'nature' of the object and 
its practice. Indeed, the continuity of change, or change as the 'new' continuity is 
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another marker of the modernist narrative. This renders the perimeters of Theory 
elastic: it is licensed to incorporate and metabolise new developments. But this 
elasticity is also clearly regulated; the discursive field can only accommodate those 
developments which contest the 'orthodoxy', for all else is the orthodoxy. The textual 
and reading relations between tradition and modernity are always proposed in linear 
terms, where the latter must always come after. A contemporary contestation of the 
assumptions of Theory is not representable as such: it must always be configured as 
tradition, its dialogic modernity cannot be represented.89 
The modern that is Theory is also heterogeneous: 
What characterises contemporary literary theory is, on the one hand its 
heterogeneity and on the other, its unprecedented attack on the grounding 
assumptions of the Anglo-American critical tradition.90 
Indeed heterogeneity or plurality is itself a marker of modernity; the energy, dynamism 
and vigour manifested by the new in its variety and contestation is opposed to the stolid 
monolith of tradition. This in turn invokes a sense of the tradition as authority and 
through the strong contrastive, implicates Literary Theory as anti-authoritarian, which 
is likewise a positive value. This characterisation is exemplified in A Practical Reader, 
which traces a historical difference within theory itself between the 
singular 'Theory' of the early eighties and the current 'theories': often 
overlapping and in fruitful dialogue, but also contesting - even within a 
seemingly given and homogeneous field, such as Marxism or feminism or 
psychoanalysis.91 
Heterogeneity is the positive value here, which differentiates early and current 
theory/ies. Diversity and contestation within are defining attributes of the contemporary 
life of Literary Theory. But these do not disturb or dissolve the unified object that is 
being proposed. 'Before it [a proposition] can be called true or false, it must be "in the 
true" ... ,92 The particular truth conditions of a discursive field enable the production of 
propositions and arguments which conflict with one another. Some of the 'statements' 
within it may be classified as erroneous or false, but this categorisation takes place 
within the true of the discursive field. The emphasis on debate and contestation 
articulates and legitimates the field and its meta-discourse as unified: the possibilities of 
debate so conceived always presuppose a shared ground of assumptions and practices: 
Like Freud and Marx, Saussure considered the manifest appearance of 
phenomena to be underpinned and made possible by underlying systems and 
structures. 93 
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Here, three very different discursive formations and traditions are recontextualised, 
reconfigured within the field of Literary Theory, through an assertion of their 
comparability.94 What is proposed is a comparative and contrastive reading practice 
which draws together texts and concepts rather than treating them as discrete. Such 
statements are possible because Literary Theory is proposed as unified in its challenge 
to traditional criticism: this heterogeneity of practices share a contestation of the 
tradition and its commonplaces. 
This relation is also imbricated in the other strongly proposed attribute of theory: its 
difficulty. Difficulty is a central attribute of the object Literary Theory as it is defined in 
textbooks: a difficulty that is not only 'linguistic' and conceptual but cultural and 
frequently thematised. In the introduction to A Practical Reader in Contemporary 
Literary Theory, the difficulty of the object is proposed in the very rationale and project 
of the book: 
students have been introduced to theory via theoretical essays which are 
conceptually and often stylistically far removed from their own experience of 
reading and writing about literature and which in their unfamiliarity, difficulty 
and variety, have been perplexing and intimidating.95 
The difficulty is not just inherent to theory but bound to the problems of teaching it, 
and the book seeks to alleviate such problems through 'a practical Reader' which 
collects applications and illustrations of theory in practice.96 Such representations are 
typica1.97 In A Reader's Guide, written eleven years before (a subsequent edition of 
which is proposed as a companion volume to A Practical Reader), the difficulty of the 
object and the project of rendering it accessible are strongly proposed on both the back-
cover reviews and synopsis and in the introduction. One review comments on the 
'lucid explanation' that the book offers, another asserts that it is 'remarkable for its 
clarity', the third describes it as 'a readable overview' and the opening sentence of the 
synoptic summary iterates this:98 
This is the first, easily accessible account of contemporary theory. It 
elucidates, clearly, simply and precisely the main developments in Europe and 
the United States. 
Accessibility is the value accorded here, in hyperbolic form, to the book. The 
modification of 'accessible' by 'easily' and the three modifiers of the verb 'elucidates', 
itself signifying a practice of clarification, emphasise to the point of tautology the 
facilitating qualities of the book. Accessibility is proposed here as one of the guide's 
central appeals but the foregrounding of its clarity presupposes the difficulty of the 
object it elucidates. The last sentence of the synopsis - '[l]iterary examples are included 
to make the theories more comprehensible' - strongly presupposes that the theories 
would be less comprehensible without literary examples and therefore that they are 
. difficult. 
The introduction also figures a third term: the value of the object: 
I decided to undertake the daunting task of writing a reader's guide to this 
subject mainly because I believe that the questions raised by modem literary 
theory are important enough to justify the effort of clarification. 99 
The difficulty and value of theory are proposed here by a way of a relation. The 
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, dauntin~ task' and 'the effort of clarification' are warranted by the value of the object, 
specifically the questions that modem literary theory raises. The very fact that the 
exertion may not be enough to secure complete success strengthens the proposal that 
literary theory is difficult but also valuable. This difficulty is not only linguistic or 
conceptual, it is cultural. Cultural difficulty is intimated at in A Practical Reader, cited 
above: it is, in part, the unfamiliarity of theoretical writing which presents difficulties 
to the prescribed reader. But it is specified much more clearly in A Reader's Guide, 
where it is strongly proposed that literary theory is difficult because it challenges a set 
of common-senses about literature, which are dominant not only in education 
(including higher education) but within the General Culture, a culture which includes 
the reader. The early part of the introduction summari~s these; ,[t]hen, at the end of 
A 
the 1960s, things began to change,.loo And since then, this consensus has been 
actively, and seemingly continuously, challenged: 
To make things worse, most of these strange noises came from abroad. The 
English are particularly adept at shrugging off intellectual heavyweights from 
the Continent. We often complain that German theorists are too unwieldy and 
that the French are incorrigible rationalists. In this way we bolster up our 
cultural chauvinism and keep the foreign invaders at bay.IOI 
The 'strange noises' that are literary theory are unfamiliar, foreign, other, and here, 
seemingly untranslatable. Literary theory is a challenge to what is represented here as a 
specifically English variety of common-sense. The defining difficulty of theory is 
represented here as a problem within the culture that encounters it. Crucial here is that 
the prescribed reader understands that 'strange noises' is an inadequate representation 
of literary theory and is not the inscribed writing subject's characterisation and 
evaluation of the challenge to the consensus. Likewise, the typologising of 'German 
theorists' and 'the French' within a code of national types is not a signifying practice 
which the writing subject endorses. And indeed 'the English' are also stereotyped. 
This is a representation of another's language, marked by certain locutions - 'abroad', 
'the Continent', 'bolster' - which contextually inflect 'foreign invaders' with the same 
accent. The figuration of the English resistance to foreign theory as a tale of combat -
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the metaphor 'heavyweights' is revivified to suggest a directly pugilistic sense - and, 
more particularly, invasion proposes a mock-heroic narrative: mock because the 
characterisation of intellectual challenge as a war is hyperbolic. This is no story of 'a 
proud island people' repelling the advances of sundry attackers but rather one of narrow 
insularity, marked in particular by the phrase 'the Continent' and its other side of the 
channel vision. 102 But whilst the writing subject does not endorse such values, there. 
is, simultaneously, an acknowledgement of the writing subject's affiliation with 
Englishness, an affiliation which the prescribed reader is presumed to share: '~often 
complain', '~bolster up'. Literary Theory is defined as a culturally difficult object 
because it challenges deep-rooted cultural assumptions within a specifically English 
culture which includes the prescribed reader. The book offers itself as a clarifying 
translation of those strange noises. 
The difficulty of theory once more foregrounds the relations between accessibility 
and coverage. Difficulty constitutes theory in relation to the prescribed reader: the 
meta-discourse is in part produce~ by its address, its orientation to a particular reading 
constituency. But the reader's difficulty is conceived not in technicist but cultural 
terms. The prescribed reader inhabits the common-senses of tradition, of the dominants 
within the General Culture. S/he not only witnesses the assault on common-sense, but 
is a co-author of the common-sense that theory challenges and denaturalises. The 
subject position of.this discourse (its enunciative modality) is the alternative universe: 
the commonplaces of theory itself. Theory can only be represented, it seems, as the 
commonplaces of the new, as the opposite of critical thought as such. 
In the introduction I suggested that one of the most distinctive features of Literary 
Theory textbooks was their representation of a body of texts and discourses and that the 
reading practices they proposed were centrally concerned with establishing and 
delimiting particular intertextual relations. Here I have shown how particular 
intertextual relations are proposed in various classificatory and narrative 
representations. The meta-discourse of Literary Theory iterates such proposals at a 
general level. First, Theory as such is proposed as a positive value and practice: it is 
worth reading and repays the effort which is so strongly thematised. Its 
characterisation as modem, a challenge to 'tradition', heterodox (and anti-
authoritarian) are the strongest markers of this. (It is perhaps worth repeating that these 
values are presumed to be shared by writing subject and prescribed reader) This 
evaluation precedes and informs the practices of interpretation and explication, but the 
conflict between accessibility and coverage, between translation and topicalisation 
suggest once again very different reading practices. On the one hand, both tradition 
and earlier theory (usually pre-post-structuralist) are proposed as pretexts which will 
assist the interpretation and explication which follows. On the other, a proleptic 
narrative is proposed where the earlier is always-already represented from the 
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standpoint of the latter: the 'epistemological and ontological certainties' of the tradition 
can only after all be the modern 'invention' that Theory is. 
1 Jorge Luis Borges, 'The Library of Babel', in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, 
edited by Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby (New York: New Directions, 1964), p.55. 
2 To avoid confusion I will use upper case when referring to the publishing category in question. 
3 Roger Chartier, 'Libraries without Walls' in The Order of Books, pp.65-7. 
4 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edition (Oxford: OUP, 1973), p.1755, the sense is 
dated to 1799. In Austen's Emma, (London: Penguin, 1995), the young farmer Robert Martin, 
whose reading practices so confuse Harriet, reads Elegant Extracts, an anthology of pieces extracted 
from mainly eighteenth century sources (p.23 and p.389). 
5 This is not to suggest that the backgrounding of the original language of 'langue' and 'parole' is 
fixed. It may be remobilised in particular textual contexts: for example, in a discussion of the 
semantic ambiguities of 'langue' and 'parole' in French. As Adorno argues in 'On the Use of Foreign 
Words' in Notes to Literature: Volume Two (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), foreign 
words are not simply gradually assimilated and absorbed into the host or other language, over time 
becoming part of it: they may remain foreign or become domesticated, and then become 'strange' once 
more. 
6 Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Culture and Religious History 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p.81: analytic commonplaces 'in effect analyse 
a subject in terms of various headings.' 
7 Ong, The Presence of the Word, p.81. Ong is interested in commonplaces as instances of 'oral 
residues'. 
8 Raman Selden, A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory 1st Edition (Brighton: Harvester, 
1985), back cover. 
9 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction 1st Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p.vii. 
10 See for example Peter Barry, Beginning Theory 1st Edition (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1995) pp.227 -31. Barry's further ~ading distinguishes and annotates general guides, reference 
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books, general Readers and 'applications', significantly in terms of difficulty. On Roger Webster's 
Studying Literary Theory: An Introduction (London: Arnold, 1990), Barry comments: 'very brief 
but quite often clear when others are not' (p.227). Webster's text, now in its second edition (1996) 
likewise distinguishes introductory and general works oli literary theory in his further reading 
bibliography (p.130). 
11 For example: 'Provides a collection of the incessantly cited but nevertheless still widely scattered 
critical texts on postmodernism and literary theory'. This is an advert for a Reader on Postmodernism 
advertised as 'also of interest' on the back cover of Modern Literary Theory: A Reader, 2nd edition, 
edited by Philip Rice and Patricia Waugh (London: Edward Arnold, 1992, second edition). 
12 Peter Brooker and Peter Widdowson, editors, A Practical Reader in Contemporary Literary Theory 
(Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall, 1996), p.2. 
13 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.ix. Both coverage and accessibility are combined in 
an annotation to Eagleton's Literary Theory in Peter Barry's Beginning Theory: An Introduction to 
Literary and Cultural Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995): 'The first 
comprehensive guide to be published. Sometimes entertaining, sometimes difficult, and now in need 
of updating.' 
14 The acknowledgement that inclusiveness is difficult or even impossible marks a strong recognition 
of its status as a criterion which shapes practice, even when another criterion intervenes: 'I have not 
tried to give a comprehensive picture of modem critical theory, but rather a guide to the most 
challenging trends' (A Reader's Guide, p.5). Whilst the book is ostensibly shaped by a goal other than 
comprehensive representation, this other goal must be explicated and rationalised against a 
presumption of inclusiveness. 
IS Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory: A Reader, p.x. 
16 Genette, Paratexts, p.79. 
17 Understanding the novel as a retelling of a sensationalised and intimate piece of town history might 
also explain the 'we' that is the first word of the novel. The first person plural disappears abruptly after 
the first scene: the school lesson where Charles Bovary is introduced to master and class. It is the 
other pupils who constitute the we, which never returns. The last paragraph of the novel which 
presses into a post-Emma-and-Charles future also suggests the novel as part of the town's history. 
Hommais has vanquished six other doctors, and 'has ll!.s.t received the Legion of Honour'. Gustave 
Flaubert, Madame Bovary (Oxford: World Classics, 1981), p.l and p.340. 
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18 Genette, Paratexts, p.294: 'Intertitles or internal titles, are titles, and as such they invite the 
same kinds of remarks I made earlier'. However Genette distinguishes intertitles from titles in two 
ways. First, whilst titles are addressed to the 'public' as a whole, intertitles are predominantly only 
accessible to readers who are 'already involved in reading the text'. Second, whilst a book title is a 
necessity (even if it is 'Untitled'), intertitles are not (p.294). 
19 Raman Selden, A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory; Terl)' Eagleton, Literary 
Theory: An Introduction;; Roger Webster, Studying Literary Theory; Peter Barry, Beginning 
Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory; Philip Rice and Patricia Waugh editors, 
Modern Literary Theory: A Reader; Peter Brooker and Peter Widdowson editors, A Practical Reader in 
Contemporary Literary Theory . 
20 Selden, A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory, pp.v-vi. 
21 The contents pages of this and the other texts discussed in this section are reproduced in Appendix B 
22 The chapter and other titles of the contents page are: 'Preface', 'Introduction: What is Literature?', 
chapter 1: 'The Rise of English', chapter 2: 'Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, Reception Theory', 
chapter 3: 'Structuralism and Semiotics', chapter 4: 'Post-Structuralism', chapter 5: 'Psychoanalysis', 
'Conclusion: Political Criticism' (Literary Theory, p.v). 
23 See Barry, Beginning Theory, pp.v-viii. 
24 These are Rice and Waugh's headings in Modern Literary Theory. 
25 In Rice and Waugh's Modern Literary Theory, 'The Death of the Author' is the introductory text for 
Part Two (post-structuralism): 'We have chosen Roland Barthes's essay, 'The Death of the Author, to 
introduce our survey because it provides a short and useful introduction to some of the significant 
themes in the development of post-structuralism' (p.113) .. In Readers, the length of a text may be an 
important criterion of selection even though many are abridged. See also David Lodge, Modern 
Criticism and Theory: A Reader (London: Longman, 1988), p.166: 'In a famous essay written in 
1968, reprinted below, Barthes proclaimed that 'the birth of the reader' must be at the cost of 'the death 
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of the author' - an assertion that struck at the very heart of traditional literary studies, and that has 
remained one of the most controversial tenets of post-structuralism.' On Barthes's trajectory, see for 
example Eagleton, Literary Theory, pp.134-142; Selden, A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary 
Theory, pp.74-8. Derrida's 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' is 
another text which is frequently represented as the moment of emergence of post-structuralism. See for 
example, Selden in A Reader's Guide: 'Derrida's paper "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of 
the Human Sciences", given at a symposium at Johns Hopkins University in 1966, virtually 
inaugurated a new critical movement in the United States'. (p.84). See also Barry, Beginning Theory, 
p.66. 
26 For example: 'More recently with the development of gay and lesbian studies, gendered criticism 
and "queer theory" on the one hand, and post-colonialism on the other, Wilde has become a focal 
figure for gay and lesbian criticism and for the newer Irish cultural history. The present chapter brings 
together five examples of these developments ... ' (Brooker and Widdowson, A Practical Reader in 
Contemporary Literary Theory, p.184). On the exemplary text: 'Cleanth Brooks's essay here 
exemplifies its [new critical] practice exactly' (p.67, my emphasis and parenthesis). 
27 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.3. 
28 This is obviously a claim which it is difficult to substantiate except at great length. The chapter 
openings however give some indication of this discreteness. For example, the first sentence of chapter 
six (Feminism and Feminist Criticism) runs: 'The 'women's movement' of the 1960's was not; of 
course, the start of Feminism' (p.2). Although this chapter makes reference to feminist appropriations 
of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism (p.124) and both are preceding chapters in the book, what is 
more strongly asserted is the 'independence' of feminist criticism and theory. This is strongly marked 
in the summary list of 'what feminist critics do': 'rethink the canon, revalue women's experience, 
examine representations of women in literature by men and women' and so on (p.134). The chapter on 
post-structuralism is an exception however, beginning with the heading 'some theoretical differences 
between structuralism and post-structuralism' (p.61). 
29 See Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, pp.v - vi. 
30 Modern Literary Theory .. pA 
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31 Although 'radical' occurs in the first paragraph of the introduction - 'literary theory has effected a 
radical transformation' (p.xi) - none of its senses are explicated. 
32 Modern Literary Theory, p.194. 
33 Said seems to present a slight classificatory problem in this respect, but although 'Said seems not 
be mobilising any specific post-structuralist theory, his language and style are clearly conditioned by 
his theoretical knowledge' (Modern Literary Theory, p.194). 
34 Modern Literary Theory, p.195. 
35 Modern Literary Theory, p.196. 
36 Modern Literary Theory, p.196. 'The Order of Discourse' is described as 'balanced between [a] shift 
in emphasis' (p.196). 
37 Homi Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry and Men', p.235. 
38 Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry and Men', p.237. 
39 'Of Mimicry and Men': 'ambivalence', p.235 and p.237; 'splitting' p.235; 'castration', p.235; 
'desire', p.235, p.237 and p.239. 
40 'Of Mimicry and Men', Modern Literary Theory, ·pp.237-8. 
41 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.196. 
42 It is also interesting here that the claim that the text is autonomously interesting is seen to require 
assertion. 
43 By local textual context, I mean that original and translation are co-present in the same text within 
the editional apparatus, as opposed to the examples I looked at earlier where the original (the title) is 
translated in another part of the apparatus (the contents page). 
44 Roman Jakobson, 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation' in Reuben E. Brower ed., On Translation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1966). 
45 Jakobson, 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation' in On Translation, edited by Reuben E. Brower 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp.232-9, p.233. 
46 This is a point made by Jenny Thomas. Cited in Jonathan Culpepper, 'Why Relevance Theory 
Does Not Explain "The Relevance of Reformulations" in Language and Literature 3, 1 (1994), pp.43-
48, p.47 
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47 Diane Blakemore, 'Relevance, Poetic Effects and Social Goals: A Reply to Culpepper' in 
Language and Literature 3, 1 (1994), pp.49-59, p.54. 
48 See for example Bakhtin's 'Discourse in the Novel', pp.270-275. In Kristeva's case, the concepts 
and assumptions that sanction linguistic theories are an important theme in many of her early writings 
but see in particular 'The System and the Speaking Subject' in The Kristeva Reader, pp.24-33, and 
'The Ethics of Linguistics' in Desire in Language, pp23-35. 
49 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Words from Abroad' in Notes to Literature: Volume One (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), pp.185-199. 
50 Adorno, 'Words from Abroad', p.190. 
51 Lawrence Venuti, The Translator's Invisibility: A History o/Translation (London and New York: 
Routledge: 1995). 
52 See in relation to Venuti's formalism, Francis Mulhern's review essay of The Translator's 
Invisibility entitled 'Re-Writing Degree Zero', in The Present Lasts a Long Time: Essays in Cultural 
Politics (Cork: Cork University Press, 1998), pp.I64-170: 'However, the concept of resistancy 
cannot claim exemption from its own critical dialectic. Venuti emphasises the historical variability of 
-
translation norms, and his analyses observe a strict contextualising discipline. Yet the key critical 
opposition between domesticating and foreignising strategies never varies so radically as to reverse 
itself' (p,169). He goes on to argue that Venuti, when deprecating the representational stereotypes of 
orientalist writing never considers that 'what is foreignising may assume the degraded conservative 
shape of exoticism'. He develops this argument in relation to realism: Venuti, in valorisinga 
modernist poetics as the shape and form of resistancy, neglects to consider the ways in which an ideal-
typical realism, the rhetorical ideal of which is '(a mirage but that is not the point) literalism: 
unadorned, univocal, quasi-veridical ... Ideal-typical realism valorises transparency as a critical 
instrument, not an anodyne; its plainness is an ideological abrasive' (p.170). I will return to this issue 
below. 
53 See for example, Raman Selden, A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary Theory (Brighton, 
Harvester, 1985). Consider the following discussion of Genette which is broadly typical of the ways 
in which certain kinds of literary knowledge are figured as shared with the prescribed reader: 'Narratives 
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are nearly always impure in this sense, whether the element of "discourse" enters via the voice of the 
narrator (Fielding, Cervantes), a character-narrator (Sterne), or through epistolary discourse 
(Richardson). Genette believes that narrative reaches its highest degree of purity in Hemingway and 
Hammett, but that with the nouveau roman, narrative began to be completely swallowed up in the 
writer's own discourse' (pp.62-63). 
54 Eagleton, Literary Theory, p.97 .. 
55 Nor is the lexeme 'langue' marked strongly here as French: Saussure's nationality is not identified, 
although his name could suggest a Francophone. 
56 See in particular pp.116-118: 'One of the most important critics of Saussurean linguistics was the 
Russian philosopher and literary theorist Mikail Bakhtin ... Bakhtin had also been responsible for what 
remains the most cogent critique of Russian Formalism.' 
57 Simon Dentith, Bakhtinian Thought: An Introductory Reader (London: Routledge, 1995), p.i. 
58 Bakhtinian Thought, pp.22-40. 
59 Bakhtinian Thought, p.25. 
60 Selden, A Reader's Guide, pp.54-55. There has been one modification to the text of the example in 
subsequent editions. 'Since joining' has been replaced by 'When the British joined' (from the 3rd 
edition, p.105). The re-temporalisation effects a greater distance between the prescribed reader and 'The 
British'. It is, however interesting, that although 'Common Market' is historically accurate, it too 
has a temporally distancing effect (and is easily misread as an archaism). 
61 Indeed conceptualising translation in an intertextual and therefore textual-context-sensitive way is 
one way out of the formalist cul-de-sac which still exerts considerable force in certain trajectories of 
translation studies (as the influential work of Venuti instances). The final example attests the 
possibilities of intertextually 'context-sensitive' analysis in identifying a single translative strategy 
which simultaneously both domesticates and foreignises: the example speaks the language (and 
discourse) of semiotics 'fluently', and 'resists' familiar or commonsensical representations of the 
routine practices it renders. But the foreignising of traffic lights as a signifying system is motivated, 
not by resistancy, but by the desire for a facilitating domestication. 
, 
62 Mary Eagleton, editor., Feminist Literary Crtitcism (Harlow: Longman, 1991), p.8; Peter 
1\ 
Barry, Beginning Theory, p.124; Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl, Feminisms 
(Houndsmill: Macmillan, 1997), p.x. 
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63 The definition of and opposition between the two most probably entered scholarly feminist discourse 
through Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Coutivron, New French Feminisms: An Anthology (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester, 1981). The introduction begins: "'We translate what the American women 
write, they never translate our texts. "' This quotation from Helene Cixous is offered as a rationale for 
the book: they are translating what the 'French women' write, in the hope of developing a dialogue. 
In the process, they elaborate certain differences between (initially) American feminists and French 
ones. For example, whilst French feminist thinking is strongly shaped by Marxism, psychoanalysis 
and 'philosophy' in general terms, 'American feminists ... tend to be focused on problem solving, on 
the individual fact ... Their style of reasoning, with few exceptions, follows the Anglo-American 
empirical, inductive, anti-speculative tradition' (p.xi). The topos was entrenched by Toril Moi's 
Sexual-Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (London: Methuen, 1985), the structure of which 
is ordered by this division. 
64 James C. Raymond, 'Enthymemes, Examples and Rhetorical Method' in Essays on Classical 
Rhetoric and Modern Discourse, edited by Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede and Andrea A. Lunsford 
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp.140-151. 
6S Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory: A Reader, p.x. 
66 Although, preferences for a particular type or set of types of theory is another matter: 'though we 
have our own preferences, our job is not to foist these on others' (final paragraph of the introduction, 
p.4). An acknowledgement of partiality and an insistence on the fact that this will neither 'distort' 
representations or be 'enforced' upon readers is a variation of the demands of coverage. I will return to 
the issue of the positive value that is accorded to Literary Theory below. 
67 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.ix. 
68 Barry does describe 'liberal humanism' as a shorthand and 'hostile' term for a particular set of 
assumptions on p.3, but there is no elaboration of who the hostiles are and why they might be so. 
69 Barry, Beginning Theory, p.2. 
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.70 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.23. 
71 This is hardly an uncontroversial definition of metalanguage either. Conventionally, the 'object 
language' is defined more broadly as the language about which the metalanguage speaks, which the 
metalanguage makes its object. An object language is clearly not necessarily referential. See for 
example, Barthes's Elements of Semiology (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p.93: 'Nothing in 
principle prevents a metalanguage from becoming in its tum the language-object of a new 
metalanguage.' 
72 One of the key texts which has been read to justify and rationalise such a concept of Theory and its 
problematic place within an English intellectual context is Perry Anderson's 'Components of the 
National Culture' in New Left Review 50 (July/August, 1968), pp.3-57. Likewise the practices of 
the journal Screen, particularly in the middle and late seventies where the commitment was not merely 
to film but to how it could be variously theoJ;1'etically / philosophically framed. 
73 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), p.38: 'The 
rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, 
and disappearance) in a given discursive division'. Likewise it is only possible to say 'that we are 
dealing with a discursive formation' if a 'regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, 
transformations), can be identified or defined (p.38). 
74 The formation of objects, concepts, enunciative modalities and strategies are discussed in chapters 
three to six, inclusive, pp.40-70. Within strategy, Foucault distinguishes between theory and theme, 
the latter less coherent, less rigorous and less stable (p.64) but treats both together. 
75 'Within its own limits, each discourse recognises true and false propositions; but it pushes back a 
whole teratology of knowledge beyond its margins ... but perhaps there are no errors in the strict sense, 
for error can only arise and be decided inside a definite practice ... a proposition must fulfil heavy 
requirements to be able to belong to the grouping of a discipline; before it can be called true or false, it 
must be "in the true" as Canguilhem would say. ' Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse' in Untying the 
Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, edited by Robert Young (London, Routledge, 1981), pp48-79, 
p.60. Although Foucault is specifically discussing the discipline as a 'principle of control over the 
production of discourse (p.61), the meaning and force of 'in the true' as a condition of discursive 
production is clearly not exclusive to the formative and regulatory practices of disciplines. 
303 
76. And indeed, a telling of this history is itself increasingly a part of textbook introductions. See for 
example, the introduction to A Practical Reader in Contemporary Literary Theory which charts a shift 
from the first Introductions and Readers to 'the quest for a second-generation textbook which will join 
theory with practice' (pI), which A Practical Reader proposes itself as. 
77 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.l. 
78 Modern Literary Theory, p.l. This pluralism is indexed in the naming of some of the tradition's 
varieties: 'literary history, literary biography, moral aesthetic criticism and ... the New Criticism' but 
these had 'until recently managed to co-exist in a state of fairly "stable disequilibrium" based on a broad 
consensus about ... ' (p.1). 
79 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.ix, p.1 and p.3 respectively. 
80 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.2, p.2, p.3, p3, p.4, p.4 respectively. 
81 The cover is reproduced in Appendix B. 
82 See for example, A Reader's Guide, pI: 'Then at the end of the 1960s, things began to change'. 
Arguably, one of the reasons why 'The Death of the Author' has become one of the emblematic texts 
of post-structuralism orland its moment of emergence is that it was first published in 1968. 
83 Modern Literary Theory, p.194. 
84 A Practical Reader is more sceptical than say Modern Literary Theory in the sense that it 
acknowledges what are represented as some of theory's excesses, its 'self-importance, its hermeticism, 
or uncontrolled pluralism' (p.2), and is concerned that 'the radical politicising theory of the post-1960's 
years has failed to produce a criticism to match its radicalising intentions' (p.3). And indeed this 
'scepticism' is itself becoming a topos. The 2001 (4th) edition of Modern Literary Theory: 'At worst 
... "theory" can degenerate into substantive dogma or an inflexible and a priori, pseudo scientific 
framework whose interpretative results become as predictable as a well-confirmed scientific explanation: 
that all texts are "about" their own conditions of indeterminacy, for example, or that all texts contain 
their own subversive strategies ... ' However such a representation of Theory is immediately 
undermined: '[t]his is of course to caricature "theory" in terms which are now the commonplace 
judgements of its enemies and detractors' (p.l). What is interesting here is that criticism of theory 
seems to automatically render its speaker an enemy or detractor. 
85 Brooker and Widdowson, A Practical Reader, pp.1-2. 
86 A Practical Reader, p.4. 
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87 And indeed the introduction of A Practical Reader strongly asserts that one of the central gains of 
theory has been to draw attention to the always-and-already theoretical 'nature' of any practice of reading 
pp.3-4. This is a staple of the discourse. See for example, the 1993 (3rd) edition of A Reader's Guide 
to Contemporary Literary Theory: 'even the apparently "spontaneous" discussion of literary texts is 
dependent on the de facto (if less self conscious) theorising of older generations ... full of dead theory 
which is sanctified by time ... ' (pp.3-4). Note here the assertion of tradition by mode of analogy with 
religion - 'sanctified' - and the implicated secular mood of the new. 
88 The updating of such texts is standard practice. A Reader's Guide is currently in its 4th edition, as is 
Modern Literary Theory. The changes vary from minor - for example in the case of Eagleton's Literary 
Theory to substantial re-editing and re-writing, the representation of entirely 'new' bodies or work 
and/or the exclusion of others. 
89 If such writing is represented at all. One of the most noticeable features of such textbooks is the 
non-representation of criticisms of theory from outside the field. 
90 Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, p.l. 
91 Brooker and Widdowson, A Practical Reader, p.2. 
92 The Order of Discourse', p.60, my parenthesis. 
93 Modern Literary Theory, p.l. 
94 Indeed Foucault assigns each of these authors the title of 'founders' or 'initiators' of discursive 
practices, 'establishing the endless possibility of discourse' ... '[f]hey not only made possible a certain 
number of analogies that could be adopted, but as importantly, they also made possible a certain 
number of differences. They cleared a space for the introduction of elements other than their own.' 
'What is an Author?' in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, pp.131-6. 
95 Brooker and Widdowson, A Practical Reader, p.4. 
96 A Practical Reader, p.4. 
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97 But not universal. In the preface to Literary Theory, Eagleton identifies a constituency who 
complain that 'literary theory is impossibly esoteric - who suspect it as an arcane, elitist enclave akin 
to nuclear physics' (p.vii) but then brusquely offers a rebuttal: 'literary theory is in fact no more 
difficult than many theoretical enquiries and a good deal easier than some' (p. vii). The substance of this 
somewhat curt rejoinder is the exception rather than the rule. 
98 The first review is by Chris Baldick, in the TLS; the second is by Christopher Norris in British 
Book News; and the third is unsigned and comes from English Literature in Transition. 
99 Selden, A Reader's Guide, p.2. 
100 A Reader's Guide, p.l. 
101 A Reader's Guide, p.l. 
102 This passage makes oblique and topicalised reference to the critique of 'English empiricism' referred 
to earlier. The Anglo~American versus French feminism commonplace, discussed above, is also 
clearly a version of this. 
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Closing Remarks 
Interpretative possibilities are many and rich, yet interpretations are, for the most part, 
few and sparse. This might stand as the stark and unnuanced conclusion of this thesis, 
which seeks to understand why both these statements are true, and why some 
interpretations are more probable, often far more probable, than others. Intertextual 
and inferential theories both offer powerful accounts of why interpretative possibilities 
are many; but they diverge strongly as to whether interpretation is, for the most part, 
'sparse'. For the most part, intertextual theories assume that, like interpretative 
possibilities, interpretations are many and rich: possibility is conflated with its 
instantiation as practice. Inferential theories (and pragmatic theories more generally) 
argue that the interpretative process constrains or 'thins' interpretative possibilities. 
This suggests a congruence between my conclusion and pragmatic common-sense, but 
it is purely formal. Inferential theories neither acknowledge nor recognise the full 
extent of interpretative possibilities and the real character of the constraints that delimit 
them in practice. In these closing remarks, my aim is to elaborate the conclusion 
abbreviated above by addressing three interrelated questions. First, what emerges 
from the exposition and critique of intertextual and inferential theories? Second, what 
is the 'positive' conception of interpretation which the critique make possible? Third, 
how do the case-studies substantiate this account? 
1. 
What emerges from the exposition and critique of the first three chapters is first, a 
certain congruence between intertextual and inferential theories. Both take the utterance 
as their object: the utterance in opposition to the 'semantic' sentence in the case of 
inferential theories, the text reconceived as utterance or utterances in intertextual ones. 
In both cases, 'utterance' marks a theoretical extension of the object to take account of 
addresser and addressee: a rhetorical concern with practice, purpose and effects. Both 
traditions argue that utterance meaning cannot be wholly explained by en-de-coding (or, 
in Grice's case, convention): a single linguistic system - whether conceived as langue 
or as a grammar - neither fully determines nor exhausts utterance meaning. Following 
on from this, utterances are constitutively ambiguous or polyvocal. But in neither case 
are the explanatory limits of the linguistic system the warrant or rationale for a flight 
from systematicity per se. The fact that some meaning 'eludes' a singular en-de-coding 
process does not entail that it is ungoverned and unpredictable; rather its 'governance' 
must be sought elsewhere. Both traditions pursue alternative accounts of what, 
beyond a linguistic system, might order meaning - the relations between a mUltiplicity 
of signifying systems, an inferential process. l Finally, in both traditions, context is 
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posited as a defining and explanatory category. Context is constitutive of utterance 
production and interpretation: it is a defining attribute of the utterance, which is always 
spoken by and to particular subjects at particular times and places, and this in turn has 
important implications for the knowledges which are inscribed and invoked in 
utterances and which are central to their production and interpretation. 
These very congruences foreground certain fundamental differences in the way that 
each account formulates its key concepts, shaped by the very different questions which 
each theory addresses and the discursive traditions of which they are a part. In the 
work of Vol os hi nov, Bakhtin and Kristeva, the central question is: what governs the 
·possibilities of utterance production and utterance meaning? In inferential theories, the 
key question is: how does the interpretative process work? These very different 
orientations lead to distinctive formulations of the concepts of utterance, the processes 
of meaning production and reception, context, speaker/writer and hearer/reader. In 
formal terms, the most important difference is that whilst in inferential theories (and 
pragmatic theories more generally), each concept remains clearly distinguishable and, 
in important senses, discrete from the others, in intertextual theories the concepts mesh 
in their definition. 
In intertextual theories, utterance or text is the central concept through which textual 
production, context and the writing or reading subject are defined .. The utterance is 
always a participant in a complex chain, oriented backwards in its responses to 
previous utterances and forward in its anticipation of subsequent ones. It is from its 
social and historical place in this chain that it derives its many signifying possibilities. 
These relations are inscribed in the utterance itself, which is therefore never a 
singularity, but always a set of relations between utterances. The utterance is never a 
discrete object, but part of a dynamic and historical process, the meaning of which can 
only be understood in relation to the other utterances which constitute it and are 
transformed by it. In the writings of Bakhtin and Kristeva in particular, the tracing of 
patterns of similarity and difference, continuity and transformation within and between 
texts is not a descriptive literary-critical practice, but an explanatory account of how 
meanings are produced. The account of text is therefore simultaneously an account of 
textual production, best understood as a process of re-signification. Context is itself 
textual: the relations between the range of signifying practices which make the utterance 
possible and which are inscribed within it. Likewise the subject is conceived most 
explicitly and consistently in Kristeva in textual terms, as inscription. And, as with 
context, the subject is complexly social and historical. The utterance is never authored 
by a single speaker or oriented to a single addressee. Writing and reading imbricate 
their subjects in a web of social processes and relations with languages, varieties, 
genres and texts, and with the relative and varying authority and value these command. 
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Inferential theories treat the utterance or utterance exchange as a particular and 
relatively discrete object embedded in a highly particular event which is completed and 
resolved in the process of interpretation: a particular kind of evidence from which 
interpretations may be derived. Whilst the presence of linguistic convention or the 
linguistic system clearly establishes a continuity between speech events, what is at 
stake is the particular meaning of this utterance for these speaker-hearers in this 
particular here-and-now, which system or convention cannot determine. In both 
Gricean and Relevance-based accounts, the particular meaning of the situation-bound 
utterance is governed by a single communicative or cognitive principle, which orders 
its interpretation. In Relevance, the continuity and generality of principle are matched 
by a continuity and generality of processes: a preliminary decoding generates semantic 
material, which is then subject to inferential operations. Whilst intertextual theories 
define context from the standpoint of the text, inferential theories conceive context as 
the sub-set of knowledges mobilised, deployed and/or produced by the hearer within 
the interpretative process which are likewise subject to the general communicative or 
cognitive principle. And while context is frequently mobilised and/or produced through 
inferential operations on the utterance, it always remains clearly distinguishable from it 
because of the focus on moment-to-moment interpretative procedures and its particular 
purpose-bound definition. Context is likewise distinguishable from the speaker-hearer, 
not the sum of the subject's knowledge and knowing but the knowledge required to 
interpret this particular utterance in this particular here-and-now. The speaker-hearer is, 
in tum, clearly distinguished from the text. Whilst Relevance now foregrounds the 
role of the speaker's expectations of the hearer in shaping the utterance, both speaker 
and hearer remain distinct from the text. 2 This in tum foregrounds the very different 
conceptions of the subject that inhabit inferential and intertextual accounts. In both· 
Gricean and Relevance-based accounts, speaker meaning is central and can be 
distinguished from other kinds of utterance meaning (though it may, in the case of 
Grice, coincide with those). Indeed such a separation between language and the 
speaker is a requirement of inferential theories, which posit that speaker meaning 
diverges from the meanings produced by conventions or codes. In both cases, speaker 
meaning is not only distinguishable from other kinds of meaning, it has authority 
(Sperber and Wilson's distinction between implicatures and implications is a clear 
(fsc.rihe? 
instance of this). Such theories always a particular and identifiable intention in 
" speaking and a 'thinning' of interpretative possibilities to those that the speaker 
intended; it is the recovery of these which the account of the interpretative process must 
be able to yield. This speaker is a distinguishable singularity who always pre-exists 
any social act or process, including those of communication. 
The order of exposition in chapters one and two, and the critique in chapter three 
draw out both the strengths and weaknesses of these two accounts. The intertextual 
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theories of Voloshinov, Bakhtin and Kristeva offer the most powerful account of how 
meanings are produced; inferential theories, and most particularly Relevance, offer the 
most convincing and rigorous explanation of the interpretative process. At the same 
time, however, both theories suffer from internal weaknesses and inconsistencies; 
each is revealed to have fundamental problems when it is exposed to the scrutiny of the 
other; and both ignore a set of processes which are central to the governing of the 
possibilities of textual production and reception: those of publishing. To take each of 
these in turn. Intertextual theories do not take adequate account of the institutional 
modalities of meaning. Given the emphasis that Voloshinov gives to speech types, the 
role of genre in Bakhtin, and Bakhtin and Kristeva's formulations of the heteroglossia 
and the General Culture, which each suggest a dynamic between official, sanctioned 
and legitimate meanings and 'unofficial' ones, it is surprising that there is little or no 
place given to the role of institutional sites and practices in the production of meaning. 
Second, whilst Bakhtin, and in particular Kristeva, foreground the complex 
historicity of the totality of signifying practices and of texts themselves, and the 
varying authority of different signifying practices, what is lacking in the definition of 
text as 'dialogic' or intertextual is a developed sense of its own internal hierarchies: the 
frequent dominance of one or more languages within the text and the limits that this 
effects on signifying possibilities. Third, in the writings of Bakhtin and Kristeva, 
there is a tendency to explore and valorise textual practices which radically transform 
some sub-set of the heteroglossia or General Culture. This not only weakens the 
concept of context, sometimes subordinated to a residually formalist dominant of 
disturbance; it also means that not enough attention is given to thinking the many 
instances of textual production as variation, rather than as the more radical 
transformation. The theory itself makes this possible, given its particular conception of 
text as social and historical, but there is little or no detailed investigation of the 
processes by which certain signifying practices, and in particular genres, endure, 
albeit in modified forms. 
Sperber and Wilson explicitly set out to remedy a set of problems in Gricean theory, 
whilst also acknowledging his contribution to their thinking. A number of the key« 
moves and tenets of Relevance are, then, critical responses to Grice, most obviously 
the critique of the mutual knowledge hypothesis (and their alternative formulation of 
mutual manifestness), the rejection of the Cooperative Principle and the rebuttal of a 
model of communicative practice which relies on a fundamental distinction between 
adherence to a set of rules (the-maxims) and their flouting or exploitation. Whilst these 
criticisms are valid, Relevance shares a set of problems with Grice. These are, most 
importantly, an exclusively rationalist conception of the subject and his/her practice 
which leaves no place for an explanation of the irrational as effect in signification; and 
the fundamental and decisive role accorded to the speaker's intended meaning which is 
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what must be recovered and what has authority. Yet this emphasis sits uneasily with 
the lack of attention accorded to the process whereby speakers identify and articulate 
intentions. This is particularly marked in Relevance, where the detailed account of the 
complexities of the interpretative procedure foreground the absence of an equivalently 
detailed account of meaning production. There is a further internal problem in 
Relevance, which does impact on its account of the interpretative process, namely, the 
uneven relations between effort and effects, most visible in Relevance-based accounts 
of poetic language where there seems little or no warrant for the continuation of 
interpretation after the 'criterion' of relevance has been met. 
Each theory also exposes the limits of the other. The great strength of inferential 
theories is the rigour with which the interpretative process is theorised. This is 
particularly true of Relevance where the accounts of how contexts are mobilised and/or 
produced, and the introduction of the concept of explicature are particularly valuable as 
a model for the kind of detailed questions that a theory of interpretation is required to 
address. This foregrounds the lack of specificity in intertextual theories of reception. 
Further, the clear distinction that inferential theories make between the processes of 
production and reception exposes a fundamental weakness in intertextual theories of 
reception, where reading is inertially inferred from writing and there is no sustained 
attempt to specify the former's distinctiveness. Inferential theories seek to substantiate 
this other process, this 'other production', in precise terms. Most fundamentally, 
intertextual theories cannot entertain the possibility of another systematic process at 
work in the making of meaning; inferential theories do just this by theorising 
inferencing as a central interpretative process. Intertextual theories of reception can 
only posit recoding, yet this cannot generate an adequate account of interpretation or 
reading. Intertextual theories of production theorise the text as both like and unlike 
other texts meaning that interpretation must involve the reader 'registering' these 
patterns of similarity and difference; intertextual theories of reception stress the location 
of the text within a pattern of intertextual relations. Neither of these processes can be 
adequately captured by 'recoding'; rather they require a concept of inference in order to 
be adequately specified. 
The great strength of intertextual theories lies in the detailed accounts of the ways in 
which textual form both produces and delimits signifying possibilities, a focus which 
is entirely missing in Grice and Sperber and Wilson. Where inferential theories see a 
single language, intertextual theories see languages: a mUltiplicity of varieties, 
registers and genres converging on the ground conventionally identified as a national 
language, which produce and delimit the totality of signifying possibilities. These 
languages do not offer various different ways of 'saying the same thing', in contrast 
with much pragmatic common-sense, which assumes a common propositional core of 
meaning, nor are they subject to a singular logic which renders their differences 
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superficial and formal; rather they articulate different ways of knowing the world. 
These languages and the knowledges they inscribe are not a set of discreet alternatives; 
they are constituted by their relations with each other, the overarching order of which is 
set by the relations between dominant and subordinate social forces and their differential 
political and cultural authority. These relations inscribe the always-already social 
character of the subjects who speak them, their solidarities and/or conflicts with others, 
their confirmation and/or contestation of certain social and cultural values. Intertextual 
theories expose the explanatory weakness inherent in the individualism of inferential 
theories - which underestimate the number and range of interpretative possibilities 
assuming that speaker-hearers share knowledges and values which require no' 
explanation. This is clearly the case with Grice. Relevance ostensibly makes no such 
error: the insistent underlining of the idiosyncrasies of speaker-hearers, and the 
awareness of the multiplicity of interpretation-conclusions that the utterance-premise 
may generate, are the strongest markers of this break with Gricean assumptions. Yet 
Relevance is itself blind to the extent of interpretative possibilities, understood as 
socially and culturally differential and often contested; this is demonstrated by the 
failure to identify these in its own examples, as well as in its constructed speaker-
hearers, who are precisely not idiosyncratic, but share know I edges and values (and 
those of the prescribed readership of the book). This underestimation is matched by 
another: the inability to conceptualise the role of the intertextual in delimiting 
interpretative possibilities. The principles which are deemed to govern interpretation 
(The Cooperative Principle, the Principle of Relevance) cannot account for the full 
range of signifying possibilities, and do not even do the work that is assigned to them. 
Further, inferential theories acknowledge only a~interpretative process, whereas 
" 
intertextual theories of reception extend the notion of writing practices to reading 
practices, which are always co-present with and shaping of the process of 
interpretation in any interpretative event. Interpretation is always more than a singular 
process, always intersecting with interpretative practices, and with the other practices 
of reading: explication and evaluation. 
In addition to this, both traditions share a fundamental problem which is to ignore 
the role of processes other than 'speaking' or 'writing' in the production and 
interpretation of meaning. Inferential theories (and, in fact, most strong pragmatic 
theories) treat an idealised 'everyday' speech as the basis and model from which all 
interpretation as process and result can be theorised: where writing is acknowledged, it 
is treated as interchangeable with speech. And while intertextual theories expose the 
flaws in the canonical speech situation from which inferential accounts are modelled, 
the intertextual concept of 'writing' ignores the role of other processes, specifically 
those of publishing in the production and interpretation of meaning. 
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2. 
The exposition and critique of the first three chapters make it possible to formulate an 
alternative model of the interpretative process, which takes the form of a critical 
synthesis of the two traditions. This has three interconnected elements: modifications 
to the central concepts deployed in both traditions; the reconceptualisation of the 
interpretative process; and, the reformulation of the goal of any strong and plausible 
theory of interpretation. To take each of these in turn. 
The strengths and weaknesses of inferential and intertextual accounts lead to an 
alternative model of the central concepts required by any model of interpretation. First, 
clear theoretical distinctions must be made between textual production and reception, 
between interpretation and readin~, and between process and practice. Inferential 
accounts, and Relevance particularly, make a strong distinction between production 
and interpretation, suggesting that whilst these processes are to some extent congruent, 
they cannot be collapsed into one another as many intertextual accounts presume. 
However, inferential accounts do not consider the distinction between reading and 
interpretation: that reading is always more than interpretation, involving 
simultaneously the processes of evaluation and explication. Whilst many intertextual 
accounts have drawn attention to the other processes encompassed by reading (and 
Bakhtin's work, in particular, is suggestive of the role of evaluation), it is necessary 
to theoretically distinguish interpretation from reading in order to assess the role of 
evaluation and explication in shaping interpretation. A clear theoretical distinction must 
also be made between an interpretative or reading process and an interpretative or 
reading practice, again in order to be able to identify their relations within any occasion 
of reading. Intertextual theories of reception have, in the main, retreated from the 
question of process in favour of practice, whilst inferential theories do not 
acknowledge the role of practices in shaping interpretation. 
Each of these distinctions foregrounds the ways in which both intertextual and 
inferential theories ignore or misidentify the 'medium' of interpretation, failing to see 
that 'writing' is governed by the institutions, processes and practices of publishing. 
Inferential theories treat writing as a variety and modification of speech; intertextual 
theories render writing a complex and conflictual social and cultural process, they do 
not take account of publishing institutions, processes and practices as modalities which 
shape interpretation. The 'horizon of the publishable' strengthens and specifies the 
conceptual distinctions identified above. It also modifies the definitions of text and 
textual production. The horizon of the publishable - what it is possible to publish at a 
particular moment - is, as I argue in chapter four, a complex horizon which binds the 
possibilities of publishing with other processes and institutions. It effects a further 
qualitative distinction between production and reception. Both the concepts of text and 
textual production encompass the processes of editing, design, production and 
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marketing as well as composition, processes which are inscribed in the edition, where 
they are instantiated as practices which shape interpretation and reading. The horizon of 
the publishable in tum contributes to an understanding of how some signifying 
practices can become institutionalised, varying minimally across time and space (and 
how others do not), and how certain patterns of intertextual relations become 
established. 
The exposition and critique likewise call for a reconceptualisation of the 
interpretative process which builds on the strengths and remedies the errors and 
weaknesses in the two traditions. The interpretative process involves the reader in both 
'selecting' and developing one or more interpretative possibilities; but these processes 
are not governed by a single communicative or cognitive principle, or by a single order 
of knowledge. Interpretation is a substantially inferential process, but what governs 
inferencing are intertextual relations which produce and delimit the range of 
interpretative possibilities. The 'evidence' that the utterance or text provides, the 
contexts or knowledges mobilised by the hearer or reader, and the logics which make 
possible inferential operations and the production of implicatures, are shaped by textual 
relations. The contexts which are mobilised and/or produced by the text and the 
situation of interpretation are likewise textual, discursive and plural. 
An account of the processes of interpretation must therefore be able to identify, as 
far as it is possible, the multiple interpretative possibilities of the text, and delineate 
their graduated contingency. In a given and specifiable situation of utterance, which 
interpretation or interpretations is/are most, more, less and least likely? And, equally 
importantly, why? Whilst intertextual theories of reception tend to be preoccupied with 
distinguishing or simply asserting the range of interpretative possibilities rather than 
their relative possibility, inferential theories recognise the centrality of explaining how 
one interpretation is reached instead of another or others. However, whilst inferential 
theories ask the right kinds of question, they do not propose satisfactory answers. 
And at the same time, because they treat utterance interpretation as a process of 
resolution, they are not well equipped to handle the graduated character of contingency. 
These inadequacies render the 'pragmatic question' more rather than less important. 
First, there are a range of interpretative possibilities which are not susceptible to 
pragmatic explanation. Second, a delineation of the graduated contingencies of 
possible interpretations is a necessary and central element in any account of 
interpretation. Indeed, the very unlikeliness of an interpretative possibility being 
transformed into an interpretation may tell us a great deal about what governs the 
varying contingencies of the interpretative process. 
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3 . 
The case-studies substantiate the model of communication outlined in chapter four in 
two broad ways; first, they continue the critique which is itself inscribed in the model; 
second, they seek to substantiate the claims and arguments outlined there. In both 
chapters five and six, texts are conceived in rhetorical terms, following and extending 
the focus of inferential and intertextual theories. The exploration of distinct rhetorical 
practices - classification, translation and topicalisation - is an obvious marker ofthis 
emphasis which informs every aspect of the analysis. The relations of knowledge 
which are textually inscribed between writing subject and prescribed reader are a central 
preoccupation in both chapters, with the aim of identifying particular patterns of 
inference and the relation of these to distinct and distinguishable discourses. The scope 
of rhetorical analysis is also extended to take account of what intertextual and inferential 
theories ignore in their accounts of both print production and 'reading': the processes 
of book publishing. The objects of the case-studies are categories constituted by 
publishing processes; and it is the edition, conceived as the site where the totality of 
production practices intersect and as the material form in which the reader encounters 
the text, which is the focus of the analysis in each case. 
Within this extended rhetorical framework, the mode of intertextual analysis begins 
by delineating a wide range of interpretative and reading possibilities - take as an 
example, the multiple classifications of Pride and Prejudice which are elaborated as 
proffered by the cover text, design and illustration of the Penguin Classic edition - and 
then goes to examine which of these are proposed most strongly, and how others are 
diminished and/or backgrounded and why. Given the role accorded to textual form and 
textual relations in the processes of signification, the mode of analysis is designed to 
register and represent both the micro-intertextual shifts that may take place within the 
dialogisms of a multi accentual word or utterance, and the broader patterns and relations 
which extend across longer passages of the text, or the text and edition as awhole. 
The relative strength or weakness of interpretative and reading possibilities is shown to 
be shaped by a variety of interconnected factors which pertain both to the 'internal' 
relations of the text and the place of these within the General Culture. First and most 
obviously, textual form not only shapes but orders interpretative possibilities, 
strengthening some, diminishing or backgrounding others. For example, Dentith's 
analogical rendering of langue and parole as types of pebble versus all the pebbles on 
the beach makes possible the (false) interpretation-conclusion that langue is a practice of 
classification, but the intertextual context, including the analogical mode of 
representation foregrounds science as the ground of comparison - geology and 
structural linguistics are both scientific practices - and weakens (though does not cancel) 
this interpretative possibility.3 Second, whilst any text comprises a multiplicity of 
languages, these do not have the same force in interpretative terms. Intertextual 
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theories often tend to ignore the frequent dominance of a small number of languages 
(sometimes only one) within a text which subordinate and transform its other languages 
and signifying possibilities. For example, whilst at certain moments Conrad's 
introduction to Pride and Prejudice proposes a historical reading of the novel, its 
dominant discourse identifies literary value with a transcendence of history thus 
backgrounding history as an interpretative context. Thisexample in shows how the 
relative authority of genres and discourses within the General Culture shape and 
hierarchise interpretations. Both case-studies draw attention to this in different ways. 
The definition of the classic as 'a text of enduring value', which is multiply inscribed in 
the editional apparatus of classics is a strong interpretative proposal in significant part 
because, within the General Culture, it has the authority of a commonplace. It may be 
at variance with other definitions of the text within the edition be they general - the 
acknowledgement of the text's opacity which are also central to the apparatus - or 
particular - Jones's historicist reading for example - but its strength as an interpretative 
context derives not only from its multiple iterations within the edition, but from its 
status within the General Culture. In the case of Literary Theory textbooks, one of the 
avowed goals is the representation of the controversial, the 'anti-commonplace' (and 
the attendant challenge to common-senses): that which has little or no authority within 
the General Culture. Yet the acknowledged difficulties that such alien concepts and 
discourses present to the prescribed reader can effect strong interpretative proposals 
which can re-naturalise the unfamiliar and translate it into familiar commonsense terms -
Eagleton'S translative representation of langue and parole is clearly not 'intended' to 
contest the value of abstraction as practice, but the iterations of the 'thing itself are 
most likely to mobilise a discourse which constitutes the abstract as a rarefied plane 
unsuited to grappling with 'real' objects and problems, because the discourse which 
constructs this opposition is so readily accessible within the General Culture.4 
The three broad modes of intertextual practice examined - translation, classification 
and topicalisation - all foreground the discursive character of the know ledges that are 
deployed in the interpretative and reading process, and the ways in which inferential 
patterns are shaped by the logics of particular discourses. Classification always locates 
a text in a network of textual, including discursive, relations. It is also the most 
general practice considered and one that is fundamental to all publishing processes. It is 
also a practice which foregrounds the relations between edition, publishing practices 
and the horizon of the publishable. Therefore whilst the three classic editions discussed 
in chapter five all strongly propose Pride and Prejudice as a work of enduring, indeed 
timeless value, a classification which squares with a set of familiar discourses about 
culture and the literary, the Penguin and Everyman editions also strongly propose the 
classic as an object of study in formal educational situations, a definition which 
includes inscribing essay writing conventions into the edition and which the student 
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reader is presumed to follow. This suggests a horizon of the publishable which in part 
overlaps with the Folio, but which can also be differentiated: the Penguin and 
Everyman classics series are strongly shaped by higher educational institutions and 
practices. This marked and distinctive classification of the text as an object of formal 
study is suggestive of the ways in which publishing practices and the specific horizon 
of the publishable shape discursive and therefore interpretative and reading possibilities. 
Translation and topicalisation likewise exemplify the discursive, including textual, 
character of knowledge. Translation from one language into another can effect a 
discursive shift which in tum may alter (as well as vary the strength) of inferential 
possibilities. An analysis of translative practices demonstrates how discourses are 
inscribed in genres and registers, inscribed in the textual, as well as in the distinctive 
logics and patterns of inference that particular discourses make possible and probable. 
The topicalisation of texts, concepts and arguments, their formulation as particular 
questions and problems, and their situation within particular intertextual formations, 
not only reveals the always-already discursive character of knowledge but the ways in 
which certain patterns of argument and inference can become established, indeed fixed 
procedures. The alignment of 'contemporary literary theory' with a valorised new in a 
narrative of modernity is just such a topos within the meta-discourse of theory. And as 
demonstrated in chapter six, its frequently elliptical representation assumes and/or 
demands knowledge of this argument (with its consequent devaluing of tradition and 
'the past'). In more general terms, the distinctive characteristics of the meta-discourse 
of theory - its difficulty (including an identified cultural difficulty), its challenge to 
established orthodoxies, its modernity and so on - are fundamentally (though not 
exclusively) shaped by the horizon of the publishable, marked by the particular 
contents and contradictions of accessibility and coverage. This in tum suggests a way 
of developing genre as a concept. Classics and Literary Theory textbooks can both be 
conceived as genres in the sense that they constitute a distinctive and (increasingly) 
institutionalised pattern of intertextual relations and practices, including a dominant 
operating discourse. They are both genres which are shaped by fundamental tensions 
or contradictions; in the case of classics these centre on what a classic is, in the case of 
Literary Theory textbooks these centre on the know ledges of the prescribed reader. The 
two case-studies also demonstrate very clearly how it is the relations between the 
totality of publishing practices that constitute genre. This is particularly strongly 
marked because there is a sharp dissonance between compositional practice and editing 
(and marketing) practices in each case. In both cases, a close rhetorical analysis makes 
it possible to identify in very precise terms the reading practices that a genre (conceived 
in this way) proposes. 
Classics and Literary Theory textbooks conceived as genres in this expanded sense 
strongly suggest particular and highly distinctive practices of interpretation, explication 
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and evaluation. In the case of classics, literary interpretation is a practice which 
translates 'story' and 'literal' meaning into a set of aesthetic, moral, social and/or' 
political preoccupations and values. This formal practice of interpretation and 
consequent injunction to the prescribed reader remains constant across the divergences 
of interpretation between and within editions. It is predicated on the assumption of the 
text's value which is variously inscribed, for example, in the ways in which editorial 
authority is figured, and in the endnotes, which, taken as a general discourse, are 
proposed as a procedure that the text merits or deserves. The intertexts which the 
classic edition proposes as pertinent and indeed necessary to interpretation, whether 
this takes the form of a discourse of moral critique (Conrad) or of contemporaneous 
discourses of gender (Jones), are finally governed and delimited by an assumption 
about the text's value. But the reader's presumed relation to these intertexts can be 
markedly different, with consequences for the interpretative process. Conrad's 
introduction 'reminds' the reader of a set of discourses which they are assumed to 
know already (or 'should' know), knowledge which the reader must mobilise; Jones's 
historicist reading makes no such claim: seeking rather to supply the reader with the 
know ledges s/he lacks. In the case of Literary Theory textbooks, reading 'Theory' is 
conceived in significant part as the construction of a particular set of intertextual 
relations. 'Theory' is never just a group of texts, concepts and arguments; it is also a 
set of narratives (for example, the British reception of theory), genealogies (Saussure 
as the origin of contemporary theory), thematics (writing gender) and topics. Reading 
is proposed as a construction of a certain order which itself delimits interpretative 
possibilities, and where 'order' suggests both an explanatory sequence, and a 
hierarchy which accords differential values to particular texts and discourses. These 
explicatory and evaluative modalities of reading shape interpretation, in that the 
translative 'making sense' of a particular text, concept or argument is always governed 
by its place within a particular order of reading which the textbook proposes as the 
legitimate logic of the field. This in turn raises questions about the interpretative 
processes, here the differences between mobilising knowledge and producing it within 
an interpretative procedure. And given the conflict between accessibility and coverage, 
the intertextualities that the interpretation of Theory requires is both, and sometimes 
simultaneously, a deficit which must be made good within the text, and an assumption 
which can therefore be elided. These instances of translative practices help to 'specify 
the definition of interpretation as translation proposed in chapter four. In both classics 
and Literary Theory textbooks it is acknowledged that the prescribed reader may not or 
probably does not know at least some of the languages that interpretation depends on. 
And translation is, at least in part, a productive way of formulating interpretation 
because it draws attention to the fundamental role of knowledge in an interpretative 
process conceived as both intertextual and inferential. Indeed one useful way of 
conceiving many implicated meanings might be as translations. 
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This attempt to explain why despite multiple interpretative possibilities, some 
interpretations are far more probable than others should not be conflated with an attempt 
to treat interpretation as a process of pragmatic resolution. First, because the multiple 
and frequently conflictual possibilities remain, they do not vanish or 'wither away'. 
Second because all these possibilities are contingent, and while some are indeed far 
more probable than others, no interpretation is necessary. This refusal to treat 
interpretation as pragmatic resolution is strongly marked in the ways that the mode of 
analysis makes it possible to identify the contradictions which govern the practices of 
both publishing categories. In the case of classics, the contradiction between the 
universally legible that is the most definitive marker of the classic's value and the 
opacities which the editional apparatus seeks to clarify; in the case of Literary Theory 
textbooks, the contradiction between reader-oriented accessibility and a conception of 
coverage which is authored and sanctioned by the field. These conflicts, which are 
central to the production practices of each publishing category and the interpretative 
possibilities which follow from them, suggest not only the impossibility of 
interpretation conceived as resolution, but once more demonstrate the need to take 
account of publishing practices as part of a properly rhetorical account of interpretation. 
To take just one example, the practices of topicalisation and translation each constitute a 
distinguishable writing and reading subject and a distinctive relation between them. Co-
occurring, even in the same sentence, they render the pragmatic division between 
speaker and spoken and, more specifically, Relevance's account of the speaker who 
chooses a stimulus which best suits their estimation of the hearer, not only simplistic 
but inadequate. Which speaker, which hearer? 
As I suggested at the beginning of these remarks, interpretative possibilities are 
rich, yet in contrast, and for the most part, interpretations are few and sparse. 
Intertextual theories of production offer the most plausible account of the character of 
these possibilities and how they arise, and, in the process, demonstrate the limits of 
the richness that inferential theories predict. Yet, inferential theories by positing 
inferencing as an interpretative process, attempt to specify it, which intertextual 
theories of reception do not, except in negative terms (reading is not decoding). To 
argue that interpretation is a substantially inferential process is not, as I have shown, a 
simple matter of leasing a component of pragmatic theory, as an unmodified adjunct or 
support to an intertextual theory of interpretation. First, because intertextual accounts 
can demonstrate that what governs patterns and possibilities of inference is textual 
form, the relations between languages and discourses and not a general communicative 
or cognitive principle. Second, because intertextual theories, in formulating the 
process of meaning as transformation and, I would want to underline, variation, make 
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any act of interpretation one which must register and work with both similarity and 
difference, and such a process cannot be adequately explained as a process of 
'recoding'. Intertextual theories of reception correctly argue that the reading process 
involves a situating of the text being read in a particular intertextual formation, but 
without an account of inferencing it is not possible to explain how a particular 
intertextual conjunction might 'become' a particular interpretation. Both intertextual 
and inferential theories open up the range and character of interpretative possibilities, 
but interpretation as event and process is neither the sum total of these, nor the local 
resolution of many into one in a particular here-and-now. Inferential theories and 
pragmatic theories more generally are correct to specify interpretation as centrally a 
process of delimiting or 'thinning' interpretative possibilities. But both traditions fail to 
identify the ways in certain possibilities are more probable than others, and the many 
practices which delimit and fix meaning. Most starkly, both traditions are blind to the 
delimiting role of the processes and practices of publishing and the horizon of the 
publishable. To specify the interpretative process requires both a narrowing and an 
expanding of focus. It must be narrow enough to capture the detail of interpretative 
processes, but this narrowness cannot be reduced to a technical procedure. For the 
terms in which the interpretative process must be specified, terms which take account 
of texts and the intertextual, the edition, readers, context, and reading as process and 
practice in the terms elaborated must constitute interpretation as an attempt to fix 
meaning which is always governed by social and cultural relations. 
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1 The exception to this is Kristeva's 'semiotic' which does introduce an unpredictable and strictly 
uncoded dimension into signification. But although the semiotic is not wholly subject to language as 
Law, it is governed by the logics of the psychic economy. 
2 The 'now' marks the modification that is made in the second edition of Relevance. See the 
discussion of how the theory has been modified in chapter two. 
3 This example is discussed in detail in chapter six, pp.277-278. 
4 This example is discussed in detail in chapter six, pp.274-6 
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Appendix A 
Photocopies of: 
1. Everyman Pride and Prejudice (1993) cover. 
2. Folio Pride and Prejudice (1957/75) cover. 
3. Folio Pride and Prejudice (1957) sample illustration, page 19. 
4. Penguin Pride and Prejudice (1995) cover. 
5. Penguin Pride and Prejudice (1996) cover. 
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